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PREFACE
On March 30-31, 2007, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies
(TISS) held a colloquium on “Global Climate Change:
National Security Implications.” The 2-day event took
place in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and was wellattended by both academics and members of the U.S.
Government and the Armed Forces.
This edited volume is based on this event. It
reflects, as closely as possible, the form and content of
the conference. Each chapter is based on a conference
panel. The final chapter contains a keynote talk by
General Paul Kern (USA-Ret.) and concluding remarks
by Dr. Richard Weitz. The first seven chapters each
contain three essays, a comment, and a discussion. The
essays are not exact reproductions of the talks given at
the conference. They remain true in spirit and length
to the originals but have been adapted to be read. The
question and answer sessions have been abbreviated
in the interests of space. The reader who would like to
hear exactly what was said at the conference is invited
to turn to the video-taped proceedings which are
posted on the TISS web site at www.tiss-nc.org.
The linkage between climate change and national
security has received increasing attention over the last
year, and the colloquium provided some timely insights.
TISS would thank all those who made it possible. Too
many individuals and institutions provided conceptual
and other help along the way to be enumerated here.
But we would like to acknowledge a few in particular.
First, we owe thanks to the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC) both for generous financial support and
for recognizing this as a subject worthy of serious
intellectual discussion. Second, we owe thanks to the

vii

participants. Their collegiality and professionalism
made organizing this event a rare pleasure and the
conference itself a success.
Besides these, the editor would like to express
personal gratitude to a few individuals: Dr. Timothy
McKeown, UNC-Chapel Hill, who first suggested
that TISS look at the security implications of climate
change; Dr. Kent Butts, USAWC, who insisted in the
face of the skeptics that such a conference would be
worth doing; Dr. Alex Roland, TISS Acting Director,
who was instrumental in framing the agenda; and
Dr. Douglas Johnson, SSI, who assisted from start to
finish. Thanks also go to Michelle Koeneke for her
invaluable assistance in organizing the conference and
to Joseph W. Caddell, Jr., who read this manuscript.
Last but not least, thanks go to Lowell Pumphrey, who
wrote his senior thesis on the “Economics of Power
Alcohol” (Princeton, 1936). He lived to learn all about
the conference, though not to see the completion of this
book. This volume is dedicated to him.

CAROLYN PUMPHREY, Ph.D.
Program and Outreach Coordinator
Triangle Institute for Security Studies
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INTRODUCTION
Carolyn Pumphrey
Triangle Institute for Security Studies
The Evolution of a Problem.
Until fairly recent times no one thought climate
changed, let alone was influenced by human activities.
By the 19th century, scientists were theorizing that
temperatures were affected by what we now call
greenhouse gasses. And in the late 19th century, the
Swedish scientist Arrhenius suggested that human
industry might cause the planet to warm. But this
notion was generally scoffed at. Over the course of the
20th century, the scientific community gradually came
to terms with this theory and began to regard climate
change—even rapid climate change—as more than a
distant possibility.
Interest in climate change as a national security
issue developed even later. Although the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) did commission a study to
look into the security implications of climate change in
the late 1970s, the issue had little resonance until the
late 1990s when the Senate Armed Services Committee
declared that environmental destruction, including
global warming, was “a growing national security
threat.” The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) was created in 1995 in part to allay
fears. And then, in 2003, the rather notorious report
commissioned by the Pentagon, “An Abrupt Climate
Change Scenario and its Implications for United States
National Security,” provided a worst-case scenario,
which suggested that climate change might have a
catastrophic impact, leading to rioting and nuclear
war.1
1

The State of the Problem Today.
So where are we in our thinking today when it
comes to the science of climate change? There are
still dissenting voices, and we cannot speak with
absolute certainty. But science, we should remember,
is essentially a culture of doubt.2 As Karl Popper wrote
at the start of the 20th century, “I think that we shall
have to get accustomed to the idea that we must not
look upon science as a ‘body of knowledge’, but rather
as a system of hypotheses, or as a system of guesses or
anticipations that in principle cannot be justified, but
with which we work as long as they stand up to tests,
and of which we are never justified in saying that we
know they are ‘true’. . . .”3
Nonetheless, the idea that there is such a thing
as climate change is as close to established scientific
fact as one can get. At its last meeting in February
2007, the IPCC concluded that human activity has
indeed increased global atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. It further
concluded that “warming of the climate system is
unequivocal,” and “most of the observed increase in
globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th
century is very likely due to the observed increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” It is
important to remember that the IPCC is an inherently
conservative body. It can only make a statement by the
unanimous consent of all the scientific representatives
of all the world’s governments. And it uses its words
very precisely—so when it says “unequivocal,” we
know that it means exactly 90 percent certain—which
is very certain indeed.4

2

What complicates the problem when it comes to the
science of climate change, however, is that the devil is
in the details. Although our instruments are improving
and our data base enlarging, scientists have come up
with many different scenarios as to how changes will
play out over the next century. Timing is a case in point.
Most estimates suggest a somewhat gradual timeline
for change. However, there are some who fear that our
current estimates fail to take into consideration what
may happen if crucial tipping points are reached. If,
for example, the Siberian tundra melts and releases its
methane, this could act as a catalyst to climate change
and make things happen a lot faster than expected.
Some scenarios envisage sea-level rise sufficiently
great to end civilization as we know it.5 While we may
acknowledge that these outcomes are less likely than
some others, we ignore such possibilities at our peril.
The Consequences of Climate Change.
A level of uncertainty also exists when it comes to
the correlations we can make between climate change
and human security. The initial connections are easy
enough to establish. For example, it is well known
that warming facilitates the propagation of certain
harmful bacteria and the spread of disease.6 It is also
clear that higher temperatures will lead to droughts
which will affect agricultural production, and that ice
melt will cause flooding especially in coastal areas.
But it is much less easy to predict how these changes
will affect different societies. Suppose climate change
brings droughts and floods. Societies will cope more
or less well depending on a lot of other variables. How
adaptable are they, how effective are their political
organizations, and do their cultural traditions serve as
an obstacle or an aid to enlightened change?7
3

If you go one step beyond this and try to draw a
correlation between these consequences of climate
change and violence and conflict, you encounter a
still more controversial area. Social scientists are not
in agreement here. To be sure many—and possibly
the preponderance—of social scientists think that
such things as poverty and resource shortages lead
to conflict, make post-conflict reconciliation harder,
and provide a breeding ground for, if not terrorists,
at least their supporters. However, there are informed
and thoughtful minorities who disagree. Similarly,
the historical record makes it quite clear that when
life becomes unsustainable, people will simply get up
and leave their homes, sometimes in large numbers.8
But if mass migrations are a likely outcome of climate
change, the precise ways in which they may lead to
conflict are not clearly understood. Much will depend
on the age of the migrants, the environment into which
they move, and a host of other variables.
So, in short, we can assert with a large degree of
confidence that the climate is changing, and that this
has the potential to do us harm. But our challenge is
how to approach this problem in light of the very real
uncertainties.
National Security and the Climate Change Threat.
The purpose of the Triangle Institute for Security
Studies (TISS) conference was to consider the national
security implications of climate change. Here we
run into some definitional problems. The meaning
of the term “national security” is not agreed upon.9
A traditional view is that it is concerned with the
preservation of state sovereignty (most especially
its monopoly of force) and the protection of national
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interests. In recent times, however, some scholars have
argued that national security should encompass more
than this. They argue that human welfare is in and of
itself a security issue.10 Thus construed, such things as
poverty, disease, and environmental degradation are
security threats not just because they lead to conflict,
but because they are in and of themselves violations
of “human security.” Other scholars have argued that
to define security in this way is to strip the term of
all real meaning. This clearly has implications for the
discussion at hand. If one takes the broadest definition
of security, the mere fact that we are polluting the
environment is a national security threat. If one takes
the narrow view, the national security implications are
less immediately obvious.
Protecting our “national interests” also means
different things to different people. According to the
DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, “National security
interests include preserving U.S. political identity,
framework, and institutions; fostering economic wellbeing; and bolstering international order supporting
the vital interests of the United States and its allies.”
But opinion is divided as to whether this goes too far
or not far enough. When it comes to climate change,
for example, it seems as if those who are likely to suffer
most hardship are people living outside the United
States and not necessarily in regions of great strategic
concern to us. Some see humanitarian intervention as
an important component of our national interest—a
fulfillment of a moral obligation that validates what we
stand for as a society; a way to generate goodwill, and
a way to preserve stability. But many others disagree.
These different underlying assumptions about the
meaning of national security affect our response to
climate change. They shape both threat assessments
and policy recommendations.
5

Evaluating the Threat.
That climate change poses some kind of national
security threat—impending danger or harm—seems
clear. However, the United States faces many threats.
The very act of preparing to meet one kind of threat
may mean that we will be less able to meet another.
So we must prioritize. In the pecking order of threats,
where does climate change stand?
Evaluations vary markedly. A quick look at the
official positions adopted by the leaders of different
countries will provide an indication of this. As far as
Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair is concerned
climate change is the biggest threat facing the world
today.11 By contrast, as far as the Czech Prime Minister
Vaclav Klaus is concerned, a still bigger threat comes
from the very environmentalists who try to deal with
the problem. In their efforts to halt global warming,
they fatally endanger freedom and prosperity.12
The U.S. administration under George W. Bush has
certainly not placed climate change high on the list of
priorities. As to conference participants, they agreed
that the threat was a dangerous one, compounded
by a context of rapid population growth, increasing
economic appetite, pockets of extreme violence, and
global interdependence.13
Why this enormous discrepancy? In part, the
answer is because climate change is going to affect
different nations to different degrees and in different
ways. Unfashionable though these terms may be, there
will be “winners” as well as “losers.” The Russians, for
example, are likely to benefit from the melting of Polar
ice and the opening of new maritime routes. And, on
a more frivolous note, the English wine industry may
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challenge the French.14 By contrast, according to the
Climate Change Index, people living in such places as
Djibouti, Egypt, Pakistan, and Cuba are likely to suffer
from serious physical problems leading in turn to
political destabilization.15
In part the answer is because national security
organizations have so many pressing concerns to
consider. While chronic instability of the sort that may
come out of climate change is obviously worrying,
clear and present dangers like the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the looming threat from Iran are
almost inevitably going to command more attention.
Where climate change ranks in the scheme of things
also stems from differences in interpretation of the
scientific evidence. Analysts are currently working out
a range of estimates. Scenarios vary from the totally
catastrophic to the mildly disruptive but ultimately
survivable.16 It is all too easy, given this uncertainty,
to choose the interpretation which best fits one’s own
cultural predilections or fills one’s rice bowl.
Climate Change as a U.S. National Security Concern.
What about the United States? Is climate change
currently expected to bring catastrophic changes in
weather? Violent social upheavals? Intractable strategic
problems? Or should we expect more subtle changes,
more manageable problems?
Here, too, scenarios vary. Some models suggest
that the North American continent will be among
those most significantly (and negatively) affected by
climate change.17 Others suggest considerably less
dramatic impacts. They say we might expect some
serious flooding of coastal areas and rather serious
drought in the Southwest. We might also expect more
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extreme weather patterns.18 In principle, there seems
to be agreement that we have the means to cope with
most of these eventualities. Our recent experience
with Hurricane Katrina, however, demonstrates that
we have not yet learned how to take advantage of our
existing assets.19
Even if we dismiss the worst case scenarios and
assume that we will be spared the worst of what
climate change can bring, we should note that climate
change does indirectly pose very real national security
concerns. Take terrorism, for example. The “war”
against terrorists is very high up on the current list of
national priorities. And there is persuasive evidence
that extremism draws strength from the presence of
poverty and inequality.20 While images of streams of
displaced persons swarming across the border are likely
exaggerated, we know less than we should about how
to integrate migrants into our society.21 In some parts
of the world, significant population movements could
further destabilize volatile regions which we have
a profound interest in keeping peaceful. The Middle
East, for example, is vulnerable to water shortages, and
climate change promises to exacerbate this problem.22
The United States will also certainly have to deal
with a rapidly changing strategic picture which may
challenge its efforts to preserve world-wide stability.
In short, climate change is likely to be a stressmultiplier, to exacerbate tensions, and to complicate
American foreign policy in a wide variety of ways.
A Sluggish Response.
Climate change is, then, at the very least a national
security challenge for the United States. How effectively
have we dealt with it in the past? The short answer is,
not well.
8

If the polls can be trusted, the American public is
gradually beginning to believe that climate change is
not simply the figment of imagination of overexcited
environmentalists. A 2006 Pew study found that about
41 percent of Americans think that global warming
is a very serious threat. However, they rank it well
below other issues as a national priority, and they are
not willing to dip into their pockets to find a remedy.23
While some corporations are trying to find ways to be
more energy efficient, many others are dragging their
feet.24
The American military is more environmentally
conscious than is widely recognized. To some extent,
this is policy driven. The Energy Policy Act, for example,
makes energy conservation on bases a requirement.25
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-100.4 stresses environmental
stewardship.26 However, interest in environmental
issues goes beyond grudging acquiescence to orders
given by civilian “bosses.” Some regional commanders
have insisted on environmental engagement in the
face of resistance from above.27 Environmental security
and disaster prevention, response, and recovery are
now looked upon as acceptable military missions in
that they are viewed as essential elements of regional
stability.28 And agencies like the Army Environmental
Protection Agency work hard to promote advances in
this area. At the same time, the Armed Forces continue
to be committed first and foremost to the warfighting
mission.
What is signally lacking is planning at a national
level and clear directives from above. Environmental
security is not part of any existing National Security
Act. DOD Directive 3000.05 may tell the Armed Services
that stability and support operations will receive the
same priority as combat operations, but does not
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allocate specific funds to give these mandates “teeth.”
Corporations are not given the kind of incentives
which might drive them to change their patterns of
behavior. In short, while many different organizations
and individuals are taking constructive steps to deal
with the climate change problem, these are not, as yet,
part of a coordinated strategic plan.
What is also lacking is a commitment to international
diplomacy. The United States refused to ratify the
Kyoto Treaty and remains reluctant to agree to any
international legislation that would significantly curtail
its actions.29 It could be a leader in this area, and that it
most certainly is not.
Solutions.
As a threat comes closer, our options for dealing
with it become more and more limited. In the case
of climate, studies suggest that we have a narrow
window of opportunity to make some meaningful
changes before irreversible damage is done.30 It is,
therefore, imperative that we remove our heads from
the proverbial sand. So why has this problem failed to
get much traction despite warnings from the scientific
community and from some members of the defense
establishment? There are arguably three overriding
explanations.
1. In the first place, the uncertainty of science
undermines the political will to act. Politicians do
not like to operate in an uncertain environment and
are likely to put such issues on the back burner. And
warning about climate change is difficult. Because the
public has a somewhat hazy understanding about how
climate change manifests itself and because specific
predictions are bound at times to be wrong, it is all too
easy to throw the baby out with the bath water.
10

2. Closely related to this is the communications
dilemma. A lot of climate change is about creeping
dangers.31 These appear remote and, sadly, rather
boring to a public that likes drama. But if we attempt
to wake the public up—as Former Vice President Al
Gore did in An Inconvenient Truth—we may distort or
manipulate the evidence. This too can give ammunition
to the skeptics.
3. Finally, the problem has failed to really get
our attention because it is all too easy to see it as
the other man’s problem. If the correlation between
industrialization and accelerated climate change is
indeed true, there would be both logic and justice in
our doing proportionally more than others at this time
to remedy the problem.32 The fact is, however, that in
developed countries we have some confidence that
our powers to adapt will outpace the problems created
by climate change. We do not, therefore, see it as a
problem that will affect our vital interests. And so our
enthusiasm to deal with it is correspondingly less.
Getting Traction.
Intrinsic to the whole process of addressing
climate change will be finding ways to overcome these
entrenched attitudes. The uncertainty of science does
not, in fact, have to hamstring us. Risk management
tools are available to help us deal with decisionmaking
in uncertain environments.33 Simple models exist which
can help us explain this to the public. A wise person
insures his home both against highly probable if not
very serious potential dangers, as well as unlikely but
potentially catastrophic disasters.34
The public needs to understand, moreover, that
climate change will not just affect the polar bear. It will
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damage the health of our children.35 People also need
to better understand the implications of globalization.
Not all currently appreciate how our security is affected
by what is happening elsewhere in the world.
At the same time, we need to make clear the positive
benefits that will result if we deal with the problem.
Historically, reforms have tended to be more longlasting and effective when they have served not just an
ideal purpose but quite functional ends. Thankfully,
one of the characteristics of the climate change issue
is that it does not just threaten us. It also offers us
opportunities.
Opportunities.
Consider just a few of the concrete benefits that
might accrue to us if we take steps to deal with climate
change. First, to slow down the pace of global warming,
we will have to reduce carbon emissions. This is not just
a tiresome necessity. If we do find alternative sources
of energy, we will be less dependent on foreign oil
and increase our foreign policy options. If our military
becomes more energy efficient, its logistical capabilities
will be enhanced.36 If we reduce pollution, our national
health costs will be cut. If our businesses discover
creative new technologies, they will prosper and jobs
will be created.
Second, climate change is a global problem and
one that can only be solved by cooperation. As such,
it offers us a chance to foster partnerships and build
trust. Shared environmental concerns can bring people
around the negotiating table. Providing clean water
to local populations can make troubled zones more
secure for our troops. And assisting people afflicted
by climate-related disasters can help restore our
somewhat tarnished image abroad.
12

Third, we can use climate change to promote the
kind of developments that will benefit us all. It would
be to our advantage if more foreign militaries were
attuned to the idea of serving their people. It would be
to our advantage if, instead of failed or failing states,
we were to find legitimate governments capable of
meeting the needs of their citizens and able to respond
to a crisis.37 Behind the scenes assistance to governments
struggling to establish credibility and military to
military engagement on environmental issues can do
much to bring about such changes.38
Strategies.
Climate change, as a security problem, needs
to be addressed at multiple levels. First, there is the
root problem—the changing climate. Second, there is
the human misery it will engender—we are talking
of such things as poverty, disease, displacement, and
social inequality. Third, there is the instability and/or
changing strategic picture that will spring from all of the
above. Simply put, our response needs to encompass
at least three things: slowing down the rate of climate
change and preparing to adapt to changes that cannot
be avoided; taking steps to alleviate social distress; and
preparing to cope with potential conflicts.
To slow down climate change, we clearly need
to engage in mitigation and adaptation efforts. The
terms are somewhat loosely applied and can mean
different things to different people. For our purposes
here, let us say that adaptation involves finding ways
to accommodate ourselves to what is going to happen.
Mitigation is an attempt to lessen harm.
If we want to change the direction of the curve,
as it were, and slow down global warming, we have
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a range of options. These run the whole gamut from
sponsoring research into alternative forms of energy to
funding birth control programs. It will call for public
education, legislation, and constructive participation in
international diplomacy. If we want to adapt to changes
that we think will inevitably occur, we should think,
among other things, in terms of developing effective
new technologies—desalination plants, perhaps, if we
face drought; or hydropoles, if we face floods. We need
to improve our forecasts and warning systems.39 We
need to identify areas of high vulnerability and work
with the people there to help them build institutions at
a local level capable of meeting future challenges.40
To deal with those human security problems
that threaten to provide a fertile soil for extremism
and violence, it would seem logical to address the
problem of growing social inequality. This might
mean providing assistance to vulnerable nations. The
United States can play a role here, as it has done in the
past. It can fashion suitable international institutions to
help create economic prosperity.41 And it can provide
states with the tools to adapt to increasingly stressful
conditions. Fostering legitimate governments is a key
element of this strategy.
To deal with future conflicts, more comprehensive
planning is essential. The entire range of plausible
threats needs to be delineated. Alternative approaches
and cost-benefit analyses must be run to establish what
can be done, when, and at what cost.42 We need to
improve our warning systems so that a warning is not
simply given, but also heard and acted upon.43
Coordination at many levels is also going to be
crucial. It has been identified for some time as one of our
national shortcomings. Dealing with climate change
generated conflict calls for contributions from a wide
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variety of agencies, local, national, and international;
military and civilian. An effort needs to be made to
determine what kinds of organizations are best suited
to what kinds of activities so as not to duplicate efforts.
Thought also needs to be given as to how to take
best advantage of assets already in place: How, for
example, can uneasy bedfellows like nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and the military work together
without arousing the suspicion of host countries? Along
similar lines, effective interagency action may require
new legislation and better definition of Department of
Homeland Security authority.44
Finally, a precondition for success in all three
cases must be improved understanding of the
problem—better intelligence, better science, and better
understanding of the relationships between such things
as violence, society, and climate change. And plans, at
every level, must get the ear of the leadership, so that
they do not sit in elegant volumes and gather dust.45
Responsibility.
If climate change is ever to be successfully dealt with,
someone is going to have to assume responsibility. Who
should it be? Is responsibility related to culpability?
Or is it related to capability? What organizations are
best equipped to deal with particular tasks? What
role, in particular, should U.S. Armed Forces play?
As major consumers of energy, and as organizations
that are periodically engaged in warfare, armed forces
inevitably contribute to climate change in general and
to global warming in particular. They also have assets
and capabilities that many other elements within our
society do not. Should they, therefore, take the lead
when it comes to finding solutions?
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The answer is both “yes” and “no.” The Armed
Forces—perhaps the Air Force more than the Army—
can clearly help reduce global warming. Military
research and development can be applied to the task
of developing new and more efficient technologies.
Military demand for fuel efficient vehicles could
help stimulate similar demand in the private sector.
As a huge organization, merely applying efficient
technologies on bases46 can (and in fact is) making a
big difference. And, as noted above, developing fuel
efficient systems has a military utility.
The Armed Forces may also be called upon to
restore stability to regions devastated by extreme
weather events or to provide humanitarian assistance.
Peacekeeping and stabilization operations are in fact
now officially part of the core mission of the Armed
Forces.47 And our military does have some unique
advantages. It has a widespread presence throughout
the world; is good at dealing with emergencies; and
has vast, though not infinite, economic resources at its
disposal. Its ability to gather and analyze intelligence,
and the cultural awareness and linguistic skills of
some of its special forces are among other less widely
recognized assets that could be useful in disaster
relief.48 However, for a variety of reasons—traditional
understanding of proper civil-military relations among
them - it is probably best that it play a supporting rather
than a leading role in such missions, plugging gaps
where appropriate, but not remaining in charge.49
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the military must
maintain the ability to deal with a wide range of
contingencies. It has to make choices when it comes to
structure and training. Gearing up for climate change
may be compatible enough with efforts to deal with
asymmetrical threats. But some fear that it may reduce
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its ability to get ready for war of a more traditional kind.
This particular dilemma is far from resolved. However,
even if we grant that the military should not be the
leader in the struggle against climate change, it is still
important to recognize that it is a vital contributor.
In the final analysis, however, it is clear that
this is not just a job for the military. We also need a
government that incorporates climate change science
into its strategic planning and that leads international
efforts to create partnerships and institutions capable
of responding to the threat. We need businessmen
willing to invest money and effort in clean, energyefficient technologies. And we need ordinary citizens
who are sufficiently well-educated on this subject to
put the problem in perspective, pay carbon taxes if
needs be, and buy the right sort of light bulbs. In short,
it is a job for everyone.
Conclusion.
To conclude, climate change is certainly an issue
that deserves serious consideration as a national
security concern. It may not appear at the moment
to be the most crucial threat facing the United States.
However, we ignore this threat at our peril. We stand
to lose a great deal if we do not move fast; the evidence
suggests that the problems will increase incrementally
if we wait. And at the same time, we stand to gain
much if we do act—a healthier, cleaner environment,
a more stable world community, better relationships
with other countries, and greater national security.
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CHAPTER 1
DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this chapter is to put the issue of global
climate change into perspective, define terms, and introduce
the reader to major debates and areas of uncertainty. Dr.
Spencer Weart shows how global warming has come, over
time, to be framed as a national security issue. Dr. Robert
Corell lays out the scientific evidence for climate change
in general and global warming in particular. Dr. Richard
Matthew evaluates global climate change as a security threat
and outlines some of the definitional problems that face us.
A National Security Issue?
How People Tried to Frame Global Warming
Spencer R. Weart
American Institute of Physics
Global Warming as a Scientific Puzzle.
Nice weather we’re having, isn’t it? People are, and
always have been, interested in the weather and changes
in the weather. Climate was something that came with
the territory—weather was what changed. People were
very concerned of course, about floods, droughts, cold
spells, and so on. These were things which came and
went, and went and came again. Climate, by contrast,
wasn’t supposed to change. It came as a great surprise
in the 19th century when people found that there was a
historic record of climate change, namely the ice ages.
The ice ages were a great puzzle and one of the big
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intellectual challenges of the 19th century. One of the
leading lights of the Swedish Academy of Sciences,
Svante Arrhenius, thought that he had an explanation
for the ice ages: They were mainly caused by carbon
dioxide, what we now call a “greenhouse gas.”
Over geological ages, carbon dioxide was put
into the atmosphere by volcanoes. It was taken out of
the atmosphere by chemical absorption in rocks or,
especially, by dissolving into the oceans. If something
happened to change this, if there were fewer volcanoes,
for example, there would be less carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere. Arrhenius made some calculations
and concluded that if you cut the amount of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere in half, that would lower the
temperature enough, probably, to bring on an ice age.
This was not an entirely new idea. His calculations were
new, but the idea had been around since the mid-19th
century. John Tyndall, an English scientist, explained
it neatly—you’ll never get a better explanation than
this of the greenhouse effect: “As a dam built across
the river causes a local deepening of the stream, so our
atmosphere, thrown as a barrier across the terrestrial
rays [that is, the heat rays, the infrared radiation coming
up from the surface] produces a local heightening
of the temperature of the Earth’s surface.”1 Adding
carbon dioxide high in the atmosphere, will block
more of the radiation coming up from below, causing
an imbalance—more radiation coming in than going
out—so that the temperature underneath has to rise
until there is enough radiation coming out to restore a
balance.
A colleague of Arrhenius pointed out that
humanity was putting as much carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere as volcanoes, more or less. Over the 19th
century, industry had grown to a prodigious extent,
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with puffing smokestacks dominating the cities—
which, by the way, was regarded as a welcomed and
happy sight, standing for employment, industry,
progress, overall a very good thing.
So Arrhenius decided to calculate things the other
way: What happens if we double the carbon dioxide
level of the atmosphere? A very rough calculation,
which only took him a year with pencil and paper,
suggested that it could raise the temperature by several
degrees. In chilly Sweden, that sounded like a good
idea. “We may hope to enjoy ages with more equable
and better climates,” he wrote, “ages when the Earth
will bring forth much more abundant crops than at
present. . . .”2 He did not expect this to happen for a
very long time, thousands of years in the future. So at
the outset, global climate change was not framed as a
problem for our society; it was framed as an interesting
scientific problem. And even as a scientific problem,
the main interest was not in global warming but global
cooling. Some thought the greenhouse effect might
provide the long-sought solution to the puzzle of what
caused ice ages.
When Arrhenius presented the scientific world with
his speculation that human industry might some day
warm the planet, the idea was scoffed at. How could
humans produce an effect great enough to affect the
climate? And of course if they did, would it not be all
for the better? At the time, it was generally held that
we lived in a balance with nature, and the balance of
nature would make sure nothing terribly bad happened.
You could even take it to the extent of believing in a
kind of homeostasis—there was a natural system that
regulated everything, kept everything stable. The
oceans after all, would absorb carbon dioxide as fast as

25

the gas was produced, and everything would be stable
and fine.
A few began to raise doubts in the 1930s, for climate
changes were beginning to be visible. People had
accumulated enough good weather records by that
time to see that there were some long-term changes
underway in the climate in Africa and the United States
and so on. For the northern hemisphere, the record of
good temperature measurements began in the 1880s.
This was far enough back for people to see that there
had been a slow increase. As one of the news magazines
put it, “Gaffers who claim that winters were harder
when they were boys are quite right . . . weather men
have no doubt that the world at least for the time being
is growing warmer.” Still, if some people recognized
that climate did change, they saw that as just a part
of some natural cycle: “Meteorologists do not know
whether the present warm trend is likely to last 20
years or 20,000 years.” Such natural cycles seemed to
have nothing to do with human emissions. There was
one man who challenged this, a well-known engineer
but an entirely amateur meteorologist, Guy Stewart
Callendar. Looking over historical data, he concluded
that the carbon dioxide level in the atmosphere had in
fact been increasing. He predicted that the increase in
temperature due to the artificial production of carbon
dioxide would come to 0.3 degrees Celsius per century.
Again, Callendar saw nothing very urgent in this. He
saw it largely as a scientific problem in geophysics, and
mainly of interest if it could explain ice ages. To other
scientists, it was only one theory of climate change,
and not as likely as many other theories going around,
having to do with sunspots and other solar changes,
or variations in ocean currents, or who knows what.
As a science writer put it, “Everyone has his own
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theory—and each sounds good—until the next lad
comes along with his theory and knocks the others into
smithereens.” The carbon dioxide greenhouse effect
theory of climate change was just one more thing on
the shelf with all the other bric-a-brac and not by any
means the most attractive.
The idea that humans could change the climate
began to change with the coming of atomic energy.
The atomic bombs themselves showed that humanity
was now in fact in possession of forces of geophysical
magnitude. Also, as fallout went around the world,
people began to realize that what you do in one
place could have an effect on the environment far
away. Some people even began to say that bomb tests
were affecting their weather, causing more floods
or droughts. If weather records said the world was
getting warmer, a news magazine reported that “large
numbers of people wonder whether the atomic bomb is
responsible for it all.” If theoretical ignorance remained
complete, there was an increasing willingness to accept
that human civilization might have some impact on the
natural world. Global warming began to be reframed,
as something that might have more than an abstract
scientific interest.
First Worries about Climate Change.
Now we begin to get into some of the real science.
For lack of time, I will just tell a couple of stories that
relate to how the matter was framed. One of the stories
starts with Roger Revelle, an oceanographer who had
been studying sea water since the 1930s. Sea water was
of interest to the U.S. Navy. By the end of World War
II, Roger was Commander Revelle, in charge of a large
scientific team sent to the atoll at the 1946 Bikini atom
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bomb test, to study what effects the explosion had on
the sea water and the lagoon. This revived his interest
in sea water chemistry. Now, sea water is not just salt
water; it is a complex chemical solution. In fact it is a
buffered solution, and Revelle realized that means it
does not take up carbon dioxide as rapidly as people
had thought. Moreover, he was aware that the human
population had doubled since Arrhenius’s day, and the
output of industry per capita had more than doubled.
More important still, he was aware (what earlier people
had failed to recognize) that this was an exponential
trend, which was probably going to double and
redouble again. So Revelle took the trouble to do a new
calculation, taking into account his understanding of
the lesser capacity of oceans to absorb carbon dioxide
and the ever increasing emissions of CO2. In 1956 he
came to the conclusion that, in fact, the carbon dioxide
content of the atmosphere must increase.
In 1956 Revelle testified to Congress that the Arctic
Ocean might become navigable. If so, he said, “the
Russians will become a great maritime nation.”3 This is
the first statement that I have found that hinted at the
national security implications of climate change. Revelle
was actually talking through his hat, speculating about
something that he didn’t actually expect to happen
for centuries. The reason he was testifying (before
an appropriations committee) was to ask for money
to fund new research, planned for the forthcoming
International Geophysical Year (IGY 1957-58). In the
1950s, the word “Russia” was a common code word
for “give us some money.” Revelle’s personal attitude
was expressed better in a statement he made several
times, that by adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere
“human beings are now carrying out a large scale
geophysical experiment.” In short, it was scientifically
interesting, and probably his main interest was the old
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one of hoping to explain what caused the ice ages. He
was little concerned with a future rise in temperature.
Because of the scientific interest and because he
did get money for more research during the IGY, he
hired a young post-doctoral candidate, Charles David
Keeling, to study carbon dioxide. Keeling went to Little
America, the base the Navy established in Antarctica
for the IGY. In the very pure air there, he carried out
the most meticulous measurements that had ever been
made on carbon dioxide. Within 2 years, he was able to
show that, exactly as Revelle had predicted, the carbon
dioxide level was increasing.
Whether that meant that the temperature would
increase, nobody was sure. But if it did, then as one
scientist put it, “there would seem to be every reason
for producing as much carbon dioxide as we can
manage. It is helping us towards a warmer and drier
world.” Such optimistic views about technological
“progress” had begun to shift, however, and not only
because of atomic weapons—although that certainly
had something to do with it. Environmentalism had
come on the scene. (Earth Day 1970 is often cited as
a breakthrough in public opinion and political clout.)
And weather changes were worrying now. In the early
1970s there were very severe droughts in Africa, the
American Midwest, and elsewhere. Concern about the
world food supply grew with the collapse of the Russian
wheat crop. In short, a variety of things stimulated
doubts about the benevolent impact of climate change
and led people to consider that human-generated
pollution might possibly be affecting climate, at least
regionally.
Concern about atmospheric pollution was no longer
limited to complaints about smog in cities. Industrial
haze was found to be spreading around the entire
Northern Hemisphere. Environmentalists took note. In
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the long list developed in the 1970s of harms we were
doing to the environment—deforestation, overgrazing,
acid rain, smog—global warming took a modest place.
Global warming became framed as an environmental
issue. It was a fateful move, for environmentalism in
general was increasingly associated with only one part
of the political spectrum, the left.
Speculating about Catastrophe.
Meanwhile, temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere had begun to turn down. In the Southern
Hemisphere, we now know, this wasn’t happening,
but they didn’t have good records for the Southern
Hemisphere at the time. One possible explanation for
the cooling was the smoke and other particles that
industry and so forth were putting into the atmosphere.
One scientist, Reid Bryson, proposed that what he
called the “Human Volcano” was putting so much soot
and dust into the atmosphere that it was producing
a cooling effect around the world. (Volcanoes pour
out not only carbon dioxide gas, but also smoke and
sulfate particles, and a great eruption will temporarily
shade the planet’s surface and cool it.) This bothered
Bryson because there was a lot of data accumulating,
including data he had found himself from studies of
ancient tree rings and so forth, that climate change
could be quite rapid and persistent. In the American
Southwest and Midwest, he found signs that there had
been very, very severe droughts that had come on in
less than a hundred years—it was no longer a question
of ice ages that took ten thousand years to settle in, or
even a thousand years. It seemed like serious climate
change could come within as little as one or two human
generations. He wondered whether, by putting all this
in the air, we might be bringing on a new ice age.
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If that was so, there would be serious implications.
As Fortune magazine put it in an article inspired by
Bryson, we might see “a billion people starving” or
other very serious consequences. (In fact, recent work
suggests that pollution and other human influences did
play a role in the great drought that hit Africa at just
that time, the early 1970s, starving millions and killing
tens of thousands.) Now, while this kind of talk was
found in the popular press, if you look at the refereed
scientific literature, you will find that nobody was
saying anything so radical. Some scientists were saying
that there might be a rather gradual cooling. Others
were saying that it was more likely that greenhouse
warming was coming on. The important new scientific
idea was that serious climate change could be relatively
rapid, within a single century, and it could be triggered
by humans.
These ideas provoked a study commissioned
by the Central Intelligence Agency on the potential
implications. The study built on Bryson’s ideas,
suggesting that there might be serious problems—what
we might well call national security problems—coming
from climate change. Indeed they predicted that in the
worst case, “there would be increasingly desperate
attempts on the part of powerful but hungry nations
to get grain any way they could. Massive migrations,
sometimes backed by force, would become a live
issue. . . .”4
Now, this was only one small report, by no means
an official government position. Probably the dominant
view among meteorologists was that, as one authority
put it, “the climatic system is so robust . . . that man
has still a long way to go before his influence becomes
great enough to cause serious disruption.”5 The
refereed scientific literature had it all down as a matter
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that needed, and deserved, further research. The old
assumptions about the balance of nature remained
widespread: Maybe we’ll get warmer, maybe we’ll get
cooler, but more likely nothing will change very badly
or very fast.
Scientists Begin to See a Real Problem.
To explain how this view changed, I have to skip
back in time to another line of the scientific story.
Let’s visit the meteorology group in Princeton in 1952.
The leader is Jule Charney, the first man to work out
the mathematics for how to predict weather on a
computer. His main colleague was Norman Phillips,
the first person to actually program a computer
that could predict weather 24 hours ahead. It took a
24-hour computer run, but it was a start. In fact the
most important member of the team was not human:
MANIAC 1. This computer was designed specifically
to study the dynamics of compressible fluids, although
the compressible fluid originally in mind was not the
atmosphere, it was the plasma in a hydrogen bomb.
I’m making a little point here about the importance of
military funding in this entire story.
Jumping forward in time to the mid 1960s, the next
main figure is Syukuro Manabe, working in another
lab in Princeton. Manabe took the weather computer
models, which were working pretty well by that time,
and developed a model for the average weather over
a year, that is, climate. Compared with the real planet,
Manabe’s world wasn’t too bad. For the United States,
for example, his model had a lot of precipitation in
the Pacific Northwest, not much in the Southwest.
He had the tropical rain bands, a wet Brazil, a dry
Chilean desert, and so on. In short, his computer was
simulating the real world to a rough approximation.
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Now Manabe decided to put some extra greenhouse
gas in his model atmosphere: Let’s double the carbon
dioxide and see what happens. The temperature went
up several degrees. And in fact, this is a robust feature
of models to this day. You cannot make any kind of
mathematical or computer model of the climate, which
will (1) produce a climate that looks anything like the
real world’s climate, and (2) not have it heat up if you
add carbon dioxide. That’s just the way models work.
This began to catch the attention of physicists,
including a group of elite physicists who called
themselves the Jasons. One summer they undertook
to study the long-term impact of atmospheric carbon
dioxide on climate. Some of you may be familiar
with the Jasons, whose main activity was and remains
wide-ranging studies for the military. After decades of
working out of public view for the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and other defense
agencies, they came under great fire from their fellow
academics during the Vietnam War. When they
decided to study climate, they did it for the Department
of Energy. It was a step away from national security
affairs; they wanted to do something more civilian in
nature, so they took up the study of climate as a break
from their usual military-oriented summer studies. But
what they concluded was, perhaps, closer to national
security than they might have thought.
After devising their own computer model, they got
the same result Manabe and others were getting: They
predicted a warming of a few degrees Celsius by the
middle of the 21st century, and much more warming in
the Polar regions. That Arctic warming, by the way, is
a robust feature of climate models; even Arrhenius got
that with his pencil and paper. The Jasons concluded
that there might be serious consequences for the world’s
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food supply. There would be a sea-level rise, which
could possibly be damagingly rapid. As a result of the
climate changes, they reported, there could be a largescale displacing of populations. Of course populations
have always been moving from one climate zone to
another, as when Mexicans come to the United States,
but they might not be happy to have it imposed upon
them. The Jasons were also aware of, shall we say, the
unknown unknowns, a variety of other possible effects:
acidification of the oceans and so forth. In short, pretty
much the whole range of potential problems that we are
now concerned about were already well-understood
by physicists by the early 1970s.
This was just a bunch of physicists doing a study
out of their own curiosity. But their report did cause
greenhouse warming to get attention, for the first time,
at the highest levels of government. The President’s
science advisor was a geophysicist, Frank Press, and
he decided to have a real study done by a panel of the
National Academy of Sciences. It was headed by Jule
Charney, who had become (and remains) the grand old
man of computer weather prediction, but he had no
fixed views on climate change. Charney and his panel
studied the entire question carefully and concluded:
Yes, if you doubled atmospheric carbon dioxide, there
would be a 1.5 to 4.5 degree Celsius rise. This is not as
precise as it sounds; what they were really saying was
“roughly three degrees, plus or minus 50 percent.”
It was a good estimate even so, not far from current
values (those computer models really are robust). But
carbon dioxide would not double until well into the
next century, and the 21st century seemed very far away
at that time. So when it came to actual consequences,
the Charney Panel only needed to conclude that “the
socioeconomic consequences may well be significant,
but . . . cannot yet be adequately projected.” There was
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plenty of time for more research, and that was the only
action they recommended.
The research did proceed, and it gradually shifted
opinions in the scientific community. What had seemed
a rather vague and remote possibility began to look
more and more serious and certain. I will just mention
one of the many lines of research: the Soviet Union’s
last great achievement. At Vostok in Antarctica, the
most remote and barren spot on the planet, they drilled
kilometers down through the ice. Analysis of gases
trapped in the layers of ancient ice showed that carbon
dioxide and temperature went up and down together
through the last ice age (in fact, the core eventually got
deep enough to record the same thing through the last
four ice ages). In short, there was demonstrably a tight
feedback between carbon dioxide and temperature.
Raise the temperature and the carbon dioxide will
go up, raise the carbon dioxide and that will raise the
temperature still more, bringing out yet more carbon
dioxide, and so forth—a strong and rather frightening
feedback.
Getting Serious about Global Warming.
Meanwhile, the temperature in the Northern
Hemisphere had begun to rise. A few scientists began
to feel it was time to alert policymakers and the public
that a real problem could be foreseen. The pioneer
was Jim Hansen, who already in the early 1980s
had predicted, quite accurately, that the “signal” of
greenhouse warming would emerge from the noise of
normal climate fluctuations sometime around the year
2000. Testifying before Congress in 1988, the hottest
summer ever in Washington, DC, he told people, “It’s
time to stop waffling and say the evidence is pretty
strong that the greenhouse effect is here.”6
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Congress took little notice (aside from Al Gore and
one or two others). Environmentalists did, however,
begin to join the scientists in calling for national policy
attention to global warming. It was, in fact, the new
Environmental Protection Agency that issued the
first official government report on climate change. As
the New York Times described their findings, “Global
warming caused by industrial pollutants is likely to
shrink forests, destroy most coastal wetlands, reduce
water quality and quantity in many areas, and otherwise
cause extensive environmental destruction in the United
States over the next century.”7 Other environmentalists
went farther. For example, one publication exclaimed
that “A climate change that turned the Great Plains of
North America into an arid zone would be analogous
to a major military disaster.”8 Thus environmentalists
framed climate change as a problem on the same order
as national security issues. Their plan, typical of the
1970s, was to take money away from the military.
They said we should spend less money on the military
and use it to address the more serious environmental
threats to our well-being. Other government agencies
gave all that little credence. But the pressure became
more serious with the end of the Cold War, when the
military lost what had been its primary mission.
That prompted Senator Sam Nunn and other
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee
(Al Gore for one) to bring the environment into their
deliberations. In 1990 they tried to stir up public interest
with a joint declaration that environmental destruction,
including global warming among other problems, was
“a growing national security threat.” Their conclusion
was that we should give more money to the military,
or at least stop cutting the military budget so the armed
forces could do something about the environment—
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and, not coincidentally, preserve the prerogatives and
power of the Armed Services Committee.
This idea of going environmentalist was not very
natural to Senator Nunn, and it struck no resonance
whatsoever with then Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney. Moreover, there was a strong political counter
movement against any worrisome talk about the
environment. An attack specifically aiming to reduce
concern and action on global warming was mounted by
the fossil fuel industries and their allies. They sponsored
scientific and quasi-scientific reports, and spent
literally millions of dollars on press releases, websites,
and lobbying the administration and Congress. They
had considerable success convincing people that the
science of climate change was nonsense, or at any rate
so dubious that it was nothing anybody really needed
to worry about, still less act upon. Policymakers, partly
because of these countervailing forces and partly from
the usual inertia about undertaking anything new, were
perfectly happy to do nothing about climate change.
Meanwhile the science continued to progress.
Again, I can only take one example from many
hundreds of significant findings. In 1991, a volcano in
the Philippines erupted and threw a cloud of sulfates
the size of Iowa into the stratosphere. Jim Hansen saw
this was a fine natural experiment: He could put the
cloud of sulfates into his computer model and see what
happened. The models were much better now, and
he could follow climate month by month. His results
predicted what the effects of the Pinatubo eruption
would be, in what regions the sulfates would produce
some cooling for a year or two until they washed out
of the atmosphere. The world followed his simulation
with impressive accuracy. This is one of many examples
where computer models faced a severe test and passed
it with flying colors.
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Meanwhile, as Hansen and others had predicted,
the temperature continued to rise—indeed, now
clearly rising beyond the range of normal variability.
Warming was greater in Arctic regions and had other
particular features that matched the predictions from
the greenhouse effect. No such neat match to the
observations was found by people who tried other
explanations for the warming, such as a change in the
sun or just random variations. It was increasingly clear
that people like Hansen who had predicted warming
were right, whereas the skeptics’ predictions had all
failed. Policymakers finally had to take action.
Seeking Agreement on the Threat.
The outcome was the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC). It was designed by the
Reagan administration, primarily as a replacement
for the self-appointed committees of scientists (like
the National Academy of Sciences’ panels), which the
administration thought were unduly alarmist. The
IPCC was designed so that it can make a statement
only by the unanimous consent of all the scientific
representatives of all the world’s governments. This
is surely a recipe for conservatism, if not paralysis. In
fact, the first statement that the IPCC issued in 1995
was perhaps the most weasel-worded statement ever
issued by a scientific body: “The balance of evidence
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on
global climate . . . [emphasis added]”9 And yet it does
say something, a serious something.
By now, the debate on global warming was well
underway. But the most important debate was not
the one most people heard about, what we might
call Greenpeace versus the editors of The Wall Street
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Journal. The real debate was conducted under the
auspices of the IPCC, and it engaged all of the world’s
thousands of climate scientists in round after round of
research, debate, workshops, working papers, panel
discussions, and more research. Surprisingly in the
end, the IPCC, after a fierce night-long debate among
the representatives, was able to come out in 2001 with
a truly meaningful consensus statement. And it was
scary, “Temperature is very likely to increase by 1.4 to
5.8 degrees C by 2100 . . . a rate without precedent during
at least the last 10,000 years.” So that, essentially, was
the close of the debate, at least among intellectually
informed people who did not have a preconceived
bias. (Of course, a very few senior scientists could not
bring themselves to abandon views they had formed
decades earlier. That propped up the fixed opinions
of people with less grasp of science, but who felt that
to admit that anything might require government
regulation would be an offense against their ideology
or their wallet.)
The consensus that serious warming was, if not
certain, then surely very likely, was not the end of the
research. Again I will just mention one of the many
developments. Ice cores were gathered, at substantial
risk to life and limb, in places from Greenland to the
Andes. Where the snowfall is heavy enough, you get
annual layers and you can study them like tree rings. In
some places, the changes of past climate were shockingly
rapid. Such evidence convinced the National Academy
of Sciences to convene another panel to look into rapid
climate change—more often now called abrupt climate
change. They found that a 3 degree Celsius (that is, 5
degrees Fahrenheit) regional change is possible within
1 decade. That would be a great catastrophe for the
region affected. This new scientific thinking, they said,
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“is little known and scarcely appreciated.” I think that
is still to some extent the case (the IPCC reports in
particular give little attention to these less likely, but
vastly more dangerous, scenarios).
However, the concern did to some extent reach
the public. It also reached the attention of people in
the Pentagon and some defense intellectuals, who
commissioned a 2003 report on “An Abrupt Climate
Change Scenario and its Implications for United States
National Security.”10 The key word here is scenario—in
true military think-tank fashion, they decided to study
a worst-case scenario, just so we could be prepared.
When it was leaked to the press, it inspired some
sensational stories: “Climate change will destroy us.
Secret report warns of rioting and nuclear war. Threat
to the world is greater than terrorism.” (We have heard
a similar statement recently from some high authorities
in Europe.) The most frightening possibility, they
said, would be a collapse of the North Atlantic ocean
current system, in which case “Britain will be Siberia
in less than 20 years.”11 That was also the premise for
a widely seen summer disaster movie, “The Day After
Tomorrow.” This was definitely a worst-case scenario;
all scientists agree that there is virtually no chance of
such an event within the foreseeable future . . . that is,
the next century or two.
While all this got a lot of attention, there was also
push-back. Every winter somebody publishes an
editorial cartoon joking about a meeting on global
warming postponed on account of snow or whatever.
These always appear in conservative media, for already
by the time of the Reagan years, the issue had become
strongly politicized. In terms of the degree of worry
about consequences of global warming, a Gallup poll
just released shows that among Democrats the level of
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worry is about 75 percent; among Independents, it is
60 percent; and among Republicans, it is 35 percent.
So if you tell me how you vote, I can make a good
guess about what you think about a scientific issue like
climate change (a sorry indictment of the intellectual
state of our society right now).
Yet opinions were shifting even among conservative
business leaders, who began to understand that
climate change could have serious and direct economic
consequences. The unprecedented European heat
wave of 2003, which killed 10,000 people in France
alone, certainly had a great impact on public opinion
in Europe. It is now believed that this heat wave was
made considerably more likely by global warming, and
that more will increasingly follow. As for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita that struck the Gulf Coast in 2006,
nobody knows whether they were made more likely by
global warming. The best guess is that such disasters
were about equally likely to happen in 2006, 1906, or
2106 (other changes in weather, like increased floods
and droughts, are much more certain). However, the
hurricane catastrophes did show Americans what
is meant by “higher sea level” and “environmental
refugees.” The destruction of New Orleans was a
striking illustration of the kind of forces that we expect
will in fact drive millions of people around the world
from their homes.
Coming back to where the big scientific picture now
stands, let’s recall the IPCC’s 2001 statement that future
warming of several degrees was “very likely.” Just last
month, after half a dozen years of intense research
and discussion, they issued their next statement. And
their 2007 statement says, in effect, “Like we said . . . !”
The temperature will rise by more than one degree
Celsius, perhaps as much as six (with a small but awful
possibility of even more). And the changes predicted
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to come, the heat waves and droughts and floods,
the rising sea level, and stress to countless species,
are already being observed around the world. At the
request of the British government, a team of experts
under a former Chief Economist of the World Bank
studied a businesslike “worst case worth insuring
against” for climate change in this century (not as
bad as a national security worst-case scenario). They
concluded the impacts could easily be as serious as the
consequences of World War II.12
So there you have, in 20 minutes, 20,000 personyears of intellectual endeavor.13
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The Science of Climate Change
Robert W. Corell
The Heinz Center
For the past year or two, many of us within the
scientific community have been commenting that
climate change is no longer just an environmental
issue. It is now an economic and national security issue.
It is good, therefore, to see so many of you gathered
here to explore this issue in depth. The purpose of this
presentation is to provide some basic insights into the
science of climate change so that the reader can better
gauge what we do and do not know at this point in
time.
Let me start by elaborating a little further on some
of the points made so well by Spencer Weart. First of all,
a bit more should be said to underline the significance
of the Vostok record. This dates back 650,000 years.
It provides us with information about temperatures
and CO2 concentrations over the past 400,000 years.
It is important to note that, at no time in the course
of this 650,000 year period, did the level of CO2 in the
atmosphere reach the level at which it now stands.
So, obviously, we are experiencing a slightly new
condition.
Second, scientists have an increasing ability to
measure climate change. Dr. Weart mentioned the
use of ice cores. Why can we use these? When slowly
deposited snow freezes, it freezes into tiny hollow
spheres which capture the atmosphere as it was in
the first few years of the snowfall. The air bubbles
in ice contain samples of this past atmosphere. They
contain CO2 and methane and nitrous oxide and all the
other gases. We have sufficiently good techniques to
permit us to peel-out and look at this historic record of
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climate change. How, one might ask, do you measure
temperature? It turns out that temperature is nothing
more than the ratio of two isotopes of oxygen. These
isotopes are to be found in the spheres, and so you can
measure, quite accurately, what temperature it was at
the time that the snow fell. So, the whole paleo record,
the historic record, is well-captured by our ice cores.
It is also well-captured in tree rings, coral reef cores,
and sediments in the deep ocean. Thanks to increasing
sensitivity of our instrumentation, particularly over
the last generation, we can reconstruct temperature
changes over time with increasing confidence.
After we came out of the last ice age—which ended
some 20,000 years ago, as you may recall—we entered
a period which I call the Anthropogenic Sweet-Spot.
It lasted some 10,000 years. This period witnessed the
birth of agriculture, the medieval warm period which
caused the Vikings to go trucking off to Iceland and
Greenland and ultimately even to North America, and
a little ice age between the 15th and 18th century. All
those changes took place in a temperature band of less
than 1 degree centigrade. All the things we associate
with evolution, from the birth of the concept of a village
and the concept of a state, to lighting and heat in our
homes, took place in this 10,000 year period.
We have now left this period behind us. The scientific
evidence, in my view, moreover, permits us to predict
with confidence that, at the current rate, we are likely
to face a two to three degree warming period in this
coming century. Hansen’s research reveals that we
have now come out of the Anthropogenic Sweet-Spot.1
We did so (and I think most of the scientific community
would agree with this statement) during the period in
which there was a lot of sulphur and other pollutants in
the atmosphere. These caused the temperature to level
off before it went screaming northward again, and we
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kept getting higher and higher temperatures. There is
a great deal of variation in temperature from month-tomonth, season-to-season, and even year-to-year. The
computer models tell us to expect such variability, and
indeed variability is likely to grow as the temperature
of the planet warms.
The Evidence from the Ocean.
The ocean is also very important to scientists
attempting to understand climate change. Why is that
so? Bear in mind that most of the water (97 percent)
on earth is to be found in the ocean. Of all evaporative
processes, 86 percent occur across the surface of
the ocean. Oceans receive 78 percent of planetary
precipitation. The oceans are the thermodynamic
flywheel—they slow down the rate at which things
happen, but they also give it momentum over time.
Enough energy is stored in the ocean to make the planet
even a bit warmer than it is now. And if you ask where
the heat goes, that’s where it goes. Any excess warmth
that comes into this planet and is not reradiated out
ends up in the ocean. So all the stuff we talk about
is inside 10 percent. So the ocean really is the central
game player.
Research undertaken by Tim Barnett gives you
some idea of the role that heat is playing in the ocean.2
Suppose we assemble temperature data from every
available source (ships, satellites, etc.) for the last 40
years and plot it in all six oceans on a graph as red
dots. Suppose we find that, in some places (e.g., the
northern Indian Ocean), the warming does not extend
nearly as far south as it does in, say, the north Atlantic.
We then say to the computer: Well, let’s back up 40
years and let’s not allow humans to introduce their
contribution to warming.3 So the anthropogenic inputs
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are removed. Then we ask the computer to identify the
statistical band within which the temperature is likely
to be (blue dots). Then we run the computer again.
We put in the equation, and the computer says that
projections ought to be in the green. And then we ask
the question for various U.S. computer runs: “For all
these six oceans, what is the correlation coefficient
between the actual measurements and the computer
projections?” And it turns out they are all at 95 percent.
We are becoming, in short, increasingly confident as
time goes on. The computer models don’t give us the
fine details—they can’t tell you, for example, what’s
happening here at Chapel Hill—but they can tell you
very well what’s happening on a global scale.
The Evidence from Icebergs.
The icebergs and glaciers of Greenland also help
us to understand the process of global warming. In
this country, floating icebergs extend some 700 meters
below the surface. Greenland is also filled with glaciers
which are really wonderful, magical things. Over the
last decade our understanding of why they behave the
way they do has changed radically. For example, at
one point it was theorized that surface water did not
make its way to the bottom. A research team from
the University of Kansas has recently developed radar
capable of penetrating the entire ice sheet, penetrating
some 12,000 feet—something that 10 years ago we
would have thought impossible and which, one
imagines, the military must find interesting. We now
find that there are lots of puddles of water below the
ice that are lubricating these ice sheets.
In Greenland, ice is melting incredibly rapidly.
Since 1979 the surface area has been reduced by about
30 percent. There is a place in Greenland where the
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face is coming off the ice sheet at a rate of 15 kilometers
a year. If you stand in front of it for over an hour, you
can actually see it move a couple of meters. So things
are happening very rapidly in Greenland. As the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
says, both the Greenland and the Antarctic ice sheets,
are reducing en masse. There is going to be some buildup
due to snow fall. But, there is a net loss. The surface of
melt is increasing about 1 percent per year, so we see
Greenland as one of the hotspots—one of the places
to watch, key our eye on. But why are they melting
so rapidly? Well, if the ice sheets are percolating, they
are taking the water down. If the water pooled on
the surface, the energy exchange has to evaporate the
water. That takes seven times as much energy as it
does to melt ice. So if the water has disappeared and
all you see is the surface ice, it takes one-seventh of
the energy, so we accelerate the process of melting; so
there is a dynamic feedback mechanism that is causing
these glaciers to both melt faster and flow faster.
What are the projected temperatures likely to be in
the high Arctic? As Dr. Weart noted, everyone knows
for a fact that, no matter what you do, the Polar Regions
are going to warm more rapidly, and the Arctic is
going to warm more rapidly than Antarctica. Why
is this so? The explanation is really simple. Take an
ice drill in the Arctic and drill down two meters, and
you’re in water. So it’s 0 degrees Centigrade. Go to
Antarctica, you’ve got to drill 12,000 feet in ice. So, it’s
the difference between you putting just a tiny ice piece
in your cocktail glass tonight versus filling it full of ice.
The Antarctic mass is going to stay colder longer, and
the high Artic is going to warm much more rapidly.
There are other factors involved, but this is probably
the dominant one. There are places which we expect to
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experience 8 to 10 degrees of warming from the 1990s
to the 2090s.
What happened to Arctic Sea Ice in 2005 and
2006? The melt rate of the sea ice is pretty rapid. And
though the rate has declined a bit in the last year or
so, we are still talking about very large amounts of ice.
What of thickness? Submarine data tells us that the
ice was 40 percent thinner during this period than it
had been previously. This is true, but one must bear
in mind that submarines only go places where it has
become 40 percent thinner. When you do the analysis,
there is probably an 18 to 20 percent reduction in the
thickness. This is a lot of fresh water. Dumping a lot of
fresh water into the system also, incidentally, has some
consequences as well.
Another interesting development to consider is
the opening of new sea routes—notably the northern
route and the Northwest Passage. Russia has always
wanted to be a maritime nation. It is coming closer to
that now. In fact, the sea route is 40 percent closer to
the two major markets of Europe and the Far East. Two
things have become clear since the last IPCC meeting.
One, the opening is going to be on the Russian side.
Two, it is likely to give Americans close to a half a
year of opening within the next generation. The Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) models project
that the current navigation season of 20-30 days per
year will increase to 3-6 months/yr by 2080, with one
model indicating an ice-free summer by 2040.
This will have significant repercussions. All kinds
of issues of access will have to be worked out. Seaward
claims will be made. At the present moment, Canadians
and Russians both lay claim to territory all the way to
the Pole. Even the Americans, who generally adhere to
the law of the sea, get quite heated over this particular
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issue. Boundary disputes are also likely to occur. There
is already a boundary dispute between every Arctic
nation. We are going to have to solve these problems
and figure out the correct means to do so. Is the law of
the sea going to be applicable? Or will there be some
other forum in which to resolve these conflicts?
So what happened in the lower Arctic? We see the
same picture. A lot of things are happening. In some
places, where there is no longer an ice presence, the sea
is eating away at the coastline and will gobble up little
villages. In other places, where there is permafrost
warming, the local fauna suffers. The Hudson Bay is
almost empty of ice, and polar bears are well on their
way to extinction now—they eat primarily seal and
cannot hunt seals if there is no ice.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Let me finish by saying a few things about the key
findings of the IPCC. These were released in February
2007.
First, the Panel concluded that “Global atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and
nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result
of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed
pre-industrial values. The global increases in carbon
dioxide concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel
use and land-use change, while those of methane and
nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture.” The
documentation is solid. Over the course of a 10,000
year period, things remained pretty stable. The last
100-150 years witnessed a pretty dramatic change.
Second, “Warming of the climate system is
unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures,
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widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global
mean sea level.” Note the use by the Panel of words
like “unequivocal” which means 90 percent certain or
better.
Third, “Most of the observed increase in globally
averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is
very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas concentrations.” This also means that
there is a 90 percent likelihood. The Report documented
several long-term changes in climate: “The global
average temperature trend over 1906–2005 is 0.74°C
(1.3°F), increasing to 0.2°C (0.36°F) per decade over
the last 3 decades; Global average sea level rose 0.17
meters (6.7 inches) over the 20th century; Mountain
glaciers and snow cover have declined on average in
both hemispheres.”
One interesting thing to observe is that the IPCC
projections for sea level rises which came out a few
weeks ago were quite low. That is because they decided
not to include glacial ice-sheet melt in their model
because they did not have sufficient confidence in those
predictions. The IPCC has a very calming effect. They
ask, what can we scientists agree upon? By the way,
most of the sea level ice comes from thermal expansion
into the water and not from the sea ice—not sea ice
but glacial ice sheets. But this century we’re going to
see an increasing contribution from Greenland and ice
sheets around the world. Virtually all (probably 98
percent) glaciers are now losing mass. The IPCC also
made clear that predictions are scenario dependent.
For example, if we consider how far sea level might
have risen by the end of the 21st century, we can find
low and high projections. The low projection is: 0.28
meters (11+ inches). The high projection is: 0.39 meters
(15 + inches). Recent literature projects a rise of about 1
meter.
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What might happen in the United States? Studies
suggest we will see dramatic shifts in temperature
regimes, though scenarios vary. Projections must
take into consideration a variety of factors to assess
how a coastline might be affected: tidal range, wave
height, coastal slope, coastal shoreline change rates,
geomorphology, historical rates of relative sea change.
Virtually all the models we now run say that the
Southwest is really going to get hit by droughts of a
pretty dramatic nature. These droughts may last, not
just a few years, but many decades. Analysts think
it might take as long as a century to recover. Beyond
that, no one is willing to talk. We’re going to see shifts
in the type of vegetation, and entire ecosystems will
change.
What about time scales? If we’re really aggressive
and say, “Okay, we’re going to bring our greenhouse
gases down over this next century,” what happens? First
of all, it’s going to take several hundred years to stabilize
CO2 because its resident time in the atmosphere is 120
years. So it could take some time for this supertanker
called climate change to level off. This is a new
world—a world that is two to three degrees warmer
will look a lot different from the world we are familiar
with. Everything we are used to emerged during the
human “sweet spot” of relative climatic stability of
which I spoke earlier. At this higher temperature, ice
is going to continue to melt, and the oceans are going
to continue to experience thermal expansion. There is
a real lack of symmetry between how long it took to
set these changes in motion, and how long it will take
to stop/reverse the problem. Even if temperatures are
stabilized within the next hundred years, it will take
centuries to millennia for sea level rises to stabilize.
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How are we going to come to grips with this
problem? There are solutions. We can take one step
at a time: increase fuel standards, reduce vehicle use,
increase energy efficiency, etc. If you do that, you will
start undoing some of the damage. Eventually over
the course of the next 100 years, you may be able to
stabilize matters.
In the final analysis, remember this is where we are.
We are living on a tiny little planet. It is the only place
we have. We need to take care of it.
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A Threat Assessment
Richard A. Matthew
University of California, Irvine
Introduction.
The purpose of this paper is to put climate change
into the context of global politics, talk a little bit about the
work that has already been done linking environmental
change and security around the world, and then look
at ways we might think of linking climate change to
security. The geographic focus will be on South Asia.
The previous two panelists have already described
in detail the science of climate change, so I will not
reiterate any of this, but will turn immediately to how
climate change interacts with other global forces. I also
will raise some questions about what we mean when
we use the term security. I do, however, want to make
two points about the science. First, we should bear in
mind that the pace of change (whether global climate
change is abrupt or gradual) will affect security. Second,
while scientific models capture broad trends very well
and help us to imagine the future, the precise impacts
of climate change are likely to vary enormously from
place to place, which means, of course, that the security
effects will vary. We know that we should expect such
consequences as water scarcity, desertification, and
sea level rise. We know that changes are going to take
place that will affect food production and microbial
activity. We do know that all these elements could
become security concerns, but we cannot predict how
and where with any precision.1
There is a good reason for this, and it relates to the
broader point I want to make, which is that climate
change is taking place in the context of a lot of other
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global changes. In the next few decades, we are probably
going to be living in a relatively new world, in which
humans experience things not experienced before. It
is going to be a new world in the sense that its climate
will be different. But it is also going to be a new world
in a lot of other ways. The natural environment is
undergoing multiple forms of severe stress due to land
and energy use, and significant social changes also are
taking place throughout the planet.
For example, an important demographic change
is taking place. We are soon going to be living in one
the oldest societies known to humankind. Some of the
planet’s societies are going to move towards an average
age of 50 during the course of our lifetimes. This has all
sorts of implications for things like health care needs
and retirement planning, but it also is likely to interact
with climate change. Specifically, we know that things
like heat waves take a higher toll on elderly people.
What else is happening? We know that we are in
a world in which a vast and unprecedented informal
economy has grown up alongside trade liberalization.
This informal economy has received scholarly and
policy attention because it has become home to all sorts
of criminal activity, as well as a rich menu of poverty
alleviation initiatives. But the unregulated character
and sheer size of the informal economy also has
implications for fuel wood and other energy sources.
We know that global terrorism, or transnational
networks of terrorists with global agendas, has become
an increasing problem in the last decade and is likely to
continue to be a grave threat. We can imagine scenarios
in which energy supplies are attacked during heat
waves, causing considerable problems to us.
Another notable global change is the extent of
democratization that has taken place since the end of
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the Cold War, something that has been in many ways
a tremendously positive development. I just got back
yesterday from a meeting in Stockholm with a group
of people from Nepal who are at the forefront of the
democratic change taking place there. The excitement
and the enthusiasm these people express are
tremendously affirming. However, the expectations
that they have for quick and permanent social gains
are remarkably unrealistic in a lot of ways. It is not
easy to quickly provide extensive public goods, and
opportunities to acquire private goods, in places that
are characterized by enormous inequality. Indeed,
democratic efforts have stalled twice in the past in
Nepal. The same thing has been true for a number of
other countries around the world trying to make this
change. Nothing is certain, but climate change could
conceivably deepen inequalities in ways that make
political reform even more daunting.
One of the most widely observed forms of
global change has to do with the pace and extent of
technological innovations and diffusions that give
people worldwide access to information and an
unprecedented ability to learn about and become
involved with things that are taking place far from
where they live and work. I was talking to a group of
epidemiologists at The University of California-Irvine,
and they were describing how quickly the world is
sharing scientific information these days. Real time
global scientific collaboration meant that scientists
were able to understand the characteristics of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) far more quickly
than they did Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Of
course we also know that there are dangers that have
developed which are inherent in the globe spanning
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information and communication technologies, as
we have no effective way of denying terrorists and
criminals access to them.
Another positive development around the world is
the steady institutionalization of the empowerment of
women. This, too, has implications that we can scarcely
anticipate.
In short, a lot of things that are happening in
the world are changing people’s values, practices,
institutions, and beliefs. We do not know exactly
what they will mean for complex processes like global
climate change. But clearly, climate change does not
operate in a vacuum. Rather, it competes and interacts
with a lot of other important global forces.
Defining National Security.
At a conference dedicated to studying the national
security implications of global climate change we need
to think about what we mean by national security.
Political scientists who are focused on security studies
and international relations tend to look to things like
territorial integrity, critical infrastructure, national
identity, protection of people, a government’s ability
to govern, and our military’s readiness when they
seek to define national security. But in a world that is
changing dramatically, it may be that these things, so
long a part of security studies, need to be reconsidered.
For example, compare the notion of territorial integrity
to the idea of a state’s ecological footprint, that is to
say, the amount of resources that a country uses to
maintain itself. For much of the world, the latter is
far larger than the former. The United States, Canada,
Australia, and a number of other countries have such
an abundance of resources that we and they could
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probably maintain a very healthy lifestyle for some
time without drawing on resources from the rest of the
world. In the case of other countries—Japan, Israel,
and Switzerland, for example—territoriality does not
really define what they need to be secure in the sense
of being able to maintain their standard of living.
Critical infrastructure no longer stops at national
borders. Technologies have integrated our information
and communication systems into global systems, and
while we depend on these, they have a life of their
own.
National identity is being changed. Here in the
United States we can probably cope—our country is
accustomed to tremendous diversity and to people
engaged in complex relationships with the rest of the
world. But many countries must deal with a sudden
influx of large numbers of people who pose a challenge
to their traditional identity.
In a recent book, Princeton professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter argues that our government is already
becoming transnational. She says, in effect, that we
can no longer maintain the sort of image of territorial
and political autonomy that was so popular during the
19th and 20th centuries. In fact, if we were to cut off
our government from the rest of the world, we would
reduce its capacity in a significant way.2
These challenges to conventional ways of thinking
about security are significant. They may be more
advanced elsewhere, and we may be coming to terms
with them later than, say, the countries that have
formed the European Union and really grasp the
logics of interdependence. Very likely, because of the
somewhat erratic character of global change, national
security will not mean the same things to all people
for a very long time—if ever. I think that today our

59

cherished and historically grounded definitions are
not as persuasive to everybody as they were during
the 20th century.
Climate Change and Security.
Both the planet’s climate and its understandings of
security are in flux. Fortunately, when we try to think
of how to link climate change to security, we are not
starting with an entirely blank sheet of paper. For the
past 20-30 years, researchers have been working to
link environmental change and security in a variety of
ways.3 Now some people who study security argue
that this linkage does not have a lot of explanatory
power or add much that is new. They believe that
the existing set of theories about war, conflict, and
threat can accommodate things like migrations due to
desertification or competition over oil, which trigger
processes no different than the familiar competitions
over state power or market share.
The environmental security scholars do, however,
have some important and novel insights. For example,
they appreciate the security significance of population
growth.4 Not everyone agrees on statistical estimates,
but world population is expected to grow by a couple
of billion during the next 50 to 100 years. It is wellestablished that we are already overusing the bioproductive capacity—the renewable food and energy—
of the planet. Consider that three billion people are
today living in conditions of dire poverty and that
another two or three billion people are going to be
added into this category. Consider further that we are
currently using some 2.3 hectares of bioproductivity
per person to maintain the lifestyle that we have
globally today, and that we probably do not have more
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than about one and a half hectares of bioproductivity
to give to each person on the planet. In other words, we
are using up resources like fish and forests faster than
they can be replenished. Indeed, influential scientists
like E. O. Wilson, the Harvard biologist, are even more
pessimistic about the relationship between renewable
resources and consumption rates than what I am
suggesting here.5 This poses a very serious problem.
It means that there are a whole lot of people who have
little, if any, prospects of ever pulling themselves out
of dire poverty and the imperative of basic survival,
no matter how unsustainable this may be. It would be
remarkable if technology could close this gap between
bioproductivity and consumption in the space of
the next 50 or 100 years. Environmental security
scholars looking at the social implications of this type
of scarcity are doing useful work which does, I think,
have enormous implications for climate change, which
is going to place further pressure on many renewable
natural resources.
Another line of scholarly research that has been
pursued examines the relationship between natural
resource abundance, greed, and violent conflict. While
the widespread and violent competition over things
like diamonds, gold, and oil throughout the world does
not add much in terms of theory to our understandings
of security, we should be aware that competition over
resources like oil could increase as the world warms up
or as other types of changes take place and the demand
for energy grows.
According to last year’s Human Security Report put
out by the University of British Columbia, the world is
overall becoming a more peaceful, more cooperative,
and less violent place. This is obviously, on the whole,
encouraging. But although there have been great gains
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in terms of reducing the number of people killed in
war and displaced by war, there are, nonetheless,
many seemingly intractable areas of extreme violence.
These areas do largely coincide with areas where one
finds conditions of scarcity or violent competition for
control of a natural resource like oil or gold.
So the big question is what will happen as we
add two billion more people to a planet which is not
producing enough for the six billion people already in
existence? Will the additional stress of climate change
create the kind of conditions that make it difficult,
or even impossible, to find rational ways to meet the
needs of the world? Will collaboration continue, or are
we going to see increased competition for pieces of a
pie which will be getting smaller and smaller for a lot
of people? Evidence from the Sudan and Rwanda and
throughout South Asia suggests that there is a very tight
set of connections between forms of environmental
stress, lack of access to credit, confusion over property
rights, and poverty and inequality.6 There is also a
strong relationship between these conditions and the
existence of violent conflict and other forms of human
insecurity.7 I think the environmental security literature
has introduced into the security studies field some
ideas that are significant and worth taking seriously.
Against this background, climate change and
security can be linked in a number of ways. Where
climate changes abruptly, security problems will
be immediate and extensive and perhaps even
existential. We can easily envision threats on this scale
in Bangladesh or other poor low-lying countries, but
even here a significant number of Americans would
be affected by a sudden barrage of massive flooding,
Katrina-sized hurricanes, and tropical disease
epidemics—perhaps enough to make climate change
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a national security issue. Another possible threat that
we should take seriously is that of the gradual erosion
of American power as endless demands are placed on
it due to abrupt changes elsewhere. These are likely
to arise as we face humanitarian disasters, as drought
intensifies throughout Africa, and as South Asia
collapses into conflict over things like fresh water. The
greater our sense of interdependence, the greater our
sense that national security depends on the welfare of
things beyond our borders, and the more likely it is
that the climate change will be a real security threat.
This poses a big problem today. To what extent should
we intervene to assist abroad? When should we use
our resources and when should we show restraint? It
is going to be difficult to make these decisions. We are
playing with a lot of uncertainty. We do not know how
other actors in the world will behave.
Gradual climate change, by its very nature, creates
more opportunities for effective adaptation and
mitigation measures, but I want to raise one concern—
complacency. Like many things in life, the sooner
we invest, the cheaper it will be. I think as a nation
we are ignoring a lot of compelling data about what
is happening because so far the changes inside our
country have been quite manageable. But think of the
models of the first two speakers. Now is the time to
work hard to reduce energy use, increase efficiency,
implement green design, revise our education and
research programs, adopt alternative energy forms,
and reduce consumption.
Further complicating matters, we also know
that there will be winners and losers as the world’s
climate changes. Not everyone will experience the
same kind of problems, and some areas will find the
changes conducive to human settlement and increased
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agricultural output and so on. But overall, the expected
downside massively outweighs any predicted upside.
The menu of likely threats includes severe weather
events, changes in the food supply, massive flooding,
and dramatic changes in microbial activity that will
lead to the spread of infectious disease. Indeed, many
analysts believe that we are very close to a global
pandemic. They anticipate a transfer of disease from
the animal kingdom to the human kingdom that will
be highly virulent. A lot of these transfers have taken
place in the past 3 decades because environmental
conditions are changing and because people are being
forced into marginal environments where they come
into close contact with pathogens with which they
have not had any contact in the past.
South Asia.
At this point, let me put a concrete face on all of this
by looking at a specific place. Let me examine what
might happen in South Asia. A quarter of the world
lives there. It is a region already facing water scarcity.
Much of the fresh water comes from the mountain
regions. If the glaciers continue to melt and snow
patterns continue to change as we now see happening,
people may, for a couple of decades, think that there
is a lot of fresh water to be had. That is, there will
be a temporary increase in many areas. But this will
suddenly and quite abruptly change, and the people
there will soon find that there is, in fact, a real scarcity
of fresh water in an area that has one and a half billion
people and in which there are two nuclear powers.
Now there is disagreement in the academic
literature over the extent to which competition over
water leads to violent conflict rather than being worked

64

out institutionally. But whatever the trends of the
past, there is general agreement that climate change
could create an entirely new type of water politics.
South Asia is an area of considerable concern in this
regard. If we look at water-related conflict in South
Asia, there have been 10 incidents of violent conflict in
the past 7 years. In the 53 years before, there were only
three incidents. In other words, water-related violent
conflict has increased 24-fold in the past 7 years. Fresh
water is clearly the cause of grave concern throughout
the subcontinent these days. Nepal, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh worry that India is using its enormous
power to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements that
may not be on their best interests. So these countries
are already very nervous about their prospects for
fresh water over the next 20, 30, or 40 years, but they
are not sure what to do.
They are aware, however, that their fresh water
supply could collapse dramatically, and they are
concerned about how this will play out. Let me give
you one example from my own research that I think
is somewhat illustrative of what might lie in the not
too distant future. Nepal, of course, is a fairly small
country, 30 million people, but it is an extremely poor
country, a country with a very low literacy rate and low
rates in things like the United Nations (UN) Human
Development Index, where it ranks at the very bottom
of the planet’s 192 countries or close to the bottom. It
is a country that has experimented with democracy. It
has also experienced 10 years of extreme civil conflict
that has driven the government to invest less and less
in education and fresh water and sanitation and more
and more in security. Nepal has a population that is
very youthful, growing very rapidly, concentrated
in a small number of areas. In short, it has all the
conditions for violent conflict. It is transforming into
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a democracy, it is extremely impoverished, there is a
high population density, and the big issue today is land.
During 10 years of insurgency, the Maoists promised to
redistribute land once they came into power, but since
they joined the parliamentary system in November,
they have backed away from this promise in two ways.
Now they are saying, “Well, we will not redistribute
any land of less than 10 hectares because that would be
costly and disruptive, and, as for the formula for the
rest, we have no idea what it should be, because we do
not want to throw our economy into chaos by scaring
away our local expertise and foreign investors.”
So right now the politics of Nepal is defined by
a tremendous expectation for land reform and very
little clue of how to reform land ownership and access.
What people are also starting to recognize is that land
reform will need to be somehow integrated with access
to fresh water. But fresh water is something that Nepal
has been losing. It sees itself as a water rich country,
but it has been losing a considerable amount to India.
For example, in the 1950s people were encouraged
to move to a wetland area of the Koshi River system
to take pressure off the Kathmandu Valley. Half of
this wetland was then leased to India because India
has tremendous thirst for fresh water and needed it
for irrigation in the north. Then the other half was
turned into a protected site because the people were
destroying it. What happened to the people? Well, the
people, feeling uncompensated, appear to have been
mobilized by the Maoists, who promised to return the
wetland to them as soon as they were in power. Now
you have a situation in which millions of people are
waiting to recover or gain access to water and land that
they believe is rightfully theirs, and the Maoists have
no idea how they are going to satisfy this expectation—
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one they cultivated. Meanwhile, Maoists have risen in
power significantly in India in the past couple of years.
These Naxalites are calling the Nepali Maoists soft
because they are not dealing with the water and land
issues that they promised they would deal with. This
is a sort of pattern we are going to see more and more
of. Ultimately there is no easy solution to the land and
water issues in South Asia. Climate changes are likely
to make these problems even more difficult to solve
than in the past.
In conclusion, we face a gap between what we need
to do to ensure security and what we are actually doing.
Technology has moved us into a new world where we
have new needs. Our old institutions are not adequate
to meet these needs. The question is, are we going to
be able to develop new institutions? Or are we going to
try to use our existing ones? Time does not permit us
to elaborate on how we might close this gap but clearly
research on institutional reform and cooperation are
key elements.
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Commentator
James A. Rotenberg
University of North Carolina, Wilmington
At the G8 conference back in 2005, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair referred to Climate Change as
“Probably long term, the single most important issue we
face as a global community. . . .” The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Climate Change
Report which came out earlier this year made the same
point. On page 5, it says that the warming of climate is
unequivocal. We are now about 90 percent confident of
the accuracy of our data. We not only have historical
data and more recent climate change models, but we
also are more certain in our understanding of how
climate change might affect security. We probably
should mention that not everyone agrees—it has been
said that global warming is the “greatest hoax ever
perpetrated on the American people.”
Let us briefly put this issue into a broader context. I
myself am a tropical environmental ecologist. I study
birds as environmental indicators of change. Global
warming affects human populations, as we have heard.
It also affects other biological organisms. A recent study
looked at the range of occurrence of various different
birds of about 35 neotropical migratory species that fly
south for the winter and come back to North America
to breed in the spring and summer. The breeding range
of seven of these have already shifted significantly in
the past 25 years on an average of more than 65 miles,
likely due to climate change. What does that mean
or why should we even care? In fact, these birds can
serve as the proverbial canary in a coal mine. They
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can provide us with significant information about the
availability of resources. Another study done by Jeff
Price for the American Bird Conservatory used a climate
model to model bird activity and the bird activity to
look at future rain distribution for North America.
The model predicted definite net changes for birds all
across America—with some birds moving to different
areas in response to climate, and other species being
lost altogether. E. O. Wilson (preeminent scholar of
Ecology, and author of books such as Biodiversity and
The Future of Life) recently visited UNC-Wilmington. I
asked him, “What is the greatest issue facing us right
now, Dr. Wilson?” Immediately, he responded with
“climate change,” and in particular he went on to say
that climate change and global warming will alter our
resources and resource needs for the future.
I’m sure most of you have heard of Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring. Why “silent?” Well, because the birds
were not singing anymore. The book, published in the
1960s, was about pesticide use and its negative effects
on birds. A few decades later, John Terborgh wrote a
book on bird conservation, entitled Where Have All the
Birds Gone? Essays on the Biology and Conservation of Birds
That Migrate to the American Tropics, which addressed
bird population declines due to habitat destruction in
the topics. Will the pivotal book of the next decade be
on Birds and Climate Change?
Let me conclude by posing several questions. First,
how will environmental change, in particular, resource
needs, such as water, food, and energy, shape our world
in the future? To what extent will security concerns
affect our thinking on the environment? This first panel
has made me realize that I do, in fact, address security
dimensions in my global environmental class—I
talk about such matters as the needs of the poor, the
changing demographics of human populations, and
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how water scarcity may really change how we look at
things. Second, what is the role of the military? Can
they really combat climate change? And third, can we
be a giving nation as well as a nation that sees to its
own needs? Thank you.
Discussion
Q: Can global climate models predict local changes?
If not, what can be done to improve our capability in
this area?
Corell: Global models, which call for supercomputers, do not provide nuanced information about
local changes. To get a finer scale, we have developed
two techniques. The first entails dynamic downscaling,
which is expensive and still calls for powerful
computers. You nest a finer grid within the larger grid
and connect the two. The second is called statistical
downscaling. You use weather stations and databases
to characterize what is going on in a region over a given
period and then build a statistical relationship between
that fine scale behavior and large scale computer
models. It takes about 30 years to get the statistics to
stabilize. The results are interesting: In Norway, for
example, the computer model Global One says there is
no temperature difference between north and south.
When one is using downscaling, we get a five to one
difference.
Q: You talk about the gradual erosion of American
power that may occur as humanitarian disasters take
place what do you mean?
Matthew: Our military capability is only so great.
Last year there were 800 natural and human disasters
around the world. If that number continues to increase
as predicted, our resources will be strained.
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Q: How high will sea levels rise in the course of this
century?
Corell: Estimates differ. In its February 2 report
based on the computer models, the IPCC suggested
something on the order of a foot and half. Remember,
that they cannot use any data that has not been
published in peer reviewed journals. They also do
not include material published in the last 18 months.
Most scientists would argue that the ice sheet melts
from Greenland and Antarctica, and from the glaciers
of the land mass, will push that number up closer to
a meter. I don’t think any responsible persons are
talking about a three, four, or five meter sea level rise
during this century. Remember, though, that there will
be differences—rather remarkable ones—around the
globe, depending on the topography and other effects.
The Chesapeake Bay, for example, is rising at twice the
global rate. That is because it is a Helmholtz resonator
which amplifies effects as tides move about. It also
experiences subsidence. There was a glacier there that
ended by the bay bridge. As the glacier formed, the
elastic soil pushed a bow wave ahead of it. As it goes
away, this wave subsides—that is what causes the 50
percent relative sea level rise. All this causes confusion.
I would argue in favor of an estimate of about a meter
rise in the general sea level this coming century.
Weart: I was at a meeting very recently with the
Assessment Group looking at rapid ice sheet change.
They noted that ice sheets are more sensitive than
previously thought to temperature rise, so we may see
more than this. And we may also see very rapid rises.
A surge that would raise sea levels by a meter within
a few decades would be very catastrophic for coastal
populations.
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Q: A professor at The Massachusetts Institute of
Technolgy (MIT) spoke of a moderating effect that will
keep the temperature rise to one or perhaps one and a
half degrees over the next 100 years. Have you heard
this explanation?
Corell: Yes. I have debated this with him in public
and private. One of the beauties of science is that
there is always someone to challenge the system. The
lonely voice ought always to be encouraged but not
necessarily believed as equal to the collective wisdom.
We should remember that the IPCC arrives at its
conclusions only after looking and judging a wide
range of scientific papers and after a lot of debate and
discussion. It also chooses its words very carefully. So
when it says something is likely or very likely, that has
statistical meaning.
Q: Can you speak to the likelihood of abrupt climate
change?
Corell: This is something which we are still
struggling to get a handle on. Most of the models are
monotonic in their behavior. Our best estimates use
what we might call the analog. This means we go back
in time and try to find a case where the conditions
were similar and then draw some conclusions about
abruptness. At the moment we can speak with much
less confidence about abrupt than long-term change.
We do know, though that these things happen: We
know, for example, that the thermal hyaline circulation
was dramatically readjusted in the North Atlantic as
we came out of the last ice age. At the Heinz Center,
we are looking at threshold systems/tipping points.
We can do a little better in ecological systems. Certain
plant species are temperature sensitive, so changes in
their growing area can tell us what is happening. Those
tipping points are driven by temperature, and other
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tipping points are driven by phase change between ice
and water. The methane release in the Arctic is going
to be dramatically affected by the bog and permafrost
melt. On the grand scale, I would say it is still pretty
tough to give you some sense of what will happen—in a
century or two we might see thermal haline circulation
adjustment.
Weart: It is possible to frame climate change as
an insurance problem. In the late 1990s reinsurance
companies and others who handle events like massive
hurricanes began to be concerned that climate change
might increase the occurrence of such abrupt events. We
could, I think, follow the insurance model in national
security. When it comes to climate change, there are
things that we are pretty sure will happen. We need to
invest considerable resources into dealing with these.
At the same time, there are things that probably won’t
happen but could. Given their potentially catastrophic
nature, we must still make some provision for these.
Corell: I want to build on that. We need to put this
whole problem in some sort of a risk management
framework. The military really does understand how
to evaluate risk. For us to govern our lives by the
mean temperature would make no more sense than
for military strategy to be dictated by the average of
something happening. It makes sense to put what we
are doing into some sort of risk probabilistic framework.
I recently met with Pacific Gas and Electric. It took some
of the senior managers a while to take to the notion that
their company ought to be become the first ever to be
fossil free. What made them see the value in what we
were doing was when we asked them, how many of
you ever have had your house burn down? No hands
went up. How many of you have fire insurance? Every
hand went up. Nesting climate change and these other
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factors that are affecting our future in this framework
will go a long way towards giving us a much sounder
ground on which to work.
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CHAPTER 2
HUMAN SECURITY
How exactly climate change and conflict are linked
remains an area of controversy. Scholars disagree as to
how far resource shortages, the spread of disease, human
migration on a massive scale, and other climate-generated
factors might exacerbate existing conflicts. In Chapter 2,
Dr. Erika Weinthal considers water-generated conflict, Dr.
Andrew Price-Smith focuses on disease, and Dr. Timothy
McKeown analyzes the complex way demographic shifts
relate to conflict.
Water, Climate Change, and Human Security
Erika Weinthal
Duke University
I was asked to speak today about water, which is a
very broad topic. Although most of my work on water
has concentrated on the Middle East and Central Asia,
events elsewhere highlight the tremendous disparity
in freshwater resources worldwide. In particular, I am
referring to the tremendous downpours and flooding
in Europe over the last few years and, most recently, in
Indonesia. Yet, elsewhere, the picture is very different.
In the Middle East, shortages are increasingly the norm.
Take the river Jordan. We think of it as the “Mighty”
Jordan, but in the summer, it is a mere trickle. You
cannot even bathe in it. Water scarcity, is, in fact, where
I want to begin. I then want to tie this issue of scarcity
to climate change, and consider how this combination
has an impact upon both human security and conflict.
My first point is that when we think about water as
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a source of conflict, water scarcity usually is the first
thing that comes to mind.1 There are several reasons
why this is so. First of all, the global distribution of
water is uneven. Some states have plenty of water—for
example, there is a tremendous amount of fresh water
in Lake Baikal in the Russian Federation, and Latin
America has about 31 percent of global fresh water—
while other parts of the world (e.g., Northern Africa
and the Middle East) are poorly endowed.
Secondly, it is not just that water is unequally
distributed, but also that most of the world’s major
sources of freshwater are shared between states, forcing
states to negotiate with their neighbors to determine
the appropriate distribution of resources. There has,
nonetheless, been a greater potential for conflict among
riparians since the end of the Cold War, largely owing
to the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
which produced several new international river basins.
Whereas in 1978, there were 214 shared international
river basins, today there are 263.2 Take the Aral Sea
Basin. During the Soviet period, it was an internal
river basin whereby Moscow would decide how to
allocate the water among the five different Central
Asian republics. When the Soviet Union collapsed,
new territorial borders sprang up, and conflicts arose
between the upstream and downstream riparians in
Central Asia over how water would be utilized for
both irrigation and hydroelectricity generation.3 The
Danube River basin, following the reconstitution of
East Central Europe, is now shared by 19 countries,
and here conflicts have transpired in the early 1990s
over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dams.
The situation is no different if you look to other
regions. In South Asia, the Ganges Brahmaputra
is shared by six states and the Indus by five. In the
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Middle East, the Jordan is shared by five. Finally, in
Africa, there are a large number of river basins that are
shared—the Congo, the Zambezi, the Okavango, the
Volta, the Niger, and the Nile, which is shared by no
less than 11 countries.
Water sharing in Africa is especially complicated
because it is a region that has been ravaged by numerous
internal conflicts over the last few decades. It is also
a region that will likely be greatly affected by climate
change—in particular, an increase in desertification
along the Sub-Saharan zone. Thus, finding solutions to
Africa’s water crisis will also invariably entail dealing
with the effects of climate change as well as other sociopolitical issues related to water resources distribution.
The region that is usually most associated with
water related conflict is the Middle East. In a famous
quote, Boutros Boutros-Ghali said: “The next war in
the Middle East will be fought over water and not
politics.”4 A number of people have suggested—not
without good reason—that water will drive future
political conflicts in the Middle East.
For example, how the waters of the Jordan River
should be used and by whom has been very contentious
for those riparians with a claim to its waters. That the
issue is so highly contested is attested by its inclusion
in the formal peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.
Similarly, the Oslo Accords had a section on water
and a section on the environment, as water is of vital
economic importance to both Israelis and Palestinians.
The Israelis and Palestinians agreed to negotiate a
solution to share the mountain and coastal aquifers
at the height of the Oslo Accords. This is unusual. In
the aftermath of wars, there is usually a tendency to
postpone dealing with really heated issues—and in the
Middle East, water belongs to that category.5 Thus, it
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is rare to find water (and other environmental issues)
directly included in a peace treaty. In both these cases,
however, peacemakers clearly recognized that a
resolution to the issue of water sharing was essential
for maintaining the peace and rebuilding economies
and societies.
It is the scarcity of the resource, then, which is most
closely associated in people’s minds with conflict and
human insecurity. And, to tie this talk back to climate
change—the primary theme of the conference—we
do know that changes in precipitation, temperature,
and carbon dioxide levels will affect the supply of and
demand for renewable water resources. However,
scarcity is only one part of the picture. There are other
things which we need to factor in when assessing the
role played by water in conflict, including the capacity
of state institutions to adapt, the quality (as opposed to
simply the quantity) of water, and demographics.
The effects of climate change will vary because
some states are more vulnerable and less able to adapt
than others. Developing countries often do not have
the institutional or technological capacity to plan for
some of the changes that are most likely to come about.
When we come up with models, it is important that
we consider what kind of states we are looking at and
think about whether or not we need to develop different
planning strategies for different states—that is, the
ability to implement our models might be contingent
upon the particular institutional configuration within
any one state.
Water quality, moreover, must also be taken into
consideration. There are 1.1 billion people worldwide
that lack access to clean water, and 2.6 billion people
that lack access to sanitation.6 Most of this population,
again, is in Sub-Saharan Africa or in Asia. A society—
even one likely to be dramatically affected by climate
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change—is not likely to give much thought to planning
for this eventuality if most of its energies are focused on
just trying to procure water to meet very basic human
needs.
Let us return to a consideration of the Middle East.
This region is very arid. Countries with an annual
availability of less than 1,000 cubic meters per person
are considered to be water-scarce. Countries which
have less than 500 cubic meters annually are considered
absolute scarce. The Gaza strip, for example, is very
water stressed.7 Each person has access to no more
than about 320 cubic meters annually. The water
resources—from the coastal aquifer—are shared
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Here,
water flows from Israel into the Gaza Strip—that is,
towards the Mediterranean Sea. In the Gaza Strip, the
water quality is extremely poor—the water salinity is
very high. In addition to an overall water shortage,
there is a significant shortage of safe drinking water.
Add to this the fact that Gaza has one of the fastest
growing populations in the world—about 4 percent
growth rate per year. It is very common for individual
women to have about seven children. Nearly 1.5 million
Palestinians live on a very small piece of land, and the
population is expected to reach 2.5 million in the next
decade. Given the current consumption rates of water
resources, the natural replenishment rate is far lower,
which means that there is a growing water deficit and
increasing magnitude of the water crisis.
Attention must also be paid to demographics.
Population growth is going to exacerbate the effects of
climate change especially in regions like the Gaza Strip.
The net effect of climate change on water availability
will be limited in some regions. In other regions,
climate change, compounded by population growth,
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will actually have a much greater impact globally.8
This is especially true of regions such as North Africa
and the Middle East. It is estimated that in the year
2025 about 3 billion people might be living in waterstressed areas.
How will climate change affect the more long-term
prospects of a post-conflict society? We tend to focus on
the conflicts themselves and how to bring them to an
end. We do not devote enough time to thinking about
the next stage. What happens after a conflict ends?
A recent finding suggests that many people will die
following a civil war because they lack good drinking
water and are forced to live in unsanitary conditions.9
Far more people, in fact, die every year from poor water
quality than they do in war. For example, 1.8 million
children die from diarrhea and water-borne illnesses
yearly.
People also migrate during and after conflicts. This
not only leads to the spread of infectious diseases but it
puts added stress on strained water resources. Consider,
for example, the case of Iraq today. Thousands of people
are moving into Jordan. It is one of the few places they
can go. They have also been trying to get into Syria.
Water is already scarce in these areas. In Jordan,
current supplies barely provide enough water for its
rapidly growing population. Thus, the government
could face mounting pressure to develop more rapidly
its fossil (i.e., nonsustainable) groundwater. Consider
also the case of Bangladesh. Here, if the models are
correct, monsoons will be more intense, and flooding
will also be more intense in the future. In that case, we
are likely to see an unprecedented scale of migration
within Bangladesh and into neighboring countries
such as India. Groups are likely to compete for scarce
resources and/or poor quality resources—another
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situation ripe for conflict.
Before I conclude, I would like to return to the
question of adaptability. Why are some countries
more vulnerable to climate change than others?
More particularly, why do some countries choose
not to adapt? Sometimes it is because to do so would
require reforming their economies, which would entail
tremendous social and political costs. To understand
this, one must understand something about agriculture
and water use and bear in mind that approximately
80 percent of water consumed worldwide goes into
supporting agriculture.
Central Asia provides a classic example. Two rivers
here feed into the Aral Sea: the Syr Darya and the Amu
Darya. Water has been withdrawn from these rivers
for 50 years to support a system of cotton monoculture.
This form of agriculture in turn supported a system
of social and political control.10 It kept people on the
farms, and more importantly allowed governments to
control the economy and, essentially, to control people’s
livelihoods. It ensured that they would not have the
chance to challenge the government (especially during
the Soviet era) because they had certain basic needs
provided for.
This cotton monoculture desiccated the Aral Sea,
basically dividing it into two lakes—a northern lake
and southern lake. Today there are still more demands
being made on the water system. The conflict in
Afghanistan has ended, and steps have been taken to
rebuild its feeble economy. Afghanistan contains about
17 percent of the water resources in the Aral Sea Basin.
There has been a lot of interest among the international
community in helping Afghanistan redevelop the upper
watershed for agriculture as the basis for economic
reconstruction there. But this will have tremendous
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effects on the downstream states such as Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan which are highly dependant on this
water for agriculture.
More importantly, the rivers in Central Asia are
fed by glaciers in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and in
Tajikistan. Climate change could accelerate snowmelt,
which would affect the seasonal flow. This would affect
thousands of livelihoods downstream, as it could have
an impact upon the current cropping patterns.
In short, these systems are all interlinked. If we
just focus on the snowmelt and what is happening
with the glaciers, we will fail to see what is happening
downstream in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Here
you find a system of cotton farming, which in turn
is linked to government and social control. If these
countries find themselves forced to restructure their
entire economies so as to be able to deal with climate
change, they may find themselves facing increased
social unrest.
To conclude, when we think about water and
conflict, and how these two relate, it is important that
we think about the complex ways natural processes
and social processes are linked. Thank you.
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On Climate Change and Infectious Disease:
Implications for Political Destabilization
and Conflict
Andrew Price-Smith
Colorado College
On Etiology and Emergence.
In the 21st century, novel pathogens are currently
“emerging” at the rate of approximately one new agent
per annum. Emerging diseases often are the result of
“emergent properties” wherein antecedent variables
(e.g., population density, speed of transport) combine
in unusual and unforeseen ways that facilitate the
emergence of a given pathogen which then becomes
endogenized within the human ecology. The classic
modern example of such emergent properties leading
to viral proliferation is the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) coronavirus which appeared in
Guangzhou, China, in late 2002, and subsequently
spread throughout the Pacific Rim nations. In that
particular case, this virulent coronavirus spread from
its natural reservoir in east Asian bat populations,
into palm civets. The variant of the virus that infected
civets was transmissible among humans, amplified
by elements of the human ecology such as the “wet
markets” of East Asia, the closed environments of
modern hospitals which amplified degrees of infection,
and modern jet airplane technology that facilitated the
rapid spread of the virus throughout the Pacific theatre.
Individually these disparate variables would not
predict the emergence of epidemic disease; however,
when combined together, the SARS contagion of 200203 resulted.
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The dynamics of contagion frequently exhibit
such emergent properties,1 and the relations between
pathogen, human host, and vectors of transmission
(e.g., mosquitoes) are central to both the transmissibility
and lethality of any given manifestation of contagion.
Furthermore, epidemics and pandemics exhibit
nonlinearities and threshold dynamics. For example,
pathogens may simmer in a given population for some
time, but once the rate of transmission passes from <1 to
>1, the proliferation of the pathogen may then increase
on an exponential scale. Diseases also exhibit high
levels of interactivity, and the capacity for co-infection.
The classic example is HIV which destroys the host’s
immune system, and thereby facilitates colonization
by other pathogens (e.g., tuberculosis) that ultimately
kill the host.
What, then, is the relationship between climate
change, infectious disease, prosperity, and political
stability and security? The complexity of such
interactions is enormous, and so we begin with the
relations between climate and disease, focusing on
malaria in particular.
Data provided by the IPCC regarding changes
in precipitation from 1900-2000 indicate enormous
variance on a global scale. Certain regions, such
as the arctic and sub-arctic regions of the northern
hemisphere, the northeastern sector of south Asia, and
Eastern Australia are clearly enjoying increased levels
of precipitation. Certain vectors of disease, (such as
mosquitoes and snails) thrive in wet environments.
Consequently, increases in precipitation will induce
the proliferation of vectors, and thereby increase the
transmission rates of certain pathogens such as malaria
and schistosomiasis.
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Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2006,
available at www.ipcc.ch/, accessed on April 2007.

Figure 1.

Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2006,
available at www.ipcc.ch/, accessed on April 2007.

Figure 2.
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Pathogens and their vectors of transmission are
often highly sensitive to changes in temperature as well.
IPCC data from 1976-2000 clearly indicate increasing
temperatures for much of the surface of the planet,
with the greatest increases evident in the temperate
to polar regions. As isotherms shift toward the polar
regions, this will expand the latitudinal range of the
vectors in question (i.e., anopheles mosquitoes) and
thereby permit the expansion of malaria in previously
nonmalarious zones. Similarly, increasing surface
temperatures permit the movement of malaria in
higher altitudes than before. For example, Nairobi has
historically been nonmalarial due to its altitude, but
in recent years increases in temperature have seen the
pathogen moving into the region. The temperatureinduced expansion of malaria is problematic because it
exposes novel populations, who often lack any genetic
or acquired immunity to the pathogen. Thus, the
mortality and morbidity in such regions may be much
higher than in zones where malaria is endemic.
Increasing temperatures also affect the biting rate of
vectors. As temperatures rise, the vectors (mosquitoes)
feed with greater frequency, and therefore increase
the transmission rate of the plasmodium (the parasite)
into human populations. Furthermore, increasing
temperatures also affect the extrinsic incubation rate
of the pathogen, such that it replicates within the gut
of the vector at a greatly augmented rate. Thus, under
conditions of higher temperatures, there are greater
numbers of plasmodium within the vector, and the
vector bites with much greater frequency.2 On a macro
level, all of this means that as temperatures increase,
the burden of disease (e.g., malaria) is likely to increase
to a significant degree. Precipitation and Sea Surface
Temperatures (SSTs) are strong predictors of malarial
incidence.3
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In the case of cholera, increasing SSTs are highly
correlated with the growth of algal blooms. The blooms
move across oceans courtesy of dominant currents and
winds and function as vectors of transmission of the
vibrio. Thus, we see a long-term empirical association
between SSTs and the incidence of cholera. In the case of
cholera, we have also seen that incidence is responsive
to the modulation of the El Nino Southern Oscillation
(ENSO), with preliminary evidence from case studies
carried out in Bangladesh.4 There is also considerable
evidence of thresholds and nonlinearities, such that
warming temperatures may produce minor and linear
increases in vibrio incidence until a threshold point
is reached, after which the numbers of the pathogen
increase at an exponential scale.
Schistosomiasis is a frequently lethal disease
induced by parasitic blood flukes, and it is prevalent
in tropical and temperate zones. The vector of the
parasite is the snail (oncomelania) which thrives under
conditions of increased precipitation, and within the
temperature range of 15.3 degrees Celsius (C) to an
optimal temperature of 30 degrees C. The balance of
available evidence suggests that global climate change
(GCC) will shift the distribution of the vectors into
new regions, and thereby afflict previously uninfected
populations. A caveat however, the IPCC data clearly
indicate that certain regions (e.g., West Africa) are
becoming increasingly arid, which is inimical to the
vector. Consequently, those zones that witness declining
precipitation levels will see a decline in the incidence
of schistosomiasis in their respective populations. In
those regions that exhibit increasing precipitation
coupled with increasing temperature, we are likely to
witness augmented geographic zones of transmission
and increased frequency of transmission within those
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regions. Thus, GCC will result in winners and losers,
dependent upon the particular pathogen in question,
and its sensitivity to aridity and temperature.5
Economic Outcomes.
The economic historian Robert Fogel won the
Nobel Prize in economics in 1994 for his analysis of
the hypothesis that population health was the central
driver of economic productivity.6 If health promotes
prosperity, then disease erodes productivity and
wealth. At the microeconomic level, disease erodes productivity through mechanisms such as the debilitation
of workers, increased absenteeism, increased medical
costs, reduced savings and investment, and the
premature death of breadwinners. At the sectoral
level, disease imposes a particular burden upon those
sectors of the economy that are labor-intensive, such
as agriculture and resource-extraction, and thereby
imposes a relatively greater effect upon the economies
of the developing world.
The impact of malaria is illustrative at the
macroeconomic level. Sachs and Malaney estimate
that for those countries where malaria is endemic, the
pathogen generates a 1.3 percent drag on their gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate, per capita/per
annum. Further, Gallup and Sachs estimated that a 10
percent decline in malaria incidence resulted in a 0.3
percent increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita/
per annum. McCarthy estimated that malaria imposed
a drag on the GDP growth rate of affected nations, at the
level of 0.25 to 0.55 percent per annum.7 In case studies
of individual nations, malaria control has resulted
in greater prosperity for the polity in question. For
example, malaria control measures in Zambia resulted
in a $7.1 billion increase to that nation’s economy.8
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The burden of infectious disease falls primarily
upon the poor and middle classes, and therefore as the
burden of disease increases in certain regions, it will
likely exacerbate both the perceived and real level of
economic inequities between socio-economic strata.
Historically, such perceptions of inequity have led to
periods of social and political destabilization.9 On a
global scale, GCC-induced increases in the burden of
disease will exert a drag on the global economy, and
the perpetuation of poverty within the less developed
countries.
Assessments of the economic burden of a given
illness (e.g., malaria) are complicated by the lack
of adequate surveillance infrastructure throughout
much of the developing world where the disease is
endemic.10 Moreover, the complexity of measuring the
economic impact of GCC-induced infectious diseases
is augmented by the interactivity of various pathogens
in a given population. For example, the population
of country X may be increasingly beset by increased
incidence of malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis,
and certain individuals may exhibit co-infection with
one or more pathogens.
Pathogens may also erode the functionality and
efficacy of the state as well. For example, diseaseinduced economic stagnation (or contraction) of the
macro economy will consequently reduce tax-based
revenues available to the state. Diminished revenues
will in turn impede the state’s capacity to provide
public goods and services (e.g., education and law
enforcement) to its population. This may in turn
reduce the populace’s perceptions of the legitimacy of
the state. In the domain of human capital, disease may
further erode state capacity by debilitating and/or
killing trained and skilled personnel, thereby reducing
institutional resilience and efficacy.11
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On Poverty, Instability and Conflict.
The association between poverty, political
destabilization, and outright conflict is complex. In
particular, there is an endogeneity issue regarding the
direction of causality. However, we can make some
preliminary observations at this point. First, various
iterations of the State Failure Task Force conducted
empirical investigations and determined that infant
mortality (as a measure) is a strong empirical predictor
of state failure.12 Ted Gurr argued that increasing levels
of poverty induced a psychological state of deprivation
(perceived injustice) that often led to intrastate conflict.13
This hypothesis that conditions of deprivation (both
real and perceived) led to civil strife was supported by
Deininger, and low levels of the Human Development
Index are associated with conflict in Indonesia.14 Other
political scientists have found that poverty combines
with ethnic fragmentation to produce intrastate
conflict.15 Charles Tilly has argued that inequities are
directly associated with intrastate conflict.16 Further,
there is empirical evidence that social polarization
leads to conflict, and that conflict may function as a
“coping strategy” for those populations confronted
with extreme levels of economic deprivation.17
Convincing arguments take the form of the state
weakness hypothesis wherein deprivation combines
with a weakened state to offer both the motive and
the opportunity for political violence, with evidence
from numerous case studies.18 Political scientists have
also hypothesized that increased levels of infectious
disease may lead to conflict between sovereign states.19
Although there is evidence that contagion leads to
political acrimony and trade disputes between nations,
there is no evidence that infectious disease results in
93

war between nations.20 Despite the proliferation of
literature to support the hypothesis that economic
deprivation generates political violence at the intrastate
level, additional cross-national empirical analysis,
using time-series data, is required. That said, the
balance of existing evidence supports the hypothesis.
Conclusions.
Pathogens function as stressors that impose burdens
on both populations (i.e., society), and upon the
structures of the state itself. Historical analysis of the
stresses generated by epidemic disease demonstrate
that pathogens have exacerbated pre-existing conflicts
between socio-economic classes, between ethnicities,
and between those of different religious affiliations;
and have frequently induced conflicts between states
and societies.21 Thus, the GCC-induced proliferation
of disease may facilitate socio-political destabilization,
particularly in the weak states and impoverished
populations of the developing world. However, such
destabilization is contingent upon several factors, it is
pathogen-specific, and it depends upon existing socioeconomic and political cleavages within the polity
in question. Areas at risk of such disease-induced
destabilization include the subtropical to temperate
zones as tropical pathogens and their attendant
vectors expand into these contiguous zones to affect
immunologically naïve populations. Thus, we should
be concerned about nations in South Asia, Central and
East Asia, Southern Africa, and South America.
The effects upon the security of the United States
will be indirect. However, in the post September 11, 2001
(9-11) era, we now recognize that weak and failed states
in the developing world may generate externalities
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(such as terrorism) that threaten the material interests
of the dominant powers of the international system,
including the United States.
In conclusion, further research is required to flesh
out the complex chain of possible causation that I
have detailed above. This will require the formation
of interdisciplinary teams of both social and natural
scientists who will then model the impacts of climate
change upon disease, and the consequent effects
upon the economic and political domains. This might
involve the compilation of a time-series dataset across
a representative sample of countries. One obvious
problem involves modeling the long-term processes
of climate change. However, we might use the ENSO
effect to model how short-term changes in climate
induce variance in disease incidence, and then observe
the resulting economic and political impacts over the
very short term.
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Climate Change, Population
Movements, and Conflict
Timothy J. McKeown
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Climate change will directly affect the operating
environment of military forces through such specific
changes as the melting of polar ice packs and the
thawing of permafrost. However, its impact on
international security will arguably be greater through
its pervasive and complex effects on the globe’s human
societies, especially on population movements. As the
2005 example of Hurricane Katrina illustrates, extreme
weather events sometimes trigger large, unplanned
population movements. Even when the effects are felt
in the form of less dramatic but lengthier departures
from established patterns, sizeable emigrations can be
triggered when local conditions reach a point where
local economic and social support systems begin to
break down. The experience of eastern Oklahoma
during the Dust Bowl period of the 1930s is a good
example of this.
In this section,1 I summarize the array of effects on
societies identified in current climate change research
based on the 2007 report of Working Group II of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).2
Next, I discuss effects on the United States, then the
results of a project that has developed a procedure
for representing each nation’s vulnerability to climate
change by a climate change vulnerability index.
The index numbers are a simple way to depict how
climate change might confer relative advantages or
disadvantages on a number of powers. A fourth section
summarizes research on how population movements
—a likely response to extreme weather or to climate
changes rendering some regions less habitable—are
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related to the occurrence of violent political conflict.
I conclude with a discussion of the implications for
national security if the forecast changes in climate and
associated population changes do indeed take place. It
is, of course, possible that some forecasts are unduly
pessimistic, others unduly optimistic, and that some
significant effects simply have not been anticipated at
all. However, all national security planning takes place
in an environment of uncertainty, and enough research
has been conducted that many of the forecasts have a
substantial basis in historical data and experimental
observations.
Current Assessments of the General Impacts
of Climate Change.
Even among highly educated members of the
U.S. population, the most common understanding of
climate change is to view it as a long, gradual process
producing gradual changes, with the whole system
readily stoppable or reversible once we believe that we
are certain about our understanding of climate change
dynamics.3 That is a faulty understanding for several
reasons, but the one that is most salient from a national
security standpoint is that human vulnerability to
climate change is highly likely to make itself felt not
though the cumulative effects of long, gradual, smooth
processes, but by sudden, extreme events. The recently
completed Report of Working Group II of the Fourth
Assessment of the IPCC finds that extreme weather
conditions will generally become more common over
the 21st century. This is significant because “Climate
change vulnerabilities of industry, settlement and
society are mainly related to extreme weather events
rather than to gradual climate change.”4 Unfortunately
for predictive purposes,
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Vulnerabilities to climate change depend considerably
on specific geographic, sectoral and social contexts. They
are not reliably estimated by large-scale (aggregate)
modeling and estimation. . . . The significance of climate
change (positive or negative) lies in its interactions with
other non-climate sources of change and stress, and its
impacts should be considered in such a multi-cause
context.5

Thus, highly specific and detailed forecasts are
subject to high levels of uncertainty. Although they
are sometimes useful in sensitizing an audience to
possibilities that they had not previously considered,
the fact that most such forecasts are inevitably
inaccurate can also lead an audience to conclude that
forecasters are “crying wolf” simply in an effort to
attract attention. If treated more modestly, as a source
for a series of “rule of thumb” claims, extant research
on climate change does provide helpful insights on how
human societies are likely to be affected. The vividness
of highly specific and detailed predictions is lost, but a
certain level of credibility is gained.
The kinds of claims that current research supports
are summarized below. Taken from the 2007 findings
of Working Group II, this array of forecast social
impacts illustrates a wide variety of climate change
impacts beyond increases in average temperatures.
It also suggests that who is affected is a product of
economic factors—who has access to what resources—
as well as political ones—which governments are
going to adopt and successfully implement policies
designed to mitigate the impacts of climate change?
The issue of who is affected is also not just a matter
of geography, but also of demographics, with some
groups—especially those dependent on the smooth
functioning of the larger social system—especially
vulnerable to negative events.
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Climate Phenomena

Other Casual Factors

Projected Impact

Zones,Groups Affected

a) Increased frequency of extreme events
Tropical cyclones,
storm surge

Population density,
land use in flood-prone
areas; flood defenses;
institutional capacities

Increased vulnerability
in storm-prone coastal
areas; possible effects on
settlements, health, tourism,
economic and transportaion
systems, buildings and
infrastructures

Coastal areas, settlements
and activities; regions and
populations with limited
capacities or resources; fixed
infrastructure; insurance
sector

Extreme rainfall,
riverine floods

As above, plus drainage
infrastructure

As above, plus drainage
infrastructure

As above, plus flood plains

Heat or cold waves

Building design and
internal temperature
control; social contexts;
institutional capacities

Increased vulnerabilities
in some regions and
populations; health
effects; change in energy
requirements

Mid-latitude areas; elderly,
very young, ill or very poor
populations

Drought

Water systems;
competing water uses;
energy demand; water
demand constraints

Water resource challenges
in affected areas; shifts in
locations of population and
economic activities; additional
investments in water supply

Semi-arid and arid regions;
poor areas and populations;
areas with human-induced
water scarcity

b) Changes in mean levels of climate variables
Temperature

Demographic and
economic changes;
land-use changes;
technological innovations;
air pollution; institutional
capacities

Shifts in energy demand;
worsening of air quality;
impacts on settlements’
livelihoods depending on
melt water; threats to built
environment from thawing
permafrost soils in some
regions

Very diverse, but more
vulnerability in places with
populations with more limited
capacities and resources for
adaption

Precipitation

Competition from other
regions or sectors. Water
resouce allocation

Vulnerabilities in some areas
to effects of precipitation
increases (e.g., flooding,
but could be positive) and
in some areas to decreases
(see drought above)

Poor regions and populations

Saline intrusion

Trends in groundwater
withdrawl

Increased vulnerabilities in
coastal areas

Low-lying coastal areas,
especially those with limited
capacities and resources

Sea-level rise

Trends in coastal
development, settlement,
and land uses

Long-term increases in
vulnerabilities of low-lying
coastal areas

As for saline intrusion

Possible significant effects on
most places and populations
in the world, at least for a
limited time

Most zones and groups

c) Abrupt climate change in general
Demographic, economic,
and technological
changes; institutional
developments
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2007: Table 7.3)

Table 1. Projected Social Impacts
of Climate Change.
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These effects are not easily summarized. They
show a wide variety of undesirable changes, an equally
wide variety of affected areas and groups, as well as
substantial uncertainty about the timing, location, and
magnitude of specific events. Because climate change
as a threat is multifaceted, broad-scale, and nonspecific,
we can only be certain that we will be responding to
it, without necessarily knowing which of the above
processes will be most important at any given time or
location.
Effects on the United States.
The 2007 working group II assessment suggests
that the most significant effects on U.S. residents will
likely be:
• effects on coastal regions due to rising oceans,
rising ocean temperatures, more variability in
weather, and more severe weather. Increased
variability of weather not only means more
flooding, but also more droughts.
• effects on river basins due to greater variability
in precipitation, declines in precipitation in arid
and semi-arid areas, and greater winter and
smaller summer flows from snow packs and
glaciers.
• effects on forest, food, and fiber agriculture as a
result of changes in average weather conditions,
and the occurrence of more extreme weather
conditions. In middle to high latitudes, crop
yields might modestly increase, and adaptation
to climate change might minimize negative
effects, but this is less likely to be successful in
lower latitudes and in arid or semi-arid regions,
and for larger increases in temperatures. “Over
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the 21st century, pressure for species to shift
north and to higher elevations will fundamentally rearrange North American ecosystems.”6
• effects on public health as high temperatures and
extreme weather likely lead to more heat-related
mortality, pollution, storm-related fatalities and
injuries, and infectious diseases. The geographic
range of various pests and diseases will shift,
with tropical and sub-tropical varieties moving
to higher latitudes.
Overall, the forecast effects are significant and mostly
negative. However, that is true for most countries.
How is the United States likely to fare compared to
other powers?
Cross-National Comparisons.
Although climate change has and will continue to
impose costs around the globe, these costs are not borne
equally. National security analysts rightly focus on
factors affecting not merely absolute but also relative
capabilities. To the extent that nations differ in their
exposure to adverse effects, their capacity to adapt to
the changes or to mitigate the damages that the changes
inflict, their relative advantages or disadvantages in
military or nonmilitary competition, will be affected.
Maplecroft is a British firm that specializes in
research, management consulting, training, and other
forms of organizational development that bear upon
corporate social responsibility at the global level.
The firm has developed an index of climate change
vulnerability that provides a useful starting point for
considering the question of how differences in national
vulnerabilities to climate change translate into the
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conferring of security advantages or disadvantages
on the world’s nations. Their index relies on a small
number of general measures widely available for the
nations of the world. Scores on the three dimensions
of coastal vulnerability, inland vulnerability, and
health-related vulnerability are averaged to generate
a single summary statistic that serves as a guide to
relative vulnerability. (Details on the construction of
the index are provided in the Appendix). The skeptical
reader might note that it is but one of many such
possible approaches to constructing an index, and that
at this point there is no basis for strongly preferring
it to other plausible contenders. The skeptical reader
would, of course, be correct. However, the necessity to
begin the consideration of the questions involved, its
ready availability, and transparent documentation all
commend it as a useful starting point.
Social Processes Triggered by Climate Change.
The human impacts of these changes that have the
most implications for social disruption—and hence for
national security—fall into two related categories. The
first are the generic consequences of extreme weather
conditions triggering large-scale natural disasters:
large-scale loss of life; of habitation; of essential services
such as drinking water, sewage treatment, and energy;
and of the capacity of the governments in question to
provide order and emergency assistance, and begin the
process of recovery. The second category is all of the
impacts that are a result of relatively large and sudden
migrations of human populations. These might be the
result of a large natural disaster, but can also occur as a
result of gradual deterioration leading to the crossing
of some threshold, after which the situation takes a
dramatic turn for the worse.
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Country
Exposure

Overall
Impact

RANK*
(among 189
countries)

Coastal
Exposure

Inland
Exposure

Health

Poland

Low

12th

Medium

Medium

Medium

Japan

Medium

35th

High

Medium

Low

Australia

Medium

44th

High

Medium

Low

Russia

Medium

46th

Medium

Medium

Low

China

Medium

73rd

High

Low

Medium

Germany

High

93rd

Medium

Extreme

Low

Brazil

High

95th

Medium

Medium

High

India

High

103rd

High

Low

Extreme

Iran

High

155th

Medium

High

High

Canada

Extreme

168th

High

Extreme

Low

USA

Extreme

174th

High

Extreme

Low

Iraq

Extreme

185th

Medium

High

Extreme

* From least to most vulnerable. See Appendix for detailed
explanation of the rankings.
Source: Based on data provided by Maplecroft to accompany
their map of climate change impacts. The map, as well as maps
and data covering greenhouse gas emissions, carbon resources,
renewable energy use, and energy security risk, can be found at
http://www.global-risks.com/content/maps/.

Table 2. Selected Countries Ranked by Forecast
Vulnerability to Effects of Climate Change.
The possibility that climate change could trigger
large population movements, and that these movements
would spawn political conflict and perhaps even largescale violence, has already begun to attract attention
within the U.S. national security community. In a
2003 report, consultants to the Defense Department’s
Office of Net Assessment explored the national
security implications of a relatively abrupt climate
shift triggered by sudden changes in ocean currents.
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In such a situation, large scale population movements
could be triggered by food shortages due to decreasing
global agricultural production, decreased fresh water
supplies, and disruptions in transoceanic movements
of oil and coal.7
Responding to natural disasters is part of the
repertoire of organizational skills that governments
in developed countries supposedly possess. While
in that sense climate change does not pose a novel
challenge, the frequency and the magnitude of such
disasters are likely to increase, and such developments
might impose demands on the existing infrastructure
of civilian and military governmental organizations,
as well as nongovernmental organizations, that these
organizations are not presently equipped to meet.
Similarly, while migration has been a constant
feature of human history, the proportion of the world’s
population migrating at any given time might well
substantially increase, and patterns of migration might
well depart from those experienced in the recent past.
The report of Working Group II is cautious in assessing
these possibilities, merely noting that:
large numbers of displaced people are a likely
consequence of extreme events. Their numbers could
increase, and so could the likelihood of their migration
becoming permanent, if such events increase in frequency.
Yet, disaggregating the causes of migration is highly
problematic, not least [because] individual migrants may
have multiple motivations and be displaced by multiple
factors.8 . . . Estimates of the number of people who may
become environmental migrants are, at best, guesswork
since (a) migrations in areas impacted by climate change
are not one-way and permanent, but multi-directional
and often temporary or episodic; (b) the reasons for
migration are often multiple and complex, and do not
relate straightforwardly to climate variability and change;
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(c) in many cases migration is a longstanding response
to seasonal variability in environmental conditions, it also
represents a strategy to accumulate wealth or to seek a
route out of poverty, a strategy with benefits for both the
receiving and original country or region; (d) there are
few reliable censuses or surveys in many key parts of the
world on which to base such estimates (e.g., Africa); and
(e) there is a lack of agreement on what an environmental
migrant is anyway.9 . . . [R]ising ethnic conflicts can
be linked to competition over natural resources that
are increasingly scarce as a result of climate change,
but many other intervening and contributing causes
. . . need to be taken into account. For example, major
environmentally-influenced conflicts in Africa have
more to do with relative abundance of resources, e.g.,
oil, diamonds, cobalt, and gold, than with scarcity.10 This
suggests caution in the prediction of such conflicts as a
result of climate change.11

U.S. history presents us with a small-scale analogue
to possible global migratory patterns in the form of
the drought-induced exodus of farm families from
Oklahoma in the 1930s. The case is instructive partly
because later droughts in eastern Oklahoma that were
comparable in severity to the “dustbowl” drought did
not spur nearly the same level of emigration.12 Changes
in the economic vulnerability of the population to
drought, the attractiveness of easy-to-reach destinations,
and the capacity of local institutions to counteract the
effects of the drought or adjust to them all help to
account for differences in human responses to highly
similar climatic events. Similarly, Sen and Davis13 have
shown that famines can be as much the consequence
of social, political and economic inequalities that affect
access to food, as they are of pestilence or extreme
weather.
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The Political Consequences of Demographic
Changes.
Nazli Choucri pioneered the modern study of the
political impact of migration and other demographic
changes. Her summary of the importance of demographic factors in violent conflicts14 is still a useful
summary of the factors that are politically significant.
(See Table 3 below.)
Although all of these factors play some role in
some situations, the most frequently important one
is segmental divisions, a category that captures
ethnic or religious differences. Events since 1984
(especially since the break-up of the Soviet empire)
have, if anything, further confirmed the significance
of segmental divisions as sources of violent political
conflict. However, Table 3 is also a useful reminder that
such segmental divisions hardly exhaust the sources of
violent conflict.
Migrating populations often have distinct
characteristics that differentiate them from either
the population from which they are departing or the
ones that will be their new neighbors. Probably the
single most important one from a military security
standpoint is that those most likely to migrate are young
males15—the primary recruitment pool for militaries
and guerrilla armies the world over. Conversely, a
migrating population with large numbers of children or
the elderly means that such a group will require more
aid, or a relatively quick and successful integration of
employable family members into local communities to
provide them with the earnings that they will require
to feed and house their dependents. It also means that
relatively fewer will be of fighting age and joining
militaries or paramilitaries or gangs, and that those
who are of the correct age might feel the tug of family
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Total
Number
of Cases

Background
Factor

Minor
Irritant

Major
Irritant

Central
Importance

Sole
Determinant

Population size*

22

3

15

1

2

1

Absolute size

16

8

4

2

2

0

Size in relation to
resouces

19

1

8

7

2

1

Population change

19

8

6

5

0

0

Absolute rate of growth

25

10

10

3

2

0

Differential rates of
growth

9

3

5

1

0

0

Population
Distribution

35

7

10

13

5

0

Rural/urban
distribution

16

3

10

3

0

0

Population density

7

2

3

2

0

0

Spatial location in
relation to resources

18

3

4

8

3

0

Spatial location in
relation to borders

15

4

5

4

2

0

Population Movement

30

11

6

8

5

0

Population
Composition

32

1

6

11

13

1

Sex distribution

4

2

2

0

0

0

Age distribution

10

3

3

4

0

0

Segmental divisions

31

2

1

10

12

6

Level of knowledge
and skills

26

4

9

10

3

0

Variable

* General factors are in bold type, specific factors are not. The number of cases where a specific
factor affected outcomes is typically less than the number of cases where the general factor did,
because for some cases a given specific factor played no role.

Table 3. Importance of Demographic Factors
in Violent Conflict.
obligations. Assessing the political impacts of any
given flow of people across borders will require going
well beyond simply counting heads and figuring out
how many thousand calories of food will be needed
each day by each group.
Migration becomes easier to the extent that
a migrating population already has ties to their
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destination region. Early migrants play an important
role in welcoming later arrivals, providing them with
familiar products and services, help in adapting to
their new locale, and an immigrant community into
which they can integrate. Thus, migration patterns
tend to exhibit some persistence or inertia.16 Knowing
historical migration patterns has some value for
forecasting where subsequent migrating populations
will go. However, widespread alteration of the earth’s
ecosystems might also disrupt currently observed
migration patterns and create new ones.
Conclusions.
The possibility that climate change will lead to
more instances of extreme weather not easily forecast
far in advance, and that such weather will bring about
sudden and large movements of affected populations,
is probably the most important security challenge that
climate change presents in the near term. Over a long
period, more gradual and longer-term processes are
forecast to drive various ecosystems across thresholds
into new configurations where previous patterns of
human settlement and economic activity might no
longer be possible. Taken together, these forecasts
suggest a substantially greater demand for disaster
management by the array of government agencies,
international organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations that now engage in such activities. The
expected increase in population movements, especially
sudden and unplanned movements, implies the
likelihood of an elevated level of “normal” social and
political turmoil, and a correspondingly higher level of
global political turbulence.
The disruptive effects of climate change will like-
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wise have broad effects on national capabilities. In an
absolute sense, most nations will experience significant
effects; in a relative sense, the resulting distribution of
gains and losses will tend to disadvantage some more
than others. The Maplecroft index suggests that North
America will suffer greater net negative impacts than
most other regions,17 suggesting that there is a strong
case to be made for U.S. leadership in efforts to minimize
the negative effects of greenhouse gas emissions simply
in terms of traditional national security concerns about
relative national capabilities.
While coping with the implications of high levels of
greenhouse gases will require a global response beyond
the capabilities of any single national government,
the United States over much of the post-1945 era has
several times confronted situations where national
objectives could only be met by international action. The
United States has often responded to these situations
by becoming a leader in fashioning international
institutions to create international public good in the
realms of military security and economic prosperity.
Both U.S. and global interests would be well-served by
a similarly energetic and imaginative effort to create
the international institutions that will be necessary in
order to cope with the looming consequences of climate
change.
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Appendix
The Maplecroft Climate Change
Vulnerability Index
The Maplecroft Climate Change Index is intended
to capture nations’ relative levels of exposure to the
physical and health impacts of climate change. The
index has three components: coastal exposure, inland
exposure, and health exposure. The Index is simply the
unweighted mean of each country’s three scores.
Coastal Exposure.
This component quantifies the exposure of each
country to rises in sea levels and increasing coastal
flooding during storms. It is based on the following
indicators:
• Percentage of land below five meters above sea
level.18 Weight: 40%.
• Percentage of population living below five
meters above sea level.19 Weight: 40%.
• Total number of people affected by tropical
storms between 1975 and 2005 as a percentage
of the population.20 Weight 20%.
Inland Exposure.
This component quantifies the exposure of each
country to extreme temperature events, inland flooding, and food availability. It is based on the relative risk
factors presented in the World Health Organization
(WHO) publication, “Comparative Quantification of
Health Risks.”21 The risk factor is defined as future
changes in global climate attributable to increasing
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.
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Projections of the extent and geographical
distribution of climate change within each nation were
calculated by WHO by applying various emissions scenarios to the Hadley Centre’s HadCM2 global climate
model.22 The HadCM2 model generates projections
of changes in temperature and other climatic factors
which have been verified by back-casting. Average
climate conditions during 1961-90 provide the baseline
observations.23
The data used for calculating the inland exposure
component came from the high estimate for 2030 using
the IPCC IS92a scenario (unmitigated greenhouse gas
emissions). The scores were calculated by summing the
relative risk factors for extreme temperature events,
inland flooding, and food availability.
Health Exposure.
The health exposure component was calculated
using data for estimated mortality attributable to
climate change from McMichael et al.24 WHO calculated
mortality attributable to climate change for five specific
health outcomes selected on the basis of their observed
sensitivity to temporal and geographic climate
variation, their importance in terms of mortality and
burden of disease, and the availability of quantitative
global models.25 The five health outcomes and the class
that they proxy are as follows:
Outcome class

Outcome

Direct effects of heat and cold

Cardiovascular disease deaths

Food-borne and water-borne diseases

Diarrhea episodes

Vector-borne diseases

Malaria cases

Natural disasters

Unintentional deaths and injuries

Risk of malnutrition

Nonavailability of recommended calorie intake
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Mortality estimates were based on observations of
the effects of recent shorter-term climate variation (e.g.,
the effects of daily or interannual climate variability on
specific health outcomes) or the present (e.g., climate
as a determinant of current disease distribution), or
on specific processes that may influence health states
(e.g., parasite and vector population dynamics in the
laboratory, determining the transmission of infectious
diseases). These quantitative relationships were then
applied to future climate scenarios.
Adjustments were made for possible changes in
vulnerability through biological or socioeconomic
adaptation. Estimates of future effects were then
interpolated back to give an approximate measure of the
effect of climate change that has occurred since 1990 on
mortality and burden of disease in the year 2000. This
gives a measure of the magnitude and distribution of
health impacts of climate change. The health exposure
component was calculated by indexing the calculated
deaths per million population for the combination of
the above five health outcomes.
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Commentator
David Gilmartin
North Carolina State University
I really appreciate being asked to do this. I have
to say global climate change is not the area that I am
most familiar with. I am a historian, and have worked
in particular on the politics and the history of water in
India and Pakistan, but from that angle I do have some
ideas on some of the interesting presentations we just
heard.
To begin with, I would like to go back to the first
panel this morning, and make a couple of comments
as a way of framing how we might think about these
papers and their relevance to the overall topic. The
papers this morning on climate change were, for me,
fantastic, because they were a real introduction to a lot
of what is going on in the scientific community on this;
and particularly to the science.
One thing that really struck me, though, was how
significant the “global” part of the equation was. We
saw the image this morning of the globe taken from the
moon several decades ago. This global dimension is, I
think, one of the reasons why global climate change
is such an important and critical issue in popular
politics. The power of this issue lies in the way that it
creates a framework for thinking about humanity as
a single community. It puts the role of scientists, and
an international community of scientists, at the very
center of the discussion.
And it is a quite powerful force this way, particularly
as juxtaposed to the notion of globalization as an
economic issue. Economics, of course, also defines
world-wide processes, though it does so through
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theories that posit notions of integration through
people pursuing their distinctive self-interests. Climate
change has, of course, been significantly influenced
by the changes that economic globalization has
produced, particularly in the wake of the industrial
revolution. Understanding environmental change thus
undoubtedly depends on understanding the operation
of the world economy. But the importance of studying
climate change in long-term perspective lies precisely
in the fact that it also allows us to stand outside these
economic processes and look at the human community
in different sorts of terms. Like the image of the globe
taken from the moon, it creates an image of human
community that transcends the realities of the world
economic system, and thus transcends also economic
perspectives.
As we try to figure out how to approach the topic of
climate change, we thus need to think about how to put
these perspectives together. We need to understand
what is happening in the world economy to understand
climate change and to understand possibilities for
action in dealing with it. But the significance of
environmental perspectives lies in imagining a human
community in relationship to the environment that
stands outside such strictly economic perspectives,
and outside the conflicts over resources that strictly
economic valuations generate. If these perspectives
are not put together, no projection or models can fully
capture the past and point us toward the future. One
way to do this is through history.
Now let me turn to the three papers, all of which
I enjoyed. I would like to put them a bit further into
historical context: Without knowing how we got to
where we are, it is pointless to try to figure out what
might happen in the future.
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Let me start with Erika Weinthal’s presentation,
which I found very challenging and enjoyable. We
talk about environmental changes caused by climate
change. But, of course, as her paper illustrates, there
have been vast environmental changes associated
with water that are linked to what some would call
the “Irrigation Revolution” of the last 100 or 150 years,
which in some ways, utterly constrain the ways that
we can respond to climate change now. In fact, the
very meaning of water scarcity, as she points out, is
conditioned by the ways that water has been used for
irrigation in the creation of irrigated societies. If people
were to step back and imagine a world outside history,
many people would say the massive development of
extensive irrigation on arid lands in the last century
makes no sense whatsoever. But, historically vast
expenditures and investment in irrigation have
transformed huge areas of the world and created the
water environment that exists in the world today. This
is therefore an environment that today we live with.
What I really liked about Erika’s paper was her point
that now—and if one looks at the history, one can see
this as well—irrigation development has been deeply
embedded in particular forms of power, in particular
kinds of social structures, and in notions of state
authority and how it operates in irrigated societies. All
these things now create a huge constraint, and create
a framework in which conflict may occur. Large-scale
irrigation systems, almost by their very nature, make
water scarce. But we need to remember the history of
how it got that way. When we think about what water
scarcity means, we should bear in mind that scarcity
is not solely, or even primarily, a concept defined by
nature, but one defined by the histories of the ways
that states have sought to extend their power over
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land. As Erika makes clear, trying to understand water
scarcity, as a technical problem, without understanding
history, is a fool’s errand. Water scarcity may have
potential implications for international conflict, but
these implications cannot be addressed apart from the
processes of state-building that have produced them.
It would also be useful, I think, to put Andrew
Price-Smith’s presentation—which I also learned
a lot from—into historical context. To take a huge
historical frame for this, one could say that the greatest
change in human history, which opened the doors
to the worst ravages of disease on human societies,
was the Agricultural Revolution. This was one of the
critical moments, of course, in the development of
human societies. At the same time, it was a moment
which made possible, because of the environmental
changes associated with it and particularly, as some
have argued, the relationship between domesticated
livestock and human beings, a vast expansion of the
place of endemic diseases in human life. This reminds
us that disease has a very complex relationship to what
we would see as some of the most important advances
in human history, and so, as we think about the future,
one would have to ask questions about that. No easy
generalizations about disease and human progress are
possible.
I think that Price-Smith’s point about poverty,
disease, and conflict is a very interesting one. Let me
suggest, however, that, although disease undoubtedly
has an impact on state capacity and poverty (and thus
for potentially engendering conflict), from my own
perspective, the causation in the other direction has
historically been far more powerful. Poverty and its
attendant malnutrition has historically been one of the
great enablers of the spread of disease. So, I find it a bit
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problematic to talk about the impact of disease on state
capacity without emphasizing, more basically, how
poverty itself is related in myriad ways to state structures
and to the relationship of states in the international
economy. As far as poverty and international conflict
goes, one need only look at the history of the world
economy to see the range of arguments on this. Some of
the most powerful historical arguments, going back to
John Hobson’s critique of imperialism at the beginning
of the 20th century, argued that there was a direct
connection between inequality in European societies
(and poverty) and what one might call Europe’s
military adventurism overseas. One could well argue
that that relationship, though it is a controversial one
among historians, has by no means gone away. In
fact, the relationship between domestic inequality and
overseas militarism and conflict remains an important
issue in the discussion about America’s overseas
military policy even today.
The final presentation was also very illuminating for
me. Here again, though, I think a historical framework
would really help. I am not sure how one can gain
perspectives on climate change, demography, and
conflict without putting the subject into the broader
context provided by the history of world population
change and its relationship to industrialization and
the world economy. The theory of the demographic
transition would provide an invaluable perspective.
Demographic change has, of course, been intimately
related to the vast economic changes both before and
after the industrial revolution which, after all, have
been critical to processes of global warming.
I would just stop there with those few comments
and thank the panel givers very much for some very
interesting papers.
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Discussion
Q: Migration from the northeastern sectors of
Brazil into Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro arguably led
to a coup by the Brazilian army. Does this kind of case
study help us understand how demographic shifts
caused by climate change might become national
security threats?
Weinthal: I cannot really speak to Brazil, but I can
point to other areas where natural processes disrupted
livelihoods. These are not necessarily related to shifts
in climate. In Rwanda, for example, it was misuse of
land that played a role. It is often hard to prove that
climate change is a direct cause of conflict. Whether
or not an environmental event becomes politicized
and has a disruptive outcome depends on the broader
social and economic context.
Q: A lot of questions surround global precipitation
cycles. It seems to me that societies are growing more
sensitive to short-term precipitation deficits. Is that
true? Does the security risk come from pressures on
existing water supplies caused by growing populations
or from long-term climate change and what it will do
to water supplies?
Weinthal: A bit of both. Short-term provision of
water is a concern. It is a problem, though, if we limit
ourselves to short-term solutions. Jordan, for example,
has limited sources of water as it is. If the region is
going to become more arid, it is essential to engage
in long-term planning. Relying on fossil groundwater
will do in the short, but not the long-term.
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Q: Do we need to just build more dams to capture
rain when it does fall and use this during the dry
periods? Or must we engage in social engineering?
Weinthal: Again, a bit of both. There are ways to
augment water supplies. One way is desalination (a
technique proposed for Gaza). But this is problematic—
desalination is energy-intensive. It might work for
Saudi-Arabia, but for Gaza? And, of course, this is
only going to contribute to the problem of climate
change which is adversely affected by the use of fossil
fuels. Another way is to use recycled waste water in
agriculture or introduce drip irrigation. But here,
too, there are problems, as experience has shown. In
Central Asia, Israelis introduced drip irrigation in the
cotton fields to help improve the situation in the Aral
Sea. They laid down the lines at night, and the next
morning when they got to the fields, everything was
ripped up. Here was a solution that was economically
appropriate and environmentally beneficial. But it
meant doing things differently, and the locals found it
disruptive. If you modify irrigation patterns in a society
which is based on irrigation, you will break down social
networks. That adds a whole level of uncertainty and
scares people.
Q: How have migration patterns changed with
changing conditions? We need to know this so that we
can bounce them against some of these global climate
change trends we are beginning to see.
McKeown: We do have an overall sense of what
has driven the rise and fall of the movement of
populations over the last 2 centuries. That is largely
a story about economic development, the opening of
the new world, and declining transportation costs.
The story becomes more complicated as we get into
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the early 20th century, when states started to regulate
the international movements of people. What we do
not have is a broader picture of how political change,
particularly political violence, creates longer, larger
trends. We tend to study the relationship between
political violence and the movement of people on a
case by case basis, and our conclusions about it tend
to be heavily context-specific, so in that regard, I am
afraid I don’t have a lot to offer you. There are people
now, however, who speculate that we are entering
a world where state capacities are going to tend to
decline across the board. This will likely lead to more
unauthorized and quasi-illegal movement of people
across borders.
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CHAPTER 3
U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE
This chapter looks at the security threat from a more
narrowly U.S. perspective. Dr. Joshua Busby, Dr. John
T. Ackerman, and Dr. Kent Butts discuss the direct and
indirect repercussions of global climate change: how growing
inequalities might impact the struggle against extremism,
what financial and other demands these might place on the
United States, and how U.S. strategic relationships with
the world at large might change. The authors consider both
threats and opportunities.
Climate Change:
Complicating the Struggle
against Extremist Ideology
Kent Hughes Butts
U.S. Army War College
I would like to share a few thoughts with you
today on environmental security and climate change
and how they relate to combating terrorism. At the
end of my talk, I will suggest how we might bring all
the elements of national power to bear on the problem.
There are a number of themes we should consider as
we proceed:
1. Stability. Terrorism is rooted in regional instability
which has posed the major threat to U.S. national
security interests since the end of the Cold War.
2. Opportunities. Change, even global climate
change, brings opportunities.
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3. Legitimacy. Being able to meet the needs of the
people is essential for any government.
4. Confidence building measures. Climate change
phenomena provide opportunities to establish
communication and cooperation both multilaterally
and intrastate, and deescalate tensions.
5. The elements of power. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright was quoted as saying, “What’s the
point of having this superb military . . . if we can’t use
it?” We can now see the downside of using the military
element of power to effect regime change without also
having a sound plan for using the other elements of
national power to create a stable political system capable
of meeting the demands placed on it. The United States
must find creative ways to use all the elements of
national power to deal with problems resulting from
global climate change if it is to successfully manage
terrorist insurgencies and ensure regional stability.
Environmental Security and the National Security
Strategies.
Climate change is best understood through the
lens of environmental security. Not all environmental
issues are environmental security issues. Dr. Alan
Hecht of the Environmental Protection Agency tells
us that “Environmental Security is a process whereby
solutions to environmental problems contribute
to national security objectives.” A flood in which
there is no human involvement or loss of resource
wealth is not a security issue. However, a flood that
displaces 100,000 people across a national border,
overwhelming the resources of a fragile neighboring
state, and destabilizing the region is a security issue.
Global climate change is a subset of environmental
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security and because it can be a force multiplier for
existing tensions, it will complicate the ability of the
United States to manage threats to regional stability
and preserve U.S. national security interests.
Climate change brings opportunity because today’s
science is so good that it can predict where the effects of
climate change will be most pronounced and threaten
regional stability. As the awareness of climate change
effects becomes more widespread within the security
community, the opportunity to synchronize the
programs of the U.S. interagency in addressing them
will offer an advantage.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) report was
designed to preclude U.S. involvement in conflicts
around the world where its interests had not been
properly defined. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act
mandated this annual report to Congress. The NSS
should clearly define U.S. national security interests
and a strategy for achieving the objectives necessary to
preserve those interests. The best and most useful NSS
reports have defined U.S. national security interests
by region, clarifying any threats to those interests,
articulating a strategy for attaining objectives, and the
resources necessary to do so. This is not a Defense
document; it addresses the use of all elements of
national power, including the interagency community,
which largely represents the available resources.
Each of the agencies, then, is supposed to develop
its own strategic documents delineating how it will
support the NSS intent. DoD, for example, develops
the National Military Strategy and the National
Defense Strategy, which provide guidance for DoD
policymakers and guidance for military forces. A
similar process takes place within the Department of
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State (DoS) providing guidance to the Embassies within
which reside the important Regional Environment
Offices or Hubs.
The NSS will typically define U.S. national
security interests to include combating terrorism,
democratization, development of market economies,
regional stability, the nonproliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs), and a strong economy.
Most of these have been on the list for the last 15 years,
though their prominence may vary. Two of them will
figure prominently in today’s talk—the fight against
terrorism and the effort to create regional stability.
Environmental security and climate change, although
very important to these two interests, are not a priority
of the current administration.
Environmental security has figured prominently
in most of the national security strategies generated
over the last 20 years. First consider this quote from
President Reagan’s 1988 document: “The dangerous
depletion or contamination of natural endowments of
some nations—soil, forest, water, and air—will create
potential threats to the peace and prosperity that are
in our national interests as well as the interests of the
affected nations.” This NSS emphasizes the relevance of
the land, man/land relationship to national security.
In the Bush and Clinton administrations’ National
Security Strategies of the 1990s, environmental security
was recognized as an important variable: “The stress
from environmental challenges is already contributing
to political conflict” (1991); and “[Environmental
security issues] pose a direct or indirect threat to U. S.
National Security Interests” (1997); and “Environmental
security issues often trigger and exacerbate conflict”
(1997). Note the language used in these documents.
As several of the speakers today have already noted,

130

controversy does exist as to causality; if a statistical
analysis cannot prove causality, the test will say so.
Critics will often seize upon the results to suggest that
the issue is not relevant to security, and thus does not
warrant policymaker attention. This is particularly true
in regions of existing tensions. Because policymakers
are interested in relevance, not overstating causal
relationships is important. Well-respected academic
literature may rule out water as a cause of violent
conflict, while a policymaker like Ariel Sharon will
be quoted as saying that the 1967 War actually began
2 years earlier when Israel attacked the Arab Jordan
River Headwater Diversion scheme to prevent the
diversion of the Jordan River headwaters. Thus, it is
often more useful and avoids needless controversy
to characterize environmental challenges, to include
climate change events, as triggers, stressors, multiplier
effects, or having exacerbated pre-existing tensions.
This issue has a direct bearing on the issue of
terrorism and climate change. Does poverty cause
terrorism? In Washington, DC, it is common to hear
the phrase, “Poverty doesn’t cause terrorism.” This is
justified in part because there are areas of the world
where there is poverty and no terrorism. However, in
Southeast Asia where terrorism and insurgency have
a long history, national leaders such as Philippine
President Gloria Arroyo and Malaysian Prime Minister
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi speak with great conviction
about the need to address the link between poverty
and terrorism. Overreaching led in part to the current
National Security Strategy stating that “Poverty does
not, in and of itself, cause terrorism.” This diminishes the
perceived U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) role as a resource for addressing terrorism.
However, stating that poverty erodes governmental
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legitimacy and contributes to conditions that terrorists
seek to exploit invites the use of USAID’s substantial
capacity to address the terrorist insurgency.
Finally, note the emphasis in the current National
Security Strategy, “We will harness the tools of
economic assistance, development, aid, trade, and good
governance to help ensure that new democracies are
not burdened with economic stagnation or economic
corruption” (2006). Once again, we see recognition
at the highest level that development, economics,
empowerment, and building capacity for our allies are
important; and it is the relationship of climate change
to these variables that defines its greatest relevance to
regional security.
The Military in Mitigation and Adaptation.
It is not surprising to find that the military is
often the largest agency in a government, with a
correspondingly dominant budget. Many developing
countries have bloated militaries that are remnants
of the Cold War or past military threats to the state.
Apropos, downsizing of these militaries is politically
difficult, and many downsizing initiatives have resulted
in unintended regime change. Thus, the regime may
continue, but at a substantial opportunity cost for
other agencies struggling to meet the demands placed
upon the regime. In regions where climate change is
predicted to affect weather patterns, crop production,
disease, and clean water availability, and may do so
disproportionately between states and within states,
involving the military in providing support to other
agencies tasked with addressing these issues may mean
the difference between maintaining governmental
legitimacy and a failed state.
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In a diagram of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs for
a developing state, stewardship of the environment
would likely be placed at the pinnacle of the triangle,
as a goal to fulfill only after other demands upon the political system have been met. In fact, it really should be at
the base, because sustaining the environment underpins
success in the other seemingly more important base
categories such as food and shelter, security from
violence, economic growth, and development. Meeting
all of these demands will contribute to maintaining a
government’s legitimacy and providing for the human
security needs of its people. Failure to do so leaves
the government vulnerable to alternative visions and,
in some countries very important to U.S. national
security, to extremist ideology and terrorist insurgency.
The military can contribute to developing a country’s
resilience to climate change effects. Unlike many
government agencies, the military has a presence on
the frontier and relatively good transportation assets
and fuel; it also has technical, medical, and civil works
capabilities and a training and education program.
Developing the capacity of the military to help in
climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts in
support of other agencies could enhance resilience,
reduce systemic stress, and gain legitimacy for the
government and the military.
In order to have a stable world and continued
prosperity, it will be necessary to find creative solutions
for the effects of global climate change. In seeking
these solutions, the host nations’ militaries should be
seriously considered.
Addressing global climate change is not just a
matter for DoD. DoS is also very much involved in
issues of environmental security. Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, at the request of then Vice
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President Gore, created the system of environmental
hubs. These bring the resources of powerful regional
bureaus within DoS to bear on solving environmental
security issues. There are 12 of these world-wide. In
our work at the Center for Strategic Leadership, we
work closely with the Combatant Commands to help
them develop environmental security programs.
When we put together a regional conference or activity
on environmental security for those Commands, our
first action is to contact the relevant environmental
hub and seek their guidance and support. This has led
to many areas of interagency cooperation and, quite
often, to the Commands following the lead of the State
environmental hubs in their efforts to develop regional
capacity and promote multilateral cooperation.
Currently we are working with the DoS environmental
hub in Brasilia in response to a Brazilian Army request
to support an environmental security conference for
South America that focuses on alternative fuels. When
we do this, we are bringing the substantial capabilities
of the military element of power to bear on climate
change issues that are a priority of the U.S. interagency
community.
Climate Change and Combating Extremist
Ideologies.
Climate change is affecting the efforts of the
United States to combat the global insurgency and its
underlying extremist ideologies in two ways: First,
it provides a strategic communication windfall for
the insurgency, allowing extremists and critics of the
United States to claim that the United States does
not care about the welfare of other countries. These
countries, they say, must struggle with the rising
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energy costs and global warming that directly result
from the high U.S. per capita consumption of energy
resources. Second, climate change is complicating the
ability of countries to meet the needs of their people,
thus enhancing the appeal of extremist ideology by
creating underlying conditions terrorists may exploit.
The role of climate change in security ranges from
the global to regional to local levels. The Russian
geopolitical quest for dominance of the energy fields
of the Arctic was spawned by the unexpectedly rapid
melting of the polar ice cap. The coastal resources of
Florida are threatened by saltwater incursion because
of the drought affecting the Southeast; and there are
many traditional security concerns that directly affect
U.S. national security interests that are being influenced
by climate change. These concerns are highlighted by
two important studies. One was published in 2007:
National Security and the Threat of Climate Change by the
Center for Naval Analyses Corporation. The leader of
the study’s research team, Tom Morehouse, discusses
the highly influential study in Chapter 6. The National
Intelligence Council (NIC) is preparing a National
Intelligence Estimate on this subject. According to
the NIC, the variables include: Conflict; Failed States;
Terrorist Opportunities; Economics; Energy; Social
Unrest and Migration; Humanitarian Crisis; and Unrest
in Islamic Countries.
We heard excellent presentations this morning
about the cause of climate change. However, these
two studies are not being conducted to contest critics
who maintain climate change is not anthropogenic.
They are moving beyond the causal debate and instead
saying, “We represent the security community and we
are convinced that we are facing an imminent threat,
and we need to be prepared to deal with this threat.”
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Many of the variables that these studies address are
going to affect the ability of the United States to manage
the terrorist insurgency and compete with extremist
ideologies overseas.
In 2003 when visiting the U.S. Army War College,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conceded that
the United States was not doing as well as it could in
the war of ideas.
If I were grading, I would say we probably deserve a
“D” or a “D-plus” as a country as to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place in the world
today. I’m not going to suggest that it’s easy, but we
have not found the formula as a country for countering
the extremists’ message. The strategy must do a great
deal more to reduce the lure of the extremist ideology
by standing with those moderate Muslims advocating
peaceful change, freedom, and tolerance.

His point is salient. To defeat terrorist ideology, the
United States requires a good message and the support
of those who are trying to prove it to be accurate and
appealing. Climate change undermines both of those
objectives. To understand how, it is useful to review
the U.S. strategy for combating terrorism.
In February 2003, the National Security Council
published the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
(NSCT). This strategy had four pillars: defeat terrorist
organizations with global reach; defend the interests,
citizens, and territory of the United States both
domestically and overseas; deny terrorist groups
sponsorship, support, and sanctuary; and diminish
the underlying conditions terrorist seek to exploit. The
latter two are directly related to climate change. The
United States sought to encourage other states to meet
the terrorist threat by building their capacity and will,
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while winning the war of ideas by promoting state
and regional stability through political, social, and
economic development.
The United States found it easy to take the moral
high ground against the oppressive Soviet enemy of
the Cold War: its message is no longer well-respected
by the developing world. The invasion of Iraq and its
mishandled aftermath, with such issues as Abu Ghraib
and torture, was a propaganda gift to the insurgents
and those opposing the moderate Muslim regimes
upon which the U.S. combating terrorism strategy
depends. So, too, is the U.S. position on climate change.
The United States is perceived by the developing as
having double standards double standards. It asks
the developing world to preserve its forests to serve
as carbon stores, and, though the largest per capita
emitter of greenhouse gases, denies its responsibility
for creating climate change stresses. These stresses
are seen as giving rise to droughts, floods, disease,
and the weakening monsoons that no longer feed
the mountain glaciers providing essential water to
many cities. They also complicate governmental
legitimacy by overloading weak political systems and
demonstrating the developing government’s weak
economy and social infrastructure, and its inability to
manage the resulting human security problems. The
terrorist insurgency is rooted in the developing world
and seeks to take advantage of weak or failed states
and exploit the resulting ungoverned spaces to train
insurgents and exert political control.
The NSCT strategy was replaced by a three pillar
strategy developed by Secretary Rumsfeld that seeks
to: protect the homeland; disrupt and attack terrorist
networks; and counter ideological support for terror-
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ism. The elements of the original strategy are subsumed
under these pillars, but the greater emphasis on
combating the ideology of extremism places even more
importance on strategic communication messages and
the critical factor of moderate governments developing
the capacity to meet the challenges of climate change.
To achieve success over the insurgency in “the long
war,” attacks against terrorists and their networks will
not be enough; we must think in terms of countering
extremist ideologies. While climate change factors,
such as the drought related conflicts in Darfur,
cause instability, they also create an awareness of
the importance of building governmental capacity
to address environmental security issues. The new
Africa Command embraced the concept that, in
order to counter extremist ideology and promote the
stability essential to U.S. interests, the military needs
to prioritize “enabling” partner nations. If we use all
the instruments of power at our disposal to help these
partner nations build their own capacities, over time
they will be able to undermine ideological support for
terrorism. Terrorism is fueled by discontent. Countries
where there is drought and instability, where failed
states are not meeting the needs of their people,
places like Mali and Somalia, are breeding grounds
for terrorism. The military recognized that it should
actively contribute to the establishment of those
conditions that would reduce ideological support for
terrorism. Thus, environmental security issues, and
the climate change multiplier affects, became priority
issues for the military, and building good governance
and capacity is a major priority of the new Africa
Command.
The importance of governmental legitimacy to
managing the terrorist insurgency was perhaps best
stated by Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, then
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Marine Forces Pacific Commander, in his remarks to
the “Underlying Conditions of Terrorism Conference”
at the U.S. Army War College in June 2005.
The center of gravity, the decisive terrain of this war,
is the vast majority of people not directly involved,
but whose support, willing or coerced, is necessary to
insurgent operations around the world. . . . Providing
what local governments have not, these insurgents have
gained legitimacy, psychologically conditioned these
populations, and created an area from which they can
safely operate. Winning the hearts and minds of local
populations is far more important than killing or capturing people.

As the 9/11 (September 11, 2001) Commission Report
states, “When people lose hope, when societies break
down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds
for terrorism are created.”
Recommendations.
In determining how to craft policy options for
mitigating the effects of climatic disruption, one
should seek to apply all four elements of national
power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and
military. How should these resources be applied most
effectively and creatively to deal with the impact of
global climate change? Rather than responding to
crises and possibly being forced to undertake the
costly introduction of large combat forces, the United
States should be proactive in its approach. In the
Clinton administration, the 1997 and 1999 National
Security Strategies took a dual approach to promoting
U.S. national interests, emphasizing “Shaping the
International Environment,” as well as “Responding to
Threats and Crises.” These NSS’s specifically detailed
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the roles of all four of the elements of power in affecting
this strategy.
At DoD, Secretary of Defense William Perry had a
preventive defense strategy that argued for shaping the
security environment and being prepared to respond
if necessary. The United States should “promote trust,
stability, and democratic reform, and so help to prevent
the conditions for conflict and build the conditions for
peace.” He was supported by Deputy Undersecretary
of Defense Sherri Goodman, who testified before
Congress saying, “We will mitigate the impacts of
adverse environmental actions leading to international
instability.” Thus, the United States would commit
military forces to address soft power activities so that it
would not have to fight wars. This proactive approach
is essential to dealing with the terrorist insurgency and
addressing the underlying conditions that terrorists
seek to exploit; conditions that are being worsened by
changes in climate.
A valuable approach to this problem would be
to apply the concept of resilience that the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) introduced for tsunami preparedness, seeking to actively promote mitigation and adaptation programs aimed at making communities climate change
resilient. The U.S. interagency, through the regional
USAID Missions, the DoS environmental hubs, and the
Combatant Commands; with valuable technical support
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), NOAA, and the U.S. Forest
Service (USFS); could make meaningful contributions
to governmental capacity. Such an approach would
build governmental legitimacy, allow communities to
contribute to problem solving, and reduce the appeal of
extremist ideology and the potential for failed states.
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Conclusion.
In summary, we need to think about how existing
regional issues are complicated by global climate
change, and develop a strong domestic message that
makes clear to the American people how destabilizing
conditions in other parts of the world threaten U.S.
national security interests and our way of life. We need
to think about how U.S. foreign policy can be proactive
in nature, identifying ways to build the capacity of
other countries and regions so that their governments
will be able to deal with the problems of instability
and climate change themselves, before they lead to
destabilizing crises or the election of alternative voices
such as Hamas or Hezbollah. If the United States is to
preserve its security, it must seize the engagement and
strategic communications opportunity presented by the
climate change phenomenon. It must build networks
of resilient and capable regional states able to manage
climate change and other destabilizing variables that
would otherwise threaten U.S. national security.

141

Under What Conditions Could Climate Change Pose
a Threat to U.S. National Security?
Joshua Busby
University of Texas, Austin
Introduction.
My interest in national security and climate change
started in 2004 when Nigel Purvis and I were at the
Brookings Institution. We were commissioned to write
a paper on the links between climate and security for
the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change.1 In that paper, we looked
mostly at the effects of extreme weather events in the
developing world and the possibilities for large-scale
humanitarian disasters in countries that had little
capacity to respond.
When I looked at the environmental security
literature, much of it focused on the links between
environmental change and violent conflict, and it
seemed to me that there was a more expansive set of
problems that were relevant to security. At the same
time, there was a rather careless use of the security
frame to encompass all harms to human welfare. This
threatened to make security so amorphous as to be
meaningless. Attempts to “securitize” climate change
appeared to me to be an effort to figure out how to get
U.S. decisionmakers to care about this problem.2
I set off to write a new paper on climate change
and national security that could stand up to scrutiny
from traditional security types, both practitioners and
academics. In that paper, I identified a broad set of
potential security challenges linked to climate change,
and I assessed, in a preliminary fashion, whether these

142

purported links are indeed security challenges for the
United States.
You might think that U.S. national security is a
parochial subject. However, if U.S. decisionmakers are
supposed to care about the problem of climate change
and if they think about the world primarily in terms
of a national interest lens, then it makes sense, at some
level, to look at the problem in the way they see the
world. In addition, the United States is the biggest
greenhouse gas producer and the strongest military
power in the world. Its participation will be necessary
if the effects of climate change are to be minimized,
and if countries buffeted by climate change are going
to get the assistance they need. So, again, I think it
makes sense to look at this through a national security
lens and from the perspective of U.S. national security
in particular.
Climate-Related Security Threats.
To assess whether or not the links between climate
and U.S. national security are credible, I sought to
develop a concept of security that hews closely to
traditional notions of security but could also be open
to environmental harm. Before talking about this
conceptual framework, let me tell you a bit about the
breadth of climate-related potential security problems
that I discuss in that paper. They include three classes:
The first are direct threats to the homeland, the second
are indirect threats to the national interest, and the third
are broader security externalities of energy policies.
I consider three kinds of direct threats to the
homeland: (1) abrupt climate change, (2) sea level rise,
and (3) extreme weather events. I conclude, based on
my reading of the scientific evidence to date, that only
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the third, extreme weather events, currently constitutes
a security risk that policymakers are likely to find
credible, given their short-term time horizons. We will
come back to this later in this talk.
I also consider indirect threats to the national interest
that include the extraterritorial effects of climate change
on U.S. interests. I explore the connections between
(1) climate change and violent conflict in the world;
(2) the connections between climate change, natural
disasters, and humanitarian tragedies in strategically
important areas; and, finally, (3) I consider the links
between climate change and U.S. soft power and its
international reputation.3
I also look at the security externalities of climate
change. First, I consider how oil dependence may
give rise to two “social bads,” contributing to two
problems simultaneously, both climate change and the
increased risk of terrorism. Second, I also look at how
a remedy to climate change, nuclear power, may pose
a proliferation risk.
While I have not yet written about this in as much
detail, the geo-strategic consequences of reactions to
climate change are also of interest. For example, under
the Kyoto Protocol, Russia was awarded emissions
levels based on the economy it had before the former
Soviet Union collapsed. This gave it scope to sell permits
it did not need to countries like Canada and Japan that
did. As an inducement to ratify Kyoto, Russia was also
awarded generous credits for the carbon sequestration
potential of its forests. What are we to make of the
large transfer of funds that might result? Might they
bolster Russia’s efforts to tamp down on domestic
dissent and throw its weight around in its near abroad?
If Kyoto blows apart, perhaps these transfers will
never materialize. It would, however, be interesting
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to consider whether the Japanese and Canadians still
intend to purchase credits from the Russians.4
As the economic consequences of responses to
climate change take on real significance—just think
about the European emissions trading program—we
can expect to see these issues begin to interface with a
broader set of diplomatic challenges, whether it be the
U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, technology transfer to India
and China, or other issues seemingly far removed such
as the fate of the Middle East.
Defining Security and Assessing Risk.
Let me engage in a brief discussion of the conditions
under which a new problem constitutes a real security
risk. Security threats are traditionally associated
with armed external attack against a state by another
country’s military. Security is typically thought of
as protecting one’s territorial integrity and ensuring
survival of the state. But, we also know that security
can be more broadly defined. It can include a country’s
vital interests overseas that, if challenged, the effects
could be so severe that the country’s way of life would
be threatened. For these sorts of overseas interests,
such as access to oil, the country would be willing to
go to war to defend them.
Although national defense is frequently associated
with the military and the use of force, this is not the
only way a country can protect its security. Diplomatic
and economic means are also part of a country’s tools
to defend its national interest, as the United States
understood quite well when it supported the Marshall
Plan after World War II. Increasingly, we realize
that attacks from other states are not the only ways a
country’s security can be threatened. Both terrorism and
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civil wars remind us that nonstate actors and internal
threats may constitute national security challenges.
What about harm that is not the result of intentional
human agency—specifically environmental harm?
Here we have to imagine threats so severe that a
country will find its way of life will be threatened,
either in terms of direct threats to the homeland or its
extraterritorial interests.
For a direct threat to rise to the level of a security
concern, one or more conditions would have to be
met. It would have to: (1) threaten the existence of
the country, or (2) threaten to decapitate its center of
government, or (3) destabilize the government such
that its monopoly of the use of force over its territory
would be compromised over an extended period of
time and over a significant geographic space, or (4) be
one that could disrupt or destroy critically important
infrastructure, or, finally, (5) lead to such catastrophic
loss of life and well-being as to undermine the
government’s legitimacy.
As I suggested earlier, states also have interests
beyond their borders. For an extraterritorial threat
to constitute a security risk, it would have to be in a
location strategically significant in some way. It would
also have to reach thresholds of concern in terms of
the stakes involved and/or a potential loss of life. The
criteria of “strategically significant places” include:
(1) those belonging to allies, (2) those which serve as
transportation corridors, (3) those containing sources
of raw materials, (4) those where bad consequences
could blow-back on the homeland, and others. I also
talk about different thresholds that would constitute
high stakes and high potential loss of life. Situations
likely to have higher stakes are those where there is
a possibility of state failure or regional contagion. In
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terms of the thresholds for high loss of life, I suggest the
somewhat arbitrary figure of 10,000 or more civilians
at risk of death either from violence or as a result of
dislocation from extreme weather events.
There are some places that are not strategically
important enough or where the stakes aren’t high
enough for the problem to constitute a national
security risk for the United States. But where the
strategic significance is high and the stakes are high,
these situations should be considered security threats
to the United States.
Let me say a word, though, about dealing with
uncertainty. Climate change is a problem with effects
some of which are of low or unknown probabilities
and/or distant in the future. Policymakers have been
resistant to take action because they are fearful of false
alarms and over-reaction. Thus, the most politically
salient effects of climate change will be those the
scientists already think are likely to occur in the coming
2 decades.
Climate Change as a Security Threat.
At this point, let us look at some of the evidence
that supports my contention that climate change
may constitute a direct threat to the homeland or an
extraterritorial threat to our interests.
Direct Threats to the Homeland. In my research
into what might or might not constitute a direct threat
to the homeland, I looked at abrupt climate change, sea
level rise, and extreme weather events.
Abrupt climate change speaks to the threats of the
slow-down in the Gulf Stream and other changes that
might occur in a matter of a few decades, as we heard
this morning from Dr. Corell. Scientists are worried
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about that possibility, but they don’t really have a good
handle on how likely these threats are. Their best guess
is that they are of low probability or are, at the very
least, not likely to happen during this century.5 So,
based on this reading of what the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says about abrupt
climate change, I conclude that it is not currently a
national security risk for the United States around
which policymakers would likely mobilize concern.
I then look at sea level rise. Despite Gore’s warning
of a 20 foot sea level rise,6 the IPCC fourth assessment
report suggested that, across the range of models, the
estimates for predicted sea level rise were between
20 centimeters and 60 centimeters by the end of the
century, more or less.7 As we heard this morning, these
estimates don’t take into consideration the possible
melt and collapse of the Greenland and Antarctic
glaciers, which appears to be occurring more rapidly
than anticipated. These models also don’t take into
account the ways in which some areas may have faster
and higher sea level rise than others.
But, again, these modest increases in sea level are
expected to unfold only over the next 80 years. Thus,
coastal populations, particularly in a rich country like
the United States, would have plenty of time to adapt,
either by moving or preparing countermeasures. So
the prospect of New York City or San Francisco under
water from rising seas, which would require forced
migration and the mobilization of the military to
evacuate them, seems rather unlikely, in my view.
Extreme weather events are, in my estimate, a more
serious threat to the homeland. Such events include
storm surges, hurricanes, droughts, and extremely hot
days. While we cannot attribute a single weather event
like Hurricane Katrina to climate change, the scientific
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community now thinks that climate change is likely to
make extreme weather events more frequent or (in the
case of hurricanes) more severe.8
The prospect of more Hurricane Katrinas in the
United States could pose a national security risk to our
country. At the most basic level, this would be manifest
in terms of the diversion of military resources to deal
with humanitarian needs and to restore domestic
civil order, as we saw in New Orleans. This can take
on larger significance if it impairs a country’s ability
to extend its monopoly of force over its territory for
extended periods of time. This is not likely to happen
in the United States, but it might happen in weaker,
poorer countries, and some are places that we might
care about.
At the very least, if the assessment of extreme U.S.
vulnerability to climate change is right,9 then we need
to be thinking about the local consequences of rising
extreme weather events and what that might mean for
disaster preparedness and military mobilization in the
United States. We need to be prepared to imagine what
would happen if we had as much trouble responding to
the disaster as we did in New Orleans. The legitimacy
of our government would be questioned. This would
not only have local political consequences but would
have wider ramifications for the way the United States
is perceived on the world stage.
Climate Changes and Overseas Impacts.
In looking at the security consequences of climate
change on U.S. overseas interests, I consider the links
between climate change and violent conflict, climate
change and natural disasters, and climate change and
U.S. soft power.
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Climate Change and Conflict. Climate change will
likely make a number of problems worse, particularly
extreme weather events. But does it increase the
prospects for violent conflict? As Andrew Price-Smith
suggested earlier, increasing deprivation caused
by climate change might lead to poverty which in
turn would lead to conflict. However, there is a real
concern that those causal linkages may not, in fact,
be credible. Maybe people just don’t fight when they
are poor. Maybe they do not have a strong enough
sense of grievance to fight. Or maybe they just can’t—
they are so exhausted by their daily struggle that they
just will not take up arms. That said, Mark Levy at
Columbia University has recently found a correlation
between the variability of rainfall and the enhanced
onset of violent conflict.10 Other studies have found a
correlation between refugee flows and conflict as well
as natural disasters and conflict.11 Given that scarce
rains, refugee numbers, and natural disasters are all
likely to be intensified with climate change, we should
be worried and prepared with much more extensive
programs to help countries adapt to climate change
and respond to emergent crises.
Climate Change and Extreme Weather Events.
It is important for us to look at the links between
climate change and violent conflict, but arguably
more important to look at the links between climate
change and extreme weather events. The reason I say
this is because far more people are affected every year
by extreme weather events than by violent conflict.12
If we focus solely on armed conflict, we are going to
be missing a hugely important part of the problem. In
the 2004 piece I wrote with Nigel Purvis, our biggest
concern was the prospect of extreme weather events
and humanitarian disasters. We anticipated that the
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United States would be called upon for humanitarian
intervention overseas. Little did we imagine that a year
later the United States would be staging such a crisis
rescue at home with more than 70,000 soldiers deployed
to New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.13
I talked about extreme weather events in the context
of the United States; these problems are likely to have
an even bigger impact on those countries that are less
well-prepared, less wealthy, with worse governments
than our own. We need to look at where our strategic
overseas interests match up with the places most
vulnerable to climate change and help those countries
prepare.
Climate Change and Soft Power. Finally, we
should consider the connections between soft power,
U.S. reputation in the world, and climate change. To the
extent that our government has not done as much on
climate change as other countries in the world would
like us to, this has added and exacerbated the problem
of our reputation in the world. If you don’t think that
matters, then it is irrelevant. But if you think what other
countries think of us matters, then doing something on
issues they care about so that they cooperate on issues
we care about could be highly instructional. There are
better and worse ways of burnishing our international
reputation, and climate change may be an especially
costly way to restore our good image in the world. If
you think our good image is important, then this is one
area where doing less than desired has damaged our
interests.
Climate change and national security is a very
complex issue deserving of far more detailed discussion
and analysis. I hope, however, that this brief survey
has given you food for thought.
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The “Perfect Storm”
John T. Ackerman
USAF Air Command and Staff College
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a
cornerstone of our national defense policy and is created
by the Department of Defense (DoD). My plan today is
to introduce planning models from within this defense
planning document and then use climate change as
a case study to test my thesis against the planning
models. Essentially, I will take the main points in the
QDR and show how they might be applied to create a
QDR for climate change.
The QDR 2006 starts with a chapter on “Fighting the
Long War.” It goes on to discuss how to operationalize
the strategy, and then how to reorient our capabilities
and forces to fight this long war. By the “Long War,”
the authors of the QDR mean terrorists. Right now the
United States has a strong conventional, symmetrical
capability. The DoD wants us to reorient our forces
so that we are more capable of fighting asymmetric
enemies. Also, the Defense Secretary wants to pay special attention to what he calls an ”enterprise activity”
—the reorganization of the DoD so that it can become
more agile and more cost effective. The QDR suggests
that we face four kinds of September 11, 2001 (9/11) postsecurity challenges—traditional, irregular, disruptive,
and catastrophic. It also notes four focal points of
interest: defeating terrorist networks, defending the
homeland, shaping the choices of countries, and,
finally, preventing hostile states and nonstate actors
from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The QDR also draws lessons learned from
our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. It stresses
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the need to build partnership capabilities, to take early
anticipatory measures, and to engage in unity of effort.
And it speaks of the “uncertainty of predictability.”
These challenges, focal points, and lessons learned can,
I think, be applied to the environment we are likely to
encounter in the event of global climate change.
Let us start by looking more closely at how the
QDR conceptualizes the challenges facing us. It
divides the threats into four conceptual challenge
areas. Traditional threats involve force on force,
or threats from conventional or symmetric sources.
The asymmetric challenges or irregular challenges
arise when we become involved in guerilla wars, or
counter insurgencies. Disruptive challenges occur
when the enemy does something that undermines
our current capabilities. For example, an advance in
biotechnology or directed energy weapons offsets our
current advantages. Catastrophic challenges takes
place when, for example, terrorists or other nonstate
actors use WMD or weapons which have WMD-like
effects.1
Figure 1 is a nice graphic representation that
shows the relationships between the four challenge
areas and our current capabilities.2 It makes clear
that we have great strengths in one area—meeting
traditional challenges. However, we have got to build
our capabilities up in other areas. We need to center
or balance our capabilities so that we can deal with all
four of them equally well.
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Figure 1.
Applying the QDR.
Can this model help us address climate change?
Yes, with modifications. Granted, climate change is
a dispersed global threat. By that I mean that it has
a wide range of possible consequences, which might
include synergistic, nonlinear, and abrupt affects.3
But I still think that, as the QDR suggests, the thing
we want to do is to reorient our defense capabilities.
We can apply the challenge area concepts found in the
2006 QDR to good purpose, although we do need to
shift from a very specific focus on the war on terror
to a broader focus on achieving sustainable security.
Sustainable security is a new concept that can be
defined as “providing for security in a manner that, at
the very least, does not diminish or compromise, and
at very best actually enhances an environmentally,
socially, and economically sustainable quality of life
for future generations worldwide.”4
Earlier today, you heard about what climate change
involves and what causes it.5 What of the results? The
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
2007 report suggests that, among other things, there
will be more frequent warm days, the nights will not
be as cool, and there will more hot days and more heat
waves.6 But these are all rather generic, and we need
to think further about the implications of such changes
if they take place on a global scale.
The QDR provides us with a useful tool or model.
We can, for example, try to determine whether a given
set of climatic and environmental threats are likely
to constitute a traditional, irregular, disruptive, or
catastrophic challenge.
So, what would be a traditional challenge created by
climate change? Well, we’re pretty good at addressing
heat waves, droughts, and floods7 here in the United
States. We have encountered these challenges before
and know how to respond. So these could be construed
as falling into this category.
But what happens if we have a lot more of these
events that challenge our conventional capabilities
from different angles all around the world? Well,
we are not really good at enforcing global treaties
that might have to be made to deal with climate
change. What would be the DoD role in enforcing
global climate regimes? Nor are we very good with
the concept of ocean acidification,8 which we just
tangentially covered. What happens if our oceans
become more acidic, and some of the creatures that
live in it become extinct, and the whole biodiversity
of the oceans change? What does that mean? How
do we counter that? What would DoD’s role be? Geoengineering, another area we didn’t talk much about,
could be offered as a solution to global climate change.
If climate change turns out to be a really damaging
problem and we have to do dramatic things to counter
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climate change, what’s going to happen? Some of these
potential geo-engineered changes we don’t understand
very well. Shooting sulfur particles or aerosols into
the atmosphere and building gigantic mirrors up in
the atmosphere to block the sunlight; what will be the
second and third order effects?9 What is it going to do
to our planet? These could be identified as irregular
challenges to our national security.
What might we classify as a disruptive challenge?
Well, what if you have famine10 on an international
scale affecting perhaps four or five regions at the
same time? Or what if you have increased fresh water
scarcity11 problems in the countries that are currently
suffering from shortages of potable water? What will
happen? Also, what if the water shortages spread,
for example if the monsoons don’t come to India?
Climate change also has the potential to influence how
diseases spread. How would we respond to a number
of different pandemics by different disease vectors?
Here we must also consider not just diseases that
affect only humans.12 What will happen if beetles eat
all the temperate forests in Siberia?13 What does that
do to Siberia? These challenges run counter to some of
our current strengths, and we may have to rely upon
revolutionary breakthroughs in technology and science
to help us mitigate or adapt to these threats.
Last are the catastrophic challenges. Josh Busby
said that the probability of the polar ice caps melting
is quite low. Still, they are melting, and as they
continue to melt, sea levels will rise, and bad things
will happen.14 For example, there are several different
Ocean Circulation Systems (OCS) which have direct
influences on regional and global climate. If the OCSs
change, speed up, slow down, or stop, then there will
be enormous regional and global changes that could
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affect crop production, rainfall, fisheries, and a variety
of other natural processes that we may not even know
about.15 How do they impact our planet? Finally, is
there the possibility of mass extinctions and mass
migrations?16 We didn’t talk much about biodiversity,
but if you suddenly lose a whole species of organisms
within a food chain, what will the impact be? What
replaces them, if anything? What will happen? We
don’t know. Also, if large populations of people can
no longer survive in an area or they are displaced by
rising sea levels, where will they move to and how will
these mass movements of environmental refugees affect
international and environmental security? Again, we
do not have all the answers.
If any one of these changes takes place, we will face
a major challenge. If four or five of them happen at the
same time, then we may witness the “perfect storm.” In
the movie of the same name, a whole series of disparate
climatic factors came together to create a super storm,
and the storm was impossible for one nation to deal
with. Further complicating all these challenges is the
fact that natural resources are finite. Is peak oil, the
end of fossil fuel abundance, right around the corner;
is that coming? And if burning oil is one of the causes
of the greenhouse effect and climate change, how do
we deal with oil shortages and the impacts of burning
fossil fuels? Also, if you throw in the possibility of
abrupt climate change, what do we do then? In short,
we are looking at a potential problem of no mean
proportions.
Solutions.
But I like to view these challenges from an optimistic
standpoint. Climate change really offers us a tremen-
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dous opportunity. If we focus less on how to deal with
the problems that emerge after an event and more about
what we can do in advance to prevent problems, help
friends, and make new friends, then we might create
more good will globally. We have the opportunity to
shape our choices and the choices of other states in the
future if we approach this in a positive manner with
a sustainable security strategy. A sustainable security
strategy requires blending the sustainability tenets
of environmental security, ecological economics,
and social/environmental equity with the pillars
of the democratic peace theory.17 I contend that the
conflict ameliorating powers of democracy, economic
interdependence, and international organizations
operating within the finite environmental, economic,
and social limits of the sustainability tenets will enable
the United States and DoD to mitigate and adapt to the
multiple challenges from climate change and build for
the United States and for all other democratic states
sustainable security.18
Objectives: Sustainable Security.
So suppose we want to prevent the ”perfect storm”
from taking place. There are two ways you can get at
this problem. The DoD has an internal problem and an
external problem.
Internally, we in the DoD consume too many finite
resources. We are energy hogs. The DoD is the biggest
energy consumer in the United States, probably the
biggest single energy consumer in the world, if you
just wanted to isolate us. We consume way too many
resources. And we consume things in unsustainable
ways: we don’t recycle, we seldom reuse, and we don’t
have broad based plans to reduce the amount of things
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we consume. We break things, and then we throw
them away.
So, to address all these challenges, the Defense
enterprise needs to reform itself. It needs to find a way
to create “sustainable security” for the United States.
One primary method to create sustainable security is
to ensure producers take the product back after the
consumer is done with it, and the producer reenters
it into the production system and then makes a new
one using parts from the old one. I submit that the
DoD can become a driving force in the creation of
“sustainable security” because it has a lot of leverage.
It has a 500 billion dollar budget, which gives it unique
purchasing power. Why can’t the DoD tell contractors
that we want to buy things that have a cradle-to-cradle
life cycle?19 Why can’t we put our leverage toward
buying those products, buying those technologies
that are climate benign, environmentally friendly, and
carbon-friendly?
And how do you do that? Well, right now in
the climate change discussions, policymakers are
talking about two major ways to reduce emissions
of greenhouse gases. Economically, they are talking
about a global cap and trade system, and they are
talking about carbon taxes on emissions. Both of these
economic principles are applicable to the DoD.20 I
could see a base commander right now saying, “Hey,
we have a carbon tax on our overuse of energy. If we
exceed it, then our budget is going to be decreased.
Let’s find ways to reduce energy use.” And everyday,
base commanders deal with budget fluctuations. So,
we have to reform ourselves.
That was our internal problem. Here is our
external problem. We focus a lot on how to kill things
and break things. We are good at that. We are not so
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good at making friends. In fact, we should broaden
our concept of national security to include social,
political, economic, and environmental security. We
need to implement ecological accounting and develop
a better understanding of how to create sustainable free
markets, resolve equity disputes, make democracy work
for everyone, and learn how to work with, not against,
international organizations to create environmental
security. These are the tenets of sustainable security.21
Ecological Accounting. There is a sustainability
concept called ecological economics.22 That is where
you determine the complete economic cost of your
activities and then determine what is cost effective.
For example, how much does a gallon of gas really
cost? If you figure in all the subsidies, all the money
that DoD spends to make sure that oil tankers can get
from the Persian Gulf to the United States, one scholar
estimated it at about $10.00 a gallon. All the negative
externalities have to be included in the true cost of a
resource or an activity. Now, figuring in the health
costs of burning fossil fuels, how many people are
breathing smog—bad air—because of the pollution
that comes out of the back end of our cars; figure all
those negative externalities in, and the true cost is
much higher. Obviously, the real cost of burning fossil
fuels is much higher than what we currently see at a
gas station or in our electric bill. We have to figure out
what the true cost accounting for all DoD processes is.
Then we will get an idea of how much our national
security efforts are really costing us, and then maybe
we can find a better way of doing it, a sustainable
way. Then when we compare the complete costs of
renewable energy against fossil fuel energy, the fossil
fuels are clearly not so attractive.
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Environmental Justice/Equity. For those working
to mitigate or adapt to climate change, issues of
equity are of paramount importance.23 This word
has popped up in four or five of our discussions. We
talked about water. Who gets the water? Who controls
it? Is it the elites? Is it the people? We talked about
land. Who controls the arable land? These are all
equity issues that will only be exacerbated by climate
change. Also, if you look in-depth into terrorist issues
and read the literature on terrorism, you will see
that a lot of the problems, a lot of the complaints by
people who support the terrorists or actually become
terrorists, are equity problems.24 They feel like they
are being marginalized. They don’t have a voice. The
distribution of life supporting resources is unfair.
They don’t have anything that they can say to change
the system. The system is corrupt, the government is
corrupt, and they don’t have an avenue to make any
positive change. Equity issues come right down to
the center of terrorism, but they are also at the center
of climate change because the richest and the most
developed states are producing the most greenhouse
gases. The poorest, most vulnerable, most unequal
states are producing the least amount of greenhouse
gases. We in the United States have to take the lead in
reducing our greenhouse emissions because China and
India look at us and say, “You already put all this stuff
in the atmosphere. We’re not going to do anything
until you do something.” And you wonder why many
developing states won’t talk to us? They contend that
the United States must make the first move before they
are going to believe we are going to make a good faith
effort.

164

Environmental Security. The DoD’s existing
approach to the natural environment is shallow and
unremarkable. DoD policies reflect perceptions of
environmental issues more in the realm of pollution
prevention, toxic waste cleanup, base closures, and
worker safety.25 What is lacking in the DoD approach
is concentrated research into the relationships between
environmental/climate change and conflict, and
into how environmental security can be sustained.
Specifically, Combatant Commanders’ Theater
Security Cooperation Plans should identify in an Area
of Responsibility who controls access to water, food,
and energy. Also, the basic environmental context
surrounding the water, food, and energy situation must
be determined and plans to mitigate or improve basic
environmental conditions drafted. These efforts will
build trust, cooperation, and goodwill. Additionally,
these activities will improve host nation capacity
and capability to deal with climate change and other
national security threats.26
Democracy.
Another factor that influences
“sustainable security” is governance or simply
democracy. This is also a core aspect of our national
security strategy.27 We want to spread democracy. Now
how we spread democracy is a debatable dilemma. Do
you do it at the point of a gun, or do you do it in a more
pacific way? That is debatable, but democracy has a
certain theoretical appeal that I will discuss shortly.
Sustainable Free Markets. All free markets have
to be sustainable and the complete costs of market
processes have to be measured and accounted for. We
have to make sure that we are not taking away from
all these developing countries their core finite natural
resources that can not be replaced—if you take away
their forests and you destroy or degrade their core
natural resources, they will never be able to develop
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economically, socially, or politically. So we have to
find a way that we can deal with these countries so
that they can sustain their economies, too.
International organizations. Right now, we don’t
do a very good job of working with governmental and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We do a
really good job at heading them off and stopping them
from accomplishing things we don’t like, but we don’t
work with them as well as we could. So this is the core
of our “sustainable security” strategy.
Developing a 21st Century Total Force.
The QDR says we need to reconfigure the total force,
build the right skills, and effectively use our human
capital.28 I think these concepts can aptly be applied
to the challenges created by climate change. So what
would a sustainable security force developed to deal
with climate change look like as opposed to what we
currently have? Actually it would look a great deal
like the forces we currently have. You could use the
QDR as it is, merely changing a few words here and
there, and it would be a good starting point for creating
sustainable security forces.
A new sustainable security force would be focused
on what climate change is doing internationally to
countries that are vulnerable to global warming. The
new force would be a mix of military and civilian
specialists who understand what climate change could
do to make these states unstable, and what security
issues might potentially create problems for us. The
sustainable security forces would be expected to head
these problems off before they blend together in a
“perfect storm” and create failed states and breeding
grounds for terrorists. And, as you may remember,
during the tsunami event in 2005 when the Navy
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showed up on ships with helicopters, food, water, and
shelters, we were very popular in South East Asia again.
In particular, our popularity rating in Indonesia soared
from that one event. Those types of events, where we
intervene to help states mitigate and adapt to climate
change and then leave, will build trust and confidence
in the United States. If we do this on a recurring basis
aided by our allies, maybe we can gain back that global
goodwill we used to have.
Unity of Effort.
The QDR also noted that we should try to achieve
unity of effort.29 This included a suggestion that we
do things to make the interagency process work better.
I will leave that aside for the moment. Another QDR
recommendation was that we improve our abilities to
work with allies and partners.30 We haven’t done a
good job lately of working with allies and partners on
a recurring basis. And we have to do a better job at
getting out the strategic communication, which is at
the heart of countering terrorism—telling the people
that “Hey, we are selling something better than what
the terrorists are selling.” Strategic communication
clearly has climate change applications. We need to
tell vulnerable states that we will help them mitigate
and adapt to climate change. We need to build their
capacity to deal with climate change, and then their
internal security will be increased. This will make us
more friends and allies.
Within the political science field, scholars have
developed something called the democratic peace
theory. The three key processes that make the theory
acceptable are the interactions of democracy, economic
interdependence, and international organizations.

167

They work together, and they create international
peace. That is the theory. And believe it or not, it has
been proven in a variety of ways, and it is working.
Democracies don’t fight each other.31
Now, how do you get more peace and sustain
it? Well, as I said before, you take some of the core
paradigms out of the sustainability argument:
environmental security, ecological economics, and
that idea of equity, and you try to push them inside of
the democratic peace theory into what scholars call the
“pillars of the democratic theory.” There are a couple of
well-known political scientists, Bruce Russett and John
O’Neal, who call the relationship between the three
pillars a “virtuous circle.”32 It is based on the famous
philosopher Emmanuel Kant’s theory of perpetual
peace and how these processes and institutions work
together to reinforce each other and create peace.33
What I recommend is that democracy be made
the core governmental structure of any sustainability
process.
Take ecological economics and embed
it into the processes that are creating economic
interdependence so that our economic processes
become sustainable. Finally, take our international
organizations and use them as the tools to spread and
implement sustainability principles, with a clear focus
on creating equitable living conditions globally. Give
those voices out there that have not had a chance to
speak an opportunity to be heard. This will green
the democratic peace theory and will hopefully foster
sustainable security.34
Why the DoD?
Now why should DoD play a role in all this?
What is unique about DoD? DoD has many positive

168

characteristics that can allow us to use it as a starting
point to implement these ideas. First, one of the main
objectives of our national security strategy is to help
create more democracies around the world. Also,
our charge is to spread prosperity and freedom and
to protect human dignity,35 which I would equate
to creating an equitable world where people have a
chance to succeed. That is our charge in DoD based
on the objectives identified in the National Security
Strategy.
Also, the DoD has got the biggest budget in the U.S.
Government. There is that leverage tool again. Now,
if you take that big budget and you make it sustainable
and you apply ecological economic principles to the
way we buy and sell things, preferably buy things, then
we will be more sustainable and the DoD procurement
process will be greener. And we have done some good
things in DoD in the past, but we have also dirtied up
some places. We dumped some rather toxic things and
buried dangerous things and some of them, we don’t
even know where they are. We have to do a better
job. If we don’t remember where we put some of
these toxic things, they are going to come back some
day and create problems. They are going to end up in
the ground water, or the radiation from some of these
dumps is going to travel. You have to be careful what
you do with some of these things.
In addition, DoD has been a social laboratory
in the past. For example, DoD was a pioneer for
desegregation, minorities working in the military,
religious freedom, and preventing sexual harassment.
All those issues have been addressed in the military
early on, and I think we have done a pretty good job of
overcoming many of those challenges.
Finally, there is one more major challenge—social
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and environmental equity issues. How do you go into
somebody else’s country where less than 10 percent of
the people control 90 percent of the land? Essentially,
the land in many parts of the developing world is
controlled by a small group of elites. How do we get
them to give up that power and spread the wealth
and the land? And, we use too much energy; we are
the energy hogs out there. We use more energy than
anybody else, so if we can move from being fossil fuel
dependent to being renewable based and sustainably
based, then we can set the example for the rest of the
federal agencies and also for the state governments and
for other countries. Also, DoD owns a lot of land, so
that gives us a lot of opportunities to show how to use
our natural resources in a sustainable manner. New
technologies are coming out where we can sequester the
carbon dioxide emissions and reforest areas and things
like that to take more carbon out of the atmosphere.
The bottom line is we must take the lead and
use the pacific forces of democracy, united with
economic interdependence based on ecological
economic principles. We should encourage and enable
international organizations to implement equitable
climate change regimes and treaties. We must also lead
the world in securing perishable environmental areas
that are threatened by climate change and help states
create sustainable environmental security within their
own borders. If we reach out to other nations and try to
help them mitigate or adapt to climate change, we will
undermine the equity arguments that terrorists take
advantage of, we will make it less likely that climateinduced failed states will become breeding grounds for
extremists, and we will return the United States to the
position of global friend and leader, admired the world
over for leading the efforts to prevent catastrophic
climate change!
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Commentator
Col. Gregory M. Douquet, USMC
Royal College of Defence Studies
and King’s College, London
As a practitioner, currently in the U.S. Marine Corps,
I, too, have been wrestling with how, and indeed if,
we should establish linkages between U.S. National
Defense and climate change, which is the question put
before us on our panel today. I would like to thank our
speakers, Kent, Joshua, and John, for what I thought
was an excellent analysis of a very complicated and
important issue.
It struck me that all three speakers agreed on some
issues, disagreed on others, and there were a few
issues that they agreed upon the nature of the problem
but there were differences in the way they thought the
U.S. Government should approach it. Incidentally,
the internal debate that we are having here I find an
interesting contrast to the debate in the United Kingdom
(UK), where the current Defense Minister, John Reid,
was recently quoted as saying that “climate change
is the single biggest threat to UK national security,
indeed, greater than international terrorism.”
So, what is it that all three speakers agree upon?
Well, first of all, they agree that the climate is changing,
and this, at a minimum, will complicate U.S. national
security and defense strategy and possibly create
situations in which the United States might choose to
intervene. They also agree that if the United States
responds to a climate change induced problem, the
response should be via the interagency that coordinates
and employs the appropriate instruments of national
power.
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Perhaps in the question and answer (Q&A) period,
we can discuss if such a situation does demand an
interagency response, is our current interagency up
to the job? They also agree that climate change might
be a way to help restore U.S. soft power that might be
sorely lacking in the world today. Our three speakers
saw some climate change issues differently, however.
For example, how we might establish conditions
to counter the effects of global climate change and
the linkages between national defense and climate
change? Joshua saw the need for a plausibility probe,
and Kent and John saw climate change as a more or
less imminent threat, something that we need to think
about now and perhaps take action on. And all three
agree that national defense needs to be part of the U.S.
Government’s response to global climate change, and
that climate change could be part of a larger problem
such as complicating our struggle against extremist
ideology.
There were some differences in how they think the
U.S. Government should approach the problem. For
example, Kent suggested the military can shape the
environment by regional engagement via the Combatant Commander. Joshua thought that we could focus
upon climate change with regard to extreme weather
events. Perhaps we can probe these differences a little
bit further in the Q&A. Each of our speakers offered
some unique perspectives on the issue of U.S. national
defense and climate change, perspectives I have not
heard before.
I thought that Joshua’s analysis of the conditions
under which climate change can pose a threat to U.S.
national security interests was insightful and helps
focus our attention, and maybe more important in
these days of stretched capabilities, our resources.
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As Joshua pointed out, many of the effects of climate
change are beyond the scope of national security, and
perhaps we need a new model to address them.
Moreover, it is hard or probably a misallocation
of resources to prematurely redirect national security
strategy or national military strategy in expectation of
theoretical climate changes while we are fighting a long
multifront war, and our forces are deployed around
the world. I particularly agree with Kent’s observation
that environmental security issues often trigger or
exacerbate conflict and with his idea of Maslow’s
Hierarchy of Needs: that environmental security
is often not thought of as important by developing
countries, yet it is the foundation of their very success;
we have heard a lot about that today.
We should remain mindful of what John said
about sustainable security, and the fact that the DoD
is the biggest user of energy in this country and made
perhaps a great step in the right direction with respect
to the demand side of the equation.
I would like to make a few observations from a
practitioner’s perspective. In terms of national defense,
climate change is likely to make a bad region worse.
Those regions destabilized by resource shortfalls and
great ethnic tensions, disease, and poor governance,
the stresses that we have been discussing all day today,
could push these regions over the edge through the
exacerbating influence of climate change. Sub-Saharan
Africa and Central and Southeast Asia come to mind.
Therefore, it seems to me that a regional approach,
as opposed to a DoD-wide, one size fits all approach,
is reasonable and feasible. We have a mechanism
for such a regional approach: Unified Combatant
Commanders. They are among our eyes and ears
around the world and are probably in the best position
to assess the affects of climate change and work with
177

their regional partners, military to military and state
to state, to shape the situation before it erupts into a
larger problem.
But, “What might these Combatant Commanders
do?” is the question, particularly when these Combatant
Commanders don’t own their own resources, their
own forces. They are assigned those forces and as of
right now, none of those forces are assigned for the
purpose of responding to climate change. Perhaps they
could do some of the eyes and ears aspect of their job.
Risk management and modeling has come up today.
Perhaps they could be a means for nations to openly
cooperate, military to military. Perhaps they could
think of pre-staging capabilities, in order to respond
more rapidly in a climate change type of situation.
Discussion
(Douquet): If I may, I’d like to steal the first
question for our panel and ask it about the possibility
of U.S. intervention in a region destabilized by climate
change. It strikes me that such a projected intervention
is something of a Catch 22. Darfur might be a good
example. If the United States does intervene, regional
powers will likely be suspicious of intentions and
portray U.S. actions in a negative light. It will also
give those who want to gain an advantage over the
United States an opportunity to criticize us, possibly
also decreasing our soft power.
If the United States doesn’t intervene, we will
be accused of having created the problem with our
carbon emissions, et al., what John was talking about,
and not participating in the solution. In what might be
perceived as a sovereign nation’s domestic problem,
what would be our justification to intervene and would
such an intervention likely meet UN approval?
Q.
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Busby: My first reaction would be to look at the part
of the world where it took place and then think about
the strategic significance. If we are talking about Africa,
I think its strategic importance to the United States is
an open question. Looking at what our interests are in
the region comes down to resources, the possibility of
state failure creating ungoverned spaces for terrorists
to organize, and the potential for blowback if we fail
to intervene. Even given those considerations, much of
Africa may not be strategically important to the United
States. So intervention would have to be justified on
moral grounds, which is a hard conclusion to come to
as someone who is concerned about Africa. But merely
thinking about how extreme weather events might
exacerbate human tragedies is an important cognitive
shift on our part. We also see the mobilization of
domestic constituencies that demand the U.S. military
take action even when we have no strategic dog in the
fight. We should anticipate this possibility. Investing
in early warning systems to head off such crises will
make it less costly for us later on.
Butts: I agree. I like to approach intervention like
lifesaving: We should row, throw, and then go. Go
last. Intervention should be a last resort. Have we
given diplomacy a chance? Are there others that could
participate? Have we tried our alliances? What about
the UN? Could we, in fact, support an international
force by providing strategic lift and intelligence, but
not having our troops on the ground themselves?
There is a reason why you don’t use the most powerful
military in the world in a cavalier fashion. When
you do get involved, you should be sensitive to local
customs and have a game plan. That way you won’t
create resentment. There are times, however, when
we should get involved in a place even if it is not
strategically important to us. If you look at the Great
179

Lakes area in Rwanda, many people would say that
the number of dead could have been halved if the
United States had been involved earlier. It is hard to
walk away from that. I don’t think we should. Finally,
if we do get involved, we should build the necessary
institutions and capacity to do a hand off. The World
Bank used to say “The problem with U.S. military is
you get in, then because you don’t want mission creep,
you get out as soon as you can, and then we have a
potential failed state.” So while you are in there, create
those institutions. Work with NGOs to build capacity
so that they can be effective when in fact we pull out
and maybe allow us to pull out earlier.
Ackerman: I would like to differ a little bit from
my colleagues. I think intervention is an opportunity,
especially if it is done in response to a disaster that is
climatically or environmentally driven. I think that
in such cases, we don’t have to worry so much about
countries construing our intentions in a negative way.
When we responded to the tsunami, we generated
a great amount of good will. I think that we ought
to take advantage of any opportunity out there to
help countries mitigate or adapt to climate change.
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) operations are designed to help countries
develop the ability to solve their own problems using
their own security forces. We help them understand
the climatic problems that they are going to encounter
in the future and build their own capabilities. So I think
helping a country deal with an unnatural disaster is an
opportunity.
Q: My concern in that you are calling upon DoD
to take on a lot responsibilities that are more properly
suited for the DoS. Could you comment on that,
please?
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Ackerman: The DoD has a 500 billion dollar budget,
the largest in the United States Government, and other
necessary capabilities and assets. The DoS has nothing
compared to this. Moreover, there has been a transition
in the last 4 or 5 years to put even more capacity into
DoD and take it away from DoS. So as long as that trend
continues, I think that DoD is the logical organization
to turn to. That is not to say that DoS cannot provide
cultural and ecological awareness and also help with
those transitions and security situations. But DoD has
the power; DoS does not.
Audience: But DoS is the lead for foreign disaster
and assistance. DoD cannot deploy forces without
DoS support. A Combatant Commander can take the
initiative in the theater and introduce programs of
humanitarian assistance or disaster preparedness—as
in the case of Indonesia. However, when it comes to
providing a system of enduring presence and enduring
assistance after the disaster, that would be better done
by interagencies and other governmental agencies. The
military likes to fight its nation’s wars. We are not the
world’s 9-1-1 emergency carte blanche, and I think we
all understand that.
Busby: The real problem is that we do not have
adequate tools in the State Department tool kit in an
expeditionary way to do nation-building or provide
adequate state governance assistance. We have ended
up with a concentration of capability in the Pentagon,
and we see the atrophying of USAID. I agree that, at
the end of the day, the military is going to be tasked to
fight and win wars; but when we face new challenges,
we need to anticipate and build the capacity to deal with
them. And whether those capabilities lie in Defense
or State or some other venue, we should ensure that
military capabilities aren’t the only tool in our arsenal.
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Q: I have a question about priorities. The British
Government spokespersons have said that, in their
view, climate change is the greatest threat to their
national security. We are in a country where that is
not the view of our administration. The panelists made
some very thoughtful recommendations as to what we
should do to meet the coming threat. But what is the
likelihood that any commander is going to take these
steps? The military establishment has to meet a lot of
other operational and other requirements. Given that
climate change is viewed as a long-term rather than
an immediate problem in many quarters, including
our own administration, are we going to see anything
happen in the foreseeable future along the lines that
you all are suggesting?
Butts: The answer is “Yes.” As General Frank said,
“It doesn’t matter that we are in two wars, we still have
to do engagement.” Not so long ago, CENTCOM was
told by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to
abandon its environmental security programs despite
the fact that Deputy CENTCOM Commander General
Delong said, “If it weren’t for those environmental
security programs with the Central Asian States, it
would’ve taken us years instead of months to gain the
access we needed to fight the Afghanistan War.” But
CENTCOM went ahead anyway—they simply renamed
the program. Three weeks ago we helped CENTCOM
do a nuclear disaster preparedness conference for the
GCC plus 2, Jordan and Egypt. Despite the pressures,
they went ahead with their engagement program. This
is true of other commands, too.
Dorff: The Deputy Commandant Pacific Command
and European Command are, I can confirm, involved in
engagement. They are involved because in Washington
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there is a lot of talk but little action and because they
know it must be done. Out there in the theater, things
are being done.
Q: You suggested that, because DoD has the
largest budget, it should be tasked with humanitarian
intervention. This same logic might be applied to
everything else that the government does, as well. Is
this not a case of mission creep?
Ackerman: It would indeed be a problem if we
saw the DoD as a bottomless pit and sought all our
answers from it. I did not mean to suggest this. I do
think, though, that we will achieve positive results if
we help people deal with climate change. Suppose a
third world nation suffers from serious floods or the
kind of heat wave that causes security to break down in
cities. We could use our soft forces to help them adapt
to these challenges. We might be fondly remembered.
Q: Let me ask a hypothetical question. What if a
disaster on the order of the tsunami occurred in Iran?
It would seem to me that if we offered to help them,
they would see that as an opportunity for us to affect
regime change. They wouldn’t want us in there because
the U.S. military, for whatever reasons, good or bad,
has a reputation of not simply doing humanitarian
relief. Rather, it tries at the same time to achieve larger
government objectives, which do include in some places
like Iran, regime change. How would you respond to a
situation in which there was an opportunity to intervene
to affect humanitarian relief, but in which there was
a larger political framework, which might, to put it
mildly, complicate the achievement or intervention?
Ackerman: After Hurricane Katrina, we received
an offer from the Iranian government and also from
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some other governments that we are not very friendly
with to aid us, too. That was rather unique, I thought.
As to the Iranians, they might not want our help, and
we would obviously not force it on them. But it would
surely say a lot about us if we offered to help people
we weren’t on very friendly terms with. It might begin
to help us recreate the idea that America is about
democracy and freedom and human dignity. I would
hope, though, that whenever we go, we go with the
UN and we go with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), we go with the European Union (EU),
we go with a whole group of allies.
Q: Will climate change oblige us to think in
unfamiliar ways? Or will we be dealing with things we
already understand?
Busby: There will be some new things—glacier
melt in Greenland and Antarctica that could
surprise us, for example. There may also be major
discontinuities of the kinds that we heard about where
there is larger ecosystem collapse that we may have
difficulty anticipating. But some things over which we
have more confidence are the increased severity and
frequency of extreme weather events that we are more
familiar with. But we haven’t really thought about and
prepared for how to handle the socio-economic and
political consequences of them.
Ackerman: Global agreement enforcement may be
challenging. Suppose, for example, we sign a treaty
agreeing to put a cap on oil. How do we stop the illicit
trade in oil? Would we use the U.S. Navy to police the
world?
Glantz: I cannot see the military policing the oceans.
We are not a bottomless pit. As my periodontist said
when he gave me a toothbrush, “Brush the teeth you

184

want to keep.” We need to think about our priorities.
If we want to protect the world, let’s do it. If we want
to protect certain strategic interests, let’s do that. But
we do need to deal with problems at home, too. Our
failure to deal well with Hurricane Katrina at home
has undermined foreign confidence. In Spain, our
allies wonder if they can depend on a nation that can’t
take care of its own! We also need a reality check. A
lot of what we are talking about here is theoretical, and
we can do anything we want on paper. Every early
warning system that I know of works on paper and
in Power Point. But in reality, they all don’t seem to
do the job. I would like to see more discussion about
reality.
Butts: We should remember the CNN factor. Take,
for example, the Horn of Africa and Somalia. You could
not have paid any military person to bet a nickel that
we would have put 20,000 combat troops in the Horn
of Africa to distribute food. And yet we did. And we
could be back tomorrow, depending on what is shown
on television. Public opinion is very powerful, and so
is the media.
Busby: In my paper, I tried to distinguish between
things that were more and less credible. I focused on
extreme weather events because these, I think, are
more likely to command the attention of policymakers
in the short run. It may be that we ought to have the
broader strategic discussion in the lead up to the 2008
elections. But at the very least, we are injecting into the
discussion a new issue. Concerns about climate change
do have some scientific basis and we ought to be paying
them some attention.
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CHAPTER 4
MEETING THE CHALLENGE
In this chapter, discussion shifts from analysis of the
problem to a discussion of solutions. What individuals/
institutions should be involved in the effort to combat
climate change? What methods are most likely to yield
positive results? Mr. Dennis Tänzler stresses the need for
a transatlantic consensus and effective international diplomacy, Mr. Simon Rich focuses on the role of corporations,
and Dr. Anthony Leiserowitz looks at risk perception and
analyzes how this affects our ability to deal with the issue.
International Diplomacy
Dennis Tänzler
Adelphi Research
My talk today will focus on the mitigation challenges facing the transatlantic and the global communities. In particular, it will examine the prospects of transatlantic climate and energy policymaking. There are
good reasons to think about these issues. Science tells
us that we have only a limited window of opportunity.1
If we do not take decisive action within the next 5 to 10
years, it will be hard to avoid some of the worst impacts
of global climate change.
In my presentation, I will touch on four points. First
I will outline the milestones of international climate
policies. Second, I will argue that the basis for a
future global climate agreement will be a transatlantic
consensus. I want to explain why I think there is
common ground, and why I am optimistic that we will
be able to start developing forward looking climate and
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energy policies. Third, I will discuss ways to engage
other countries and suggest what issues need to be
part of a global framework on climate change. Fourth,
I will suggest ways to inject some new dynamics into
the international climate-change process.
Milestones of International Climate Policies.
When we talk about the milestones of international
climate change policies, there are basically two major
international agreements; a very strong United Nations
(UN) framework convention on climate change agreed
on in 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997.2
1991 United Nations Framework Convention. The
1992 UN framework convention was ratified by 189
countries. Its ultimate objective is to avoid dangerous
climate change. Some analysts have argued that it
is more or less a security treaty for those countries
(especially small island states) which are in danger of
disappearing because of rising sea levels. An important
normative aspect of the framework convention on
climate change is that it points out the common but
differentiated responsibility of industrialized and
developing countries to combat climate change. In other
words, it works on the assumption that industrialized
countries, because of their historical responsibility for
causing greenhouse gas emissions, should take the
lead in reducing greenhouse gases and the developing
countries will follow.
1997 Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was
adopted in 1997 after “negotiation by exhaustion.”
This protocol has been subject to highly controversial
debates within the transatlantic as well as international
community. It did not enter into force before 2005. It
has been ratified by 169 countries but not by the United
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States and Australia. The Kyoto Protocol includes legally
binding emissions reduction targets for industrialized
countries. It does not set emissions reduction targets for
developing countries. It does introduce some flexible
mechanisms including emissions trading which are
designed to promote sustainable development and
reduce overall emissions.
The idea behind emissions trading is that countries
who have come in under their prescribed limits can
sell the emissions permitted but not used to countries
who have failed to meet their limits. Countries who
have to pay a steep price to “buy” compliance will be
encouraged to promote the development of alternative
sources of energy.
This system means jointly implemented emissions
reduction projects within the framework of the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint
Implementation (JI). The CDM is a good example of
international cooperation. Industrialized countries
invest in projects in developing countries that will
help reduce emissions. By doing so, they get so-called
certified emission reduction units which means they
will not have to reduce emissions so much in their own
countries. Such certified reduction units or emission
permits might, I think, become a powerful world
currency.
However, these innovative instruments are—at least
in the way they are currently designed—not sufficient
to trigger breakthrough technological innovations.
There are no appropriate mechanisms or agreements
to enforce technological change. This might well be
the central reason why industrialized countries today
do not perform very well when it comes to emissions
reductions.
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Copenhagen: Home of a Future Agreement? Nevertheless, plans are underway in the international
community to start negotiating a new climate agreement
by the end of the year.3 There is some urgency here
if we are to reach an agreement by 2009 on what a
2012 climate change framework should look like. The
conference will take place in Copenhagen, and the
agreement is thus likely to be called the Copenhagen
Protocol or Copenhagen Agreement. The negotiations,
as well as the agreement, will tackle the questions of
mitigation, adaptation, financing, and technology.
A main feature of this agreement is likely to be
differentiated commitments. Countries that contribute
most to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will
be asked to reduce GHG emissions substantially in
the years to come. We need some kind of technology
funding mechanisms to trigger innovations and, of
course, we will have to raise the question of adaptation
and compensation. Technology funding mechanisms
might be an appropriate way to link all those four
challenges.
It is clear that these negotiations will be very
complicated. Creative solutions and willingness to
compromise are prerequisites for a successful outcome.
Four components will be decisive. First, the European
Union (EU) needs to demonstrate renewed leadership.
That means the EU has to show that the climate policies
it has adopted so far are successful. Second, we need
to foster U.S. leadership. Third, we need to engage
emerging countries like China and India which today
belong to the major emitters. And, last but not least,
the international community needs to compensate
countries most affected by climate change.
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The Need for a Transatlantic Consensus.
If these negotiations are to be successful, a transatlantic consensus is crucial. Why?4 First, the United
States, Canada, and the EU are responsible for about
two-thirds of industrialized GHG emissions. Between
them, they caused the lion’s share of the anthropogenic
greenhouse gases in today’s atmosphere. Because of
this historical responsibility, emerging economies like
China and India are only likely to follow and to accept
legally binding commitments if the United States
and the EU take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
Second, transatlantic political and economic
cooperation has a vital role to play in encouraging
innovations and curbing emissions. Forward looking
policy measures on both sides of the Atlantic will do
much to encourage environmental innovations. The
increased use made of renewable energy in Germany
and wind energy in Texas are cases in point.
At the same time, decisionmakers on both sides
of the Atlantic should be aware that their first and
foremost obligation is to stop and reverse negative
emissions trends. The GHG emissions trends from
1990 to 2010 make it quite clear that policy efforts so
far have been insufficient. Two trends are visible. On
the one hand, there has been a tremendous increase
in U.S. GHG emissions since 1990, although data for
2004 and 2005 indicates that this negative trend may
at least have slowed down.5 On the other hand, the EU
has shown since 1990 that a reversal of the emissions
trend is possible. However, the EU is still far away
from the emissions reductions it aims to achieve. It still
has some way to go before it is in compliance with the
Kyoto target.
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On a more optimistic note, there is some reason to
argue that the EU will achieve the target since some
of the measures adopted will show impact only in the
years to come. One important example in this regard
is the development and implementation of emissions
trading systems. Emissions trading was invented
initially in the United States. It is now a major pillar
of European Climate Change Policies and provides us
with an example of what a transatlantic climate policy
approach might look like.6
Prospects for a Transatlantic Consensus.
There are several reasons why I think such a
consensus may be reached.
Scientific Certainty. First, the dialogue between the
United States and the EU countries is based on increased
scientific certainty. If we compare today’s discussion
regarding human influence on the climate system
with that 5 years ago, I think we see a tremendous
difference.
Converging Climate and Energy Security
Agendas. Second, climate and energy security agendas
are beginning to come together on both sides of the
Atlantic.7 In Europe, in March 2007 there was a very
important EU council meeting in which EU heads
of state agreed upon several binding targets.8 They
agreed that by 2020, 20 percent of energy used must
be renewable energy and 10 percent of EU transport
fuel must be bio-fuels.9 They also made a commitment
to improve energy efficiency by 20 percent in the
same year. This is important because, as the European
Commission pointed out in the fall of 2006, energy
efficiency is one way to significantly reduce greenhouse
gas at minimal cost. A number of observers regard this
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EU council as a successful integration of both agendas,
that of climate change and energy security. Some are
so euphoric as to see in the meeting the rebirth of the
European spirit.
Meantime, in the United States, there are also
encouraging signs of a similar convergence of climate
and energy security agendas. For example, in the State
of the Union Address of 2007, President Bush pointed
out that climate change is an important issue. He also
said that there is a need to increase energy independence
and cut gasoline usage by 20 percent in 10 years. He
mandated a higher proportion of alternative fuels and
announced measures for increasing the fuel efficiency
standards for cars and light trucks.
Even more importantly, there are promising
activities at the state level. For example, more than
20 states have introduced renewable energy portfolio
standards. It is worth noting why these states agreed
to adopt binding targets regarding their share of
renewable energies. Analysis suggests two reasons:
States are guided by environmental policies, and they
recognize the need for energy independence.10
Cutting GHG Emissions. There are other promising
signs of a transatlantic consensus—in this case reflected
in a mutual interest in reducing dangerous emissions.
In Europe, at a March 2007 meeting, EU members
agreed on a binding unilateral commitment to cut 1990
levels of GHG emissions by 20% by 2020. In addition,
the EU emphasized that developed countries need to
reduce their own GHC emissions by 60 to 80 percent
by 2050.
In the United States, there is huge political debate as
to whether to set a cap on GHG emissions. In the U.S.
Senate, a number of proposals for a cap and trade system
were introduced in 2007. These included proposals for
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caps to be set in 2020 and 2050, respectively. Moreover,
regional climate policy approaches in California aim at
similar long-term emissions reduction targets. In other
words, EU and the United States at least have a place to
start when it comes to discussing what a future climate
change policy should look like.
This is especially the case with respect to the
development and implementation of emissions
trading systems. The EU will leave the learning phase
of its system in 2008.11 Meanwhile, regional systems
are under development in the United States. Here
I draw your attention to systems developed by nine
northeastern states—the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI)—and a system planned by California
and five other west coast states.12
The federal system of the United States makes it
likely that these approaches at the state level will have
a significant effect at the national level. Pluralistic
competition means that policy innovations like
standards and procedures for emissions inventory and
registry are likely to spread across the whole country
after a “critical mass” has been reached. In addition,
there are senate proposals for national cap and trade
systems to be discussed in the upcoming months.13
Most importantly, we need to mention the Lieberman
proposal which is co-sponsored by potential future
presidents of the United States John McCain, Barak
Obama, and Hillary Clinton. Given their ambitions,
their political support means something for the
development and implementation of a national
emissions trading scheme.
What might be as important as the political will
I outlined is the increasing pressure by business
actors to establish market-based solutions to tackle
the problem of global climate change. A number of
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important companies and business have asked for a
global market for emissions in order to get investment
security and the same conditions in the United States
and within the EU.14
Engaging the International Community.
So the United States and Europe have both made
progress when it comes to these issues. They share
common ground when it comes to such things as the
need to cut greenhouse gases and the convergence of
climate change and energy security issues. They have
much to learn from each other, and both could and
should work together.
Extending the Partnership. There is another reason
to stress the importance of the transatlantic relationship.
A cooperative relationship between the United States
and the EU could serve as a catalyst for broader global
action involving newly industrialized countries. Given
the increasing emissions in countries like China and
India, engaging other countries is vital. What must we
do to bring such nations into the process?
Transforming Energy Systems. First, we need
to transform energy systems. We need to achieve a
global deal on low carbon technologies which can lead
the way towards a decarbonized future. This must be
achieved by the middle of the century at the latest. In
particular, we need to increase efficiency in the power
plant sector. We need to improve our ability to capture
and store carbon and develop better gasification
technologies. We need to expand renewable energies,
and to develop high-capacity grids. Finally, we should
not forget that from a global perspective, decentralized
energy systems can play a very important role in
alleviating energy poverty throughout the world.
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Flexible Emissions. Looking at the debate within
the international climate change arena, there are
signs that newly industrialized countries are more
likely to agree on a first step to a flexible or a sectoral
emissions target.15 However, we should figure out
what our options are when it comes to linking targets
and gaining improved access to clean technologies.
This is especially necessary given the huge increase
in power consumption in China and India. We also
need to develop a system of adaptation planning and
financing which needs to start immediately. There are
some funds under the UN framework convention on
climate change and under the Kyoto Protocol, but they
are underfunded and not well equipped. So we need to
gain new momentum here.
Visionary Projects. Another related approach is
to develop visionary projects, or lighthouse projects,
in order to jointly address mitigation and adaptation
needs. Here I may point to the discussions within the
EU on an Africa-EU energy partnership. At the same
time, new concepts are being developed in the area
of renewable energies based on solar thermal power
plants like those already operating in Kramer Junction,
California. How, for example, might one build a
transmission grid to connect Europe, the Middle East,
and North Africa, the so called EU-MENA region? The
objective is to provide clean energy for the sunbelt
countries as well as for Europe. The vision is to develop
a system of solar thermal power plants in the desert that
would serve multiple purposes: reduce C02 emissions,
increase the security of energy supplies in EU-MENA,
and provide additional jobs and earnings for people in
North Africa and the Middle East.
This concept was suggested by the National Energy
Research Center of Jordan, together with the Club
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of Rome and the German Aerospace Center.16 They
developed a concept based on solar thermal power
plants connected through an intercontinental electricity
transmission grid with the European grid. This grid
would enable the EU to obtain about 10 percent of its
electricity demand from MENA countries. In addition,
there are plans to use the waste heat generated by
the plants to desalinate water and hence to tackle the
problem of water scarcity at the same time. So it is a
very ambitious project, and maybe it is not realistic in
some parts. However, we need such visionary projects
just as much as we need decisionmakers willing to
adopt these ideas and help make them work.
New Dynamics.
We need, as I have said, a transatlantic as well as
a global consensus on how to address climate change.
And we need to renew transatlantic dialogue. There are
many ways to achieve these goals. We can harmonize
policy approaches as I have just suggested. We can
also engage in more cooperative research. Here the
energy and technology initiative currently promoted
by Foreign Ministers Rice and Steinmeier may be a
useful starting point.17
A first U.S.-EU high level meeting involving chief
executive officers (CEOs) from energy, research, and
venture capital took place in March 2007. Its goal
was to hasten the innovation and deployment of new
energy technologies across the Atlantic. Such initiatives
need to accompany international negotiations carried
out under the auspices of the UN. These negotiations
might be triggered by dialogues between the G-8
countries and the five outreach countries, Brazil, India,
China, Mexico, and South Africa. The aim of all these
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discussions is to develop a shared understanding
of the nature of future commitments. Meetings like
that in Heiligendamm in Germany could serve as
springboards for a global approach on climate change
and energy security.
In fact, international climate negotiations for a
multitrack approach are scheduled to start in Bali at the
end of the year. Lots of things will have to be agreed
upon. Under discussion will be targets and timetables,
technological partnerships and compensation mechanisms.
Conclusion.
In sum, despite the enormous challenges we still
face, I am at this point somewhat optimistic. There are
signs that a transatlantic consensus can be reached. If
we build on our historical relationships and find ways
to engage newly industrialized nations, the search to
find a diplomatic solution to climate change may gain
much needed momentum.
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Meeting the Challenge of Climate Change:
The Role of the Corporation
Simon Rich
Louis Dreyfus Holding Corporation
The Challenge.
We are here today to discuss climate change. I
have been asked to suggest what corporations can
do to address the problem. I want to start by asking
you to imagine a small circle surrounded by a larger
circle. The larger circle represents the biosphere. As
all the scientists in this room know, this biosphere
operates under certain immutable laws. The smaller
circle represents the global economy. This operates
according to economic theories. I would suggest to
you that we need to keep in mind that they are just
that—theories. We are overshooting in so many areas.
Our global economy is dumping too much waste in
the biosphere for it to handle. We are overfishing. We
are running out of oil. We are abusing our top soil.
And our population is still growing quite rapidly. So
the economy is pushing against the real limits of the
biosphere to which we owe LIFE.
At the same time, we still operate according to the
antiquated belief that there are no limits to growth.
That theory worked well enough when the world
was relatively empty. But can we afford to operate at
the start of the 21st century the same way we did in
earlier times? And what of the future? We have a stock
market selling at 25 times earnings. This means that
the investors are expecting these companies to achieve
a significant rate of growth, and this is predicated
within a mature economy. Second, China and India
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have rapidly developing economies and are using
natural resources and creating waste at unprecedented
amounts. Our biosphere is really not designed to
handle this kind of exponential growth. If we are to
expect two billion additional people over the next 30
or 40 years, maybe we should consider managing our
global economies quite differently.
Our global economy is to a large extent a market
driven economy. As we all recognize, accurate price
signals are critical to the proper functioning of any
market. But price signals can be distorted. Economists
tend to assume that the substitutions of inputs to
their economic models are without restriction. So, for
example, if we are short of natural resources or labor, we
can substitute technology. However, if we are getting
the wrong price signals, we may not be able to make
the substitution, or we may make one that is incorrect.
Consider our current oil prices. At $60 a barrel, oil is
cheap. It is certainly not properly priced because there
are many unpriced attributes to the current price of
oil. These include the cost of maintaining a military
presence in the Middle East, the cost of health care
as more and more people are affected by the poor
air quality in most of our cities, and the one we are
talking about today—climate change. Therefore, our
$60 per barrel oil may really be costing us $100, and
the resulting economic assumptions must be wrong.
We also find it difficult to do what needs to be done.
To illustrate this point, let me tell you a brief and rather
funny story. I am on the board of an organization
called “Sustainable North Carolina.” We give an
award each year to the most sustainable business or
operation. The year before last the award was won by
the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point, which is
responsible for repairing airplanes. When the Marine
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Corps colonel came up to receive his award, he made
the following observations: He thanked everybody for
the award. He said they would keep working at Cherry
Point to defend democracy at home and abroad. Then
he stopped and said, “But I’ll tell you, I would never
have won this award if I ran a democracy at Cherry
Point. When I decided we were going to recycle on the
base, believe me, we recycled. When I said we were
going to cut water consumption, we did.” He went
through his whole list. His point is well-taken, and we
all recognize the difficulty in moving a group without
proper education or incentive. While I have been
asked to focus on what corporations can do to meet the
challenge, the story does illustrate an interesting point.
The fact is that the Department of Defense (DoD) and
the Army have a magnificent opportunity to lead the
nation in sustainability—and, indeed, are doing so.
Many corporations are taking the lead as well toward
limiting green house gas emissions and moving toward
a more sustainable business model in general.
Energy Efficiency.
So—to get to my central point—fossil fuel
combustion leads to greenhouse gas emissions which
lead to climate change. To deal with climate change,
we obviously need to address fossil fuel combustion.
What can we do? What are our opportunities?
Before I get to the opportunities, let us just look at
the facts as I see them. Of all of our primary energy, 80
percent comes from fossil fuels. Two-thirds of the oil
that still remains in the ground is in the Middle East.
The CO2 gas that results from the combustion of all of
this fossil fuel is released into the atmosphere. Does
it look to a rational person as if we have a sustainable
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situation here? Or does it look like we are headed
for disaster? Our population obviously is increasing.
So too is affluence. The demand of China, India, and
Brazil for oil is increasing as their economies develop,
and their need for energy services increase. If you use
the metric of gross domestic product (GDP) divided
by primary energy use, we have been doing a pretty
good job in the developed world—energy efficiency
has been increasing at 1 percent a year. The problem
is that if world energy use is projected to increase at
four times what it is today by the end of the century,
we would have to increase energy efficiency 2 percent
a year.
What I want to stress in my talk is the need for
energy efficiency. This is where opportunities lie.
We are facing some very serious issues. They are
challenging all of our scientists and our engineers. They
are made more complicated by our sociopolitical and
economic structures and even our democracy. We have
very disparate views on how to deal with the problem,
and the disagreements are fiercely held and slowing
us down. And we have to deal with the difficulty of
how to convert the developed world to sustainable
practices, while at the same time the developing world
wants to achieve a certain standard of living. And we
have to deal with human needs as opposed to the need
for economic growth. Finally, we just cannot remain
completely dependent on fossil fuels. We have to figure
out a whole new trajectory.
We also face some technical questions. We have
to know how and if CO2 can be sequestered. Can we
really capture CO2? Can we put it in the ground? Can
we pipe it and use it in industrial processes? Are there
cost-effective ways to use CO2? That means research.
It means more science dollars. The same is true of
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nuclear energy. Can we store the waste safely? When
the President of Greenpeace comes out and says, “I’ll
support a nuclear plant that’s been properly thought
out,” when the environmental community is ready to
embrace nuclear power to avert CO2 emissions, you
know that there has been a major sea change. Bio-fuels
are being touted as an answer all over this country,
including in North Carolina. However, lingering
questions remain. When you use bio-fuels, you are
placing energy demands against the food supply.
The current model for agriculture in the United States
and the developed world is basically an industrial
monoculture, facing very serious problems from the
standpoint of water use, soil erosion, and fossil fuel
use.1 Finally, there are questions about solar power.
Can we make solar power affordable?
In the limited time that remains to me, let me suggest
some of the ways we could become more efficient in
the area of electric power and transportation, both key
consumers of fossil fuels and about equally responsible
for the emission of greenhouse gases.
In the United States, 70 percent of all electric power
comes from fossil fuels—about 50 percent comes
from coal, and nearly 20 percent from natural gas and
petroleum. We have had a major nuclear program here,
which is stalled, and we are basically doing nothing
on renewables. So we are totally dependent on fossil
fuels. Now this is a bit of a disaster, but also it could
become an opportunity for us, if we dedicate ourselves
to becoming more energy efficient.
If you look at a map of the United States, you can
see that coal burning is fairly evenly distributed until
you get to the western systems power pool. California
buys a lot of electricity from Montana and Arizona. So
we Americans are totally coal-dependent, and we are
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emitting greenhouse gases all over. North Carolina is
downwind of a major coal-burning region. Our Blue
Ridge Mountains are being devastated right now from
the emissions coming out of the east north central
region of the United States.
Our current technology is very inefficient today.
When we put 100 units of coal, or anything else, into
our system, we are getting nine-and-a-half units of
energy service coming out. This inefficiency presents
a tremendous opportunity, but one which we can only
take advantage of if we spend a significant amount of
money on research and science. If you want to involve
members of the business community, you have to
provide them with incentives to invest private dollars
in the area of energy efficiency. In addition, we need
intelligent public policy or we need the military to take
the lead.
Clearly, if you can cut the number of units of
energy that you need by becoming more efficient in
your energy use, you have a tremendous leverage on
the amount of fossil fuels you are using. It means that
small amounts of energy efficiency translate into large
amounts of primary energy saved. This will help us as
we institute significant energy efficiency campaigns.
Here in North Carolina the utilities commission
recently turned down Duke University’s application to
build two coal-fired power plants down near Charlotte,
two 800 megawatt power plants. The Commission told
Duke it could build one—which they probably cannot
do since their economic calculations were based on
their building two. It also told Duke Power, “And you
have to spend $50 million a year on energy efficiency
in the state for the next 10 years.” That money spent on
energy efficiency is going to have a big effect in North
Carolina, and the challenge to any regulated state like
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North Carolina is for the Utility Commission to figure
out a way—and they will—to incentivize the utility to
spend that money on energy efficiency to create the
NEGAWATT, that is with an “N,” and earn a return
on the megawatt rather than the megawatt which is
generating capacity they must build.2
The utilities commission had a study done for them
by a very reputable consultant where a new kilowatt
of electricity might cost $2,000 or more to construct,
and that same amount of electricity can be saved
through greater efficiency and thus reduce the need,
the demand, at one-third the cost. When you institute
an energy efficiency campaign, it is independent
businesses that get involved. You need people to do
the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC);
the hot water heating; and selling the Energy Star
appliances. It is not massive business but local business
that begins the process. So the dollars stay in the place
where energy efficiency is being implemented. So it is
very positive for local economies, and it creates jobs.
The study suggested that 22,000 jobs would be created
in North Carolina with the institution of this energy
efficiency campaign. It is a million jobs around the
United States.
This is the shocker for me—you all are probably
aware of this—but if we put one compact fluorescent
bulb in each house in the United States, we would save
two coal plants or take 1.3 million cars off the road. The
savings are out there, but we are not doing it. We do not
have the political will to do it. So who are the leaders?
Australia: they said, “No incandescent lights.” The
European Union: they said, “No incandescent lights.”
North Carolina has got a bill: “No incandescent lights.”
And look at Fort Bragg’s web site on sustainability: It
is phenomenal what Fort Bragg is suggesting they are
going to do.
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You are probably very familiar with the arguments
in favor of using renewable energy. This is indeed
important. If we instituted a 20 percent renewable
energy and efficiency portfolio standard in the United
States, we could save $76 billion a year. If 50 percent
of that was from efficiency, that money would go into
local economies throughout the United States. People
in the United States would not be looking for jobs at
Wal-Mart any more, believe me.
And we haven’t even begun to price the
externalities. The Clean Smokestacks Bill was passed
in North Carolina 3 years ago simply because we drew
attention to what it cost to treat asthma in children
and other health problems caused by the dirt we were
putting out of the smokestacks. It was passed by the
legislature because they realized that spending $2
billion to clean up the smoke stacks was better than
spending $8 billion in health care in North Carolina.
That is just one of the externalities that has not been
priced.
My last point relates to transportation. You know,
we are rejecting Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards, and here is what happened. We
got serious about CAFE standards in 1980. We stated
that mileage per gallon had to increase, and look what
happened—our petroleum consumption went way
down. But we relaxed the standards because the auto
industry lobbied millions of dollars every year, and
they kept it from happening. Rick Wagoner, the Chief
Executive Officer of General Motors, stood up the
other day and said, “We don’t need CAFE standards.”
That is the mentality that is hard to get past. Anyway,
we have the same ability to be efficient when it comes
to the automobile that we do when it comes to the
provision of electricity. Of the energy that goes into
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an automobile, 87 percent is wasted. We can easily
reduce this waste by increasing CAFE standards,
saving tremendous amounts of money each year. If
we can get to 43 miles to the gallon—we’ve got the
technology to get to 80—we would save three million
barrels a day.
As to bio-fuels—they have a place. Bio-mass has
the ability to produce a whole range of fuels. The
feedstocks range from wood and any woody vegetation
to specific energy crops and agricultural waste. We
are using the worst one possible—corn. As you saw
in the Wall Street Journal today, corn planting has hit
the highest level since 1944. Corn is commanding over
$4.00 a bushel. Farmers are making a fortune. Well,
the reason corn is worth this much is because it reflects
a supply curve for ethanol produced from corn. It is
uneconomic without the subsidy. You put the subsidy
in, and everybody is growing corn. We have to move
from corn to cellulose, which is cellulosic ethanol
process, and we will have a reasonable bio-fuel from
an energy balance and environmental perspective.
Again: research, development, science. It is possible,
we are just not doing it.
Bio-fuels are a substitute for up to 2.5 mm barrels
of oil each day. That is more than comes out of the
Persian Gulf or the Arctic National Refuge, which is
just hardly a sneeze compared to the amount of oil we
use. Even though it is a fraction of our use, it amounts
to $55 billion a year.
What we need is what I call an authorizing focus.
That is to say we need public policy to set out the
rules for business. If we leave the free market to its
own devices, what happens? It operates according to a
“who’s the fastest gun?” principle and it does not price
things or allocate capital properly. The free market is
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great at pricing things in the short-term, but we need to
price the externalities, and business needs to be guided
by informed public policy.
We also need leaders. There are some. (If
you want to read a fascinating story, read about
Goldman’s intervention in the TXU deal.) But there
are also laggards. The biggest laggards are the U.S.
policymakers and the White House. They have been
stonewalling this whole notion of a sustainable energy
policy bowing to the demands of special interest
groups and the money they dispense. It is a travesty—
General Motors, stonewalling; Exxon, stonewalling;
the Southern Company, stonewalling; and TXU was
until they got bought out, and now an enlightened
ownership and leadership there are going to make a
difference. Chrysler has the worst fuel efficiency of
all the auto marketers, and their cars are becoming
dinosaurs.
So to sum up: We need to follow a new paradigm.
Below are four points which can help business become
more efficient and contribute towards the solution of
climate change.
1. We need to put economics in a broader context.
As it stands, we define things too narrowly. We do not
price externalities.
2. We need to lengthen our accounting periods.
I used to run a public company; you live quarter to
quarter. You cannot think that way in a world like we
are facing today.
3. We have to think in a less linear fashion and think
instead in circles. We need to work out how we can
recycle things. At the moment, we put something in at
one end, use a little bit of it, and dump 94 percent of it
out at the other end.
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4. Finally, we need an authorizing focus. Government has got to stand up and be government, and lay
down the rules for a sane future for all of us.
ENDNOTES - Rich
1. On a slightly different note, it is worth remarking that
modern agriculture poses yet other problems. The South
American farmer is using the same seeds and the same genetic
stock as the guy in Iowa or the guy in North Carolina or the guy
in Europe. So our genetic stock is getting narrower and narrower
and narrower and narrower, and we are opening ourselves up for
a major genetic failure in our food supply.
2. Amery Lovins (founder of the Rocky Mountain Institute
and a recognized authority on energy efficiency) coined the term
“negawatt,” and I stole it because I liked it.
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Climate Change in the American Mind
Anthony Leiserowitz
Yale University
Introduction.
This presentation is entitled “Climate Change in
the American Mind.” We will consider how Americans
perceive the risks of climate change, the severity and the
likelihood of various impacts, and what kind of policies
they support or oppose. We will also, however, take a
look at some of the underlying reasons why there are
such strong and sometimes polarized opinions about
this issue. Why is it that some people believe climate
change is a very serious problem, while others do not?
Why do some people support aggressive climate policy,
while other people do not? And finally, we will identify
several distinct “interpretive communities” within the
American public—different audiences each of which
perceives the risks of climate change and other hazards
(e.g., terrorism, nuclear power, pesticides, marijuana
use, etc.) in a uniquely patterned way.1
To begin, let us step back to consider the broader
context. It bears repeating that, with only 5 percent
of the world’s population, the United States alone
produces about 25 percent of the world’s greenhouse
gases. Thus the American people are critical to the
ultimate solution of this problem through their
individual consumer behavior and energy use, their
political preferences, the leaders they vote for, and the
kinds of climate change policies that they will support.
With regard to the many potential threats climate
change poses to national security, it is important to ask
what kinds of military actions the public will support.
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Will they support the use of either soft or hard military
power to address climate change impacts around the
world? Will they support the deployment of American
forces to deal with potential climate-induced crises
ranging from famine relief to intervention in resource
conflicts or emerging pandemics around the world? We
do not yet have answers to these questions regarding
the military, but we are beginning to understand how
the public perceives the risks of climate change.
Global Warming and the American Public.
To begin, it is important to recognize that the public
as a whole is now very aware of global warming. About
95 percent of Americans have heard of global warming
and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it.
Further, a 2006 Pew study found that about 41 percent
of Americans said that it is a very serious threat, while
another 32 percent said it is somewhat serious, while
only about a quarter said that it is not serious or not
a problem. So most Americans are clearly aware of
global warming and think it is a serious problem.
In 2003, I conducted an in-depth study of American
opinion on global warming and found strong bipartisan
support for a number of national and international
policies. Americans strongly supported the Kyoto
Protocol, and strongly believed that the United States
should act to reduce its emissions regardless of what
other countries do. They strongly supported higher
fuel economy standards, regulating carbon dioxide as
a pollutant, and shifting subsidies away from the fossil
fuel industry towards the renewable energy industry.
There was very strong bipartisan support for all of
those policies, but interestingly, very strong bipartisan
opposition to carbon taxes. Americans were strongly
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opposed to paying $300 more a year as a household as
part of a business energy tax and strongly opposed to
a 60 cent per gallon gasoline tax.
So, again, the American public are aware, they are
concerned, they want action at the international or
national level, but do not support higher energy prices
in the form of carbon taxes. That is the current political
reality.
In 2004, in another nationally representative survey,
I asked Americans which issues they thought should
be the top priority for Congress and the President.
I found—and this is consistent with many other
surveys—that global warming was a relatively low
priority, just as the environment as a broader issue is
almost always at the bottom of these kinds of priority
rankings. Global warming was well below terrorism,
the economy, healthcare, education, the budget deficit,
etc. Today we would see the Iraq War, of course, as a
leading national priority as well.
So global warming was a relatively low national
priority, but what about within the environmental
category? How did global warming compare to other
environmental issues? It has risen in recent years, but
it was still well below water pollution, air pollution,
toxic waste, and even the ozone hole. The relatively
low priority of global warming helps us understand
why there has not been more action to date. There has
been a lack of political will in the United States. So why
is that?
Understanding the American Response to
Global Warming. In part, that has to do with the way
Americans perceive the risks of global warming. My
research demonstrates that across the board, the public
generally perceives climate change as a moderate
risk that will primarily impact people, places, and
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ecosystems distant in time and space. They believe
that global warming is a greater threat to nonhuman
nature than to human beings. They believe that water
shortages, increased disease rates, and lower living
standards, are only moderately likely. Importantly,
they believe that each of these impacts is more likely to
occur globally than at the local level. Americans tend to
think of climate change as a distant problem, something
that is going to affect other people far away—small
island countries, poor people in the tropics, etc.—not
Americans—and distant in time—not for another 50 to
100 years, if ever. Thus it is not a particularly salient
issue to most people.
Another way to examine this is to take a deeper
look at the connotative meaning of global warming—
the thoughts, feelings, and images that are evoked by
the term. To assess these deeper meanings, we asked
respondents in a representative survey a seemingly
simple question: What is the first thought or image that
comes to your mind when you hear the words “global
warming?” These free associations were then compiled
and content analyzed to identify the meanings of
climate change in the American mind.
First and foremost, Americans most frequently
associated global warming with melting ice. Americans
mentioned the loss of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, ice
shelves breaking off in the Antarctic, and glaciers
melting around the world; and they rated these as very
negative things, as very bad things. But most Americans
do not live in the Arctic, very few Americans live in the
Antarctic, and most of them do not live anywhere near
a glacier. While the melting of ice around the world is
considered a bad thing, it is not a direct threat to the
lives of most Americans.
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The second most frequent set of associations were
to heat and warming temperatures, e.g., things will
get hotter, temperatures are rising, etc. Third, many
Americans thought of the impacts of global warming
on nonhuman nature, including other species and
ecosystems, not people. Fourth, many Americans
associated global warming with the ozone hole. This
and other research has demonstrated that many people
in the United States and around the world continue to
confuse and conflate global warming with the ozone
hole, with many people thinking they are either the
same thing, or that the hole in the ozone layer is the
cause of global warming.
The fifth largest set of associations came from
people I will call “alarmists,” whom I will discuss
further in a moment. Sixth, were a set of associations
to flooding and sea level rise; these tended to be a
little more concrete, with people mentioning actual
places, like Manhattan going under water. Next came
references to climate change or to changing seasons,
neither of which were rated as particularly negative or
bad. Finally, the eighth largest set of associations came
from people I will call “naysayers” who did not see
global warming as a problem at all. Thus, we found
that the top four sets of associations to global warming,
representing over 60 percent of all responses, were
to melting ice, generalized warming trends, and the
impacts on nonhuman nature—none of which represent
direct threats to the lives of most Americans—or to a
completely different environmental problem. These
predominant connotative meanings of global warming
help us understand why Americans have perceived
this issue as a moderate threat and a relatively low
national or environmental priority.
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Missing Links. One of the most important findings
was what we did not find. We did not find any
Americans who made the connection between climate
change and human health. There were no associations
to heat stroke, asthma, or infectious diseases. Likewise,
there were no associations to extreme weather
events. People did not associate global warming with
hurricanes, tornadoes, or drought. Now this survey
was conducted prior to Hurricane Katrina. In the
aftermath, some in the scientific community and the
media indirectly linked more powerful and intense
hurricanes to global warming. So one might think that
hurricanes are now firmly linked in the public mind to
global warming. I have conducted several other similar
national studies since Hurricane Katrina, however,
and have found only a few scattered associations to
hurricanes. When directly asked, however, more people
say that global warming is making hurricanes worse
than said this before Hurricane Katrina hit. But when
not primed by the question itself, hurricanes currently
rarely come to mind when people think about global
warming. Finally, we found no associations to the kind
of national security implications that we have been
talking about here at this conference; most Americans
are not connecting the dots between global warming
and national security.
Interpretive Communities of Risk. So now let
us turn back to the two groups I mentioned before,
alarmists and naysayers. Here I would like to
introduce the concept of interpretive communities of
risk. We often speak of “the American public,” but
this is misleading. The United States is actually a set of
diverse publics—for example, there are very different
groups within the United States that respond to risks in
very different ways. They may confront the same issue,
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but they often approach it from completely different
perspectives and come away with very different
conclusions. Global warming alarmists and naysayers
are two examples. “Alarmists” refers to respondents
who associated global warming with catastrophic and
even apocalyptic impacts. They often imagined impacts
well beyond the worst-case scenarios projected by the
scientific community. For example: “like after nuclear
war,” “it is going to kill the world,” or “death of the
planet.”
By contrast, some Americans were “naysayers”—
respondents who denied the reality or seriousness of
global warming. Naysayers offered six distinct reasons
why they believed climate change is not a problem.
Some flatly denied it—it is just not happening. Others
said it is happening, but it is natural, not human-caused.
Others argued it might be happening, but did not
think the science had been proven yet. Some doubted
based on their own recent personal experience, e.g.,
“It was -10 here last night, it can’t be warming.” Some
blamed it on media hype. Finally were the conspiracy
theorists, who said things like “a hoax,” “a fraud,” or
“scientists making up statistics for their job security.”
For conspiracy theorists, the accumulation of ever
more scientific evidence probably only reinforces their
sense of conspiracy, thus it is very hard to convince
these particular people.
So how did these two groups compare with each
other and the rest of the public? I compared each
group’s average risk perceptions across 13 different
measures, including the seriousness of current impacts,
the threat to nonhuman nature, the likelihood of local
and worldwide water shortages, infectious diseases,
diminished standards of living, etc. What I found
was that, not surprisingly, naysayers rated all of these

219

items as a low risk, whereas alarmists saw them as a
high risk. What was interesting, however, was how the
other 75-80 percent of the public rated these items. The
rest of the public was much more similar to alarmists
than they were to naysayers. Naysayers, it turned
out, were very different from the rest of American
society. When I compared the average support of these
three groups for a variety of climate change policies
including support for the Kyoto Protocol, increasing
fuel economy standards for cars and trucks, regulating
carbon dioxide as a pollutant, shifting government
subsidies from the fossil fuel industry to the renewable
energy industry, a carbon tax on business energy use,
or a carbon tax on gasoline; again there were very large
differences between alarmists and naysayers. However,
the rest of the public’s support for these policies was
much closer to the level of alarmists than naysayers.
One other key finding of this study was the critical
role values play in mediating the way people perceive
global warming. I found a strong positive correlation
between egalitarian values and climate change risk
perception. In other words, the more egalitarian their
values, the more concerned respondents were about
global warming. The less egalitarian, the less concerned.
For example, naysayers strongly disagreed with a
variety of egalitarian statements. They did not support
affirmative action, they did not think the world needs a
more equal distribution of wealth, they did not support
more participatory decisionmaking, or government
efforts to end poverty, and so on. By contrast, alarmists
strongly supported these statements.
On the other hand, naysayers held strong
individualistic values. For example they were much
more likely to agree that, “The government should
just get out of our way and leave us alone.” “Life
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sorts out those that try hard from those that do not.”
“Government has no right to regulate personal risks.”
And so on.
So who were the alarmists and naysayers? What
were their socio-demographic profiles? Alarmists
tended to be slightly more liberal and slightly more
Democratic. Naysayers, on the other hand, were a very
distinct group. They were overwhelmingly white,
male, conservative, Republican, highly religious, and
often got their news and information from talk radio.
Another important point is the critical role of trust
in how people respond to risk. Trust has been called
the currency of the realm and is absolutely central to
society’s ability to deal with an incredibly complicated,
often abstract, and unfolding problem like climate
change. Trust is important because climate change is
difficult to understand, most people know little about
the causal mechanisms of climate change or the most
effective solutions, and it is just one of a myriad of
other risks that people are now forced to confront with
limited personal expertise or experience. Furthermore,
most people have very busy lives, with many other
issues and personal affairs competing for their limited
time and attention. As a result, many people look to
their opinion leaders, to people they trust to guide
them through unknown and uncertain terrain—people
they trust to tell them the truth.
As part of this study, I asked respondents, “How
much do you trust each of the following groups to tell
you the truth about global warming?” I found that
naysayers were again very different than both alarmists
and the rest of the public. Naysayers strongly distrusted
the media. They also strongly distrusted environmental
organizations. As a result, environmentalists are
perhaps the least effective communicators about

221

climate change to this particular audience. Naysayers
were also less likely to trust scientists and doctors,
although they trusted these sources more than most
others. Surprisingly, naysayers were even less likely
than other Americans to trust their own friends and
family to tell them the truth about global warming.
As you can see, these two different interpretive
communities—alarmists and naysayers—each approached the issue of global warming from very
different perspectives and drew very different
conclusions about it as a threat, or how society ought
to respond. After this initial study, my colleagues and I
became interested in exploring this idea of “interpretive
communities of risk” beyond just climate change, so
we did another nationally representative survey in
June 2005. In this study, we asked, “How great a risk
are each of the following to American society?” Items
included a variety of national security, technological,
environmental, health, and moral “hazards,” including
terrorism, the Iraq war, global warming, nuclear
power, pesticides, genetically modified food, gun
control, marijuana, legal abortion, and homosexuality.
We then conducted a segmentation analysis to look for
groups with different response patterns and identified
five distinct groups, or “interpretive communities of
risk” within the American public.
The first is what we labeled “alarmists” (12
percent)—a group that rated all of these hazards as
high to very high risks. By contrast, another group,
labeled “optimists” (21 percent) rated all these hazards
as a relatively low risk. We then identified two groups
that were almost the mirror opposite of one another.
The first we labeled “the religious right” (16 percent)
and they rated items like abortion and homosexuality
as a very high risk. Opposing these views was a group
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we labeled “the liberal left” (14 percent) who rated
those same items as a very low or non-existent risk. By
contrast, the liberal left rated things like global warming
and the Iraq war as a high risk, whereas the religious
right rated them as a relatively low risk. Finally was
a group that we labeled the “mainstream.” This was
the largest of the five groups (37 percent), and had a
relatively moderate level of risk perception across all
the items.
Now let’s return to the specific issue of global
warming. This study found that over 60 percent
of the American public fell into three interpretive
communities of risk—alarmists, liberal left, and
mainstream—all of whom already saw climate change
as a high to very high risk. The primary opposition on
this issue, however, came from the other two groups—
the religious right and optimists. We now believe that
the group of climate change naysayers I discussed
earlier is actually comprised of these two groups.
Interestingly, the religious right and optimists
share a number of characteristics in common. Both
are predominantly white, male, conservative, and
Republican. Optimists, however, tended to have
significantly higher incomes than the religious right.
The two groups also differed greatly in their religious
orientations. Unsurprisingly, the religious right was
very, very religious. Optimists, however, were not.
This difference helps to explain why these two groups
strongly disagreed with one another about the threats
abortion and homosexuality pose to American society,
with the religious right respondents perceiving these
issues as great risks, while optimists perceived them as
very low risks.
Now back to global warming—which both the
religious right and optimists rated as a relatively low
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risk. Each of these groups is currently undergoing a
significant internal transformation in the United States.
Within the religious right, a large number of evangelical
leaders have recently broken with their peers to argue
that global warming is indeed happening, that humans
are at least partly responsible, and that this is a moral
issue that Christians are called to confront. These
leaders justify this new position by arguing that in the
book of Genesis, God commanded human beings to
till and tend his garden, and that the environment is
part of our stewardship responsibilities on the earth,
to care for God’s creation. Thus global warming is a
moral imperative. Secondly, many argue that action
on global warming flows directly from their longstanding missions to help the poor and needy, such
as famine and poverty relief around the world. To
paraphrase, “How can Christians devoted to these acts
of mercy in good conscience ignore a problem that is
going to push millions of people into the same kind of
circumstances that we are there to help them with?”
Importantly, these are arguments that resonate within
the religious right’s own strongly-held value system.
Yet these specifically Christian arguments may not
resonate with other audiences. There are, however,
many roads to Damascus. Different people, starting
from very different moral and ethical standpoints, can
at times reach the same conclusions and work together
in common action, albeit sometimes for different
reasons.
By contrast, optimists tend to be more libertarian
and entrepreneurial in orientation and may represent
the economically conservative wing of the Republican
party. Interestingly, we are currently seeing a
tremendous shift within the business community on
climate change. Companies are moving quickly to
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address this issue both as a response to the physical
and legal risks of climate change and to the enormous
market opportunities for those who develop the
solutions. Solving the climate change problem is
ultimately about moving the world economy from its
current foundations in fossil fuel energy to noncarbon
emitting energy sources. Reducing global emissions
60 to 90 percent below 1990 levels is going to be a
tremendous challenge and will involve hundreds of
billions, if not trillions of dollars. Somebody is going to
make that money. Further, this transition will produce
great technological innovations and the creation of
whole new jobs and industries. There are now a lot of
companies looking at this emerging energy future and
moving aggressively to exploit this new market.
Over the next few years these internal transformations are likely to reshape each of these groups, the
religious right and optimists, and the elites of both
groups and their like-minded constituents are going to
increasingly perceive global warming as a significant
risk and support serious action to deal with it. Of course,
some members within each of these groups will never
accept the reality, human causation, or importance of
this issue, but they will likely become a smaller and
more marginal minority.
Communication Implications.
So what are some implications of this research
for climate change communicators? Well, first of all,
communicators need to highlight the potential local
and regional climate change impacts for Americans.
Tip O’Neill, the former Speaker of the House of
Representatives, once said, “All politics is local,” and to
the extent that is true, people need to understand that,
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yes, global warming will impact people and places far
away; yes, it will impact polar bears and other species;
but it also has real consequences for Americans.
Second, climate change is not a temporally distant
phenomenon—it is happening right now, and there are
a lot of examples around the world. As just one example,
I have just completed a 2-year project in Alaska, and,
as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment has reported,
the impacts there and across the Arctic are dramatic—
sea ice disappearing, permafrost melting, record forest
fires and insect pests, changes in species distributions
and migrations, infrastructure crumbling, coastlines
eroding, and forced relocations of entire communities.
Third, it is important to highlight the potential impacts
of climate change on human health, on extreme weather
events, and, especially for this conference, the potential
impacts on our national security. Most Americans have
not yet connected these dots. Finally, it is critical that
we recognize that the “American public” is in fact a
set of multiple and diverse audiences. Effective climate
change communications will often require tailoring
the message and the messengers for these specific
audiences.
ENDNOTES - Leiserowitz
1. For further details, see A. Leiserowitz, “American Risk
Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?” Risk Analysis,
Vol. 25, No. 6, 2005, pp. 1433-1442; idem., “Climate Change Risk
Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery,
and Values,” Climatic Change, Vol. 77, 2006, pp. 45-72; idem.,
“Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: American Risk
Perceptions, Affective Images and Interpretive Communities,”
in S. Moser and L. Dilling, eds., Creating a Climate for Change:
Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 44-63.
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Commentator
Marvin S. Soroos
North Carolina State University
As a political scientist, I have been dealing with
global environmental issues and international responses
to them throughout most of my career. I was one of
the first international relations specialists to teach and
conduct research in the field of global environmental
politics, law, and policy. I have been teaching courses
in this field since the mid-1970s.
I would like to draw attention to a couple of general
themes that have emerged in our proceedings thus
far. The first is the dynamic nature of the science of
global climate change. A few years ago, several of us
here participated in a workshop at the Sandia National
Laboratories on the topic of “abrupt global climate
change” and its implications for national security. In
preparation for the conference, the participants were
asked to read an article by Spencer Weart which
highlighted how, over the past several decades, there
has been a paradigm shift in the assumptions of climate
researchers on how rapidly significant climate changes
could take place.1 As recently as 50 years ago, it was
generally believed that major changes in the global
climate, including those that might be induced by
human activities, could occur only very gradually over
thousands of years. By the 1960s and 1970s, further
research suggested that severe climate change could
occur in a matter of centuries, and in the next decade
the time frame was further adjusted to a century or
less. By the mid-1990s, research on ice cores extracted
from the Greenland ice sheet revealed that over the
past 100,000 years, there have been several episodes
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of “abrupt” climate changes occurring in as little as a
decade. These naturally occurring rapid changes raise
the possibility that human activities might push the
climate system past tipping points that could rather
quickly usher in a very different climate regime. In
the coming decades, we must be alert to the possibility
of other major adjustments in our basic scientific
understanding of the dynamics of global climates and
human influences on them.
Furthermore, as I review articles on internet newsfeeds on climate change, I have been impressed by how
many scientific research reports are being released
these days on the diverse impacts of global climate
change. The momentum of these reports seems to have
accelerated to the point that sometimes I wish we could
put a hold on the science of climate change impacts for
5 years to allow us to catch up on these developments,
to reflect on their many implications, and to decide
how to adapt to them before there is another cascade of
scientific findings. But unfortunately, that is not going
happen. The dynamic nature of the science of climate
change and its impacts makes this a very challenging
field to follow.
The other general observation I would make—
and this leads into the presentation by Dennis
Tänzler—is how frustrating it is to get nations to work
constructively together to create international and
global environmental regimes. We have had some
success stories, such as the international response to
the problem of depletion of the stratospheric ozone
layer. At least for now it looks like the ozone regime is
a success story. However, when it comes to the global
climate change issue, the international community has
scarcely moved beyond square one. From a national
security perspective, it is imperative that we think
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about how the United States can become a more
constructive partner in international efforts to address
climate change than it has been in the past.
Most Americans do not understand much about
international law. They do not grasp what it is to sign
and ratify treaties or the obligations that go with them.
It is encouraging, however, that polls suggest a majority
of Americans think the United States should ratify
the Kyoto Protocol, but most respondents probably
are unaware what is in that treaty and what it would
require of them. I wish I could be more optimistic
than Tänzler about the prospects for really significant
cooperation in addressing climate change between
Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world.
It is encouraging that talks are taking place. However,
in international meetings, such as the 12th Conference
of the Parties to the United Nations (UN) Framework
Convention on Climate Change in Nairobi in 2006 and
the recent Group of Eight environmental ministers’
conference, the United States remained adamant that
it will not agree to mandatory limits on greenhouse
gas emissions, which most of the rest of the developed
world agree are needed and are committed to under
the terms of the Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol at best can be only a small first
step toward addressing the problem of global climate
change. If all of the developed countries, including
the United States, were to achieve the emission limits
that they agreed to in the protocol, their combined
greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2008-12
would only be about 5 percent lower than in 1990.
Such reductions would be more than compensated
for by massive increases in greenhouse gas emissions
by the developing countries, in particular China and
India. To make significant progress toward dealing
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with this problem, developed and less developed
countries will have to go much further than they have
so far. Unfortunately, diplomacy and negotiations
are complicated by gross inequalities in per capita
emission. Americans emissions per capita are generally
about twice those of Europeans, and yet it is the United
States that rejected the Kyoto Protocol and continues
to refuse to make any commitment to capping its
emissions. Developing countries have good reason
to refuse limits on their greenhouse gas emissions as
long as their per capita emissions are a small fraction
of those of the highly developed countries.
Let me turn to the second presentation by Simon
Rich. I applaud many of his suggestions. It is just
wonderful to hear those all put together, offering hope
that, if we could get the politics right on this and get
government policy to back these initiatives, we could
deal with this problem of climate change.
As Rich suggests, growth is so much a part of our
economic paradigm these days that environmentalists
are fighting a very hard battle to try to make much of a
change in it. Recently, in an article in the March/April
2007 issue of “Mother Jones,” Bill McKibben argued
that growth was not always the predominant economic
value; in fact, the emphasis on growth dates back only
60 or 70 years. Much of the article discusses how little
economic growth has enhanced human happiness,
particularly in the developed world. Up to about
$10,000 gross national product per capita, economic
growth does bring about substantial increases in
human happiness, but beyond that additional income
adds very little to satisfaction with life. Americans are
experiencing economic growth, consuming more, and
emitting more pollutants with little increase in their
happiness. Altering this preoccupation with growth
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is going to be a challenge both in the United States and
elsewhere. For example, Vaclav Klaus, President of the
Czech Republic (and an economist by profession) has
argued recently that environmentalists are a greater
threat to the open and free society than communism
was. That is a pretty strong and disturbing statement.
I also share Rich’s concerns about bio-fuels, and in
particular those based on corn. We need to consider
the potential unintended consequences of a wholesale
rush to bio-fuel development, such as impacts on
the production and price of food, degradation of
agricultural land, loss of forests, and pollution from the
application of pesticides and fertilizers. Furthermore,
what quantities of fossil fuels will be required to
produce each unit of energy from bio-fuels?
Anthony Leiserowitz offered many fascinating
findings from his opinion research on the differences
between climate change naysayers and the alarmists.
As he spoke, I thought back to a book that I read as
an undergraduate by E. E. Schattschneider entitled
A Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy
in America.2 I specifically recall Schattschneider’s
argument that intense minorities in the United States
almost always win out over apathetic majorities in the
American political process. I have kept this little nub
of theory in my mind ever since. This insight seems to
holds true for the politics of climate change.
I also agree that Americans have a phobia about
taxes. The last thing they want governments to do is
increase them. I wonder if we could persuade them to
pay more gasoline and carbon taxes, while at the same
time reducing income taxes an equivalent amount.
That may be too complicated an idea for politicians to
sell to the American public.
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It also appears that Americans tend to demand
action when they believe their health will be adversely
affected. Thus, perhaps we need to do more to
increase public understanding of the implications that
climate change is having for human health. There are
indications that the severity and urgency of the global
climate change problem is more widely appreciated by
the American public. Leiserowitz’s remarks about the
evangelical community are encouraging. I have also
noticed such a trend as some leaders of the movement
are calling upon Christians to practice stewardship
toward preserving the planet’s natural system while
warning of the seriousness of the consequences of global
climate change. Such a change in the perspectives of
the evangelicals would be significant both because
of their numbers and their suspicion of the values of
environmentalists.
Altering basic attitudes does not come easily.
Psychological research suggests that people seek out
those information sources that reinforce their views
and avoid those that challenge their beliefs. Those who
are skeptical of climate change are going to continue
listening to Rush Limbaugh. It may take another one
or two major catastrophic types of events—heaven help
us—to really shake up the thinking public’s opinion on
the severity of the climate change threat to the point
that the American public will support the decisive
actions that will be needed to address the problem.
Discussion
Q: Leiserowitz congratulated the business community on paying attention to the issue of climate change,
but Rich asserted that the business community needs
incentives. Where is the disconnect?
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Rich: We do need an authorizing force to set
rules and make sure that everyone plays by the same
rules. We also do need incentives in some areas. The
problems of how to dispose of nuclear waste or create
cellulosic ethanol will not be solved short of money
and research. The private community cannot afford
the risk, so incentives or a public-private partnership
is needed. In other areas—take energy efficiency, for
example—the benefits of taking action are obvious,
and people are moving ahead.
Q: What percentage of the population were the
naysayers and how many people were surveyed?
Leiserowitz: I have identified them using several
different methods and with different surveys over
the years. About 12 percent are hard-core naysayers,
and perhaps another 15 percent are still skeptical. The
numbers of respondents in these surveys have ranged
from 673 to over 1,000.
Q: Has American intransigence over climate change
led to a weakening of the U.S.-European Alliance?
Leiserowitz: There is not much data on global
attitudes toward climate change. But Europeans in
general are much more concerned about this issue,
much more supportive of policy, and much more
supportive of taking individual action on the issue,
than Americans. Some are quite angry. Many in
England and other European countries care a great
deal about this issue, and they do not like our particular
administration’s policies or approach to it.
Tänzler: European opinion is regularly polled.
Polls show that Europeans are very concerned about
this issue and suggest that more people in Europe
than America would be willing to accept more taxes to
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deal with it. European response to the United States is
somewhat surprising though. At the beginning of the
century, in 2001 and 2002, there was really a kind of
Bush-bashing. But perceptions are changing. People
are coming to recognize that the administration does
not speak for all Americans. You do find many articles
in German and British newspapers talking about
changing perceptions in America. They do not just
point to Gore and his Oscar. So I am quite optimistic.
Q: The United States and the EU have argued
over the wisdom of using genetically modified grains
that are drought-resistant in drought-afflicted areas,
especially sub-Saharan Africa. Has any compromise
been reached?
Tänzler: As far as I know, the EU is very reluctant.
When it comes to sub-Saharan Africa, this is in
part because other areas have greater priority like
transboundary water cooperation or even the expansion
of renewable energies.
Leiserowitz: The international survey data on
attitudes toward genetically modified food shows that
the strongest support for biotechnology—stronger
even than the United States—is to be found in the
developing world. Americans tend to be technological
optimists—to believe that new technology can
solve problems. By contrast, Europeans are much
more skeptical about biotechnology and genetically
engineered food. There are a whole host of reasons for
that, including an important cultural dynamic—food is
very important culturally in Europe. But it is striking
that many developing countries are eager to get these
technologies, for good or for ill.
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ENDNOTES - Discussion
1. The article had appeared in Physics Today, June 11, 2004.
2. E. E. Schattschneider, A Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View
of Democracy in America, Austin, TX: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1960.
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CHAPTER 5
PREPARING FOR A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT
The authors here consider, in different ways, what should
be done to prepare for the kind of chaotic and uncertain
international environment that might come about in the
event of global climate change. Dr. Michael Glantz discusses
the importance of developing early warning systems that
work. Dr. Robert Dorff stresses the importance of promoting
good governance across the world. Dr. Henry Gaffney
introduces the reader to a variety of different scenarios. He
also suggests what steps we might take in the face of these
different eventualities.
Achillies’ Other Heel:
Early Warning Systems
Michael H. Glantz
Center for Capacity Building,
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Introduction.
My purpose today is to talk about early warning
systems. I like to think about early warning systems
as Achilles’ other heel. To be sure, the hero was
vulnerable where Thetis grabbed on to his one heel, but
he did, after all, have another, and it was never tested.
We need to remember that—and see if we cannot find
something that works when it comes to dealing with
the problem of climate change.
I was educated as a political scientist, but now I
consider myself to be a social scientist. I started out
studying foreign involvement in violent political
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revolutions (Cuba, Yemen, and Congo) during the
decolonization era. Then I turned my attention to North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) connections to the
Portuguese armaments used to contain revolutionaries
in Angola. In the early 1970s, my focus switched to
the prolonged and devastating drought in the West
African Sahel. I continued to investigate droughts and
looked at the interactions resulting from “people versus
nature.” I discovered almost immediately that people
were using nature to dominate, if not kill, other people.
So these kinds of issues do come up, even for those
of us who do not belong to the security community.
(E.g., United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Kimoon recently suggested that the conflict in western
Darfur was the first conflict related to global warming,
an erroneous suggestion in my view.)
This brings me to the question of definitions. If you
go to the Old Oxford Dictionary, you will find “security”
defined in all kinds of ways. First and foremost, it
carries the connotation of protection from harm. This
can be many things—not just political, but also cultural,
economic, or environmental. What we want to do is
to find some way to increase environmental security.
Picture Humpty Dumpty sitting on a wall, and Humpty
Dumpty is about to have a great fall. We need to figure
out a way to stabilize that egg by making some kind
of constraint. An early warning system is important to
this effort to reduce its insecurity.
The Climate and Security Problem.
The climate-related aspect of security is not a new
problem. Once people began to populate the Earth,
they devised ways to secure enough food and water
for survival. They also figured out how to cope with
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variations in precipitation and temperature from one
year to the next. Humans figured out pretty quickly
how to adapt to the vagaries of climate. For example,
those who insisted on planting, say, corn in the winter in
Iowa did not survive; those who waited until springtime
to plant were able to survive. So governments are
security-oriented, so too are individuals. When it
comes to food security, most people have heard about
the Genesis Strategy.
There are countless examples of how weather and
climate extremes have affected military conflicts over
the centuries. There is Napoleon’s famous attack
and retreat from Moscow in 1812 when only about
22,000 of his half a million men survived because of
the unexpected early frigid conditions. Most people
do not recall the French victory at Texel in Holland
in the harsh winter of 1794 when the French cavalry
captured the Dutch navy because its ships were frozen
in ice. During the Iran hostage rescue attempt in 1979,
dust storms played a major part in undermining the
operation because they grounded the rescue helicopters.
And in October 1998, El Niño-related rains in northern
Peru and Southern Ecuador caused a slowdown in the
hot border war between them, allowing time for peace
discussion to take place. A local Ecuadorian headline
noted: “El Niño Impedes Conflict.” Because of the
cloudiness, Peruvians pilots could not see where they
were to bomb; and Ecuador’s army tanks and other
vehicles were bogged down in mud. The hot war ended
thanks to a timely El Niño in the Tropical Pacific. That
climate can affect security is not a new revelation.
Because the global climate system today is
changing, we face a variety of different types of threats
to climate-sensitive sectors of society and a wide range
of human activities, some more menacing than others.
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Early warning systems (of which monitoring is an
important aspect) are critical to the very survival of
states as well as corporations and human settlements.
They exist everywhere but do not always work well.
This is due to a complex array of factors, among
them a failure to accurately forecast extreme weather
events and, perhaps still more importantly, a failure
to listen to warnings. Another problem is funding for
such monitoring aspects. In the absence of hazards,
governments and societies lose interest in providing
support for them, and they wither.
The Hazards.
Climate is changing, indeed, the global and
regional climate systems are changing. There are
climate extremes such as droughts, floods, fires, and
tropical storms going on around the globe all the time.
Today’s climate system is not like the one that existed
a thousand years ago. Take 2001, for example. This
was not a particularly spectacular year. In fact, it was
a La Niña year, which usually is seen as a “we do not
care” year. But El Niño gets mentioned on the Jay Leno
or the David Letterman show or on Entertainment
Tonight, while La Niña, El Niño’s counterpart, gets
no attention. But it is very worthwhile watching. In
fact, we ought to care because La Niña events, for the
United States, may actually be more damaging and
costly per event than El Niño. Besides El Niño events,
climate change is likely to make anomalies of climate,
water, and weather occur in more places, with greater
intensity, and more often.
It is important, though, to keep in mind that climate
is not the only thing that is changing. Societies are
changing as well. It is vital to remember what physical
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scientists tend to forget—that people are, unlike a
thousand years ago, now an integral part of the climate
system. People are doing things that have an impact.
What we do at a local level matters as well: We know
there is such a thing as the urban heat island effect.
What we do regionally matters; e.g., if you deforest
parts of the Amazon, it changes rainfall patterns
within the Amazon basin. And what we do globally
matters, such as burning fossil fuels, altering wetlands,
maintaining feedlots, tropical deforestation, and the
like.
Creeping Changes. With regard to hazards, there
are quick onset hazards and there are slow onset
(creeping) hazards. I have been focusing on and writing
about the creeping ones. The creeping ones are those
that eventually bite you when you do not expect it, so
you have to be aware of them. Most environmental
changes in which human activities are involved are of
the creeping kind. Unfortunately, creeping changes
have unknown thresholds for unwanted step-like
changes. You can recognize those thresholds once they
have been crossed and a crisis has developed. At that
point, however, it will probably be more expensive to
deal with. A rich country can somehow cope. A poor
country, however, has to live with the consequences
of the problem. In both rich and poor countries, it is
very difficult to maintain monitoring systems for
environmental changes that are of the creeping kind,
that is, long-term, low-grade, but cumulative.
One of the biggest problems facing all societies
in a warmer climate regime is health in general and
vector-borne diseases specifically. The climate-health
issue is now starting to get a lot of attention because
malaria, dengue hemorrhagic fever, and the hanta
virus are moving into Texas from Mexico. It will likely
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not be long before these types of tropical diseases
make their way into other border states. This hazard
is real, along with other creeping hazards such as
deforestation, soil erosion, ozone depletion, global
warming, CO2 emissions, SO2 emissions, urban sprawl,
and coastal erosion. In the early 1980s when I was on
climate impact advisory committees for the UN, the
committees would list 10 issues for financial support.
Food, water, and energy always made the top of their
list; then fisheries. And, finally, at the bottom and of
least interest was public health and public safety. By
the time they finished doling out support for various
issues, there were never any funds left for either
fisheries or human health.
Abrupt Changes. As noted earlier, there are two
types of change, creeping and abrupt. Now I am a
tree-hugging liberal and believe that human induced
global warming is underway. However, some of the
things that scientists say, and the media repeat, do
worry me: Talk about abrupt change is one of those
things. In the 1970s there was a lot of hype about how
the West Antarctic ice sheet was going to fall into the
ocean and raise sea level precipitously by about 8
meters. This is what could be called a “dread factor.”
Scientists continue to looking for a dread factor that
would convince society that it must act quickly. This
does not mean that abrupt climate change is not likely
to happen. It can. But it is not clear that is the best way
to garner support for taking action to combat global
warming. Personally, I continue to be more worried
about creeping changes.
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Early Warning Systems — Key to Survival.
There is actually no such thing as “an” early
warning system. There are actually lots of early
warning systems in place within any given country,
and often some of these systems are focused on the
same problem. Warning systems are more important
than many or possibly even all governments realize.
We tend to think of societies as stable when actually
they are not. The image that comes to mind is that
of a pyramid in which the base represents society
and the apex represents a country’s early warning
systems. It operates like a searchlight shining around
the base of the pyramid, ever vigilant. The reality is
that the pyramid rests on its apex, which means that
a society is in unstable equilibrium and what stability
there is rests precariously on the apex, e.g., it rests
on its early warning systems. This is as true for rich
industrialized countries as it is for poor agrarian ones.
Ultimately, whether or not these societies are able to
survive depends on whether or not they have adequate
warning systems.
A warning system is composed of much more than
just the component that prepares a warning based on
its monitoring activities. It is a system and has many
parts. The system encompasses monitoring processes
for a hazard, effective dissemination mechanisms for
the warning, response mechanisms, and reconstruction
efforts. It also includes constant feedback to those
responsible for monitoring. A key point to bear in mind
is that a warning is useless if no one is there to hear
it. Information alone is not enough. It is like clapping
with one hand; there is no sound. Again, if an early
warning system is to work, someone must receive it,
understand it, translate it, disseminate it, and use it
effectively.
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Warning Failures. Warning is about forecasting
and also about people listening to forecasts. Warning
sometimes fails because science lets us down, and it
sometimes fails because people do not respond to
information given them. All this can be attributed to
a complex set of factors. Among them, we may note
the limits of our scientific understanding, the uncertain
nature of the information that reaches us, government
dislike of monitoring, fear of cost, a widespread failure
to understand the fragility of societies, a tendency
not to take responsibility (knowing where “the buck
stops”), ignoring problems that do not obviously or
directly affect something we care about, and a failure
to correctly prioritize problems.
Forecasting and Foreseeing. What, then, is the
scientific community’s ability to forecast extreme or
high impact climate, water, or weather events? By
example, El Niño events (and their correlated socioeconomic and environmental impacts) can provide
insights into both the kind of impacts that might
result from global warming and, more importantly,
how prepared societies are to cope with such impacts.
Although there is not a one-to-one correspondence
to global warming’s potential impacts (e.g., location,
intensity, and frequency), El Niño research can serve
as an interesting glimpse of a possible future for some
regions of the globe. I believe in “forecasting by
analogy,” having studied El Niño and its impacts and
climate change issues since the mid-1970s.
The scientists watch out for the onset and
development of an El Niño by monitoring the Pacific
Ocean at the surface and below, using technologies like
hi-tech buoys and satellites. Anyone can monitor these
changes now on a daily basis on the Internet if they
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wish to do so, given advances in our environmental
monitoring capabilities. Graphs in the Internet Google
search shows what La Niña and El Niño conditions look
like. There are also many variations of impacts maps.
However, the original maps on which those impact
maps are based have not been updated since the late
1970s! So, they must be used with great care as some El
Niño-related impacts have changed over time. There
have been seven El Niño events since the late 1970s
and, despite the heavy dependence of decisionmakers
on them, researchers have been unable to get even a
proverbial “dime” to update them. The point is that we
use information in our decisions—and not just some
existing El Niño information—that masquerades as
scientific data. But we must keep in mind that climate
is constantly changing naturally even if there is no
human influence on it (which there is) and what was
useful information 10 years ago may not be all that
correct or useful now.
People have forgotten about the hurricane season
of 2004. However, it was an important year in terms
of climate-related impacts. A record-setting four
hurricanes made landfall in Florida. Before that,
three had been the maximum number. In the Pacific,
ten typhoons made landfall in Japan, before which
the record was eight. 2005’s hurricane season was
notable and record setting: 28 named storms formed
in the tropical Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico. It included
the devastating Hurricane Katrina as well as notable
hurricanes Rita and Wilma. The 2006 hurricane season
was surprising for a different reason: Pundits forecast
another harsh hurricane season when it turned out to
be a very mild and uneventful one. I do not know what
was going on, but more importantly and unfortunately,
the scientific community also does not know.
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Foreseeability. “Foreseeability” is a word I borrowed from the legal profession to apply to climate
forecasting. Though I am not a lawyer, I believe the
concept has value and could be used by impacts
researchers and for those who seek to communicate
about climate change and its impacts to the public and
policymakers. To me—a social scientist working amidst
physical scientists—foreseeability can be viewed as a
qualitative version of probability expressed in statistical
terms. For example, suppose that I am driving a car
in a location I have never visited before. When I come
to a stop sign, I can stop at the sign or take a chance
and drive past it. I have no idea whether there is a 10
percent probability of getting broadsided by another
car driving on the cross street, or 50 percent, or 80
percent. Even though I do not know the probabilities
of being hit by another car, it is foreseeable that a car
could hit me. I do not need more science (that is, a better
probability statement) to understand the situation at
this particular stop sign. An accident is foreseeable.
Apply this to climate change. Here is what the
scientists are saying about super storms and about
high impact climate, weather, and water events: super
storms are bigger in intensity, magnitude, or frequency.
Everything is being labeled “super” for a good reason.
Some storms are super because of their physical
parameters: winds are stronger than ever, the sea level
is higher than ever, the temperature is record setting,
sea level pressure is the lowest on record, the rain fell
in greater amounts than ever, etc. We may even have
several superstorms within a season. Meanwhile, as the
climate changes, our ability to forecast it deteriorates.
That is obvious when you think about it, because the
history of the past is not as useful for projecting the
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future if the climate is changing in a major way. Hence,
foreseeability can be a useful concept.
Clapping With One Hand. As I said earlier, warning
is only useful when the warning is heard, and when the
warning is understood by society at large and especially
by those at high risk. With regard to understanding the
needs of society for early warning systems, Hurricane
Katrina provides a “teachable moment.” Whether we
are looking at how governments respond to crises, or
how humans respond to warnings, a review of Katrina
can provide insights. The forecast from the National
Hurricane Center on August 26, 2005, noted the high
probability of landfall near or at New Orleans. The
situation within the hurricane’s “cone of uncertainty”
looked bleak. At that time, the director of the hurricane
center advised policymakers, “Evacuate people.” He
felt confident in his forecast. It was 60 hours in advance.
That is a respectable lead time to evacuate. However,
forecasts, as we now know from the outcome of this
event, are simply not enough to save lives or property.
After Katrina, a respected scientist noted that “We were
able to provide 60 hours of warning with our WARF
model. Give us more hundreds of millions, and we’ll
get that reliable forecast out to 70 hours.” The response
was that society would likely be as unprepared to
cope with a 70-hour lead forecast as with the 60-hour
one. What would be needed would be funding for
research to better understand society’s ability to use
such forecasts with respectable lead times. The best
value for the money would be to develop other sides of
the early warning system, not just improve the science
component.
Despite the successful 60-hour forecast, four levees
collapsed. The images of people, environment, and
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impacts were incredible. Despite the heroic efforts of
some organizations, the Internet and nightly news
exposed a confused helter-skelter response to assist
victims along the Gulf Coast with a major media
focus on New Orleans. As I watched the news and
reviewed numerous photos, I could only ask myself,
“Is this America?” Sadly, I watched tens of thousands
of refugees of American origin on American soil. I
have seen the impacts of horrible disasters in the past
such as the images on the Internet from Honduras
as a result of Hurricane Mitch in 1998. An estimated
17,000 Hondurans died, and countless numbers of
environmental refugees were created. I never expected
to see in the United States this kind of dislocation,
devastation, and political confusion. A Spanish
newspaper reported the following: “America is a Third
World country. It responded badly.” The United
States did well with its rapid military deployment to
assist tsunami victims in Southeast Asia. It was fast.
Why not here in America?
Making a bad hurricane story even worse, in 2004, a
year before Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) held a workshop with
over 250 government people to discuss Hurricane
Pam, a scenario in New Orleans, with just about every
relevant local, state and federal agency represented. The
Hurricane Pam scenario was based on a category three
hurricane hitting New Orleans head-on. The agencies
identified what the impacts might be on the population,
on the built up environment, on debris removal, on
needed emergency medical facilities, on coordinated
responses among agencies, on communication needs,
and so forth. A year later, the physical aspects of the
scenario came to pass in a hurricane called Katrina. It
is not clear at all what aspects identified from the Pam
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exercise were used, if any. Probably some elements
were used, but basically the Hurricane Pam scenario
was of little value. Those present knew that the levees
which were in need of urgent repair were not going to
be fixed.
Assuming Responsibility.
There are lots of reasons why we do not always
respond to problems as we should—some of which
have been discussed already. In part, a lack of
appropriate responses has much to do with a failure
to accept responsibility for one’s actions and perhaps a
failure to care if we personally are not affected by the
adversities associated with an event.
There are three kinds of responses to risk. There are
those who are risk averse, those who are risk takers,
and there is a third overlooked kind—risk makers.
The risk maker is the one who makes decisions that
muddy the water for someone else downstream. They
are not affected by the adverse consequences of their
decisions. They go back to the drawing board to make
other decisions, while those affected have to live with
the negative impacts caused by the risk maker. That
is something that those who monitor the impacts of
decisionmakers must watch out for. Unfortunately,
there are more risk makers than one might expect. They
must be made to take responsibility for their adverse
impacts because they are not reluctant to take credit
for their positive decisions.
People everywhere are confronted by lots of climate,
water and weather related hazards. For example,
recently China has had to deal with its dust storms.
Mumbai (India) has suffered major intense rainfall and
resultant heavy flooding. Australia has had to contend
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with bushfires threatening its cities. Problems such
as these (droughts, floods, fires, vector-borne disease
outbreaks) will continue, and it is foreseeable that they
will increase in frequency and intensity, and appear in
locations where they had not occurred in recent times.
In the early years of the 1990s, it was politically
incorrect to talk about climate-change-related winners
and losers. When you start talking about winners and
losers, you are implying that someone has caused a
problem, and, if that is the case, then that someone has
the responsibility to address the problem. With regard
to climate change, the U.S. Government, among others,
has not yet accepted its responsibility.
There is a well-known dilemma that comes to
those forced to make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty. I would guess that all societies have
adages that are meant to guide people’s actions.
Sometimes those adages send conflicting messages: “He
who hesitates is lost,” but also that “You should look
before you leap.” The European Environment Agency
(EEA) has addressed the “decisionmaking under
uncertainty” dilemma by fostering consideration of the
“precautionary principle.” Its publication is entitled
“Late Lessons from Early Warnings.” To understand
this concept, think about our politicians’ response to
asbestos, one of the EEA’s case studies. In the 1890s,
scientists say that asbestos in your lungs can kill you,
and political leaders respond by saying that there is
not enough science to support the claim. Again in
the 1920s, “asbestos in your lungs will kill you,” and
again the political response—“We need more studies,
not enough science.” Yet again in the 1960s, “asbestos
in your lungs will kill you.” This time there was too
much scientific information to support that view. The
political response was “Oh, let’s do something. Let’s
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rip out all the asbestos we put in from 1890 to the
1960s.” Global warming, it seems to me, is one more
example where the warnings have been vocalized for
more than a century but which have been ignored.
In 2001, I organized a 16-country study of the impacts of and responses to the 1997-98 El Niño. The
book that followed was entitled, Once Burned, Twice
Shy; Lessons learned from the 1997-98 El Niño. While
preparing the summary of the project, I came to realize
that lessons associated with El Niño-related disasters
are really only identified. They are the same lessons that
had been reported in other countries as a result of all
kinds of hazards. Since then, I have come to realize that
in most disasters lessons are really only being identified
and are not really learned unless they are applied to
improve a society’s response to future similar hazards.
I have come to believe that the very phrase, “lessons
learned,” is part of the problem, because when we say
it, we think someone is taking care of it when, in fact,
no one is.
Conclusion.
In short—we have been warned and should heed
the warning. Climate is changing, but climate is not
the only thing that is changing. Society is changing
as well. As a last thought, I want you to envisage
Shanghai as it looks now, a modern city of the 21st
century, as opposed to Shanghai as it looked just 2
decades ago, an industrial city on one side, the river
and a marshland on the other. When it comes to
rapid changes along the coast or in an urban center,
Shanghai is by no means alone. Without taking into
consideration environmental changes and especially
climate change (a.k.a. global warming), governments
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in most countries will continue to allow their citizens to
move into harm’s way. The climate-change future that
people fear seems to be arriving earlier than expected!
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Good Governance and Stability
Robert H. Dorff
Strategic Studies Institute
This panel, as a whole, was asked to take a look
at what we can do to prepare for a world changed by
global climate change. I myself was asked to address
what the international community in general and
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in particular
can do in this area. How, for example, might they
promote the kinds of institutions that might act as a
break on potential instability resulting from global
climate change? Some fascinating questions have been
raised earlier today: “What causes climate change?
How should we address it? Will climate change cause
conflict requiring national security responses? Is
climate change a security problem?” I do have views
on these issues, but I do not plan to take sides in these
debates. They are not essential to the argument that I
am going to present today. My argument begins with
the following:
First of all, it is my view that the strategic imperative
of the 21st century for the United States, and indeed for
the larger global community, is the persistent absence
or weakness of effective legitimate governance and
the corollary absence of the basic functioning market
economies that generally go along with that. For
reasons we can discuss later, I deliberately avoid using
the term, “democracy.”
In so saying, I am also directly implying that
several of the persistent challenges we face—terrorism,
transnational organized crime, insurgencies, repressive
tyrannical regimes (what we used to be able to call
“Rogue States,” or “axes of evil,” but now are officially
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called “States of Concern”)—stem largely from this
overall persistent weakness or absence of legitimate
governance. And because of that, a U.S. grand
strategy (encompassing our national security strategy)
should have, as its core objective, the promotion and
sustainment of effective legitimate governance and the
market economies underlying them.
Another point in this argument is that such an
overall strategy must address the potential challenges,
threats, and so on that can result from global climate
change. Here, regardless of whether or not one is an
agnostic on these other questions, the United States
clearly has a very important role to play. In other
words, addressing global climate change makes good
sense as part of helping implement this overall grand
strategy and U.S. national security strategy.
I will also argue that strategic success will depend
upon civilians working together with the military, to
include U.S. Government civilian agencies, foreign
government civilian agencies, foreign militaries, NGOs
and even—indeed especially—the private sector. This
kind of cooperation could go a long way towards
addressing some of the problems created by global
climate change.
Let me try to connect a few of the dots. First of all,
one of the themes that leapt out at me yesterday as I
listened to the discussion was this notion that global
climate change factors are at least stressors, if not direct
causes of conflict. Many presenters pointed to the fact
that no matter our perspective on global climate change,
its impact will vary. It will vary, in part, because of
some geographic and environmental “givens,” such as
where affected countries and people are located. There
are, quite frankly, some things which we really cannot
change, short of moving entire continents with some
wave of the magic wand!
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However, sometimes the impact will vary because
states and people have different capacities to respond
to climate change. That is to say, they have different
abilities to adapt and change before the consequences
are felt and different abilities to take measures to
mitigate the damage once it is done. My argument is
anchored in the assumption that we do have the ability
to change these kinds of capabilities. It may not be easy,
and when what we do about it comes to promoting
effective, legitimate governance and increasing the
effective capacity of organizations and especially of
states, there are obviously some very, very difficult
challenges ahead. But I think that, in most strategic
interactions, you always have a couple choosing. One
is to do nothing, and another is to go one step further
and do nothing with a lot of flair. I call that preemptive
surrender. Preemptive surrender—choosing to do
nothing in advance of something you are pretty sure is
going to happen—is clearly something that we can do
in this whole area of global climate change. It is also
something that we can do in the face of the persistent
weakness or absences of legitimate effective governance.
We can choose to ignore the strategic imperative. I do
not think this a good strategic choice, and I think the
consequences of it are very, very serious.
Let us continue to connect the dots and pick up on
some of yesterday’s themes. Again, humanitarian and
natural disasters may not, and I believe do not, cause
states to fail. However, failing or fragile states generally
do cause the impact of those disasters to be worse. It
is, I think, scientifically shown that, though you may
not be able to prevent the famine from happening, the
impact of famine is much greater in those states and
regions where institutions lack the capacity to deal
with it.
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Dr. Price-Smith commented that disease may or may
not cause national security threats or conflicts. System
capacity, he said, is a key intervening variable. And that
is fundamentally the argument that I am making here.
Infant mortality is a predictor of state failure. But you
are not going to address the problem of state weakness
and state failure by reducing infant mortality. You are
going to reduce infant mortality because you are going
to find ways to address the capacity problem of the
state or the region or the community. This has policy
implications. And part of our charge here over these 2
days was to think about what we can do at the policy
level, rather than simply coming back and raising
questions and more concerns.
So let me take a look at security, stability, transition
and reconstruction operations (SSTRO). The military
clearly has a role to play. This is especially true when
we are trying to move countries that are in conflict into
post-conflict situations or reconstruct countries in a
post-conflict situation.
In almost all of these kinds of situations, what a Venn
diagram would show is that you have a humanitarian
space and a battle space. The focal points for a lot of
these SSTRO are to be found where those two overlap.
My view is that this is where we need to do a lot of
work. The different organizations, agencies, and people
(civilian and military) have different capabilities. We
need to try to figure out how to synchronize, harmonize,
and coordinate the work where they overlap so that
we bring the best capabilities from the right places to
bear on these problems.
Combatant commands, as Kent Butts noted yesterday, are already doing this. They are reaching out
and co-training with and co-deploying with civilians.
This is a good thing. However, it should be driven by
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overall policy and strategy, rather than something that
the combatant commanders have to make up as they
go along because they have been given the military
policy guidance to go forth and do these things. We
have yet to get this right.
I would also like to address one related issue that
surfaced. Several persons objected to imposing so many
tasks on the U.S. military. How, they asked, can they,
the military, continue to do everything they are asked
to do? And should they be the “world’s policeman?”
In response, I would say, that no, they should not
be. That said, why can we not tackle global climate
change as part of an overall problem of promoting
and sustaining effective legitimate governance around
the world? And why do we not do this with all of our
resources and capabilities, civilian and military?
It seems to me that global climate change
response capabilities, as well as global climate change
consequence management and mitigation, will reside
significantly with state and local political capacity.
I do not think it is a matter of creating more large,
sweeping international organizations to tackle these
things. Our task is to break this down into “doable”
parts and pieces. It does appear as if the worst disasters
are likely to hit in places where much work remains to
be done—and not necessarily as much at the state level
as at the community level. There is much that is local
in building good governance, and much at that level to
be done about global climate change.
To the extent that we can integrate global climate
change response, consequence management, and mitigation capacity building as components of promoting
and sustaining effective legitimate governance, we have
a very useful convergence. This is my core argument.
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In trying to promote legitimate governance and
democratic norms of cooperation and negotiation in
post-conflict environments, it is useful to work at very
local levels. Take, for example, the building of a school.
If you involve the parties to the conflict in the design
of the school, you can create the equivalent of a parentteacher’s organization and possibly a curriculum design
effort. You get the parties to focus on the fact that this
is about their children’s future and not about how they
do not like each other and never have liked each other.
You also get them to appreciate, by the way, that they
do not have to learn to like each other to make those
kinds of legitimate, governmental institutions work.
Why could we not do the same things when it
comes to meeting the climate-change challenge? We
could do some of the things that the scientists in this
room say need to be done to mitigate consequences
as well as do some things to change habits. We could
build institutions and norms that will prevent future
bad consequences of global climate change while also
promoting effective legitimate governance.
There are many groups that could be involved,
including nongovernmental organizations and
the private sector. I have spoken with Fortune 500
companies about strategy and strategic leadership. If
you look at the areas where they are operating, they
have a vested interest in creating this kind of effective
legitimate governance. And, by the way, many of them
are in the business of doing things about mitigating
consequences and preventing global climate change.
They can also be effective partners and actors in this.
So preparing for a world changed by global climate
change is really about bringing to bear the full range
of actors with all their capabilities across the elements
and instruments of power—diplomatic, informational,
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military, and economic. I am mindful of the Russian
aphorism which says, “If all you have is a hammer,
every problem looks like a nail.” What we need to do is
figure out how to organize and bring to bear on specific
problems the most appropriate elements of power. This
includes learning how to get the military and civilian
organizations to work together most effectively. I think
my contacts in the military would tell you they would
be happy to see capabilities developed elsewhere and
happy to work together with other actors to achieve
the goals.
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Defense Planning
Henry H. Gaffney, Jr.
Center for Naval Analyses
Introduction.
Across time, I have done a lot of work on conflict
in the world. Among other things I have drawn up
an inventory of U.S. force responses to situations
from 1970 to the present—the most complete one in
existence. I have also analyzed the “American way of
war” as it has been exercised in the very few combat
situations since the end of the Cold War and the global
war on terror.
There has been a surprising emergence of an elite
consensus on both energy and global climate change.
This has, perhaps, arisen only over the last 2 years,
although a lot of work dates back to the 1970s. I myself
have found the briefings on global climate change by
Jim Hansen and Tony Ganetos quite convincing—so
long as one can handle ranges of projections off the
current data, scenarios of effects and outcomes, and
assuming no mitigation and adaptation along the way.
So I am not one of the skeptics, that is for sure. I am an
innocent bystander.
The first point I would make is that the whole
process of global climate change and the associated
energy business is going to be evolutionary. I agree with
Mickey Glantz on the question of the creeping process.
I have heard people talk about abrupt changes, but I
have not been convinced. And then I heard yesterday
that “abrupt” in some cases is supposed to indicate a
period of years. Altogether, it seems more likely that
warming is going to creep up on us. Not everything,
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therefore, will go to pieces at once. And the metaphor
which best describes this—this will the first time it is
used in this conference, but one that comes up with
both energy and climate change—is that of the boiling
frog. Is anybody not familiar with that metaphor?
No?1 Good, I will proceed.
Based on what I have read so far, it is hard to
postulate much about the wars that are supposed to
inevitably arise thanks to global climate change. What
gets mentioned are water wars, failing states, that is,
failing governments, and mass migrations to cities,
across borders, and worst of all, to the north.2 Among
those mass migrations will presumably be waves of
terrorists, supposing, that is, that 20, 30, 40 years from
now the terrorist problem is exactly the same or worse
than the one we have got today. One could argue about
that, but that is not what this conference is about.
Ironically, all these conflicts are expected to emerge
in places which do not generate much C02 and which
will not contribute much to global warming. I am
talking about Africa and the Middle East, especially.3
Let us remember, though, that any new conflicts to
emerge in Africa in the course of global climate change
would do so from what is at the moment a primarily
peaceful base. Although the U.S. military likes to talk
about a dangerous and uncertain world, state-onstate wars have practically disappeared, and internal
conflicts have been dropping like a stone. What
some of us have discovered in our discussions is that
people think that state-on-state wars are more likely to
happen when outside states intervene in some internal
situation that has gone very bad. Right now we might
allude to Iraq in that regard.
Internal conflicts have dropped both by my own
count and that of researchers formerly working at the
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University of Maryland, but now at George Mason
University with Monty Marshall.4 We Americans are
obsessed with the possibility of terrorists spreading like
weeds in ungoverned spaces like the Sahel. And some
even talk about terrorists building nuclear weapons
there despite the lack of water and electricity. That
would be an interesting thing for them to try to do. We
have got to take some of this with a grain of salt. Last
May, I was at Special Operations Command Europe’s
International Conference in Stuttgart, Germany, where
I got pretty thorough briefings on what they are up to
in the Sahel, helping the locals to chase what is now
called al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AIM). The Sahel is
underpopulated for some very good reasons. However,
the U.S. establishment can hardly see the whole
world now because it is bogged down, physically and
mentally, in Iraq, and as a sideshow, in Afghanistan.
At the same time, there is a recognition coming out of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that conflicts in the
future may well involve primarily irregular warfare,
responded to by counterinsurgency. I will talk about
that a little bit more later.
Worst Case Scenarios.
Let us imagine, nonetheless, that we are living
in, say, 2050. Let us further imagine that we have
ignored all the evolutions of global climate change,
that practically no mitigation and adaptation has
been attempted in the interim, and that, therefore, the
catastrophes of global warming are upon us. We are
faced by drought, flooding, and migrations. Let us
further suppose that economies and governance have
broken down. The question that I was supposed to
address at this conference was “What does the U.S.
military do in that eventuality?”
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Let us start by revisiting the dilemma of U.S.
national security. When we speak of this, we usually
mean defense of the homeland. Mickey Glantz said that
national security has something to do with protection
against harm. We certainly like to defend ourselves far
away before threats reach us here. We also talk about
stabilizing the world. But in terms of actual shooting
interventions, we have done very little of that since
the end of the Cold War, and only Korea and Vietnam
before that. Now, it’s Iraq, Iraq, Iraq.
Through our alliances and deployments of forces,
we consider that we are deterring North Korea from
attacking South Korea, a Chinese attack on Taiwan,
and Iran from attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz.
We keep up our strategic nuclear posture. Nobody
ever mentions that because it does not have much to
do with global climate change. We do not talk about
nuclear winter anymore.
The United States spends more than the rest of
the whole world on defense and pursues the most
technologically advanced equipment. Our belief is
that this discourages others from trying to catch up to
us. So we have to ask, how do the wars people have
postulated as arising out of global warming threaten
this national security? Among the threats postulated,
the one that comes up the most often is that of mass
migrants attempting to reach the United States. If
they are from the Middle East, the Arab countries, one
concern is that some of them might be terrorists.5
The other great threat to national security would
be the loss of the imported oil that the United States
depends on from the Persian Gulf and from West
Africa. Some of the climate change effects—especially
the rise of sea levels—could complicate the ability to
produce oil in many of these countries. I must say,
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though, that the problems we have with unrest in the
Niger Delta would be solved if the sea level rose and
all those oil platforms became offshore platforms!
Otherwise, according to most scenarios, the U.S. role
would largely consist of humanitarian interventions,
comprising both disaster relief and efforts made to
stop people from killing one another. How exactly
this can be construed as protection of America is
not altogether clear, but why should we rule it out?
Humanitarian relief is a good thing to do. We are
somehow embarrassed to say it.6
By the way, as an aside, none of these evolutions
rising from global climate change, with its economic
stringencies, if not devastations, are conducive to
any country in the world building the big classic
technological militaries. They will not have the money
and, more importantly, they will not have the need. It is
all going to be irregular warfare, as people call it, which
means a switch away from reliance on technological
capabilities to reliance on massive ground forces.
The U.S. Military Response.
Given these possibilities, how should the United
States respond militarily? First, it is not up to the U.S.
military. It is up to an administration in office and one
presumably working in consultation with Congress,
and somehow or other in touch with the public.
Many of the articles that I have read about military
interventions and collapsing states invoke the passive
voice. The authors say things like, “The United States
will be called upon. . .,” and yet nobody ever specifies
who is to do this calling upon. And why do they duck
behind the passive voice? Because it can hardly be the
UN; after all, we are a member of that organization and
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would thus be part of the calling. It might be “world
opinion” or NGOs or whatever that would do the
calling, and we would consider that. By the way, as I
was explaining to Kent Butts yesterday, the reason that
we got into Somalia was not the CNN effect so much
as the fact that the television crews went in there and
were able to pay any amount for their protection from
the “technicals” in Somalia. At that point, the NGOs
were priced out of protection, and they needed the free
protection provided by U.S. forces. So any responses
are the decisions of the President, presumably in
consultation with Congress.
Second, imagine the worst case scenario again.
Assume that climate change has not all been
evolutionary, happening bit by bit, and that we are
suddenly surprised and overwhelmed by it all at once.
The prospects are that the U.S. Government and its
military would have to occupy much of Africa south
of the Sahara and to deploy the National Guard and
Reserves all along the Mexican border and the coast
of Florida to intercept migrants. And to do any of
this around the world, they would have do it without
the help of our northern allies, because they will be
fighting off migrants trying to come into their own
countries. For these purposes, the United States would
presumably require enormous numbers of ground
forces. As we see, there is a proposal now to increase
the ground forces by 92,000 people. I can imagine that
if the situations got so bad we would have to reinstitute
the draft, but I have been told not to say anything like
that because that is too dire a political prospect.
This would call for associated lift to take the forces
wherever they needed to go. Just about all would go
by sea since no significant tonnage of anything can
ever be moved by air. And the forces would have to
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take with them all the supplies they need, including
water, power, and medicines, plus the associated relief
supplies since none would be available locally for the
needy population. And these forces should then be
prepared to stay there possibly for years. After all, we
cannot see any way out of Iraq at the moment and this
might put us in a rather similar situation.
Once the political decision has been made, it would
presumably be largely up to the military to make the
effort. As we have discussed in this conference, the
U.S. military is the most numerous, best organized,
most mobile, and best supplied of all organizations.
Moreover, as we know, it is an illusion to think that
we would be able to mobilize sufficient people from
the other departments of the government. We cannot
even do it right now for a single country of only 24
million people.
Preparing for Meet the Threats.
So what does the U.S. military do in the interim to
prepare for any of these eventualities—remembering
that we are talking about extremes? First, let us
remember that the United States itself would not escape
the effects of global warming. And this has a lot to do
with our coastal installations along the southern coast
and the Gulf of Mexico which is where most forces
are loaded if they are going to go on an expeditionary
adventure.
Second, I have been talking about massive ground
forces, which would be ready, trained, and equipped
for irregular warfare, massive police actions, and civic
action. They would, presumably, in the event of failing
states, be out there governing as it were. They would not
need to be so high-tech. All of this assumes, however,
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again, that no mitigation and adaptation had been
attempted in the interim and that many bad situations
have arisen simultaneously. Much of this, though, I
must say, is countercultural for the U.S. military. Right
now, they just want to come home from Iraq, bandage
their wounds, see their families again, and restore their
equipment. And then they are going to be reluctant to
get into another Iraq for a long time to come, perhaps
for at least 20 years. They might be resistant to going
anywhere before that, but again we know that global
climate change will not accumulate in such a way as to
require it before that time.
The ground forces, at least, have been thinking
more seriously about counterinsurgency upon their
experience in Iraq. It may lead to a big shift in the
cultural orientation of the U.S. military establishment,
especially if the possibilities of state-on-state conflict
also continue to dwindle at the same time. But the
emphasis on counterinsurgency could also fade as
time passes, as it did quickly after Vietnam. The whole
business of lessons recorded but not learned is a very
strong impulse within the system.
Nonetheless, this endless talk now of not being
ready for any other contingency because of the
quagmire in Iraq really means the forces would like
to stay home and simply maintain their readiness.
There is also much talk about switching back to major
combat operations for the planning and structuring
of the forces. The U.S. Congress and the U.S. public
would prefer to avoid foreign entanglements. Thus, it
is also countercultural for it to think about occupying
other countries, especially for prolonged periods. That
political problem would arise. But it is true that the
contemplation of such contingencies could focus minds
beyond the military onto mitigation and adaptation. By
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focusing on direct contingencies and making it clear
how much they dislike having to respond to these dire
situations, the military can play a useful role. They can
encourage the higher levels of the U.S. Government and
the public to take action and take preventive measures.
I think that is, in effect, what you heard from Paul Kern
last night.
The United States so far has been reluctant to
intervene in the messy situation of country collapse. The
only place it went in with a major pacification effort of
this kind was Somalia in late 1992. This was a political
disaster, and the United States has forgone any such
other efforts. Iraq was supposed to be a cakewalk. It
was not. In the conditions emerging from global climate
change, there is no promise of cakewalks. So we will
have to undergo a cultural change if we really want to
plan for these kinds of interventions in the future. But
remember, it is all going to be an evolutionary process.
Remember the boiling frog analogy.
Future Scenarios.
In the couple of minutes I have left, I would like to
summarize some of the points I have been making by
looking at two scenarios: One is on the future of U.S.
defense planning and the other is how defense planning
might track with changes in the climate picture.
First, when the U.S. involvement in Iraq is over,
if ever, the U.S. military could take one of two major
tracks into the future. Track 1 is to return to the United
States. Administrations would go back to providing for
the readiness and recapitalization of the forces, which
in turn means a strong impulse in the U.S. military to
go back to high technology, which would be to the
benefit of the Air Force and the Navy. And what they
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would like to do is go back to planning for the Great
War with China.
Track 2 might involve administrations planning to
occupy many other countries or any other country—but
as noted, I am not too sure this country would like to do
that after its dire Iraq experience. On the other hand,
there is a great impulse within the U.S. military right
now to stay active in the world through continuous
operations out there and continuous engagement with
other countries. In that case, the United States would
build up its ground forces, stick to fairly low-tech
stuff, and pursue the terrorists where it can. And in
the interim, administrations would send the military
on lesser, shorter interventions of a humanitarian
nature and maybe even provide relief in the event of
big natural disasters. Track 2 would be more suitable
for the climate change scenarios.
Whichever track is chosen, if we suffer another
terrorist attack in this country, the administration will
want to come back and do homeland defense. There
would be tremendous concentration on that function,
perhaps to the detriment of U.S. military operations
out in the world.
In terms of priorities for the forces, I note some huge
gaps between Tracks 1 and 2. If I am trying to occupy
other countries and yet return most forces to the United
States, there is a huge gap. You cannot do both. Staying
active in the world instead of going back to the United
States to reinstitute readiness and recapitalization
is incompatible. The third gap is pursuing terrorists
versus having a big war with China. These take
entirely different kinds of forces. The default solution
for all this is what I call “mixed priorities”—that is,
within a constrained budget trying to do a little bit of
everything—maybe not a bad solution, but leaving
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inadequacies and frustrations across the board within
the Department of Defense.
Second, we can imagine a progression from the
evolution of the world system through U.S. relations
with the world, and then to the role of U.S. forces
through illustrative stages of climate change. Let
us remember that U.S. foreign policy always lies in
between the world and U.S. forces. U.S. forces do
nothing unless the administration in office decides to
do something (or nothing) with them.
On the first level of the progressive scenario, we
are seeing the first signs of climate change, very wispy
evidence. It is very difficult to see, but the trends can
be projected to some extent as people like Jim Hansen
and the IPCC have done. This bare evidence illustrates
the difficulty of engaging climate change as an issue at
the national level at this point in time.
At the second level, over the next 10 to 20 years the
trends in climate change would be confirmed. Let us
hope they would not be, but as far as we know they
will. Across the same period, we begin to worry even
more about reaching peak oil. For the U.S. Government,
we will see some slow efforts to do something about
restraining CO2 emissions, a little more work on
alternative fuels, a little worry about competition with
other countries to get the oil out there on the market
on which we would all still be dependent. And for
the U.S. military, they will be finally out of Iraq. They
will be recovering and there will be debates over
counterinsurgency versus major combat operations
as the military considers its strategic orientation. But
they will be under budget restraints given the twin U.S.
deficits—federal budget and current (international)
accounts.
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The third level down would be when it all goes
bad: droughts, governance and economic collapses,
migrations, the North raising barriers to migrants, etc.
The United States would either be isolationist, that is,
retreating to fortress America, or it is going to face the
possibility of occupying many countries. That would
lead to a huge public debate between those choices.
For the military, they are going to have to guard U.S.
borders, think about long occupations and nationbuilding, and consider the most dire domestic political
threat of all—reinstituting the draft in order to man
these occupations.
But at the fourth level, let us say that we get into
an evolutionary situation where we manage lots of
cooperation around the world to control CO2, to work
on disasters together, and to help countries to prepare
and to stabilize before the dire effects hit them. For
the U.S. Government, by that time, we would hope
it would be fully into conservation, efficiencies, CO2
sequestration, and alternative fuels. At the same time,
we probably would expect to continue our presence in
the Persian Gulf and possibly undertake some limited
interventions that could be managed without much
loss of life. Maybe the burden would not be so hard as
under the extreme circumstances.
To conclude, there is no relentless scenario that is
likely to be played out. Climate change is going to
be only progressively recognized, efforts by the U.S.
Government and other governments to cope are likely
to be hesitant and fragmentary, and the U.S. military
will stand patiently aside, waiting to be called by the
government.
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ENDNOTES - Gaffney
1. The analogy—used by Al Gore in An Inconvenient Truth—
refers to the belief that a frog can be boiled alive if the water is
heated slowly enough. Supposedly, if a frog is placed in boiling
water, it will jump out, but if it is placed in cold water that is
slowly heated, it will not. The story suggests to people that they
should make themselves aware of gradual change lest they suffer
a catastrophic loss.
2. I fully concur with Robin Dorff about the problem of
governance in vulnerable countries. That has been identified
as one of the most serious internal problems we have seen since
decolonization—especially as old leaders hang on too long, lose
touch with their country, and are engulfed by corruption. It
always reminds me of the statement by former Prime Minister
Victor Chernomyrdin of Russia. In the mid 1990s he said, “We
hoped it would be better, but it turned out as usual.”
3. My doctoral dissertation was done on Sierra Leone, so I am
something of an Africanist with a little feel for what the continent
is like. Of course, when I came back from Sierra Leone and went
back to work at the Department of Defense, I spent most of the
next 12 years on policy for NATO nuclear weapons. It shows you
how little interest there was in Africa in the Defense Department
back in those days.
4. Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone, “Global Report on
Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility,” Foreign Policy Bulletin,
Winter 2007.
5. How all these people may cross the Atlantic or Pacific is not
clear, of course.
6. I noticed a statement in a document I read the other day
where it said, “National interests do not have to comply with
norms.” So norms and national interest are incompatible? I have
not yet completely parsed that, but it is an interesting thought.
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Commentator
William Schlesinger
Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies
The conference agenda reminds me a bit of the
agenda of the scientific group known as Medea
during the Clinton administration. Medea was tasked
to assess the potential use of the national security
assets of the country by environmental scientists. As
Medea evolved, it began to focus more fully on what
kinds of national assets, presumably reconnaissance
assets, could be brought to bear on some impending
environmental problems, including climate change.
There is a lot of convergence between what Medea
considered and what has been considered here today.
When I look at Glantz and Dorff’s presentations, I see a
number of parallel conclusions. Glantz stressed that we
cannot just have science; we need to actually translate
science into some kind of policy or action. That is
absolutely critical. The best early warning systems
are useless unless you do something with them. The
subtext of Dorff’s address is that you need to have a
government that is responsive to what science is saying.
If the government represses science, or is ignorant of it,
or chooses not to read it, disbelieve it, and instead base
their actions on divine inspiration or whatever, that
whole scientific effort is wasted.
Hank Gaffney drew attention to a number of
potential problems. For my part, I am a little worried
that we have not fully considered the cost to the United
States of playing a role as a policeman in any future
world. I am a bit of a pessimist this way. I tend to
think that the United States is going to become a bit
like Great Britain and will end up a power that was

273

once grand but no longer has the money to accomplish
much on the international scene. I think we will see a
rise in the wealth and influence of Asia. And we will
not be able to affect their behavior. I think we need
to consider what we might be able and willing to pay
for.
Let me say a few things in regard to the military
and the need for early warning systems. There will
always be flat earth people who say that climate
change is a hoax, but I think we can say that climate
change is an established scientific fact. If we ask what
kinds of specific things the military might be called
upon to respond to, I would put famine at the top of
the list. I think there is every indication that even if
the rainfall patterns do not change, if we have warmer
temperatures, there will be drier surface conditions
and less soil moisture for crops. This will be especially
true in the centers of continents, in places such as our
Great Plains and Midwestern states that grow so much
of the world’s cereal crops. The military should be
ready for not just local famine but wide-scale increases
in the price of food and crop failures. In the face of
crop failures, will we be able to feed as effectively as
we have been the 6 to 10 billion people that will be
with us then?
I would also put disease high on the list. I think we
can expect that, in a warmer future world, diseases that
are now confined to places that we visit on safari may
very well be with us here at home. And, increasingly,
we may see people coming home from faraway places
bringing these diseases with them. The medical
community needs to be prepared to deal with this but
so, too, should the military. An early warning system
would indeed be useful. In the late 1990s, scientists
proved able to forecast the outbreak of Rift Valley fever
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in East Africa some 60 days ahead of time by a satellite
monitoring of sea surface temperature in the Indian
Ocean. It would surely be useful to know when one
might have to beef up the public health infrastructure
overseas or even send the military to stabilize much of
East Africa.
There is probably very little that I can say about
water in general that has not been said in the popular
press or said here over the last couple of days. I will
just reiterate that when one looks at which resources
are going to be in short supply and that we might
think about fighting over, the prime candidate would
probably be water.
I spent all my time dodging the draft and avoiding
getting in the military back in the Vietnam era when
I had hair and a ponytail and all that good stuff. But
if I had embarked on a military career and if I were
in the Navy, I think I would certainly be concerned
about sea level rise. This clearly will have an impact
on coastal facilities and ports, and affect the ability
to land in various places. In the future, if we are still
using submarine warfare, an ice-free Arctic would put
to rest the whole cat and mouse game of hiding under
the Arctic icepack.
If I were in charge of Army-type forces, I would
be worried about the great vast areas of Siberia and
Canada that are frozen much of the time now. We have
devoted a lot of energy to studying how to fight on
frozen ground. And while it may be cold, it is a whole
lot more convenient to be on frozen land than in the
swamp of melted permafrost. So again, I would say
we are poorly prepared to think about any scenario
that puts us in a ground war at high latitudes.
As to the Air Force, it would not get off the ground
if we did not have low density liquid-based petroleum
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products. You cannot fly big transport planes with
coal. And I think the Air Force needs to give some
serious thought as to how we are going to move people
from place to place in this future world. Some elite jet
fighters could probably operate using traditional fuels.
But how would we move massive forces if we have
only a limited supply of liquid fuels? At any rate, how
would we do so at a cost we might be willing to pay?
I have one further comment. I think we need to
fear proposals for global engineering, spraying sulfate
aerosols into the stratosphere, and putting mirrors
on satellites surrounding the earth to reflect the
incoming radiation of the sun. We want to be very,
very wary about manipulating the climate with global
engineering. As an environmental scientist, that just
makes me shudder. Let me stop here and, hopefully,
we will have some good discussion.
Discussion
Q: Can you comment on the utility of the kind of
indicator-based methodologies and indicator lists
developed throughout the Cold War by intelligence
organizations?
Glantz: A lot of groups do develop indicator lists to
help warn of things like famine. Lists are fine, but they
are dangerous. They lock you in. If you stick to what
is on the list and do not keep an open mind, you can
miss things. Some lists are also overly long. I have seen
famine early warning indicators with 40 indicators,
including measuring arms and heads and body weights
and stuff. Do you need 40 to know that you are heading
towards a famine? One big problem is that famine is a
creeping thing that occurs over a relatively short period
of time. It is also an event—when we learn there is a
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famine, it means people are already dead. Dead people
are not good indicators, okay? You need to look at
things like, are people migrating? Are people selling
their jewelry in the marketplace? You are likely to get
your earliest warning from some truck driver coming
into Nairobi telling you he saw folks selling their pots
and pans. And you need to heed this and check it out;
it is not going to be the sort of thing on an indicator list,
however.
Dorff: Clearly we need early warning systems. But
failures are often not the result of a warning failure.
They happen because there is no political will to act.
We need to develop this will, and translate science into
policy, and fund the policy, or do some of the things
I talked about. As to indicators, yes, these are good.
Apart from anything else, they could help us mobilize
NGOs and the private sectors and encourage them to
see to the kind of tasks for which they are best cut out
and do the things that will make a difference.
Gaffney: I want to return to Glantz’s earlier
point about warning and response. We keep thinking
of warning as a bell going off. But it is a dynamic
relationship between things that happen and things that
you need to do as a result. When you lose track of the
Japanese fleet, you behave differently at Pearl Harbor
than you do when you know where the Japanese fleet
is. If there is a hurricane in the middle of the Gulf of
Mexico and it is heading north, you do different things
in New Orleans than you do when there is no hurricane
in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico. When the buildup
of greenhouse gases portends a future of significant
change over a great time, you behave differently. You
will never get “the bell,” except in history.

277

Q: What is a hydropole?
Glantz: That is the best question of the conference!
This is a new way of responding to flooding being
developed by the Dutch. The Dutch were always looking
at the North Sea, and all at once they got flooded from
behind. They have decided to pump billions of dollars
into building on rising waters. They are giving space to
the river and giving up on levees. As a technology, this
may not be readily transferable—it is easier to move
10,000,000 Dutch people and find some place for them
to live than it is to find a place for, say, 160,000,000
Bangladeshis. The point is that the Dutch are selling
us levee technology to use in New Orleans that they
are giving up on. We are not asking ourselves the right
questions. Can we protect New Orleans against super
storms that come twice? Remember, Katrina was a
super storm only in one respect—it hit a city that is
half below sea level. It was a category 3. It was not a
super storm with big winds like Mimi or super cyclone
Arissa. Here is an example of a city that is giving up.
Let me also make an observation about mega cities on
the coast. They will also face similar problems—storm
surges, rises in sea level. Note that because the sea level
goes up a foot does not mean it goes in a foot. When
the winds are there and the storm surge is there, it can
go in miles. So I think that is really important.
Glantz: And the second part of your question
(which you were going to ask!) was on disaster
diplomacy—can a disaster be used to bring enemy
states together? It has done so on at least one occasion,
easing relations between the Turks and the Greeks.
One had an earthquake and the other offered to help
and did, and then it worked the other way months
later. When it comes to Cuban-American relations, the
findings are interesting. Cubans and Americans work
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closely together when a specific hurricane is coming at
both of them. Cubans are glad to get training in how
to forecast. They come to Miami, and sometimes we
even go to Cuba. But if you want to talk about global
warming, you cannot talk to the Cubans. Facing a threat
is not enough to bring about a long term relationship.
Q: Can we adapt existing security relationships
(e.g., with Japan, NATO, South Korea) to these new
contingencies, provide value added, as it were? Can we
use this kind of new world of crisis as a way to build
relations with potentially adversarial relationships?
Dorff: The simple answer to both questions is,
“yes.” If we can get potential future adversaries,
let’s say China, to engage with us on some of these
problems, we might become positive rather than
negative (in the sense of military) competitors.
Building some relationships through these means
might have all kinds of other positive outcomes. That
does not necessarily guarantee we will hold hands and
sing “We Are the World” together. But focusing the
scientific community across borders would mean a
lot. In terms of theater cooperation, it is interesting to
note the military-to-military engagement Africa has on
environmental issues. The cooperation was not driven
by an environmental agenda but by a desire to show
militaries in other countries how to have democratic
military institutions that were not all about fighting
each other or about repressing their own people. As to
whether or not this adds value to existing relationships,
absolutely it does. I think to some extent, NATO has
evolved in that direction already. It is doing some of
this. With more encouragement from the United States
(call it modeling behavior), there are potentially a lot
of other organizations, political and military, as well
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as other countries that we could engage in this sort of
thing.
Finally, I think that if the United States clearly
articulated a grand strategy in which it was made
clear that our objective was to promote effective
legitimate governments, we would have a better story
to tell around the world. This would not preclude our
retaining a counterterrorism component and other
elements of good traditional security. It would just
make it clear that we want to help create long-term
solutions rather than just play Wack-a-Mole and send
our military every time a problem surfaces.
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CHAPTER 6
OPPORTUNITIES OR OBSTACLES
FOR THE MILITARY
Chapter 6 focuses on how concerns over climate change impact the
U.S. military. What can the Army do to promote responsible stewardship
of the environment while ensuring combat readiness? What is it doing?
Mr. E. Thomas Morehouse suggests that some remedies for climate
change may at the same time enhance our security and help meet our
energy needs. Mr. David Sheets shows us what the military is currently
doing to foster renewable energy, and Dr. Karen Hulme analyzes
environmental law and its impact on combat operations.

Climate, Energy, and Security —
A Related Set of Challenges
E. Thomas Morehouse, Jr.
Institute for Defense Analyses
Introduction.
Good afternoon. Over the past year, I have been
involved in two studies related to the issues of climate
change, energy, and national security. The report of
the first study, “National Security and the Threat of
Climate Change,” was prepared by the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA).1 Sherri Goodman, who served as the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental
Security during the Clinton administration, brought
together 11 retired 4-star and 3-star generals and
admirals as a Military Advisory Board (MAB) to
examine the current state of climate science and provide
their best assessments of the security risks it represents
to the nation and the world. The MAB considered
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the threat, likelihood, potential consequences, and
timing of projected changes in climate as they would
any other issue that represented a potential security
risk. The first key finding of the CNA report was that
climate change is a serious security risk to the nation.
Another key finding was that “climate change, national
security, and energy dependence are a related set of
global challenges.”2
A second study was prepared by a Defense
Science Board (DSB) task force that examined the
energy security of the Department of Defense (DoD),
recommended potential remedies, and assessed their
value to the nation’s energy challenges.
Climate, Security, and Energy: A Related Set
of Global Challenges.
The best forecasts that climate scientists can provide
have uncertainties in their timing and magnitude, and
probably always will. But the trend is unequivocal.3
The climate is warming, and there are consequences
to the ecosystems on which every living organism
on the planet depend. Consumption of fossil-derived
energy is also increasing globally, and greenhouse gas
emissions caused by fossil fuels are also increasing.
This is true in the United States and around the world,
but is occurring most rapidly in developing countries.
China and India are responsible for the largest increases
in absolute terms because of their large populations
and rapidly expanding economies. Consumption is
increasing for both electricity, produced largely from
coal, and for petroleum. The global endowment of
petroleum is concentrated in a relatively small number
of countries. This means that most of the oil we use
comes from foreign sources, and the percentage is
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increasing. China, too, imports its oil and faces the same
social and economic risks from supply disruption as
other oil importing countries. Conversely, most of our
electricity is produced from domestic sources, about
50 percent from coal. China also has a large national
endowment of coal. Nationally and globally, energy
consumption is predicted to increase in the future as
populations grow and more people aspire to a Western
lifestyle enabled by high energy consumption. This
means carbon emissions are increasing domestically
and globally, and this trend is predicted to continue
into the foreseeable future.
I will not get into the controversies surrounding
climate forecasts that were discussed earlier in this
conference.4 Suffice it to say that if the climate change that
we are observing today continues into the future, there
will be consequences for our own national security and
for international political stability. Most disturbingly,
the warming trends are predicted not only to continue,
but to accelerate. As General Gordon Sullivan, former
Chief of Staff of the Army, said, “People . . . want to
be convinced perfectly. They want to know the climate
science projections with 100 percent certainty. . . . We
never have 100 percent certainty. . . . If you wait until
you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is going
to happen on the battlefield.”5 Most military planning
is done to prepare for relatively low probability, high
consequence events. Climate change is different in two
ways. It is more likely to result in a high consequence
event and, unlike most threats that are singular in their
timing and nature, climate change will endure over a
long period of time and is global in scope. In addition
to its enduring and systemic nature, climate change
is also more certain to occur than the threats military
leaders have had to plan for in the past.
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By its nature, climate change will create new
types of security risks. It will both create new security
issues and exacerbate existing ones, making already
challenging situations worse. The political stability of
energy exporting countries will be affected by climate
change, and their energy infrastructure, often located on
the coast or off-shore, will be particularly vulnerable to
more extreme weather. Many oil-exporting nations are
net food importers with rapidly growing populations.
As climate changes and as agricultural productivity
moves in response, the patterns of supply and demand
will shift. So, the relationships are interdependent, with
effects in one place affecting others. Security is affected
by climate, energy is affected by climate, security is
affected by energy, and climate is affected by energy.
Security and Climate. Earlier speakers noted that
climate change affects the ability of populations to
feed themselves, affects access to fresh water, causes
the habitats for disease vectors to move, and threatens
coastal infrastructures from sea level rise and storm
surge. From an international security perspective,
marginal states struggle to maintain governance today.
This is particularly true in Africa. Climate stresses will
make it even more difficult for marginal governments
to meet the needs of their populations. This could
easily create an increased need for humanitarian
and peacekeeping operations, changing the types of
missions the military must be prepared to conduct in the
future, and the character of the operating environment
in which we conduct them. From an infrastructure
perspective, the United States is not immune from the
effects of climate change. For example, much of the key
military infrastructure is on the coast. Imagine what
King’s Bay would look like after a meter of sea level
rise.
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Energy and Climate. The best current example of
this interdependency that comes to mind is Europe’s
experience with its nuclear power plants last summer.
France, in particular, was hard hit because nearly 80
percent of its electricity comes from nuclear reactors.
Many are located on rivers, relying on river water
to provide cooling for the reactor. The extreme heat
caused the rivers to warm more than normal, in some
cases exceeding the maximum temperature allowed
for cooling the reactors. Some plants were required to
reduce their output. Higher temperatures for longer
periods would have forced plants to shut down.
In addition to generating plants, transmission
grids are also vulnerable to extreme weather. This is
particularly true in the United States and Canada. A
case in point was the August 2003 blackout when over
50 million electricity customers in the Northeast, the
Midwest, and in Canada were without power because
a tree blew into a power line in Ohio. Hurricane
Katrina knocked out a number of oil rigs and took
refineries off line in the Gulf Coast. In December 2003,
the U.S. Arctic Research Commission issued a report
“Climate Change, Permafrost, and Impacts on Civil
Infrastructure” which cites the risks to significant
energy infrastructure in the United States, Canada, and
Russia from melting permafrost to include electrical
transmission and oil and gas pipelines.
One of the areas of the world predicted to be most
affected by climate change and least able to adapt
is Africa. According to some estimates, the United
States will be importing as much as 40 percent of our
petroleum from Africa by 2015. A stabile supply requires
political stability in the exporting nations. Climate
change threatens to make that more challenging. The
establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
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recognizes the need to help strengthen the capacity of
governments in the region to meet the needs of their
populations.
Security, Climate, and Energy. To accept that
climate is affected by energy is to accept causation—
anthropogenic carbon emissions are contributing to
climate change. This is becoming less controversial
here in the United States than in the past. But it is not
controversial at all in most of the rest of the world.
Even George Bush acknowledged it in his 2007 State
of the Union address, “America is on the verge of
technological breakthroughs that will enable us to live
our lives less dependent on oil.” He went on to say that,
“And these technologies will help us be better stewards
of the environment, and they will help us to confront
the serious challenge of global climate change.”
Some view this as an important acknowledgement
by the administration of the body of science linking
anthropogenic carbon emissions to global climate
change.
Energy is like a master key affecting security
and climate. Energy is the foundation on which
modern societies and economies function. It is what
differentiates a modern lifestyle from an 18th century
lifestyle. Access to abundant and affordable energy
for transportation and electrification runs the global
economy. Major swings in price and availability can
send economies into recession, and cause social unrest
and conflict. Some view disruption of energy markets
as an act of war. A major objective of the foreign policies
of developed and developing nations alike has been
to assure a free and open global energy market. In the
United States, it is a dominant factor in our national
security strategy and national military strategy. One
of the major missions of the U.S. Central Command
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(CENTCOM) is to assure the free flow of oil from
Middle Eastern countries. The formation of AFRICOM
is clearly linked to predictions that by 2015 the United
States could be importing up to 40 percent of its oil
from Africa, and to increasing investments in China to
develop African energy infrastructure.
There are a number of other security risks
associated with our high oil consumption. While they
are not necessarily exacerbated by climate change,
addressing climate change also addresses these risks.
The first is related to the character of oil exporting
nations. A number of these are corrupt petro-states
that are neither free nor democratic. Many use their oil
revenues to subsidize the lifestyles of their populations
and maintain their autocratic hold on power. Our
relationships with these regimes conflict with our
commitment to freedom and democracy, undermining
our moral credibility on the world stage. Second, the
money these petro-states get from our oil purchases
also more directly undermines our interests: some use
this revenue to fund terrorists to fight against us. As
Jim Woolsey, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
director, often says “This is the first time since the Civil
War we’ve funded both sides of a conflict.” Finally,
there is the wild card of peak oil.6 Estimates of when
we begin to run out of oil range from “we’re already
at the peak,” to “we won’t get there for another 40
years.” Either way, the debate over the reality of peak
oil appears to be over. Given the long time lag for new
technology adoption and infrastructure conversion,
there is an urgent need for action regardless of which
forecast you believe.
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Threading the Needle —
Finding the Win-Win-Win Solutions.
The key challenges for this generation are to achieve
energy security, national security, and climate security.
This is a tall order since they are so interrelated. We
cannot act on one without affecting the others, so
we cannot think of any of them in isolation. Figure 1
illustrates these relationships.

Figure 1. Finding Leverage.
Our security is affected by the decisions we make
about how we use energy, the kind of energy we use,
and where we get it. Paradoxically, the more fossil
energy we use, the more we contribute to the kinds of
climate-induced geo-political instabilities that threaten
traditional energy sources and the extreme weather
that threatens our energy infrastructure. There are two
approaches to our energy problem—figure out how to
use less, the demand side; or figure out how to get more,
the supply side. Supply side approaches to meeting our
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energy demands can mitigate climate change, but they
must be renewable sources that reduce the amount of
carbon emitted per unit of energy produced. Supply
side approaches that increase the amount of carbon
emitted per unit of energy may respond to security or
economic concerns in the short term, but increase our
longer term climate risks. For example, if we choose to
meet our growing electricity demand by building more
pulverized coal plants without sequestering the carbon
emissions, we accelerate climate change and increase
our future security risks. Choosing synthetic fuels that
produce higher carbon emissions than petroleum to
replace foreign oil, such as coal-to-liquid, tar sands, or
oil shale, have the same effect. Conversely, choosing
energy paths that reduce our carbon emissions, such
as energy efficiency to displace demand or renewable
sources, will have the opposite effect. Reducing energy
consumption has a positive climate effect.
So, we have choices, and those choices have
consequences. Supply side remedies need to be
sensitive to their carbon consequences, and demand
side remedies should be valued for their contribution
to reducing climate risks. For those still questioning
the science of causation, there is a pragmatic aspect
to consider. There is growing acceptance by both
government and industry leaders that the future
constraints on carbon emissions are inevitable. The
question is not if carbon emissions will be controlled;
but rather when and how.
Options for Addressing Climate Change.
Just as there are two approaches to addressing
energy: demand, and supply; there are two approaches
for addressing climate change: adaptation, and
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mitigation. And just as for energy, the two approaches
are not mutually exclusive—they both have a role to
play.
The guiding principle we used in our CNA study
was “mitigate when you can, adapt when you cannot.”
Dictionary.com says that to “adapt” is to adjust oneself
to different conditions. To “mitigate” is to make
things less severe. To advocate mitigation requires an
acknowledgement that there is a connection between
climate change and green house gas emissions.
Mitigating climate changes requires making decisions
today to avoid future adverse events. It will require
sustained and determined political leadership.
A good starting point for discussing energy options
is scale. The United States has 2 percent of the oil
reserves in the world, about 8 percent of the production,
and about 5 percent of the world’s population. Yet, we
consume about 25 percent of the world’s oil, about 60
percent of which we import.7
To reduce dependence on foreign oil is to reduce
our foreign trade imbalance, reduce constraints on our
foreign policy options, and reduce the funds we send
to hostile regimes. As the price of oil increases, there
is a corresponding transfer of global wealth from oil
consuming countries to oil producing countries. Some
advocates propose that if oil consuming countries such
as the United States would only drill more, they would
import less and be more energy secure. Unfortunately,
most independent assessments reject the notion we can
somehow drill our way to oil independence. On the
other side of the argument, organizations such as the
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) argue that reducing
oil demand by providing incentives to increase
efficiency are a significantly less expensive and less
risky approach to reducing our oil dependence than
either buying more fuel or more drilling.
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Others have also come to this conclusion. This
suggests that we can make significant progress by
focusing on the demand side, or improving efficiency.
Efficiency can also mitigate energy price increases
on a personal level. For example, if gas is $3 a gallon
and you have a car that gets 20 miles per gallon, your
gas bill is the same as if you pay $6 a gallon for gas
but your car gets 40 miles per gallon. Buying less
fuel also provides the kinds of national benefits we
discussed earlier: less oil imports, improved balance of
trade and global wealth transfer, reduced funding to
supports terrorist activity, reduced constraints on our
foreign policy options, reduced carbon emissions, and
improved long-terms security posture of the country.
In short, efficiency is patriotic.
Efficiency also enables supply side options that are
beneficial for climate protection. For example, because
ethanol has only about two-thirds the energy density
of gasoline, a car that gets 40 miles per gallon is easier
to power with ethanol than one that requires twice as
much fuel.
The same goes for electricity. If through efficiency
improvements you can do the same job with half the
electricity, it becomes easier to satisfy demand with
renewable energy supply sources. This is true for two
reasons. First, because renewable energy is generally
more expensive than power from a pulverized coal
plant, and second, because the technical potential of
renewable energy facilities to produce large amounts
of electricity is less than coal plants. So, efficiency is
an important mechanism to enable market entry for
renewable energy. Efficiency also enhances the security
of our national electricity supplies. The national grid
transfers large amounts of power generated at large
central stations over long distances to end users.
Renewable energy is produced in smaller quantities
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and is more distributed. Smaller, more distributed
generation is inherently more secure and more efficient
than a large system distributing centrally generated
electricity.
So, demand reduction measures for both electricity
and fuel mitigate climate change and improve security.
Supply side measures only do so if they are carbon
neutral as a minimum, or preferably, produce less
carbon than current sources.
The Role of the Department of Defense.
DoD is a small market presence, using less than 1
percent of the nation’s energy. Further, DoD’s energy
use patterns are significantly different than the rest of
the nation. About 75 percent of DoD’s energy use is
jet fuel used for mobility to power combat and combat
support systems. DoD’s electricity use is only about
12 percent of its total energy use. For the nation as a
whole, petroleum for transportation and electricity
are each about half of the total energy demand. DoD
does not use gasoline for operational systems, and
uses relatively little for leased fleet vehicles at fixed
installations. While ethanol can be an important
replacement for gasoline as a national transportation
fuel, it is of little use to DoD because it cannot replace
jet fuel.
To provide some perspective on scale, DoD uses
slightly more fuel than a large international airline.
In terms of access to commercial fuel supplies, DoD
enjoys eminent domain over commercial contracts
when needed for national security. Because DoD needs
such little fuel relative to the global market and enjoys
eminent domain over energy supplies, it is difficult
to conceive of a scenario where DoD would not be
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able to access the petroleum products it needs from
commercial sources to perform its missions. DoD’s
primary petroleum problem is moving the fuel from
the point of commercial purchase to the point of use
by deployed combat or combat support systems. DoD
can contribute to the solution of the national energy
problem through its market power. But this power will
not come from an ability to create a domestic market
for a new fuel source. Rather it will come from its
ability to develop the technologies it needs to reduce
its operational fuel demand, and the market’s ability
to leverage those to commercial purpose. Solving
the problem of abundant and inexpensive global oil
supplies would not solve DoD’s most important fuel
problem.
Where DoD’s Energy Needs and National Energy
Needs Align. In August 2006, Marine Corps Major
General Richard Zilmer, Commander of Al-Anbar
in Iraq, submitted an urgent request for renewable
energy systems due to the vulnerability of American
supply lines to insurgent attack by ambush and
roadside bombs. The request said, “Reducing the
military’s dependence on fuel for power generation
could reduce the number of road-bound convoys.
Without this solution, personnel loss rates are likely
to continue at their current rate. Continued casualty
accumulation exhibits potential to jeopardize mission
success. . . .”8 While Major General Zilmer asked for
renewable energy sources, improving the efficiency of
systems deployed to forward operating bases turned
out to be a more effective remedy to the problem he
described. Indeed, the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force
made far more progress in reducing battlespace fuel
demand by implementing efficiency measure than
by employing alternative energy sources. There is an
important lesson here for the nation.
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In 2001 no one envisioned the significant level of
force protection that would be needed in Iraq to protect
vulnerable supply lines, but this situation has made
the recommendations even more important. The DSB
report recommended that to achieve this more efficient
force, DoD should not allow the logistics burden to be
an unplanned consequence of the decision process.
Instead it should integrate logistics consequences into
its key decisions about force planning and acquisition.
As General Omar Bradley said, “Amateurs talk strategy;
professionals talk logistics.”
To illustrate its point, the 2001 DSB task force asked
a rhetorical question: What are the top 10 battlefield
fuel guzzlers?9 Interestingly, of the top 10 deployed
systems, only two are combat fired munitions; a tank
at #5 and an attack helicopter at #10. The rest were
support systems. Collectively, the water heaters for
the field kitchens consumed more fuel than the attack
helicopters. (See Figure 2.) The task force coined the
concept “fully burdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) to assign
a monetary value to the fuel demanded by deployed
systems. The purpose of assigning a FBCF was to
provide a number that the acquisition and requirements
processes could use to decide how much it was worth
spending in fuel efficiency technologies to reduce the
amount of fuel demanded by deployed systems. While
this did not capture the operational benefits of reducing
battlespace fuel logistics, it did begin to quantify how
much force structure “tail” was needed to support
deployed forces. Estimates of the fully burdened cost
of fuel vary by scenario, and DoD has yet to agree on a
standard methodology for calculating it. General Kern,
a previous speaker, estimated the cost somewhere
between $1 and $400 per gallon, depending on how
it is delivered.10 This is consistent with the findings
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of the 2001 DSB task force, which worked with the
Services to determine the costs for fuel delivery assets.
They concluded it cost about $13 to deliver a gallon of
fuel to the forward edge of a battle area, and the price
escalated rapidly as you moved beyond the forward
edge. Fuel delivered by helicopter can cost hundreds of
dollars per gallon. In Iraq, fuel convoys are protected
by helicopters, driving the cost per gallon quite high
because the fuel conveys need so much protection. DoD
has made some estimates of the cost of fuel delivery
in Iraq, but will not release them.11 The task force also
investigated in-flight tanker refueling—it costs about
$26 a gallon to deliver fuel from an airborne tanker
if you assume the tankers are free. If you include the
cost of recapitalizing the tankers, the cost is about $42
a gallon.
SWA Scenario Using Current Equipment Usage Profile Data
Of the top 10 Army battlefield fuel users, only #5 and #10 are combat
platforms.
1. Truck Tractor: Line Haul C/S 50000 GVWR 6x4 M915
2. Helicopter Utility: UH-60L
3. Truck Tractor: MTV W/E
4. Truck Tractor: Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET)
5. Tank Combat Full Tracked: 120MM Gun M1A2
6. Helicopter Cargo Transport: CH-47D
7. Decontaminating Apparatus: PWR DRVN LT WT
8. Truck Utility: Cargo/Troop Carrier 1-1/4 ton 4X4 W/E (HMMWV)
9. Water Heater: Mounted Ration
10. Helicopter Attack AH-64D
Italics indicates combat systems.
Source: CASCOM study for DSB using FASTALS for SWA.
The end-state force list for SWA (based on the FASTALS Deployment Report)
was used as the force structure.

Figure 2. Today’s Top 10 Battlefield Fuel Users.
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Understanding DoD’s Decision Processes. There
are three macro decision processes that operate within
DoD. They shape the types of missions the Department
prepares for, the types of systems it develops and
acquires, and the doctrine and operational concepts
that underlie its operations. They also establish funding
priorities.
The first process, the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS), anticipates
adversaries and establishes requirements for the types
of capabilities DoD will need in the future in order to
be successful militarily. Its key output is a document
called the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). This
document describes the kinds of systems DoD needs to
field and establishes their performance parameters. If
you think of DoD as a self-contained market, JCIDS is
the customer. This customer makes its buying decisions
according to a 4-step process: 1) identifying its existing
capabilities; 2) identifying the capabilities it needs in
the future; 3) performing a gap analysis to decide what
capabilities it needs to acquire in order to possess the
full capability set it needs in future; and 4) defining
how best to fill those capability gaps.
Next is the Defense Acquisition System. It takes the
ICD as an input and produces hardware that performs
according to its requirements. In reality, there is an
iterative process between the JCIDS and acquisition
process to match available technologies to the
capability needs. Issues such as technology maturity,
risk, performance, and affordability are adjudicated to
develop an ICD that can be met within the timeframe
by which the need for the capability is envisioned.
In our market analogy, the acquisition process is the
purveyor of products that meet the customer’s needs.
To meet these needs, the process must develop new
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technologies, design, and develop new products and
oversee their manufacture.
Finally, there is the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). Its function
is to adjudicate the multiyear spending plan and
yearly budgets, balancing future year obligations and
opportunities with current year demands. Its market
function is to provide a source of capital, and assure
due diligence over Department expenditures.
Valuing Efficiency —A Military and Security
Imperative.
Unfortunately, beyond a must-pay commodity bill
in the current budget year, energy gets little visibility
throughout DoD’s decision processes. The value of
more energy efficient operations in terms of military
operations, casualties, combat vulnerability, risk to
mission, force structure balance, or cost of operations
is not calculated, so it cannot be included as a factor in
key Department decisions. Even if the information did
exist, in the absence of sustained leadership priority,
policies, procedures oversight, and accountability, it
would not become a decision factor.
There are many reasons for the current situation,
and many institutional disincentives in place that
prevent a move in the direction of more transparency
into the true cost of operations. The reasons energy has
not been systemically visible in the decision processes
or incentive structure were logical in the past; energy
was cheap and plentiful, and our operational missions
assumed secure lines of communications making
battlespace fuel delivery less of a burden. But things
are different today.
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The CNA and the DSB reports recommend that
DoD take a series of specific actions that will begin
moving it in the direction of well-informed and
transparent decisions that affect energy security and
have important national implications for national
security and climate security. They can be distilled into
three major themes.
First, we should incorporate climate change into our
national security planning processes. This includes all
levels of planning including our national intelligence
assessments, national security strategy, national
military strategy, quadrennial defense review, strategic
planning guidance, requirements for future combat
systems, and infrastructure investment plans. Scientific
evidence that the climate is changing is unequivocal.
Second, we should put more emphasis on
implementing two key policy memoranda of the past
2 years. One of these was issued by the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It established an energyrelated key performance parameter for the JCIDS
process. The second was issued by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
and established a policy to use the fully burdened
cost of fuel for all acquisition programs. These two
actions, well-implemented with sustained leadership
support, could begin moving DoD toward fielding
systems with greater endurance, better capability
against asymmetrical threats, and based on emerging
technologies that have important commercial
applications and national benefits.
Third is to adopt a business case perspective when
making investments that affect where DoD gets its
energy and how it uses that energy. This applies to
investment in both energy demand and supplies.
Business case analyses are supposed to identify the
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investment opportunities that provide the greatest
value to the entity. Here, the business case should
identify the best value contribution to mitigate DoD’s
energy risks, considering all competing opportunities
for those funds. One of the most fundamental choices
for DoD funds is to invest in new energy supplies or
demand reduction.
Summary.
Climate change, national security, and energy
dependence are a related set of global challenges. Our
energy sources both contribute to climate change and are
at risk from climate change. Our security is threatened
both by our high dependence on foreign sources of oil
and by the climate change that high energy use helps
bring about. To formulate effective climate mitigation
and adaptation strategies, climate change must be a
factor in our national security planning processes. If
we look to unconventional fossil sources that increase
carbon emissions to meet short-term fuel needs, it
will be at the expense of investments in greater use of
renewable sources and efficiency, putting us at greater
long-term risk. DoD’s reliance on high energy intensive
operations compromises our military effectiveness in a
number of ways. It creates operational vulnerabilities,
jeopardizing mission success; and increases casualty
rates, undermining popular support for the mission.
It creates an unbalanced force structure, driving an
unnecessarily large support “tail” at the expense of
our operational “tooth.” In some important ways,
DoD’s energy problem is like the nation’s energy
problem—we use too much. Demand side solutions
to DoD’s high fuel intensity can also help mitigate the
nation’s dependence on foreign oil and reduce future
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climate risks. As DoD deploys more energy efficient
technologies in its combat systems, two important
national benefits will result: Our industries will become
more competitive in a global market that increasingly
values efficiency; and national use of oil will decline
as the technologies find their way into commercial
products. Enacting the changes to DoD processes
needed to achieve these benefits will require determined
and sustained leadership. They require some changes
in the factors DoD uses to make its most fundamental
decisions affecting requirements, acquisition, force
structure and funding priorities. It requires facing the
realities of the true costs associated with high fuel use,
including its drain on our operational effectiveness.
These are factors DoD has not had to consider before,
and is not currently equipped to consider. But the
payoff for both DoD and the nation can be significant.
ENDNOTES - Morehouse
1. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, Alexandria,
VA: CNA Corporation, 2007.
2. Ibid.
3. Evidence that climate is changing is irrefutable, and comes
from such direct observations as the thawing of permafrost; the
lengthening of growing seasons; shifts in plant, insect, and animal
ranges; and earlier flowering of trees. More recent terrestrial
evidence shows that the rate of climate change is accelerating.
Paleo-climate studies show atmospheric carbon is higher than at
anytime in the past 650,000 years.
4. Previous speakers also noted that the climate is changing,
and the concentration of atmospheric carbon is increasing. To
what extent this is due to human input is debated. So too is how
much change there will be, how rapidly these changes will occur,
and where specific effects will take place. Debates include how
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accurate are estimates of how much carbon and climate change can
be attributed to anthropogenic sources, how much total change
there will be in future, how fast it will occur, and the location of
specific effects.
5. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.
6. According to the Hubbert Peak theory, peak oil is the point
or timeframe at which the maximum global petroleum production
rate is reached. After this point, the rate of production will enter
terminal decline along roughly the path of a bell-shaped curve.
7. These figures bear on the discussion earlier in the conference
about equity. How do we come up with an equitable regime for
dealing with carbon emissions and climate change?
8. Defense News, August 2006.
9. More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden,
Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2001.
10. General Paul Kern, Commanding General, Army Materiel
Command, Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Conference, Monterey,
2002, quoted in National Defense, March 2002, p. 37.
11. Some other estimates: “Fuel Costs $13/Gal—Well to
Tank—In Peacetime at Home,” Army Research Lab brief to
Defense Science Board, October 1999; “$25 at FEBA+100 km,”
Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 16; “Hundreds of Dollars [by
air] . . . [600 km] Deep in the Battlespace,” or “At least $40–50 If
Overland,” Defense Science Board, 2001, Executive Summary and
p. 20; “$100–$600 In Theater Depending on ‘Front Line’ to ‘Back
Line’ Separation in Distance, Terrain, Defense, Etc.,” JASON,
Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, 2006, p. 30; “$26 By Inflight
Tanker,” Defense Science Board, 2001.
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Military Technology and Renewable Energy
David A. Sheets
Army Environmental Policy Institute
My name is Dave Sheets, and I am with the Army
Environmental Policy Institute. We are a small policy
group working under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Environmental Safety and Occupational
Health.1 We work for Mr. Tad Davis. Those of you who
are from North Carolina might know him as Colonel
Davis. He was the Garrison Commander at Ft. Bragg
a few years ago and actually started Ft. Bragg on the
road to environmental sustainability. Therefore, he
is pretty well-known in this part of the world. My
purpose today is to focus on military technology and
renewable energy. Time permitting, I will talk a bit
about the Army Energy Program, discuss Army Energy
and Sustainability Strategies, and outline some of the
renewable energy technologies used by the Army.
The Energy Program.
As you know, the Army has an energy management
program in place which aims to eliminate/reduce
energy waste in existing facilities, increase energy
efficiency, and improve energy security. There are
a number of laws and regulations which set the
parameters. Among them, I should mention the Clean
Air Act (CAA) of 1990, which was the first major
climate change program that affected the military. This
banned the production and venting of Class 1 ozone
depleting substances (ODS), created a Department
of Defense (DoD) reserve, and allowed DoD use for
Mission Critical Requirements (Crew Protection,
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Fire Suppression, Tactical Vehicle A/C). A more
recent document is EO 123423, “Strengthening Federal
Environmental, Energy and Transportation Management,”
January 2007.2 This calls for, among other things, a 30
percent energy efficiency goal for federal agencies in 10
years, (50 percent more stringent than the Energy Policy
Act [EPACT] 05). It also states that at least 50 percent
of current renewable energy purchases must come
from new renewable sources (in service after January
1, 1999); and it requires an increase of alternative fuels
by at least 10 percent annually.
The Army does still have ODS in its legacy systems
but has also met with some successes. Starting in base
year 1992, it eliminated 80 percent of Halon 1301 use in
Legacy systems, 9 percent of ODS solvents in industrial
operations, and 98 percent of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)
use on Army installations.
We all know that the DoD is the largest single user
in terms of U.S. energy consumption, but you may not
necessarily know the details. In 2005, DoD spent $10.8
billion on fuel and consumed approximately 100M
barrels of oil. That represents only 1.4 percent of U.S.
use—Americans as a whole used about 2 million barrels
per day that year—that is, 720 million barrels a year.
Within the DoD, moreover, the Army is not the leader
in regards to energy usage—it is the Air Force. In fiscal
year 2005, the Air Force consumed 54 percent of the
fuel, the Army 12 percent, and the Navy 33 percent.
What are the energy needs? Well, the Air Force flies
a lot of jets and uses a lot of jet fuel. That is why they
consume so much oil. What the Army does have is the
largest number of utilities—35 percent of DoD utilities,
as compared to 34 percent for the Air Force and 27
percent for the Navy. That is because, as you will see,
we have a really large number of military installations,
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both within the United States and overseas. The Army
Universe is big: We own 770 million square feet of
buildings; we have 37,000 family housing units; we
house 136,000 soldiers; and we own 13 million acres of
land. We have about a million soldiers, which includes
active duty, National Guard, and Reserves. The Army
also has 209,000 civilians and 712,000 family members.
In short, we have about 2 million people in the Army
“family.” That gives you some sense of who we are
and where we are. Because of that, we do use a lot of
energy. The energy used on installations is primarily
not from oil, but rather from coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, and/or nuclear power.
Army Energy and Sustainability Strategies.
Now, what have we been doing to lean forward
in the foxhole a little bit? There is the Army Strategy
for the Environment which came out in 2004, and the
Energy Strategy for Installations which came out in
July 2005. There is also a new document that came from
the Association of the United States Army (AUSA).
Their February 2007 Torchbearer Report discusses Army
Sustainability.
In regards to the Army Strategy for the Environment,
I would like to stress that sustainability is the term
that we use to tie us to the energy program. For many
of you, it may be clear that the Army Environmental
Program and the Energy Program should be joined at
the hip. That is not necessarily the case. Environmental
people used to be focused on compliance, restoration,
and bugs and bunnies, not to mention the red cockaded
woodpecker. (A few Ft. Bragg people know that
woodpecker pretty well.) We didn’t really have much
input into the Army Energy Program, which was run
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through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management energy people.
Now, since the strategies are the “what we need to
do,” what about the “how will we do it?” For each of
these documents, there is a strategic plan. The Army
Energy and Water Campaign Plan for Installations
came out last year. The Environmental Strategic Plan for
implementing sustainability may be out this summer.
The goal of The Army Strategy for the Environment is
to foster a sustainability effort. Our triple bottom line
is: mission, environment, and community. We have
also added the economy, because we are looking
to find ways to protect the environment that make
economic sense. Sometimes when you take care of the
environmental piece, you actually add value to the
mission or the community, either by lowering costs,
improving performance or adding some other benefits.
One of the reasons we started with a green chemistry
initiative is because we are looking for those win/win
scenarios where we can actually lower waste and then
make better quality products, while improving the
environment.
What are the initiatives called for in The Army Energy
Strategy for Installations? There are five plans outlined
in this document:
1. To eliminate waste in existing facilities. With
770 million square feet of buildings, that is not an easy
task.
2. To increase energy efficiency in renovation and
new construction.
3. To reduce dependence on fossil fuels.
4. To conserve water resources.
5. To improve energy security.
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Maybe you’ve heard of the Green Building Council’s
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) standards? There are silver, gold, and platinum
certification levels. The Army is going for silver
certification in all buildings beginning in 2008 and to
do that, we will be reducing dependence on fossil fuels,
conserving water resources, and improving energy
security.
One of the big issues with the Army, at least where
waste and efficiency are concerned, is accountability.
This is a rather important issue, which I do not believe
came up in yesterday’s discussions. A lot of times
the person working the light switch, constructing the
building, or designing the vehicle does not pay the
fuel bill once the structure is designed or built. That
has been a problem for us, especially when we try to
get that extra insulation put in the buildings, or to get
people who do not pay for the utilities in their quarters
to turn off light switches. That is something the Army
is working on, and it is pretty straight forward. We
should be designing green buildings, we should
pay the extra couple of percent to get energy secure
buildings. The issue is that often the people designing
those buildings do not live with those buildings, so
no emphasis is placed on doing those extra things to
ensure efficiency and prevent waste.
Energy Technologies.
Now I am going to talk about some of these energy
technologies. Of course, each of these topics deserves
much more extensive treatment, but in the interests of
time, I can only cover them briefly. Because many of
you here are not Army people, I will start by telling
you where we are located. The Army is located across
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the country, but we are not everywhere. The Army has
a real presence in the Southeast and up the east coast.
We are also across the Southwest and up in the lower
Midwest. We really don’t have a presence up in the
Northwest except for Ft. Lewis, which is near Seattle,
Washington.
Solar Power. First, I want to talk about solar
technology. It has great potential for both a garrison
and field environment. It is secure and reliable. It is
also flexible to a wide range of loads. You can use solar
batteries in your watch. At the same time, there is a
15 megawatt solar system being designed at Nellis Air
Force Base on a 120 acre site near Las Vegas, Nevada.
Solar systems are environmentally sustainable. There
is no waste. You can connect with a grid. You can
actually use solar panels in a place like Yuma Proving
Ground, Arizona, where you may be 100 miles from a
source of energy and be self-sustainable. If you hook
them up to a wind unit, which works better at night,
you can work the lights at all times.
Anywhere in the United States can benefit from
solar power, even typically cloudy, rainy environments
such as Ft. Lewis. For example, Germany has more
solar panels than the United States, and their latitude is
about even with Canada, so they get less sun intensity.
Therefore, there is no real reason for us not to be able
to do more.
This technology is being used by the Army. At
Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, 5,000 homes will be
powered by the sun. Instead of using the expensive
crystalline solar panels, they will use the less efficient,
but cheaper amorphous kind. They are going to roll
these solar panels down the roofs. And they are going
to generate about six megawatts of solar energy.
Solar power is also being used in the field. A portable
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container sized unit, which has a little wind turbo, is
on display up in Arlington, Virginia. It can be taken
to the field to provide power to a small headquarters.
The Army also has solar panels on tents, portable solar
rucksacks that can be opened and laid flat to collect
solar energy, and hand-portable battery chargers. These
are really effective. The New Jersey National Guard is
already using a 10 KW system on a roof. Therefore, the
Army is making some good use of solar power.
Wind Power. Unfortunately, a lot of the big U.S.
sources of wind power are out in the west, which only
helps Ft. Lewis, Ft. Carson, Colorado, and a few other
major bases. In the sand hills area of North Carolina
and down into Texas and Louisiana, wind currently
does not have much potential. However, as wind mills
become more efficient, wind farms in even these lower
speed areas might be economically feasible.
A recent report to Congress said that windmill farms
hamper military readiness. It said that they affect radar
and thus impede air defenses and possibly hamper
training. Do not ask me to completely justify this.
Though I am not an expert in any of these areas, I will
say that we have some 13 million acres of land; there
has to be room for some windmill farms somewhere in
the western part of the country.3
Now, where can the Army use wind? The Army is
looking to find ways to reduce the need for fuel on the
battlefield. For example, the Rapid Equipping Force
uses a trailer mounted wind unit. A National Guard
unit based in Utah has a large wind turbine for power
generation. The Army is looking into a way to combine
solar panels and wind turbines. The solar panels
provide energy during the day; and at night, when the
wind works better, you use the wind.

308

Waste Energy. There is real potential in waste-toenergy systems for the Army. The Army can use waste
energy, especially in both the field environment and
in disaster relief. In the field, what are our wastes?
Anybody that has ever seen soldiers in the battlefield
knows the answer. There are piles of wood pallets
and empty plastic water bottles that can be burned
and used for energy. Almost 79 percent of the waste
in the field has recoverable energy content. You can
turn waste into electricity, heat, fuels, hydrogen,
methane, and JP-8. There is a zero footprint base camp
being developed where they try to recycle or reuse
everything, and that includes waste water. Disasters
also provide opportunities. If a hurricane knocks
down trees, you typically burn them in a big bonfire,
or you landfill them. That is energy that can be used in
a waste-to-energy generator for possibly hooking up
a small power grid and reestablishing electricity. This
technology, too, is being pursued. We are working on
a 50 kilowatt biomass generator, for example, in El
Salvador.
Geo-Thermal Energy. There are two kinds of
geo-thermal technologies, one where you get energy
from the ground—highly usable—with thermal heat
pumps, and these can be used anywhere. For example,
Ft. Polk, LA, is now the world’s largest geo-thermal
installation—4,000 homes have been retrofitted there.
The same thing could be done in lots of places.
Alternative Fuels and Fuel Cells. We are required,
under law, to convert to 85 percent Ethanol blend (E-85)
vehicles and 20 percent biodiesel (B-20) vehicles in our
nontactical fleet. We are doing fairly well with this—48
percent of our light duty vehicles can use alternative
fuels. So far, 12 installations have alternate fuel capacity.
We have 23,000 vehicles, so the Army has, in fact, done
a lot to get these alternate fuel vehicles. We also have
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a full range of fuel cell initiatives, from battery size to
these generator-size tactical units. There are also fuel
cell units for housing. Several units have been tested at
Watervliet Arsenal in New York. The Army even has
a fuel cell Segway that they are testing. Fuel cells have
problems, however, especially in the battlefield. First,
the platinum in a vehicle fuel cell costs about $3,000.
You have to get the cost of platinum down—this is just
too expensive. Second, the sulfur in JP-8 makes them
ineffective by contaminating the platinum. Unless we
bring methane to the battlefield, or find a way to use
fuel cells that can handle the sulfur, fuel cells are going
to be hard to use in the field.
The Army as a Leader.
One of the questions I was asked to address in my
talk was whether the Army could or should be a leader
in the effort to find a more sustainable future, and if
so, how can the Army lead? One way it can do so is
to develop new technologies and really use them. This
is what we are doing. We have an extensive program
working with fuel cells, batteries, and other new
materials. I myself look at nanotechnologies. The Army
Corps of Engineers is working on nano-enhanced mortar for buildings, which is pretty impressive. We are also
looking at quantum dots and other materials. These, as
you may have heard, are semi-conductors which can
be used for increasing solar panels’ efficiency.
Another thing the Army can do is to create a
market for high efficiency devices. We have almost a
billion square feet of buildings in the Army, if you add
the overseas locations. We are engaged in sustainable
installation efforts.4 We can lead in developing heating
and cooling initiatives that ensure high efficiency.
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We are required under the new laws to use Energy
Star certified equipment. Energy Star devices are
only certified if they are within the top 25 percent for
energy efficiency. Another way to reduce energy use
is by using light emitting diode (LED) lights and the
compact fluorescent lights (CFLs). Somebody yesterday
asked what would happen if we switched to compact
fluorescent lights? I have them in my house. You can
get about six or eight 60 watt equivalent bulbs for about
$10. Therefore, they are not that expensive, and they
save you a lot of energy. Some of the naysayers right
now say that there are problems with the mercury in
CFLs, though the Environmental Protection Agency
and Department of Energy dismiss this since the energy
savings outweighs the mercury issue. My advice is to
go out and buy the CFLs. If we take both individual
and group conservation measures, we can do a lot of
good, especially if this is done across the two million
soldiers, civilians, and family members.
ENDNOTES - Sheets
1. For more about the Army Environmental Policy Institute,
see www.aepi.army.mil.
2. Implementation Instructions were still in draft as of March
2007.
3. We should realize that even if we do get the farms, it won’t
help the Army much because this isn’t where our footprint is.
4. See the Army Sustainability Program and the Army Energy
Program.
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Warfare and Climate Change
Karen Lesley Hulme
University of Essex, United Kingdom
Introduction.
At the strategic level, U.S. Field Manual (FM)
3-100.4 concerns environmental stewardship. The
majority of the document details the ways in which the
Army and Marine Corps must include environmental
considerations in their military training, as well as in
risk assessment and risk management. By contrast, it
devotes a mere five pages to the rules governing combat
operations. In this law of war section, at paragraph 4.3,
the manual notes that “the public has been remarkably
consistent in the last 25 years in its concern for global
and local environmental degradation” and that
“public” and “public pressure”/“public perception”
have been an important factor in warfare. The manual
continues, “Application of environmental protection
in a given contingency will almost certainly differ from
its application in the midst of close combat during a
war.”1
The manual contains an illustrative bell curve
which demonstrates the level of environmental
consideration appropriate to the various roles of
the military—notably training, peacekeeping, and
combat. At the top is training—where the level of
environmental consideration is at its peak, and at
the lowest point (the lowest level of environmental
consideration) are combat operations. During armed
conflict, environmental protection is never the priority.
It is one of the lowest priorities. However, that does
not mean that it is completely absent. The laws of war
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have addressed environmental protection since the
1970s, and, although the laws do not refer directly
to climate considerations or climate change, there is
much valuable mileage in the existing environmental
considerations in wartime.
The topic of warfare and climate change raises a
number of questions:
• Armed conflict is inherently destructive of the
environment, but how destructive is it?
• Are there any legal limits on the type or scale
of environmental damage that the armed forces
are allowed to cause during armed conflict?
• When it comes to the issue of environmental
protection, do the laws of war coincide with
climate change abatement strategies? And what,
practically, can the armed forces do in war to
reduce their carbon footprint?
To answer these questions, this section will analyze
the laws that afford protection to the environment in
peacetime—in those times outside combat. The phrase
“peacetime” here refers to international environmental
laws. The central question is whether these peacetime
laws continue to apply during armed conflict? I will
then go on to analyze the laws of armed conflict which
specifically apply during combat operations.
Peacetime Environmental Laws (Jus Pacis).
In 1979 states recognized the need for global treaty
rules to address the pollution of the atmosphere.
Although states had adopted a number of international
treaties in the 19th and the early part of the 20th
centuries, it was in 1972 that international law truly
embraced environmental protection more broadly.2
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In 1972 states met in Stockholm under the auspices of
the United Nations (UN) for the UN Conference on the
Human Environment. At Stockholm, states adopted
a set of principles in the form of a Declaration,3
essentially a nonbinding instrument which would lay
the foundations for environmental protection for the
future. According to Principle 2, “the natural resources
of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and
fauna and especially representative samples of natural
ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit
of present and future generations through careful
planning or management, as appropriate” (emphasis
added).
The Stockholm Declaration introduced the notion
of safeguarding such natural resources as the air, for
the benefit of mankind—including future generations.
Then in 1979 states agreed to the first global measure to
tackle the problem of air pollution with the Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.4
This treaty was drafted to tackle the transboundary
problem of acid rain, caused by industrial and
vehicular emissions of sulphur dioxide. States agreed
to limit their emissions of sulphur dioxide,5 and in later
Protocols nitrogen oxides,6 volatile organic compounds
(VOCs),7 heavy metals,8 and ammonia.9 The next treaty
governing atmospheric pollution was the 1985 Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,10
which established emissions limits on CFCs and other
ozone-depleting compounds.
To tackle the issue of global warming, states
adopted the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,11 and the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol,12 the latter of which introduces timetabled
emission reductions of greenhouse gases for party
states including carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous
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oxides.13 The United States has so far refused to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, while the United States
is bound by the more vague 1992 treaty obligations to
limit emissions and adopt policies to mitigate climate
change, it is not bound by the specific timetabled
reductions established in the Kyoto Protocol.
The essential question is whether these rules of
peacetime (jus pacis) environmental protection continue
to apply in situations of armed conflict. According to
state practice, the answer for two or more belligerent
states inter se is “probably not.” The issue generally
comes down to the compatibility of the environmental
obligations with a situation of armed conflict. And so
peacetime environmental obligations contained within
a specific treaty may continue to apply only so far as
those obligations are compatible with the situation of
armed conflict. As a result, obligations to reduce certain
harmful emissions might be deemed to be generally
incompatible with a situation of armed conflict.
Consequently, such incompatible obligations would no
longer be applicable (to the extent of the incompatibility)
during conflict between belligerent states inter se. A
belligerent state that is party to Kyoto, however, still
has to achieve its emissions limits at home. However,
it is not obliged to adhere to these requirements on
the battlefield. Environmental obligations between a
belligerent state and nonbelligerent state, on the other
hand, do generally continue to apply, as the situation
is akin to that of “peacetime.”
The Laws of Armed Conflict (Jus in Bello).
The laws can be arranged into two categories: laws
providing ancillary environmental protection; and
laws designed to protect the environment.
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Laws Providing Ancillary Environmental Protection. Since 1977, the laws of war or humanitarian
law have afforded protection to the natural environment.14 Generally, this body of rules establishes what
the military forces can and cannot do in situations of
armed conflict. Primarily, therefore, the laws of war
establish rules for lawful weapons and targeting.
At the core of humanitarian law is the principle that
means and methods of warfare are not unlimited.15
This means essentially that the military can only use
lawful weapons and tactics. When it comes to the
environment, of course, it will generally benefit from
the prohibition of most types of weapons, such as
chemical weapons, land mines, herbicides, and other
biological weapons.
Secondly, the law establishes the principle of
distinction; 16 this is the principle that the military can
only target military objectives, not political or economic
objectives, although some states do include economic
targets within a broader definition of military objectives.
As regards the environment, it is prima facie a civilian
object, and so it cannot be subject to attack. However,
the environment may be attacked where it fulfills
the requirements of a “military objective,”17 such as
when the enemy uses forest or plants as concealment,
as in Vietnam. So although not primarily a “military
objective,” the enemy’s military use of it changes its
status into a military objective.
The third principle is that of proportionality,18
which concerns the notion that when attacking military
objectives, any damage caused to civilians and civilian
objects cannot be excessive to the military advantage
anticipated to be gained from the attack. This is usually
termed collateral damage. Since the environment is
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prima facie a civilian object, any collateral damage
caused to the environment must be included in the
quantification of collateral harm and so cannot be
excessive. However, it is very difficult to measure the
two parts in the balance, and the level of collateral
environmental damage that can be caused before a
particular attack would be deemed disproportionate is
probably quite high.
The fourth principle is that of military necessity,
and leads to the fundamental prohibition on the
wanton destruction of property,19 that is, destruction
without a military purpose. This prohibition clearly
benefits the environment, since the military cannot
wantonly destroy the environment. Finally, since
a broad interpretation of the environment might
include crops and agriculture, Article 54 of Protocol
I specifically prohibits the attack or destruction of
“objects indispensable to the civilian population,”
which includes foodstuffs.
In summary, the fundamental principles of the laws
of armed conflict stipulate:
• Means of warfare are not unlimited—use only
lawful weapons/tactics.
• Distinction—Military vs. civilian—only military
objectives may be attacked.
• Proportionality—attack of military objectives
must not cause excessive collateral (civilian)
harm.
• Military Necessity—prohibition on wanton
destruction of property (i.e., without military
purpose).
Article 54 of Protocol I stipulates (in part):
Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population:
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1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is
prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or
render useless objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural
areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the
adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for
any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply
to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an
adverse Party:
		
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its
armed forces; or
		
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support
of military action, provided, however, that in no event
shall actions against these objects be taken which may
be expected to leave the civilian population with such
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or
force its movement.

Laws Designed to Protect the Environment. How
do the laws of armed conflict protect the environment?
Environmental protection in wartime was adopted
following U.S. tactics in Vietnam. The United States
caused the destruction of three-quarters of a million
acres of land in Vietnam with the use of Rome plows,
and wide scale damage to crops and mangrove
with the use of herbicides. So in 1977, with global
environmental awareness heightened by the 1972
Stockholm Declaration and U.S. tactics in Vietnam,
states adopted Additional Protocol I to the four
1949 Geneva Conventions. And with the adoption
of Protocol I, states included in the laws of armed
conflict two provisions which specifically applied to
the environment. The first provision was Article 35(3)
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which stipulates, “It is prohibited to employ methods
or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment.”
The second provision is Article 55 which builds
upon this provision in three important ways: (1) the
addition of an obligation of “care,” (2) the linking
of the prohibition specifically to human harm, and
(3) a prohibition on reprisals against the natural
environment. It is the first of these three aspects which
may best improve environmental protection during
armed conflict—the general obligation on states to take
care to protect the environment against widespread,
long-term, and severe damage. Therefore, Protocol I
includes a specific prohibition on the use of weapons
and tactics (“means and methods of warfare”) which
may forseeably cause a serious level of environmental
damage. The element of foreseeability dictates that
states have to stop and ponder the possibility that a
particular weapon or tactic might breach the threshold
of harm. Finally, as regards the development of new
weapons, states must ensure that their effects will
conform to the rules and principles of humanitarian
law binding on that state. This obligation is enshrined in
Article 36 of Protocol I and derives from U.S. practice.
The two provisions, Articles 35(3) and 55, are
drafted so as to protect the natural environment
against harm—the threshold of which is actually set
very high (widespread, long-term, and severe). Yet the
protections have an anthropocentric basis—the idea
that any environmental damage will have knock-on
effects on people.
In 1977 the United States and Russia also adopted
a second treaty concerning tactics of warfare which
might have environmental effects, the United Nations
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Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD).20 It was adopted in New York
and currently boasts some 72 party states, including
the two main negotiating states, Russia and the United
States, and China since 2005. ENMOD came about as a
result of the global fear evoked by U.S. cloud seeding
techniques in Vietnam, tactics which appear to have
been in design since the 1940s; and the panic caused by
scenarios that appear more at home in science fiction
novels than international law treaties. Cloud seeding
with lead or silver iodide was attempted by the United
States in Vietnam to flood the Ho Chi Minh trail, with
the hope of cutting off the supply route from North
Vietnam down to the South.
The Convention establishes a prohibition on military
or any hostile use of ENMOD techniques which cause
destruction or injury to the enemy. Accordingly,
Article I of the Convention stipulates, “Each State
Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage
in military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques having widespread, longlasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage, or injury to any other State Party.” Thus
what is prohibited is the use of such “environmental
modification techniques” (EMT)—manipulating the
environment in some way—to cause harm to another
party state, for example the creation of a tidal wave
to destroy enemy fortifications in another party state,
or the use of herbicides to upset the ecological balance
and cause harm to human health.21 The Convention
defines “environmental modification techniques” at
Article II as “Any technique for changing—through
the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—
the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth,
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including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and
atmosphere, or of outer space” (emphasis added).
And finally, it is a war crime to intentionally launch an
attack in the knowledge that such an attack will cause
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the
environment, which is also “clearly excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated.”22 Unlike the prohibition in Protocol I,
for individual criminal liability, the environmental
damage has to be intentional.
Applying the Laws of Armed Conflict.
How does climate change affect the military on the
battlefield? The issue under consideration is whether
the protection of the environment (and climate change)
creates obstacles for the military or opportunities.
The Military’s Carbon Footprint in War. The first
issue is the military’s carbon footprint in war. One
of the greatest contributors to climate change is the
burning of fossil fuels. Other papers have outlined the
measures that the U.S. military is taking to reduce the
military’s impact on climate change as it installs wind
and solar power on its bases and training facilities,
and experiments with the use of bio-fuels. It is these
kinds of activities which will lead to a reduction in the
emissions levels of greenhouse gases by the military,
because there is absolutely no way that a military
commander would ground his troops for the day
because he thinks his carbon footprint is too high.
Bombs and other explosive weapons produce
carbon dioxide emissions on detonation, and the bigger
the bomb, generally the bigger the carbon footprint.
Do the laws of war address this issue at all? Yes, to
some degree, they do. The principle of economy of
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force is relevant. This principle is a pragmatic one and
essentially means “why waste money and resources
using 10 bombs when one will do the job,” or “why
waste money and resources using a larger bomb when
a smaller one will do the job.” Also pertinent is the
principle of proportionality which is concerned with
reducing nonmilitary (or civilian) harm. Since a bigger
bomb is more likely to inflict excessive harm on the
civilian population than a smaller bomb, this principle
also encourages the use of smaller bombs. As weapons
are destructive of the environment, bombs should
logically, perhaps, be phased out. However, can this be
done? In fact, the law forbids the use and development
of weapons that do not comply with the laws of wars
but goes no further. Unless and until more specific
rules are drafted which outlaw those weapons, they
will remain legal. More to the point, though, the armed
forces will not give up weapons that are lawful, if they
are also valuable.
Furthermore, if the armed forces were forced to give
up carbon emitting bombs, this would actually lead
to a more controversial issue, in that this would then
suggest greater use of noncarbon-emitting weapons
such as depleted uranium. This would be very similar
to peacetime arguments in favor of the use of nuclear
power instead of fossil fuel.
A third issue in this category is the targeting
of installations that emit greenhouse gases. Some
installations, when bombed or damaged, might release
dangerous gases or leak dangerous chemicals—
including greenhouse gases. Do the laws of war
prohibit the military from targeting such installations?
If one starts with basic principles of the laws of war,
the answer is that many such facilities will not fulfill
the definition of a military objective. If an object cannot
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be classified as a military objective, then it cannot be
attacked. While factories producing goods used by
the military—and oil refineries, for example, have
been classified as military objectives—U.S. policies
during the 1991 Gulf Conflict are slightly promising
regarding environmental protection. Probably the
most memorable image of the Gulf Conflict is the 590
burning oil wells in Kuwait, destroyed and set alight
by Iraqi troops.
In the opinion of the United States, these acts
were contrary to the laws of armed conflict due to the
wanton and unnecessary nature of their destruction.23
While this opinion may have been due in part to the
U.S. appreciation of the environmentally-destructive
nature of the burning wells, the greater consideration
undoubtedly came down to the lack of military utility of
the destruction. This assessment was clearly influenced
by the fact that the United States was being supplied
with oil by Saudi Arabia. That meant that the Iraqis
could not argue that they destroyed the oil fields in
order to deny them to the U.S. forces—in other words,
out of military necessity. A positive aspect, therefore,
from the environmental perspective (and climate
change in particular) is that the United States made
a targeting distinction during the Gulf Conflict not to
target crude oil installations. While U.S. forces were
willing to target oil refineries which would produce
a finished, usable product (petrol), they decided not
to target the long-term mining of crude oil, and so,
in effect, crude oil installations did not then routinely
form military objectives.24
Targeting Carbon Sinks. The rainforests and other
forested areas around the world provide a valuable
sink for carbon dioxide emissions, and the possibility
of the sequestration of carbon emissions in these sinks
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can counterbalance the high level of greenhouse gases
in the environment. Would a state’s armed forces,
therefore, be able to destroy carbon sinks, such as
forests or other kinds of plant cover, legitimately?
Furthermore, would a state’s armed forces be able to
legitimately destroy agriculture, so as to increase or
hasten the release of methane into the atmosphere and
carbon dioxide into the soil? The laws of war already
prohibit the targeting of anything that does not have a
military advantage. And so the principle of distinction
would, first and foremost, prevent the direct targeting
of forests and crops, for example, that did not serve a
military purpose. In modern international warfare, it is
rare for a state to adopt tactics of crop destruction so as
to deny sustenance for the enemy. Any attack on crops
is more than likely to be a result of use by the enemy of
the crops as cover or concealment, which would bring
the crops within the definition of military objective and
hence open for attack. If sustenance were the issue, of
course, the military would need to refer to Article 54
of Protocol I which specifically outlines the additional
steps in the procedure for such objects to be attacked.
In addition, if the forest were to fulfill the definition
of a military objective, the environmental protection
included within Article 35(3) would remain applicable
to ratifying states, and provides an absolute threshold
of harm which could be caused to the environment.
The general view in international law of this provision,
however, is that the threshold, albeit absolute, is also set
very high and is possibly too high to have any impact
on conventional warfare (that is outside the realms
of nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare). One of
the most important ways, however, of influencing the
military on this point, might be to encourage it to view
any attack on a carbon sink (for example the destruction
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of a forest), even if militarily necessary, as causing
severe environmental damage. Hence if the destruction
of a carbon sink comes to be viewed routinely as falling
within the threshold of “severe” harm, the military may
be more inclined to avoid such tactics. In effect, greater
protection of carbon sinks could be a question of the
interpretation of an existing threshold, as opposed to
the negotiation of a new instrument.
Climate Change as a Weapon of War.
Finally, the question was raised as to the whether
climate change, or the effects or causes of climate change,
can be used as a weapon of war. If and when climate
change raises the sea level, can the armed forces attack
sea defenses with a view to flooding their enemy and
killing their enemy in that way? Such tactics have been
used throughout history. Such tactics were recently
used by China in the second Sino-Japanese war, when
China dynamited one of the dikes of the Yellow River
in order to prevent the onslaught of Japanese troops.
In using this tactic, the Chinese killed thousands of
enemy troops but also killed hundreds of thousands of
their own people in the process.25 Today, such tactics
are prohibited by Article 56 of Protocol I, but only to
the extent that the resulting floods would cause severe
(and excessive) civilian losses.
Article 56 of Protocol I stipulates (in part);
Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces:
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even
where these objects are military objectives, if such attack
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may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these
works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
forces from the works or installations and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population.
2. The special protection against attack provided by
paragraph 1 shall cease:
		
(a) for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other
than its normal function and in regular, significant, and
direct support of military operations, and if such attack
is the only feasible way to terminate such support . . .
3. In all cases, the civilian population and individual
civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law, including the protection of
the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57.
If the protection ceases and any of the works, installations, or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 is
attacked, all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid
the release of the dangerous forces.

Beyond specific protections such as this, can
the armed forces try to accelerate or induce climate
change? In other words, would it be legitimate for the
military to use the effects of climate change as a tool
or weapon so as to destroy the enemy? For example,
can the military deliberately try to melt the polar ice
cap, cause flooding of enemy territory, cause drought
or induce famine, create a hole or a “window” in
the ozone layer above enemy territory to burn the
enemy—as legitimate weapons of warfare? Such tactics
may sound like science fiction, but these issues were
particularly prevalent in the 1970s following the use
of cloud-seeding (rain-making) tactics by U.S. forces in
the Vietnam conflict.
During Operation POPEYE in Vietnam, the United
States used cloud seeding techniques to induce rainfall
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and so flood the Ho-Chi-Minh Trail. Apparently, there
were some 2,600 flights involving some 47,000 units
of cloud-seeding material. And such flights appear
to have occurred outside Vietnam in Cambodia and
Laos in breach of international law. In addition to
trials in wartime situations, many countries have
tried weather modification techniques for peacetime
uses, too. However, military or hostile uses of such
weather modifications have been prohibited in the
1977 ENMOD.26
The ENMOD Convention stipulates:
Article II
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not
to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread,
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party.
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not
to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States
or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.
Article II
As used in Article I, the term “environmental modification techniques” refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural
processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of
the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere,
and atmosphere, or of outer space.
Article III
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder
the use of environmental modification techniques for
peaceful purposes and shall be without prejudice to the
generally recognized principles and applicable rules of
international law concerning such use.
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The Convention does not prevent peacetime uses
and the peacetime development of such environmental
modification techniques (see Article III). And so a
number of states have developed weather modification
programs, including the dispersal of rain from
clouds already formed, the creation of rain using
chemicals drawing water up from lakes (precipitation
enhancement), the creation or dispersal of fog, and the
creation of storms, possibly including lightning. Clearly,
successful peacetime uses would lead to suggestions
of wartime application. So, would states abandon the
ENMOD Convention if such weapons became viable?
This is a difficult question to answer, but if the ENMOD
Convention were abandoned, it could open the door to
some very deadly new weapons, and ones that would
appear to fly in the face of a responsible approach to
climate change. Wartime applications could include
the creation of both rain or storms to enhance the
abilities of a military’s own forces and friendly forces,
and to degrade the abilities of the opposing forces. A
good example of such military applications would be
the creation of rain on demand, so as to flood enemy
territory and hinder its operations, or to burst rain
clouds earlier so as to keep areas dry for its own
forces—and hence enhance its own environmental
conditions.
The ENMOD Convention only prohibits environmental modification techniques which have effects
above a particular threshold, and while the threshold
of harm is relatively low, it is not an absolute
prohibition even in wartime on weather modification
techniques. The threshold incorporated into the
ENMOD convention is “widespread, long-lasting, or
severe” effects. Thus only environmental modification
techniques with widespread, long-lasting, or severe
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effects—that cause destruction, damage, or injury to the
enemy—will fall within the scope of the Convention. In
an Understanding attached to the 1977 Convention, the
three terms were understood to mean: “widespread—
an area of several hundred square kilometres”; “longlasting—several months or more, or approximately a
season”; and “severe—severe or significant disruption
or harm to human life, natural or economic resources,
or other assets.”27 As opposed to the cumulative
threshold of harm contained in Article 35(3) of Protocol
I, the three criteria in ENMOD are disjunctive: only
one of which need be fulfilled to constitute a breach
of the Convention. Thus a small-scale precipitation
enhancement operation may be lawful. Furthermore,
a reading of the Convention appears to allow the
use of such environmental modification techniques
in defense, where the enemy (any other state party)
will not be affected by damage or injury, for example,
where the defending state creates drier conditions to
enable its forces to maneuver or attack.
Conclusion.
The purpose of this section was to consider the
impact of the military on the environment and the
environment on the military. It was also to consider
what could be done to reduce the military’s carbon
footprint. From a wartime perspective, are the armed
forces hampered by environmental restrictions? The
military is undoubtedly a massive polluter, particularly
when it comes to the emission of greenhouse gases,
and the current legal restrictions have little impact
on these sources of pollution. More is likely to be
achieved by the adoption of clean technology by the
military than in pushing for regulation of fossil fuel
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emissions in wartime. As regards targeting, on this
point the surprising conclusion is that climate change
mitigation and the laws of armed conflict coincide to a
greater extent than would be first thought. While the
environment is an unfortunate victim of war, it should
rarely be a direct target, and regulations adopted in
the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict may serve to rule
out many exploitative uses of an environment affected
by climate change (including all of the new rules in
Protocol I and ENMOD).
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Commentator
Christopher H. Schroeder
Duke University
Just on the last point about the contribution of
the military to this problem, the figures I have from
a United Nations (UN) report are that global military
operations in 2003 contributed about 5 percent of
global greenhouse gasses. That is about the size of
Japan, which is the fifth largest national contributor.
So you can look at global military operations as about
the equivalent of Japan.
You have just heard three very interesting papers
on addressing the question, “Dealing with Climate
Change: Opportunities or Obstacles for the Military?”
I think you could just as well flip the question and ask,
“Dealing with the Military: Opportunities or Obstacles
for Climate Change?” The papers would read just as
well because we have been answering both the question
of “To what degree is the military going forward and
contributing to the problem of climate change?” and
“How might we do something about it? How might
we turn that relationship around?”
This panel was framed around the question of
whether or not climate change posed obstacles for the
military or presented it with an opportunity. Of course,
as Doug anticipated, the answer to that either/or
question is, “Yes” and “Yes.” It is both of those things.
And it is interesting to think a little bit about what
variable affects the flow of that relationship—what
variable makes it a positive or a negative relationship
between the two. I think one dimension is the time
horizon. The more short-term you think about this
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problem, the more the military and climate change are
in conflict; and the more long-term your thinking is,
the more there are opportunities for the military, in
fact, to become part of the solution.
The short-term was illustrated by Karen’s talk.
The shortest-term thinking in the military, and for the
country, in thinking about the use of the military, is
when we are in a conflict. That gets your attention.
There is nothing more arresting than feeling the country
is at risk, as we experienced after September 11, 2001
(9/11). And, of course, what really affected attitudes
after 9/11 wasn’t the tragedy itself. It was worrying
about that second attack. And the military mobilized.
We invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq.
As Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said in one of his
press conferences, “You go to war with the Army that
you have.” So we will go to war with the Army that
we have, and climate change be damned. You are
not going to get the military to change the way they
conduct operations in time of hostility just because you
are worried about climate change. You can, however,
structure your procurement, plan, and modify your
logistical thinking in anticipation of that event. And I
think the two other presentations brought that point
out very well.
I have taught environmental law since before there
was such a subject. At one time, I could have summed
up the relationship between the armed services and
environmental law by saying that the military has
never seen an environmental control or regulation for
which it would not wish to have an exemption. You
saw that in the very early days of the Clean Air Act and
the Superfund, the Clean Water Act, and so on.
Greenhouse gas is no exception. We sent our
negotiating team in 1997 to Kyoto, Japan, with
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instructions to negotiate a national security exemption
from whatever caps we ended up agreeing to. Of course,
we did not agree to any, and the convention did adopt
a much narrower exemption for armed conflict that
has UN approval, but that wasn’t what the military
was seeking. It was actually seeking a national security
exemption, and it has sought that in other situations
as well. The military often asserts that anything that
affects preparedness is a national security concern. So
if you impose any kind of environmental constraint
on me (ie., the military) that may limit the degree of
flexibility that I have to structure my training, my
personnel activities, my procurement, or whatever else
it might be, there ought to be an exemption from that
as well.
This is often the initial reaction. However, as these
presentations illustrated with respect to the greenhouse
gas problem, over time attitudes can shift. The external
concern becomes internalized in the organization, and
then you begin to see convergence between the civilian
priorities and military priorities on environmental
issues.
There is an interim period that follows the period
when the military is in its resistant mode, but before
it has internalized a problem. During this phase, the
military still has to deal with a lot of issues. A lot of
these have to do with base closings and the problems
of hazardous waste around military sites. But I hazard
to say that the military is coping with those problems
as they build new installations, and that they are more
responsible now than they used to be about what kind
of footprints they leave.
The two talks by David and Tom give us some kind
of advanced insight into current thinking within the
defense establishment. There appears to be a realization
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that the military is uniquely situated in some ways to
do things which might help solve the greenhouse gas
problem. We have reason to be hopeful here, because
it is, to a certain degree, in the military’s self-interest to
think about such problems. As was noted, our troops
in Iraq want to reduce the number of convoys that have
to travel just to bring petroleum products into forward
installations.
An article in The Wall Street Journal written at the
start of this year reinforces this point. The authors
wrote, “The Pentagon’s planning to spend more than
$2 billion in the next 5 years on energy initiatives,
which could help spur development of energy sources
for use in other sectors.” Then they quoted Marine
Corps Major General Richard Zilmer, commander of
the U.S. forces in Anbar Province, who was asking for
a shipment of mobile solar panels and wind turbans
to supplement gas-guzzling generators. He said, “The
military’s dependence on fuel for power generation
could reduce the number of road-bound convoys and
U.S. casualties.”
The Army’s rapid equipment force is trying to
arrange for delivery to the general of hybrid power
stations and solar panels. This is a high priority and
is being done out of military self-interest. But it will
have another consequence—one noted, I think, by both
David and Tom. It means that the power of the military
procurement process will be brought to bear on the
climate-change problem. It will create new markets.
A lot of the improvements we made with respect to
environment and energy and efficiency issues have
been driven in the past 30 years by entrepreneurs
who are trying to develop new technologies. There is
nothing to help stimulate a new technology more than
having a pretty firm expectation that there will be a
market for that technology.
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Government procurement generally, and military
procurement specifically, is an area in which American
domestic policy could make a big difference. This can
be seen in the 2005 Energy Policy Act. The civilian
leaderships here decided that fleet purchases in the
military will reflect a certain percentage of E85-capable
vehicles.
Energy efficiency rating requirements may also
prove useful. It is true that it can be a problem when
government gets in the business of picking winners
and losers in a time of rapid technological change.
We could screw things up by riding the wrong horse
or developing policies that are too brittle and do not
have the capacity to reflect the best innovations that
are going on. People have always worried about this.
However, there are ways to mitigate those concerns.
And there is an urgent need to stimulate the kind of
technological improvements that will more rapidly
ramp us off the carbon-based energy economy and on
to alternative systems.
We have so many promising technologies that are
cost-ineffective today. They need one, two, or three
technological changes that people have theorized
might be capable, but the changes have not yet been
achieved on the bench, and certainly they have not been
brought up to commercialization. Having proactive
procurement policies is a way to stimulate getting
more people into that business and accelerating the
transition.
So I thank you for the opportunity to discuss three
very interesting topics. I want to leave you with a
question. Planning is great. But as we heard already
this morning and earlier, plans do not do anything.
Having people in the room who are sophisticated
about environmental problems or energy problems is
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another step in the right direction. But you have also
got to have the ear of the leadership. And the leadership
must drive the change in all kinds of mundane ways,
like structuring of the DoD procurement manager’s
incentives or making sure the priorities are played out
in the specs that are actually issued. Otherwise all these
plans just sit inside of volumes that look very elegant,
but do not have traction on the ground.
That has always been the big problem in trying
to move a large-scale institution even a couple of
deflections away from the way it is progressing. So
any insights as to how you translate the intimations of
progress into even more substantial progress, would
be something I think would be beneficial to discuss
some more. So thank you very much.
Discussion
David Sheets: The one thing I did not discuss was
metering requirements. Since this is not an energy
group, you may not be aware of the Energy Policy Act of
2005, or, in fact, Executive Order 13423. These basically
strengthen the government through energy savings—
they call for metering on all the buildings. This means
that we will be able to look at some 770 million square
feet of buildings and find out what people are using by
way of energy. We can start identifying trends within
government quarters. Military families are allowed to
use a certain amount of electricity, and after that, they
have to start paying for their own utilities. That means
we are being held accountable in a way we were not
in the past. When I was a lieutenant and had a chance
of getting an air conditioner, I did not care whether
it was 220 volts or 110 volts. I was not paying for the
electricity, so I got whatever was cheapest. That is not
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going to happen so much any more because people are
now required to care. So we are not becoming more
energy efficient simply because we want to: there are,
indeed, some national policies that are forcing us down
this road.
Q: In the early 1980s, there were three concepts, as
it were: prevention, adaptation, and mitigation. From
the early eighties to the mid-eighties, you could not
talk about adaptation because that meant surrender.
All the talk was about prevention. Then all of a sudden,
there was a policy shift at the Environmental Protection
Agency or somewhere, and then the focus shifted to
adaptation—we cannot do anything—and then to
mitigation, and now adaptation is back in. I would
like to see more talk about prevention. True, we can’t
prevent climate change from happening. It is changing
already. But we can prevent people from doing things
that are going to exacerbate it. We are talking about
these coal-fired power plants. We are talking about
building new things. There is a prevention aspect
to climate change, otherwise, it is all adaptation—
business as usual, and then try to stop it if you can and
adjust where you can. Would you support the idea of
bringing back the notion of prevention, or do you think
it is embedded in these other words?
Morehouse: You are correct. I do tend to group
prevention and mitigation together when talking about
climate change. For example, capturing and sequestering carbon from coal power plants is mitigation, and
also prevention. Given that human activities have
already created a certain amount of climate change, I
think of activities preventing additional change and
mitigating its effects as the same. However, if this is a
useful distinction, perhaps we should be more careful
in our use of the terms.
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Response from Questioner: I think this is part of
the problem. A lot of people do not know that the IPCC
and the UN define these terms in different ways. To
me, when you mitigate things, you are proactive—you
anticipate a problem and do things to prevent it. When
you adapt, you are reactive. Something hits you, and
you adjust. I am not saying that I am right and you
are wrong, I am merely saying that we need to clarify
our terms when we talk to the public to make sure that
they understand what it is that we are saying when we
talk to them.
Audience: I think when you are discussing
adaptation and mitigation, mostly it has to do with
“How do you make sure the effects are not as bad as
you think in terms of energy and climate change?” It is
leveling off those curves, as it were. But when we talk
about how to have better governance, that, to me, is
prevention. In other words, I think that to handle the
effects when they occur is not simply adaptation and
mitigation, but prevention of the effects on the people
themselves.
Q: The Navy has been quite successful at using the
seasonal forecast to adjust when you turn on and off
heating and cooling. Is the Army using this?
Sheets: I am not a utilities expert—I come from
the environmental side of the house—so I am not too
comfortable answering this. I assume you are talking
about main steam plants that provide heating and
cooling to buildings where you have large installation
size heating and cooling systems. Axiom has some,
but I don’t know what the Axiom policy is on how to
handle these.
Audience: Anybody in the Army that has been a
commander of an installation or a concern has faced the
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issue of turning the heat on too early or too bad. And,
yes, it occurs, and, no, it is never done quite right.
Audience: The Marine Corp solution is “Too early,
too bad, too late, too bad.”
Sheets: I think they are trying to decentralize those
units so the people who are in the rooms can do that—
turn them off when they don’t need them and then
turn them on when they do. But I don’t know that the
infrastructure allows that right now in all locations.
Q: You talked about the economics of it. When
you discuss these issues within your organizations,
what kinds of costs do you look at? When you do total
cost accounting, do you take into consideration what
it costs when a gallon of oil is burnt in terms of, say,
health problems?
Sheets: We do have health people looking at some
of these kinds of effects. But I don’t know that it is tied
into sustainability quite yet. We have people working
on all sorts of aspects of that. I don’t know if the health
effects of carbon dioxide have been included yet in the
models.
Morehouse: We haven’t included this in our
discussions of relevant externalities that should affect
the outcome of the requirements determination process.
Occupational health issues come up in discussions
about materials and processes used to manufacture
and maintain systems because these result in direct
costs to the Department and risks to the Department,
given new international regulatory regimes such as the
European Union’s REACH legislation. But addressing
the health effects of the carbon dioxide emitted by
military systems caused by their use of fossil fuel is not
something I think we could get support to consider at
this point.
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Q: Speaking of opportunities for military
diplomacy, there is one that did not get mentioned. You
mentioned AFRICOM. There are areas in Africa that
have no power grids whatsoever. It might be useful
to use some of these alternative energy sources to
develop power grids. Nigeria, which is larger than the
state of California, produces as much electricity or less
electricity than the city of Washington, DC. We might
be able to partner with NGOs to help them develop
energy as a sign of good will.
I have a question for Karen Hulme. You did
not mention things like environmental crime,
environmental piracy, or environmental terrorism. Do
you see a move in the international law community
towards adjusting international law to look at nonstate
actors/terrorist types of groups?
Hulme: I only covered the laws of armed conflict.
I did not have the time to cover intrastate conflict.
When it comes to noninternational law on conflict—
and we are talking internal or civil strife, as we call
it—there is no treaty. Well, there is a treaty—but there
is no treaty provision when it comes to protecting
the environment. You have to look to customary
international law, which is pretty much what states
do, what states say. Some codes in this body of law
deal with what nonstate actors/militia are doing. As
far as I know, none of the environmental provisions
are binding in noninternational law on conflict. In
noninternational law, the applicable law is usually
simple criminal law. As to terrorism, we may speak
of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), but “war” here
is not war in a legal/technical sense. It is not armed
conflict. And so the closest I think I can get to your
question is to look at what Saddam did when he set
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fire to the 590 oil wells in Kuwait. This action was
analyzed by many. The verdict was that it was not
militarily necessary. It was destruction for the sake
of it, punitive destruction. But from that, you saw the
international reaction, and the international reaction
was pretty much global condemnation. What we see
is a kind of instant customary law in the making. I
know that it was not a nonstate act. But it did make
clear that the global community condemned the use
of the environment as a weapon of war for reprisals.
This goes back to ENMOD, I guess. But, no, when it
comes to nonstate actors and the laws of war—I don’t
think it is there when it comes to the environment at
the minute.
Schroeder: Can I just add a comment? As you know,
our current definition of domestic terrorism is broad
enough to cover an operation like Greenpeace setting
up a blockade to prevent people from going whaling.
It requires a threat or actual violence or damage to
property with an intention to influence government
policy. A provision of the Patriot act expanded it this
way and got Greenpeace quite upset. But in the United
States, the Justice Department has used some of the
material support and other sanctioning provisions
enacted in the Patriot Act to bring actions against
domestic environmental activities.
Audience: I found this panel very instructive, and
I take great heart from the activities that are being
pursued and the opportunities that are available to
achieve environmental benefits from reforming the
peace time military. What I have a hard time getting
my mind around is the possibility that the military
services could ever be convinced to seriously alter their
operational schemes in the name of environmental
friendliness. That is, I envision these arguments
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between the war fighters and all of the rest of the “tail”
who go around the world telling them that they should
have fuel-efficient tanks or whatever. Do you think
there is really any prospect, either on the logistical side
or on the legal side, of actually altering their behavior
when they are engaged in combat?
Morehouse: You are right. The convincing argument
is not based on environmental friendliness. Efficiency
is being seen as a way of delivering more operational
capability from a more efficient force-structure. Since
it reduces our logistics tail, it also reduces operational
vulnerabilities caused by large soft fuel convoys that
offer the enemy a target rich environment. The idea
that we can deliver greater warfighting effectiveness
with less logistical effort is appealing to war fighters.
The selling point is not that we would reduce fuel
consumption per se or reduce our carbon footprint.
But it is something we could take credit for if we can
measure it properly.
Sheets: Last night General Kern mentioned the Air
Force Environmental Conference that went on a couple
weeks ago. I was there. People there raised the point that
addressing global warming would reduce dependence
on foreign oil—and that is another big strategic issue
for us. And I will tell you there are people who think
they have that licked, and they typically come from
West Virginia. They come from Pennsylvania. They
think that they can reduce our dependence on foreign
oil with processes like coal gasification and coal
liquefaction—the Fisher Tropsch process. We haven’t
figured out how to get rid of that CO2 from the coal.
But this is something to think about.
Hulme: When it comes to changing the armed
forces’ behavior, as I mentioned, military pragmatism
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does play a part. A lot of the laws that are on the books
are there because the military want them there. They
want them because they want a disciplined, not a
pillaging Army. The laws are not imposed on them
from the outside. When it comes to operations, public
pressure may be a big factor. War aims, too, may make
a difference. If a conflict is about water or lack of water,
for example, this may influence what the peacekeepers
or what the military will do in the conflict. I mean, if
it is about lack of water, they are not going into the
armed conflict, hopefully, and just deplete the water
even more, and make it even worse. So the aim will be
important, too. And, of course, when it comes to the
environment, the United States does not act on its own
when it comes to military operations. It tends to look
towards multilateral operations. So interoperability,
working with partners in Europe and elsewhere when
it comes to the environment, is an interesting issue that
the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States want
to protect more than others in wartime. One example
I have—it is a lovely little example from the Balkan
Conflict. The UK and the United States went to great
effort not to breach an international treaty when they
saved a brown bear to take it to safety. And so you
cannot simply say that the environment has no priority
in wartime. The UK and the United States are heavily
influenced by it.
Q: I have one brief observation and one very
quick question. The observation is that obviously the
military is a large energy user, and any measures that
can be taken to reduce that without compromising
warfare seem to be tremendously valuable. But I
think we should be careful about other claims about
the military’s impact. A lot of research done by the
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International Union for the Conservation of Nature
and others suggests that the environmental impacts
of land managed by the military are considerably less
than those of land managed by other actors. It further
suggests that the environmental impacts of wartime
are generally less than the environmental impacts of
peacetime in most situations. So we should be careful
about bundling too much together to demonize this.
My question is do you have any sense of what the
energy use is of non-U.S. militaries and actors other
than militaries, when they are engaged in similar types
of operations around the world?
Morehouse: I don’t know for sure. The energy
intensity of military operations has increased over
time, but I suspect the energy intensity of conventional
military forces among wealthy countries would
be comparable. But this would not hold true for
developing countries or for asymmetrical threats. For
example, an insurgent driving a Toyota to plant an
improvised explosive device (IED) will have far more
combat effect on a per gallon basis than a mine resistant
ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle.
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CHAPTER 7
THE U.S. MILITARY:
PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
Chapter 7 looks at what the U.S. Armed Forces might be called upon
to do in the event that rapid-climate change does indeed take place. How
should they plan for such a future? Professor Bert Tussing considers
what the military can and should do in planning and responding to
disasters and warns of some of the dangers that must be avoided. Major
General William Nash brings personal expertise to bear on his discussion
of peacekeeping and stabilization operations, and Dr. Douglas Johnson
analyzes the strategic challenges facing our nation.

The Role of the Military in Civil Support
Bert B. Tussing
U.S. Army War College
The role of the U.S. military in disaster response
operations, like the role of the military in many areas of
“civil support,” inspires conflicting responses in much
of the civilian population. Civilians traditionally think
of a U.S. general officer as someone with a triple-A type
personality who arrives on the scene and takes charge.
That is the sort of thing the American people like to
see in times of crisis. At the same time, the American
people grow weary, very quickly, of the military
remaining on the scene, and particularly remaining
on the scene “in charge.” It is a part of the American
psyche rooted in British experiences during the preRevolutionary War period, reinforced by the rise of the
posse comitatus mindset following the American Civil
War, and reaffirmed many times since.
The fact of the matter is, however, that no one is
more aware of that psyche and its accompanying
sensitivities than the leadership of the U.S. military—
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from its flag and general officers to its civil masters in
the Department of Defense (DoD). When we talk about
“support to civil authorities,” we mean precisely that;
and nowhere in our doctrine or policy does “support”
translate to “taking over.”
Combat Operations.
The range of military operations shows how this
mindset fits comfortably within our capabilities. At
one end of the spectrum, the military is organized,
trained, and equipped to conduct combat operations.
In their ultimate manifestation, these operations are
intended to fight and win our nation’s wars, or leave
the immutable impression that we are prepared to
do so. Operations conducted to achieve these ends
include the types of “kinetic” activities commonly
and uniquely associated with the military: large scale
combat operations, blockades, and so on.

Figure 1. Range of Military Operations.
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Military Operations Other Than War.
Noncombat operations, on the other hand, are not
as cut and dried. These are manifested in what we have
euphemistically come to term “Military Operations
Other than War (MOOTW).” The “upper end” of
MOOTW can be played out in support of deterring war
and resolving conflicts. In these kinds of operations,
our forces may move in and out of armed conflict,
based on the necessity of mission requirements. It is
important to note here that the military will always
retain the ability to shift back to a “combat footing” to
ensure force protection or to provide for the safety and
security of a selected civil population. The complexities
surrounding this requirement should be apparent.
Further discussion, however, lies beyond the scope
and intention of this section.
The “lower end” of MOOTW, devoted to promoting
peace, deliberately avoids (but will never rule out)
conflict. It calls upon a different kind of strength—
the kind that the military typically applies in combat
support or combat service support operations. The goal
of these is to provide support to civilian authorities in
a domestic or international scenario. Antiterrorism
operations, noncombatant evacuation in a permissive
environment, and civil support missions are subsets
of these types of operations; but of particular concern
to our intent are missions surrounding disaster
response.
The resources and capabilities possessed by the
military clearly recommend its use in disaster response
operations, but not always in ways that are readily
apparent to the casual observer. There are some obvious
and logical ways in which military assets can be brought
to bear in regions devastated by disaster and which
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have, temporarily at least, lost their normal ability to
function. The military has significant engineering and
communication capabilities as well as transportation
assets. Similarly, the military has the ability to provide
supplementary emergency health services until the
civil component is restored. Less intuitive, however,
are strengths that the military brings to the table that
may be specifically tailored to aid in disaster response.
The full breadth of the military intelligence community
may not be applicable to needs of the moment, but
the mechanisms within that discipline which allow
for the collection, analysis and dissemination of vital
information may recommend themselves. The fighting
prowess of our special forces is well known; but less
intuitive may be their value in terms of language
skills and cultural awareness, unmatched in our “line
forces.” The competence housed in the military’s civil
affairs units is not something that immediately springs
to mind, or something that the military is overly eager
to offer for reasons that will be addressed later in
this section. Nevertheless, the wherewithal contained
in these units can fill a critical void in the absence of
basic governance requirements and rule of law until
the duly constituted authorities of a stricken area
can be restored. And following catastrophic events
which traditionally bring out the best and the worst
in humanity, the element of security that the military
brings to the field is simply essential—for without it,
none of the other elements of restoration may be able
to take root, or even be introduced.
Accordingly, one begins to see the benefits the
military can bring to disaster response, but that does
not begin to explain why the U.S. Government would
want to see them applied to those ends. After all, at the
end of the day there will always be some concern that
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committing the armed forces towards these altruistic
ends may be a nice thing, but it diverts their attention
away from their “day job” of protecting and defending
the people of the United States, their values, and their
interests. That defense (which frequently takes on a very
offensive tone) can be done by no other organization;
no reciprocal supplementation of capabilities can
be effectively offered by any other segment of the
government or the society it serves.
Such a simplistic approach, however, overlooks
the ultimate strategic objective of defense, which is the
security of our people, our values, and our interests.
Without meaning to deny the genuine desire of
the U.S. Government and its people to reach out to
assist other parts of the world, our National Security
Strategy reminds us that regional stability, in a world
growing more and more connected, is inextricably
tied to the strategic security interests of our own
country. Accordingly, over time specific types of civil
support operations have been developed, defined,
and refined by the military. These serve as the armed
forces’ component of an interagency, and by extension
international, means of promoting that stability. 1
Civil Support Operations.
National Assistance Operations. One type of civil
support operation is national assistance operations.
This category is the broadest in scope of any we will
consider. It includes military or civil assistance rendered
by the United States to a nation during peacetime,
crises, or emergencies (to include war), based on
agreements mutually concluded between the nations.
National assistance programs include, but are not
limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense,
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other DoD programs, and activities performed on a
reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international
organizations. It is included here inasmuch as it sets the
stage for other programs more specific to our concern.
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.
When we consider disaster relief, foreign humanitarian
assistance operations are, perhaps, those operations
which spring most quickly to mind. Conducted
outside of the United States and its territories, these
include programs conducted to relieve or reduce the
harmful results of natural or manmade disasters or
other endemic conditions. U.S. forces can draw on
their appreciable capabilities to provide humanitarian
assistance. However, this aid is deliberately limited
in scope and duration. At first glance, this may seem
arbitrary, or even callous. However, the purpose of
these operations is to supplement or complement the
efforts of the host nation’s civil authorities or agencies
that may have the primary responsibility for providing
foreign humanitarian assistance. This reemphasizes a
recurring theme in the military’s role in these affairs:
Regardless of the scope of its support, the military will
remain in support, and not in charge under all but the
most extreme circumstances.
Civil Administration Operations.
When those extreme circumstances do arrive, the
chances are that civil administration units will be called
in. This is a mission that has historically fallen to the
military, but one that it does not necessarily welcome.
The purpose of civil administration operations is to
restore basic government functions, to include the
provision of security and the rule of law. The very fact
that the military is called upon to take up this kind of
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mission should mean that there are no other practical
alternatives. Nevertheless, doing so casts soldiers in
the ill-fitting role of policemen or statesmen, roles that
inherently cast them in an overseer capacity that falls
well outside of our notion of “civil support.” Accordingly, the military enters into these commitments on
the understanding that there will be an “exit strategy.”
It defines those steps and measures that will allow the
passage of these authorities to a duly constituted civil
structure. This structure may eventually take the shape
of the stricken nation’s leadership, or a recognized
international body, but the intent of the military is
clear: establish secure conditions for the passage of
control, and then execute that passage.
The American military is also reluctant to take on
extended civil administration operations because of
the long-term effect such operations would have on the
country receiving aid. Its approach here is similar to
its approach to civil support operations in a domestic
environment. Our uniformed leaders realize that theirs
should be a “last in-first out” requirement. When the
dust settles following a disaster, neither the United
States nor (especially) its military, is interested in
retaining control over the country they have committed
to assist. Rather, we would prefer to restore to power
appropriate civil authorities. They are the ones who,
over the long term, will remain behind to provide for
the governance and the well-being of their own people.
The longer the military remains in control, the longer
it will take these authorities to establish control and
regain credibility in the eyes of the afflicted people.
Remaining any longer than necessary, therefore, could
hinder rather than help the appropriate restoration of
authority.
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Military Civic Action.
Military civic actions further reflect this attitude,
albeit, perhaps, in a more subtle fashion. These missions,
sponsored by U.S. forces, assist in projects benefiting
local populations overseas. They are set up in such
a way as to deliberately highlight the role played by
the host nation’s military. Operations of this sort may
be directed at improving conditions in the fields of
education, public works, agriculture, transportation,
communications, health, sanitation, and others
contributing to economic and social development. In
these operations, the United States deliberately keeps
a low profile, operating in the shadows as it were.
Americans may advise the indigenous forces, and they
may provide extensive logistical backing; but the most
visible effort will be conducted by the host nation’s
military. The logic behind this approach has been
borne out in Theater Security Cooperation Programs
of every combatant command: properly planned,
executed, and promulgated in close cooperation with
local authorities and community leaders, military civic
action projects will result in popular support for the
military. As counterintuitive as it may seem, our intent
in these operations is not to increase the popularity of
the U.S. military among the local people, but rather to
restore their faith in their own military. This can pay
particular dividends in nations where the military
has traditionally been seen more as an overseer of the
people than a servant.
This is not to overplay the military card, however,
not even the host nation’s military card. If one were
to ask any U.S. combatant commanders to recite the
Prime Directive of civil support, he would likely
declare that the primary responsibility for the wellbeing of a population rests with lawful government or
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the de facto authorities of the affected state. Domestic
preparedness is first and foremost the responsibility of
the civilian government and its agencies. This serves as
the ultimate compass for the military in these matters,
reminding them who is to serve as the directing force
for the support that they bring, and who will remain
to direct the extended recovery of a nation or region
long after they have departed. At the same time, it
alerts the civil authority to the beginning and end of
the military’s function.
Civil-Military Relations.
The relationship between the military, civil
authorities, and the civil population they are both
pledged to serve in disaster response has been
carefully developed, scrutinized, and institutionalized
in recent history. One could postulate that the modern
origins of these relations evolved with the evolution
of the concept of civil defense out of World War II.
The immediate images inspired by those words may
conjure up visions of “lights out drills” on U.S. coasts
or even “duck and cover exercises” in grammar school
during the early days of the Cold War. But the actual
definition of civil defense operations was laid out in
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. This referred to
these operations as “. . . the performance of some or
all of the international humanitarian tasks intended
to protect the civilian population against the dangers,
and to help recover from the immediate effects of
hostilities or disasters . . . to provide the conditions
necessary for its survival.” The immediate intent of the
protocol, of course, was to protect the most vulnerable
from residual effects of battle, but parallels were easily
drawn to combined civil-military operations in support

355

of populations suffering from the effects of natural
disasters.
One of the difficulties faced in these combined
operations, of course, was in closing the gap of cultural
differences between the way the military approaches a
problem and the way their civil counterpart, partners,
coordinators, or even directors addressed it. This has
led to what can be described as an inherent complexity
in these procedures. The innate efficiency the military
most often demonstrates in the accomplishment of
its mission is built upon what it refers to as “unity of
command.” This unity is foundational in the armed
forces; it immediately removes the preponderance of
questions over who has authority to direct actions,
control resources, and prioritize efforts. Its purpose is
described in our doctrine as a means to “. . . ensure
unity of effort under one responsible commander for
every objective. Unity of command means that all forces
operate under a single commander with the requisite
authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a
common purpose.”2
The problem with unity of command is that it
can only be achieved in what we might think of as a
recognized chain of command. These concepts become
almost immediately unhinged when you introduce
elements into response and recovery operations that
are not in the chain, and are not inclined to insert
themselves in the chain. At that point the goal shifts from
trying to achieve unity of command more directly to
its purpose—which is ensuring unity of effort. One can
quickly discern that, without the immediate authority
embodied in our concept of unity of command, this
becomes a far more complicated effort. The complexity
is even forecast in our doctrinal definition:
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Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part
of the same command structure. In multinational and
interagency operations, unity of command may not be
possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes
paramount.3

With no intent to sound parochial, the more
diverse elements are introduced in disaster response
operations, the more difficult achieving unity of effort
will be. In the U.S. military’s Joint Doctrine for Civil
Military Operations (Joint Publication 3-57), the military
commander is specifically reminded that “[a]chieving
unity of effort becomes more complicated with the
increasing number of nonmilitary players (e.g., NGO’s
[nongovernmental
organizations],
international
organizations, other government agencies, and UN
[United Nations] agencies) involved in operations.”
This in no way implies that the military is seeking
means or approval to “go it alone.” It only points to an
inevitable challenge that will have to be overcome if
the combined civil-military relief effort is to effectively
(if not always most efficiently) provide for the victims
of a given disaster.
Again, it may be counterintuitive to those who
expect every military response to reflect the subtle
nature of a Patton, a Sherman, or a Genghis Khan,
but DoD approaches the challenges of blending civilmilitary efforts and capabilities as very much of a
give-and-take affair. Illustrative in this regard is the
Department’s approach to working with NGOs. DoD
is keenly aware of the tremendous capabilities NGOs
bring to disaster relief operations. Frequently associated
with the areas impacted by the event prior to the event,
the NGOs have access to information and background
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that no governmental organization, certainly to include
the military, may bring to the fore. However, the very
nature of NGO interaction with the population of
these areas may not recommend their close association
with any individual government (particularly the
United States) due to cultural sensitivities and political
nuances. Candidly speaking, such associations could
close many doors to the NGOs that would otherwise
remain open. These sensitivities become even more
pronounced when those associations become aligned
with military organizations, particularly in areas of
the world where their history involving militaries has
more often taken an oppressive tone.
Aware of these backgrounds, the U.S. military
recognizes a need to take a more balanced role in
dealing with NGOs, with the “balance” leaning toward
less visibility. As pointed out in the aforementioned
Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, the military
“needs to understand and try to facilitate the principles
of NGO’s operational and financial accountability.”
Moreover, our uniformed leadership needs to recognize
that the appreciable capabilities they bring to relief
operations are not the only capabilities available for
those ends, and frequently not the most affordable.
Civil agencies (governmental and nongovernmental)
will often possess comparative operational advantages
for emergency relief work. They will frequently be
able to do so at 10 times less the cost than it would
take for the military to perform the same or similar
functions. The Army is very good at providing all of
the capabilities that have been referred to throughout
this discussion. However, the total package means
not only providing manpower and resources. It also
means sustaining these capacities and retaining the
kind of cohesion and integrity that will allow units to
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transition (as necessary) from noncombatant operations
to combatant operations. All of this can come with a
remarkable price tag.
And so the military attempts to remain aware of the
constraints, limitations, and occasional allowances that
are necessary in working with its civilian counterparts.
But there is an accompanying set of sensitivities those
nonuniformed counterparts must also keep in mind
in working with the military. To begin, the military—
always aware of the potential requirement of having to
return to their “day job”—has certain tests of legitimacy
that will be weighed against any request for support.
Generally speaking, these tests are:
• The legality of the request.
• Issues of lethality which become far more
pronounced the further away the uniformed
element moves from the battlefield into the
civilian population.
• Accompanying risk to the soldiers performing
the mission and the victims they are serving.
• The cost of the required resource and manpower
expenditure.
• The cost of the expenditure in terms of readiness
to resume the missions only the military can
perform.
• Whether or not the task is appropriate—this
subtle point can only be determined by the
commander who is in charge of the personnel
and resources.
These tests for legitimacy for military inclusion should
become a part of the civilian planning process. In
that process, as much as is feasible, the viewpoint of
the military operational commander whose units’
capabilities are being sought should be solicited.
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It is not hard to imagine in these complex
environments that civil military operations may not
always proceed smoothly, in spite of cooperative
efforts on both parts or, especially, in the absence of the
same. As if to illustrate this point, some international
organizations and NGOs have demonstrated a
traditional reticence about sharing information with
the military that could prove vital to disaster response
and recovery operations. Nevertheless, our doctrine
reminds the military commander that it is most often
his or her responsibility to “go the second mile,” and
do as much as possible to cultivate a climate of respect
and trust. This will facilitate vital exchanges between
our agencies, not for the sake of the agencies, but to help
an afflicted population. Sharply differing civilian and
military perspectives usually work against achieving
a common operational culture. But, returning again to
our recurring theme, military acceptance that civilian
tasks in many modern emergencies constitute the
main operational effort—and that military tasks are
in support of this main effort—can assist greatly in
achieving a compatible culture in the field.
Contributions of the U.S. Military.
In spite of these difficulties, the U.S. military, in
collaboration and coordination with civilian authorities,
has made—and will continue to make—significant
contributions in the area of disaster response. These
notably include initiatives designed to mitigate or
preclude natural disasters. The U.S. military, in fact,
is taking an active role in environmental security
issues around the world. These efforts are orchestrated
through the office of the Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment and are
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taking place in nearly every combatant command.
Consider, for example, the U.S. Southern Command’s
(USSOUTHCOM) training initiatives surrounding
environmental security in Paraguay; efforts in the U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM) to predict and mitigate
the devastating effects of seismic disasters in Southeast
Asia; and the U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM)
initiatives to address the looming threat of water
shortages in many areas of its theater of operations.
Obviously, these are not initiatives that DoD is
taking on alone. DoD’s chief interagency partner
in these endeavors is the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). In addition, the combatant
commanders have the means of directly coordinating
their efforts in these regimes with the U.S. State
Department’s 12 Regional Environmental Hubs, whose
focus is aimed at promoting regional environmental
cooperation, sharing of environmental data, and
adoption of environmentally sound policies that will
benefit all countries in a given area.
Beyond these “senior partners” in the endeavor,
DoD frequently collaborates with other members
of the federal interagency process focused on these
issues. Included in their ranks are the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). Outside of our own
governmental agencies, DoD’s efforts have frequently
been coordinated through organizations like the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA), the International Search and
Rescue Advisory Group, and (of course) the Ministries
of Defense and Environment for countries that have
been victimized by disasters of the scope and severity
envisioned in these discussions.
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The Logic behind the Efforts.
The impetus behind these efforts on the part of
the U.S. Government in general, and its military in
particular, is not totally altruistic. More and more we
are awakening to the realization that regional stability
is directly impacted by environmental issues. Droughts
in Central Africa signify dangers and suffering that
will not be contained by political boundaries. When
catastrophic events, like the earthquake in Pakistan,
the tsunami off of Indonesia, or the hurricane in
Honduras, wreak havoc on congested areas, they
can destabilize an entire region. Ecological disasters
like that we see in the Caspian Sea region threaten to
trigger a cataclysmic series of events that could result in
human suffering, deprivation and, ultimately, conflict.
Doing something now can head off trouble later. Better
community planning may prevent migration crises.
Exposing, understanding, and preventing the neglect
or deliberate abuse of the environment can fend off
disaster. In short, environmental disaster is being
recognized as a precursor to regional instability; and
in today’s world of globalization, regional instability is
a precursor to global instability.
Fortunately, realization of shared threats and
shared concerns has led to initiatives towards regional
cooperation in every combatant theater. These initiatives focus on shared means of identification, prevention, mitigation, and (when required) response to both
manmade and natural disasters. For almost a decade,
the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic
Leadership, under the direction of Dr. Kent Hughes
Butts, has partnered with the combatant commands,
USAID, and organizations like the Woodrow Wilson
Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program,
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to bring together regional representatives around the
world to address these issues.4
The types of lessons that have come out of these and
similar efforts have reinforced the role of the military not
only in disaster response, but in disaster preparedness.
Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCPs)
sponsored by all of the combatant commands have
planted the notion that in addition to their traditional
skill sets in communication, logistics, and security,
the benefits derived from the military’s proficiency
in planning and strategic policy development further
recommends them to these efforts. A vital component
of the combatant commander’s resources towards
these ends is his Joint Interagency Coordination Group
(JIACG) which houses governmental and, occasionally,
nongovernmental representatives from outside of
DoD. These representatives serve as key advisers
to the combatant commander in understanding
and coordinating the combined capabilities of their
organization, identifying synergies and efficiencies,
and ensuring to a far greater degree their optimal
employment in times of crises.
In the past, the military has looked upon disaster
response as a necessary function, but not one that was
particularly welcomed. The concern over diverting
attention, manpower, and resources away from the
“traditional role” of the uniformed services no doubt
served as the foundation for that reticence. But times
have clearly changed. Environmental security and
disaster prevention, response, and recovery are now
looked upon as acceptable military missions in that
they are viewed as essential elements of regional
stability. Specific programs devoted to these concerns,
such as USPACOM’s Disaster Preparedness Mitigation
Assessment program, USCENTCOM’s Disaster Prepar-
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edness Program, and USPACOM’s Disaster Relief
Response Process are taking shape in every theater.
International Efforts.
In emulation of the American effort, other countries’
governments and their militaries are seeking their
own civil-military synergies. Most governmental
organizations responsible for environment and
disaster response are relatively understaffed and
under resourced, lacking manpower to undertake
the activities necessary to efficiently accomplish these
broad-based missions. The military, by working with
these organizations, allows them to accomplish a great
deal more. In the process, militaries that have been a
source of suspicion and fear in earlier times are being
rightfully cast as servants and protectors in the eyes of
their own people.
Finally, developing regional response capabilities
to address a set of common concerns may serve
as a foundation for other cooperative endeavors.
Countries that would otherwise never gather around
a negotiation table are currently engaged in regional
efforts to forecast, mitigate, and if necessary respond
to cataclysmic natural disasters. Constrained resources
have themselves provided the impetus for greater
cooperation, and a judicious division of labor in
preparing for these calamities is being directed at
producing synergies and eliminating redundancies
in providing for the common needs of a region’s
citizenry.
As is frequently said, much has been done, and
much remains to be done. But as the U.S. Government
attempts to come to terms with an evolving list of
environmental issues, its military must be counted
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upon as an essential component to any solution.
Before an event, the military represents the most tested
entity for operational and strategic planning in the
country’s inventory. During the event, our uniformed
forces can assume a responsive posture that cannot be
duplicated in terms of manpower, capacity, timeliness,
or capabilities. Following an event, the armed services
will be hard to match in terms of what they bring to
the field in restoring essential services, and setting
the conditions for long-term recovery. But little of the
military’s vast potential in meeting these demands will
be effectively brought to bear without understanding
on both sides of the civil-military framework of how
it should and should not be employed. In the final
analysis, the responsibility for that decision lies solely
in the camp of the civil authorities.
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Peace Operations
Major General William L. Nash, USA-Ret.
Council on Foreign Relations
I really did not think this climate change issue was
especially important until I got my Sports Illustrated
a couple weeks ago. And I found out that between
1954 and today the mean temperature of the United
States has increased to an alarming degree. Indeed,
had the temperature then been what it is now, the fly
ball that Vic Wertz hit in the 1954 World Series would
have gone an additional three or four inches due to
the temperature of the air, and Willie Mays might not
have made that miraculous over the shoulder catch.
Worse yet, the same temperature changes facilitated
the movement of the Emerald Ash Borer Beetle to
Pennsylvania and New York, where that little devil is
boring into the ash trees from whence the best wood for
baseball bats come. This stuff is serious, folks. Maple
shatters too much, and they are switching from ash to
maple and that is not as good. No, sir. The only thing
worse than maple bats are aluminum bats.
The problem with being the next to the last speaker,
before the sum up, is that almost everybody has
already said most of what you planned to say. As a
result, most of the points I make in my presentation
will reinforce ideas you have already heard rather than
say something entirely new. But I submit to you that I
am one of the few guys in the room who has actually
conducted or participated in a military operation for
the specific purpose of improving the environment.
In August 2000, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) forces in Kosovo (KFOR) and the United
Nations (UN) mission in Kosovo conducted the take-
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over of the lead smelter in Zvecan, Kosovo, in Northern
Kosovo. I was a civilian administrator in charge of the
civilian side of this operation. We took over this plant
because of the pollution that it was putting into the air
throughout the area. We also hoped to gain economic
opportunities through refurbishing this disastrous site.
And I will tell you how bad it was. We took a blood test
sample of 100 people, including myself and 99 locals.
I had been in Kosovo for less than 6 months. I was the
only one whose lead content was within the normal
range—and I was at the upper limit. Of the sample,
25 percent were 4 to 10 times the safe range for lead
content in blood. This was clearly a nonethnic issue in
that the Serbs and the Albanians were equally affected.
The Romas, however, because their refugee camp was
immediately downwind from the plant, suffered not
only from the air quality, but from the lead soot that
came down on top of their camp.
So we took over this plant in a military operation
which was immediately followed by civilian authorities
that had the expertise to shut down the plant safely.
It took us about 6 hours to cool down everything, to
establish an unemployment compensation system for
the workers that were being put out of work, and to
facilitate the departure of a number of thugs that ran
the place; they went scampering back to Belgrade very
quickly. But we took over the place. We then drew up
a contract for $15 million to bring in a Swedish mining
firm to conduct an environmental cleanup and a feasibility analysis to restart production. The economic
potential here was that the mines were largely in
Albanian areas. The smelters and the processing
facilities were in the Serb areas of Kosovo. They were
looking for an opportunity for mutual benefit to put
them together.
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Two days after the takeover, I went to a meeting
in the Serb Union with 100 guys. It was a little tense.
My security detail took their weapons out from under
their jackets. They parked my car outside the window
so that I could jump through if things got really tense.
And the Serb leader, thinking that we had taken over
the plant to give it to the Albanians, stood up and said,
“Are you going to let those Albanians come into this
plant?” And I looked him in the eye and said, “You’re
darned right we are. They are going to be driving the
trucks bringing in the ore. And you guys that run the
smelter can do your jobs.” And they said, “Well, that’s
fine. That’s fine. We would like work. We would like
prosperity, we would like an opportunity.”
Of course, the end of the story is that we couldn’t
pull it off. That was because the economic analysis
didn’t come up with sufficient profit margin to make
it happen. Of course, they didn’t count the unemployment compensation we were paying. They didn’t
count the added security cost, multiplied by years,
because of the failure to do the refurbishment. They
didn’t take into account the political foundations that
joint multiethnic economic associations would bring.
This is going to be the world we face in the 21st
century and beyond in an era of climate change. We
are going to find ourselves on many occasions in
circumstances in which peacekeeping, the environment,
politics, and social issues, all combine in a new formula
for security.
I think it is very important that we talk about
peacekeeping—or stability operations, if you prefer.
The fact is that dealing with the consequences of
climate change is going to be hard enough for the
United States, for Britain, and for the European Union.
For fragile states, it is going to be almost impossible.
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So obviously we must anticipate the possibility that
fragile states will fail, or that regional tensions will be
exacerbated to the point of conflict. Given that these
possibilities abound, I think you can see that the armed
forces of the United States and her allies will have an
increased opportunity to conduct stability or peace
operations in the coming years.
As we look at this situation, I would like to throw
in the fact that stability and peace operations should
be viewed as a continuum. And I want to put my two
cents in about the prevention, the mitigation, and the
recovery or post-conflict reconstruction. You will find
that the skill sets that deal with one aspect also apply
to the other two. So, as we look to organize and train
ourselves to conduct these operations, we will find
that we can use the same skills, assets, resources, and
wisdom before, during, and after conflict. I can make
the argument that it is more efficient to do it in the
prevention phase, as opposed to the mitigation or the
recovery phase. But the whole capability is necessary.
Today we are talking mostly about the recovery or the
post-conflict environment.
Given all this, we should expect that we will be
called upon to do both more and better work in this
area. On the quantity side, whether by invitation,
intervention, or invasion, I think you will see us having
to engage in peacekeeping with greater frequency. I
do not necessarily mean that we will get involved in
another Iraq or another Afghanistan or even another
Kosovo or Bosnia. We might well engage in much
smaller, less visible efforts, dealing with a variety of
problems. In addition to traditional peacekeeping
operations, we might, for example, be asked to provide
security assistance, to assist other militaries and other
governments as they themselves struggle to deal with
the consequences of climate change.
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Requirements might increase, and this, by the way,
is what Bert Tussing brought up about the Special
Forces’ capacity to teach and train. If migration becomes
an issue, we will need to improve our capabilities
in certain areas. We will need to be able to conduct
surveillance of long borders. We will need to be able
to understand what is happening and be prepared to
deal with people crossing the borders so that we can
establish refugee camps, at a minimum. We need to be
able to survey large areas to find out where displaced
people are so we can assess their needs, and then push
forward and get them the supplies they need. How
will we do these things? And how will we integrate
our efforts with those of the local military and their
government?
We are going to be concerned with lessening our
own impact on the environment. I do not know if
we can achieve carbon neutrality on these types of
interventions. But we can go many steps in the right
direction. We were talking earlier today about what
motivates the military. We talked about how the
military tended to overlook environmental concerns if
it meant it could fight better. Well, let me tell you, as an
armor officer, the worst thing that I could do is either
run out of gas or let my batteries go dead. So, fuel
efficiency is a combat multiplier for me. While getting
ready to go to war in Operation DESERT STORM, I
did not worry about anything as much as I worried
about the availability of fuel. And I spent more time
than I wish to remember writing memos to my bosses,
drilling my commanders, and drilling my soldiers on
how to refuel quickly so we could turn around the
trucks and get them filled and get them to catch up
with us.
Fuel efficiency is crucial. In the absence of an
alternative, the only way to keep the batteries charged
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is to run your engines. Indeed, the only way to stay
warm is to run your engines. Now, the M1 tank has
got an auxiliary power unit (APU). But it is about the
only vehicle other than an aircraft that has got it. Okay,
Strikers are getting one. Why not the Humvee? Take,
for example, a peacekeeping operation. Such operations
are typically check point and observation point heavy.
Think what this involves. Four Humvees stationed at a
road junction for 24 hours a day. Check points at 100,
200, even 500 road junctions. Four Humvees running,
keeping warm, keeping the radios working, at every
one of the 500 road junctions—that is a lot of fuel.
There is a way to reduce that. Incidentally, there is a
way you can demonstrate your interest. You guys can
go to Capitol Hill and get the police to stop running
their cars all day right around our Capitol (and my
neighborhood). In any case, it is an issue that is very,
very important.
But the majority of the tasks that will fall upon
us in disaster situations or peace operations are
civilian in nature. They will include things ranging
from governance to economic development, to social
reconciliation, and to the development of the rule of
law, which is beyond public security. It is the police, the
courts, the justices, and the jails that will be needed.
Now, we will have to expand upon the advances
that we made in the last couple years. The news about
National Security Policy Directive 44 (NSPD44) and
DoD Directive 3005 have brought some improvements.
At least our government has laid down the principle that
we need to achieve better civil-military integration—
and I mean integration, not just cooperation; the latter
is not good enough.
As Robin Dorff said earlier, the National Security
Act needs to be revised. The first time I gave this speech,
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it was to say we need a new National Security Act of
1998. Now I am up to 20XX. This is a serious point,
though. Look at 1947. That led to a dramatic change.
The National Security Act of 1947 created the U.S. Air
Force. It created the Central Intelligence Agency. It
created the framework in which we have worked for
60 years, until the last couple of years when we have
started changing the structure of our government.
But we are changing it in very piecemeal fashion: a
little tinkering with intelligence here, a little creation
of homeland defense and a little transformational
diplomacy there; that type of thing. We need to go well
beyond what we have done today. And this begins with
a larger definition of security in general and national
security in particular. This definition must be much
more holistic, much more comprehensive. I have not
talked about taking all these issues and putting them
to work with international and regional organizations.
That is an additional requirement that we must think
through as we go forward.
In the State of the Union address this year, the
President called for the expansion of the Army and the
Marine Corp by 92,000 people. In the same paragraph,
he called for the expansion or the establishment of a
civilian response corps. The budget, however, did not
include any requests for funding such an organization.
But, I raise that with you so you can think through how
we make the State Department’s coordinator a real
entity. Creating a new director of foreign assistance, an
administrator, is not an all-bad idea of how to integrate
the State Department with the USAID. But how do we
make a reality out this position? How can we develop
an Inner Agency team capable of working along side
the military in the stability and peace operations? All
hard questions! Thank you very much.
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The Strategic Challenges of the U.S. Army
In the Face of Global Climate Change
Douglas V. Johnson II
Strategic Studies Institute
Introduction.
My talk will focus on the U.S. Army and the
strategic challenges posed by global climate change. I
want to begin by dropping into the structural mode
for a couple of minutes to make sure everybody
understands the landscape. There are a couple of key
documents of which you should be aware. First, there
is U.S. Code, Title 10. This tells the military services
what they are directed to do and directed not to do—
in other words, what the limits of their activities are.
On top of that, or parallel to it, on an annual basis, the
President of the United States is supposed to issue a
National Security Strategy document. In this document,
the President, his entourage, and the National Security
Council survey the world, look for threats to National
Security, and prioritize them. They do not necessarily
go far beyond that. These are public documents and
you can read them online anytime. If you do this—and
if you teach National Security issues, it is an exercise
you ought to put your students through—start with
the early National Security Strategy documents and
progress through them. You will see dramatic changes
in style and variations in intent. Some are very selfcongratulatory, “Look at what my administration has
done.” Some actually do what the law requires.
Thanks to our last Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, we now have a new document called the
National Defense Strategy. It is supposed to translate
the National Security Strategy into military terms. It
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further prioritizes things, but it also begins the process
of apportioning resources in accordance with those
priorities and assigning general tasks. In the past,
the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff has issued
a National Military Strategy document. Whether
that will continue remains to be seen. There is some
overlap between that and the Secretary of Defense’s
document.
Those documents tell the military commanders
in the field and the Chiefs of the Services what they
are supposed to do. Notice that I just mentioned two
different categories of people: the Chiefs of the Services
and the commanders in the field. The combatant
commanders in the field are responsible for what goes
on in a geographic region, for the most part. The Service
Chiefs are expected to raise, to train, and to equip the
forces that are handed off to the regional commanders
to perform the actions described in such documents as
the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy,
and National Military Strategy.
The Environment and the Army.
So, the military services are permitted and directed
to act only within a very disciplined process. That
there is an Army Environmental Protection Institute
(AEPI) that exists within the legal structure of the
service is indicative of authorized interest. It shows
that environmental issues are being taken seriously.
The Army does not spend money on things in which it
has no interest. It has lots of things that it needs money
to support. Investing funds in the AEPI is, therefore,
signal number one that we are actually interested in
this business.
Last year another document was published: The
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05. The
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number may not mean much to you, but it tells the armed
services that stability and support operations, which
include issues of environmental impact, will receive
priority equivalent to combat operations. The Directive
does not say much beyond this, so much of it is open to
interpretation. Nor does it say that the same amount of
money must be spent on these kinds of operations. And
expenditures in the environmental category are, unless
I am much mistaken, infinitesimal—$500 billion are to
be spent primarily on combat operations. Nevertheless,
this directive does send a message that the U.S. Army
is interested in things happening on the environmental
front, outside of the combat theater.
There is another way to look at this, moreover.
Combat operations receive a great deal of attention
and they cost a lot, but it is actually combat operations
support that costs most. It is here that we can achieve
most positive results. By working to reduce the
harmful environmental effects of operations, we can
also plausibly enhance combat efficiency.
On the battlefield, there are certain realities that are
very difficult to deal with. For example, the Army was
told that lead pollutes. So we took lead out of bullets.
How much pollution do bullets really inflict on the
environment outside of a rifle range? But we did it.
We do not have lead bullets anymore. Well, yes, we do
have them and there are places where they are needed,
but we did back off from their use. This was done to
avoid pollution. But on the battlefield, you want to be
able to knock a guy down when you hit him with a
bullet so that he doesn’t keep on running and get close
to you. For that, lead bullets are best.
The Army has not quite figured out what to do
with this new DoD directive. It has one thing, though,
in its kit bag which will enable us to do a lot of good
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things. This is a structure called a Maneuver Support
Brigade. This is a headquarters which can bring under
its control any grouping of entities to perform almost
any essentially noncombat task that is assigned to that
particular commander.
So, in one sense, the Army is a bit like a lady-inwaiting. We have a structure, of sorts. We have a
directive of sorts. But at the moment, climate change
is not placed high in the national scheme of priorities.
So we cannot dedicate large amounts of money to
this mission nor develop suitable structures. When
Iraq eventually cools down—and we should probably
also assume that it will take the Army some time to
recover—I would predict, and I would hope, as part of
the long-range vision, the potential impact of climate
change will achieve some substance beyond a piece
of paper and a diagram on a piece of paper, which is
about where we are right now.
Potential Army Roles and Missions.
For us, disaster relief is a reaction mission. Disaster
happens or we see disaster about to happen, and we
go out and take care of the problem. Disaster relief and
national security are not necessarily, or indeed often,
synonymous. National security should be thought of
as a proactive long-range undertaking within which
disaster relief is one of those lesser-included things. It
is vital that you separate national security and disaster
relief in your thinking. When Mt. Pinatubo erupted,
how much warning did we have for that—a week at
most?
Now that we have volcanologists giving us
information, we have years of warning. So new
possibilities have arisen. And in this area of long-term
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planning, there are indeed ways in which the military
can play a useful role in environmental protection.
The armed services are constantly scanning the
world from space, from high altitude aircraft, and
in various other ways. The first wave of satellites
were primarily used to collect military data. Now,
however, there are more satellites up there producing
earth data than producing military data. And there
are people who understand that feedings from these
satellites—especially multi-spectral or geo-focused
ones—are capable of producing excellent information
which could warn us of disasters, both imminent and
creeping. The military can participate in this. It is not
necessary that all that information be classified and
sequestered behind the “Green Door” (a colloquial
phrase used to describe the pervasive barrier between
useful intelligence and the people who need to use it.)
Probably 80 percent of this information is shareable.
We also do planning very well. We train people
to be planners. The staffs of each one of the regional
combatant commanders have to deal with the prospects of environmental issues in their natural course of
events. Can that be done at a national level as well? Absolutely. Suppose we were to write a National Security
Act of 2010. I see no reason why we could not use it
to heighten awareness of those kinds of environmental
issues which pose a threat to the integrity of the United
States first, and then its allies and friends, in that order.
If we are indeed facing—as everyone now thinks we
are—inundation of the coast and low-lying waters; if
20 percent of Florida is going to go under water as the
sea level rises, should we not be seriously interested in
this? Do we actually believe that this will happen? Can
we begin to plan for this? It does not matter the color
of the suit that does the planning.
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One would hope that in this National Security Act
of 2010 (which, by the way, has been on our plate for
about 15 years) we might mandate, as an act or law,
a means of integration of climatological information
across government agencies. We created the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Cannot we write a law that
says this intelligence agency can talk to environmental
people? We created the National Security Agency. Can
we not give it new properties which make it something
other than the personal pet of the present president? Do
we want to establish some connecting mechanism that
will allow us to talk to nongovernmental organizations,
private voluntary organizations, and people like that
who are, as mentioned, not really comfortable getting
close to military guys? Why not?
There is an awful lot of interest in doing this.
What if environmental security were to become a
part of the National Security agenda and become
incorporated into a National Security Act of 2010? Can
it happen? Absolutely! Can we get it to do the right
thing? Absolutely. How do we go about it? The guys in
uniform understand the need for this. The average guy
for whom you vote, either in local elections or national
elections, hasn’t got a clue. So, what I am telling you is
that there is a possibility of bringing all of this together
in a synergistic fashion in about 6 years. Maybe. Is that
too late? I do not know. Will the threats be so palpable
then that they can be incorporated in this National
Security document? Arguably, yes. How? To whom do
you speak on a day-to-day basis? With whom do you
correspond? Do you use emotion, or do you use facts
when you address these issues? Can you establish clear
linkages between actions and consequences? When
you can do that, then we have a path to gaining control
of this thing. Thank you.
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Commentator
Richard J. Kilroy, Jr.
Virginia Military Institute
It is a pleasure for me to be here and be part of
this discussion. By bringing together the military
and academic communities, this conference is doing
something that is really very important. The academic
community tends to think of things theoretically. The
military thinks of things practically. And sometimes
the two communities do not communicate to each
other very well. So this type of conference allows us
to get to the heart of some of these issues. I must say,
too, that I very much appreciate the opportunity to be
on a panel with these three gentlemen, one of whom—
General Nash—I have known since 1998. They are all
practitioners, but they are also academics.
We are, as this panel stresses, being challenged
with a new security environment. But in many cases,
the military missions themselves really have not
changed. We are going to continue to do things that
we have historically done in the past: peacekeeping,
humanitarian intervention and civic assistance,
homeland defense, and homeland security. What has
changed, rather, is the level of intensity. A couple of
years ago at East Carolina University, a guest speaker
addressing our cadets at an ROTC commissioning
ceremony, stressed that the future would be a very
different one. He made it sound a bit like Mr. Toad’s
Wild Ride at Disney World.
One question that has arisen over the course of
the conference is whether we should focus more on
threats or capabilities. I was involved with the U.S.
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) after the
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Berlin Wall came down. We were trying to develop
threat doctrine for training purposes; we went back
to something called dial-a-threat. At the time, there
were no more bad guys: You couldn’t fight against
the Russians, so they became the Crasnovians. We
started creating the Marcollens. We created, basically,
capability-based scenarios. We sought to put the
military into challenging situations so they would
have to exercise traditional roles and missions. But we
actually could not identify what the threats would be.
We are in a situation today that is not dissimilar. As
this panel made clear, from a practitioner’s standpoint,
even if the military is not entirely clear what the threat
is, it must still be prepared, trained, and equipped to
perform its missions.
Let me turn to Professor Tussing’s talk. He made
some excellent points about capabilities. He is right
that a lot of people do not think about what the military
brings to the fight. But when they find themselves
in one of these difficult environments, the military
suddenly takes on increased significance. Even when
the military is overseas and plays a subordinate role, a
lot of civilian agencies are going to turn to the military,
because it is the military that has the capabilities. He
is also right that when the military works in foreign
operational environments, it has to give credit to the
host-nation militaries, to the host-nation governments.
I served in Latin America for a number of years.
General Clark used to say, “In SOUTHCOM, take no
credit and expect none.” And I think that was a good
rule of thumb.
Professor Tussing also provided us with a lot of
good examples of what combatant commands are
doing today, whether it be in SOUTHCOM, PACOM,
or CENTCOM. They are all looking at aspects of
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disaster preparedness and disaster response. How can
we prepare to operate in those environments? We have
to deal with the effects of climate change. But that is
difficult when you have many of these high-demand,
low-density items and assets, and especially when you
are in a theater where you may not have the right kind
of forces routinely assigned to you.
In his presentation, General Nash spoke of his
own experiences in Kosovo. He applied some of his
information operations (IO) training and stressed
the importance of shaping perceptions. And, he
said, if we can create win-win situations, especially
when it comes to environmental issues, then we can
accomplish our objectives. And I thought the example
that he gave showed just that. He also made clear that
peacekeeping in an age of environmental change has
to take into consideration many different factors—the
social, political, and cultural. And we have to integrate
the different challenges, especially in areas like the
Balkans.
It seems to me that the more we do on the
preventive side, the more tools and resources we will
have to respond effectively when the need arises.
And General Nash’s experience bears this out. When
I taught IO, one of my major challenges was trying to
convince warfighters that if we did IO well, they would
not have to go to war. They didn’t necessarily like to
hear this. Tankers, you know, want to go out and kill
things, right? But the fact is that doing IO well means
that we do not have to put U.S. forces in harm’s way
and risk blood and treasure. So, the key here, again, is
that the United States has to be able to master its own
capabilities.
I also agree with our panelists: The U.S. military
needs to become more energy efficient. We have to set
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a good example and do what we expect host nations
to do. When I was in SOUTHCOM, it was hard for us
to preach about counterdrug missions to host-nation
militaries because we didn’t do the same at home. We
were speaking, as it were, with forked tongues. As
General Nash says, the civilian leadership will play
the lead role. But the best results will be achieved if an
integrated approach is used.
Dr. Johnson also made a number of very important
points. By going into the structural mode, he reminded
us of how the military actually works and under what
constraints it operates. This is a key point which we
should bear in mind. Combatant commanders have
the warfighting role and responsibility, but so do the
Service Chiefs. Combatant commanders may be sold
on environmental security and want to perform the
kinds of missions we discussed. But they also have
to have the ability to organize, train, and equip the
necessary forces. And if the service components aren’t
read into it, it is very difficult to get that message out.
On a related note, Professor Johnson also stressed the
need for continuity between National Security Strategy,
Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and so
on. Here again, if the Service Chiefs are not involved,
combatant commanders are not going to be given the
resources needed to perform environmental missions.
And in the end, it really comes down to whether or not
the mission is funded.
Dr. Johnson also talked about planning. Combatant
commanders plan. There are official documents which
tell them what to plan for. The Unified command plan
dictates areas of responsibility, missions in areas that
the combatant commanders have to be prepared to
do. SOUTHCOM had counterdrug as its warfighting
mission. But it also had a heavy component of
humanitarian civic assistance. We had to prepare
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functional plans to do those types of missions. And I
think that Dr. Johnson is absolutely correct when he
says that we need to ratchet up this kind of activity.
Before I close, I would like to make some general
observations about environmental threats. When I was
in SOUTHCOM in 1996 and 1997, I served as a special
assistant to both General McCaffrey and General Clark.
General Clark was trying to be very proactive at the
time in environmental security. He tried to bring this
within the scope of the combatant command. It was
hard for him to get the attention of Washington. They
said, “Counterdrug is what you do in SOUTHCOM,
do not talk to me about disaster relief or environmental
issues.” But the need for this became a little bit more
clear in 1998 with Hurricane Mitch which devastated
Central America—Honduras, in particular. One of the
things that permitted an effective disaster response and
kept a democratically stable government in Honduras
is that there was a mitigation plan in place. We had
actually done an exercise the year before in Honduras
that gave us a scenario of a major hurricane coming
through Central America. True, we still had interagency
problems. But at least the government agencies, civilian
and military, were all working together and exchanging
business cards before the crisis, not during it. And that
is key.
Looking back at all this with the wisdom of
hindsight, there are some important lessons to be
learned. Honduras is still, as you know, a democratic
society today. It survived Hurricane Mitch despite
its devastating economic impact. Contrast that with
what happened in 1972 in Nicaragua. A major volcanic
eruption devastated Managua, Nicaragua. It killed
about 11,000 people. That environmental situation
exacerbated the political situation. Seven years later,
the government was overthrown, and the Sandanista
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Regime took power. And, oh by the way, Daniel Ortega
is back. He has actually, now, been elected as President
again.
So environmental threats do have national security
implications. I think our conference has done a good
job discussing that. I think this panel has done an
excellent job of explaining the practitioner’s role. And
I think that they agree, that, regardless of whether we
can agree or disagree on global warming, the military
still has the responsibility to respond to the challenges
ahead. Thank you very much.
Discussion
Q: Military and civilian institutions need to
coordinate more effectively when it comes to planning.
Yet, U.S. civilian agencies do not have the culture,
the resources, and the tradition of planning that the
military does. Could each of you mention one quick
pragmatic thing that we should be doing in the next 2,
3, or 5 years to better integrate and prepare for planning
across military and civilian U.S. federal agencies?
Tussing: We are trying to establish a strategic
cultural mindset in the Department of Homeland
Security. There are no less than 64 detailers sent from
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and American Security Affairs to
develop an educational apparatus. There is a document
called the Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support. It speaks of three pillars of
operation: to lead, to support, and to enable. There
are some things that only the military can do. Then it
leads. There are some things that it can do in support of
civil authorities. Then it supports. Sometimes it builds
partnerships inside and outside of the United States
and helps others acquire the capabilities they need to
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deal with problems. Then it enables. This, too, is very
important.
Nash: On the State Department’s side, the Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction Stability has
initiated a planning effort. The services, for the most
part, have been reasonably good in supporting them
and in sending officers to the State Department. Also,
the Joint Forces Command has been very helpful in
developing an ethos, if you will, of both planning and
training—two issues the military is strong on and most
civilian agencies are not. And, lastly, the military must
learn to lead from behind when it works with civilian
agencies at home, just as it does when it works with
foreign militaries abroad. That means giving credit
and visibility to the local authorities.
Johnson: Historically, the U.S. military has been
one of the worst long-range planning agencies in the
country. For three wars—the Spanish American War,
World War I, and World War II—we had to call on big
business to help us figure out how to do our job. The
existing organization (then 250,000 people, more or
less) was nowhere near comparable in size to the large
corporations that operate in the international arena
today. They say they do not have the manpower to spare
for training. Philosophically, I am opposed to a larger
government. But under the present circumstances,
there are a lot of government agencies that need to
get bigger so they can send—or believe that they can
send—people off to do training. Training on the job is
really cool, so long as you get the training before the
crisis hits. We in the military have a very structured
approach to training, and sometimes that’s not good
enough. We need to look at a variety of alternative
paths and continue to talk to people, including big
business.
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Nash: I was surprised that Colin Powell, when
he was Secretary of State, was not able to make more
progress on the professional development of Foreign
Service Officers. We need to establish a system that
would facilitate that. That is, I think, one of the things
that should be on our agenda.
Q: When you are engaged in operations, you find
yourself in a place that is culturally constrained and
has customs and a language that, in the post-Cold War
era, few people may know. How ready are the armed
forces to deal with this?
Nash: We can be very well-prepared if we think
things through. The problem is not always wellunderstood at the senior level. But the Armed Forces of
the United States have had a lot of experience operating
in foreign lands. You learn over time that if you treat
people with dignity and respect and recognize their
worth, then you can adapt quite easily. You can read
and listen to tapes and get a simple understanding of
a different culture. You will also gain respect if you
live by your own values. You have no doubt heard
of the DIME—Diplomatic, Information, Military, and
Economic elements of power. Well, I would argue that
values and behavior are also an element of national
power.
Johnson: Any soldier who wants to, can take
any language he wants to through the Rosetta Stone
process. It will at least let you begin a civil discussion.
It is free online to you, as a soldier, which, given how
costly this is, tells you something of how seriously we
take this language business. The next step, of course,
is to reward soldiers for demonstrated proficiency in
the languages you are most interested in. The Army
publishes its top ten list. And soldiers going into a
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theater are expected to be at least minimally conversant
with the language.
Nash: George Blanchard, when he was Commander
in Chief, U.S. Army Europe in 1975, ordered that all
200,000 plus soldiers learn to speak German. Many
battalion commanders and above got sent out to
Monterey and were ordered to include a German
section in all change of command speeches. And so,
you know, it had an overwhelming impact on the
relations with the German people.
Audience: I teach at the Air Commander Staff College right now. We are teaching four major languages
to students—Mandarin Chinese, French, Spanish, and
Arabic. All the students are tested when they initially
arrive, and then they are assigned to learn the most
difficult language based on their test scores. So during
the year, they go through the Rosetta Stone process
and learn a foreign language. They are also exposed
to 88 different international officers from 76 different
countries, as are the students at the Army and Navy
schools. So they are exposed to other cultures from
their overseas assignments as well as their interaction
during school.
Q: How do you define environmental security? And
is there a common definition within the commands,
and what is it?
Tussing: I do not believe there is a common
definition. As I see it, the purpose of environmental
security is to make sure people have protection and
provision. The government, through its military, can
make people’s lives better. Environmental security is
an extension of this idea.
Nash: Security has been a principle of war for a
long time. A commander is required to consider how to
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“secure” his force as he conducts his military operation.
That has been translated into force protection and, often
times, becomes all too consuming. Public “security” is
a mission, as opposed to a principle of operation. In
Iraq after the surge, the order was given to “secure”
the public. That had more impact than the number
of soldiers sent. You can take that same concept and
apply it to any number of functional areas to include
environmental security.
Tussing: “Security” is a very important word.
Note the distinction between the words “security” and
“defense.” There are very few people in the United
States who have any question about who the guys
are who are in charge of defense. But, “security” is a
concerted national effort. And it does not begin and
end with the guys in green.
Q: I was surprised not to hear much reference to
the National Guard and Reserve components.
Tussing: The National Guard has what amounts to
a state sponsorship program for individual countries
in the world. And they have built up a working
relationship with others for the purpose of sharing
experiences. For instance, the state of Arkansas and the
country of Kazakhstan have probably more ties than one
would really want to get into. Remember, though, that
for the preponderance of their existence, the National
Guard belonged to the state governors. And, in spite of
recent history, they will generally not have a national
mission, let alone an overseas mission. But you can be
sure that particularly with the growing concerns about
the potential disasters, not natural but man made, the
governors are keeping a closer and closer watch over,
not just how their guard is responding, but how their
guard is interacting with regional guard organizations
within the United States.
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Audience: About 4 years ago in the Air Force
Reserve, we set up and identified reservists. These
were composed of academics, people in business, etc.,
who had lived oversees for a long time and had a lot of
good contacts. We drew up a list of these so we could
call on them if needed.
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CHAPTER 8
KEYNOTE AND SUMMATION
This final chapter brings together two talks, given at different
points in the conference. The first essay is by our keynote
speaker, General Paul Kern. In it, he recounts his own growing
understanding of the serious implications of climate change and
urges us all to address the problem. Dr. Richard Weitz provides a
summary of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS)/U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) conference, drawing attention to the
areas of consensus and controversy. He concludes by comparing
the findings of recent study undertaken by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies.

Keynote Address
General Paul J. Kern, USA-Ret.
The Cohen Group
Introduction by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II.
It is an honor to introduce General Paul Kern.
General Kern is a graduate of the military academy,
as am I. General Kern served two tours in Vietnam,
as did I. General Kern got a master’s degree from the
University of Michigan, as did I.
General Kern then went on to movies and then
science and technology and other related fields,
and at one point, the Army, in a stroke of wisdom,
uncharacteristic perhaps, said, “General Kern, you
need to take command of this division with which
we are going to conduct a very high technology
experiment.” So they gave him command of the 4th
Infantry Division (Mechanized), and they said to
him, “Make it all connected and make it all connect
correctly, and work synergistically, every single piece
391

in harmony with every other piece.” And he laid the
groundwork for that thing, and ultimately produced
something that was absolutely spectacular, just in time
for the Army to decide they didn’t need divisions; but
the lessons we learned from that organization process,
that training process, that equipping and digitization
process has moved us decades ahead in increasing
our capabilities with the present force. General Kern
ended his career, for all practical purposes as far as
I’m concerned, with command of the Army Materiel
Command. That is the organization that equips the
Army; that provides it with reliable equipment in the
proper quantities and qualities; and does so based
on General Kern’s experience with the 4th Infantry
Division, so organized and digitized that all the pieces
connected—at least most of the time.
The Army unfortunately lost his services, and he
is now consulting on environmental issues for the
Center for Naval Analyses. But our paths did cross
one more time before he retired, and that was when I
was teaching a transformation seminar out in our war
college. A colonel came up to talk to the class and was
diverted immediately after that. General Kern sat down
at my seminar table with about 22 guys and gals, and
gave us the frankest evaluation of the state of the Army
and its equipping and equipment process that any of
us have ever had. He gave us a view of the potential
for the future which absolutely took our breath away.
This is a man who knows how things work. Maybe he
will get the environment to work, also. Sir?
Address by General Paul J. Kern.
Thanks. That was a nice introduction, and I
appreciate it. I enjoy being back here at Duke. I think
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if we can walk away tonight with a concept of how all
the pieces fit together, we will have been successful;
however, I fear that to do that we might have to stay
here for another couple of months. This is a very
challenging topic that you have picked, and it has
been a very challenging seminar. The issue is one I
have been very much engaged in. I recently have been
part of a military assessment board that the Center for
Naval Analyses put together on global climate change.
I have to give great credit to Sherry Goodman, who put
together a series of seminars for about 12 flag officers of
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and said,
“Come out with a single paper.” Now think about that.
You take a noncontroversial topic like global climate
change, make a military assessment of what is going
to happen as a result, and ask all four services to come
up with the same answer. That’s almost an impossible
task. But we are just about there, and within a couple
of weeks, you should be reading about what we have
all decided.
Burning Refineries and Fast Cars.
Now I will try to do that for you. You heard a little
bit about my history from Doug Johnson, but maybe I
need to put it in a little bit more context. I grew up as a
young kid in New Jersey, and I used to, on a summer
morning, go to the top of the hill where they had an ice
cream restaurant, Gruning’s, located on what we called
First Mountain. Now First Mountain is about 300 feet
high, but it overlooks Jersey City, New Jersey, and off
into the New York Harbor. And for fun and games, we
used to watch the refineries burn. Every year, it was
very predictable that we would have a major fire in
one of the refineries—you only need to look at all the
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oil tanks that sit down there to figure that one out. And
the tanks could burn for quite a while, and we didn’t
think anything about that, other than that it was a big
fire, and somebody was going to have to go put it out.
We didn’t think much about what this meant from
a national security perspective. We didn’t wonder if
someone had intentionally gone to set that fire. Nor
did we think much in terms of what it was really doing
to the environment. At that time, all the cars we drove
were as much hot rods as we could figure out how to
make them from an old V8, and the last thing that we
considered was what was coming out of the tailpipe.
What we considered was how much gas you could get
through that carburetor and if you could super charge
it, because then you could get a little bit more . . . and
don’t get caught by the cops. And so that was the
environment that I grew up in.
Vietnam, Agent Orange, and Army Missions.
I went off to the Military Academy—Bill Nash and
I were there at the same time—and I can guarantee you
that in 4 years of studying, the thoughts about global
climate change and the environment never crossed
our desks. Much like the young graduates of all of our
ROTCs, academies, and officer candidate schools today,
we were focused on what was going to happen after
graduation. And, for us, that was going to Vietnam. In
Vietnam, we dumped a lot of Agent Orange to get rid
of all that foliage. We used napalm to burn off jungle,
and we didn’t think, again, too much about what that
meant with respect to the environment. That was a
military operation. Napalm was one the tools that we
had with which to conduct those operations, and so we
used it. That was how we thought for quite a while.
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Well, after spending some time in a Navy hospital,
I went on another tour to Vietnam. I looked around
at my friends—McCaffrey and Donovan (who were
badly wounded), and looking at myself in the mirror
as another Irish descendant—I said, “Geez, I wonder
if anybody’s figured out that, though my name is
German, half my family came from Ireland (some
think from a family of horse thieves that were running
around Ireland before they came to the United States),
and maybe the Irish’s luck is running out.” And so
when I was finished with my second tour with the
Army in Vietnam and was asked, “Would you like to
go to graduate school,” I said, “Yeah, that sounds like
a good deal.”
Michigan: First Encounters with the Environmental
Protection Agency.
So I went off to the University of Michigan and had
a great time. The Michigan/Ohio State football rivalry
was, at that time, in its heyday and was absolutely one
of the greatest rivalries of all time. Bo Schembechler and
Woody Hayes were providing as much entertainment
on the field as were the football teams.
It was at Michigan that I got into this business of
looking at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
which was actually being established at that time. In
fact, the Agency put its first test offices within Ann
Arbor. I was looking at transportation through studies
in civil and mechanical engineering. And I took part one
summer in a study of combustion which asked, “How
do you clean up what is coming out of that tailpipe?”
This was a new idea, and I had a really good friend at
that time who had been a Military Police (MP) Sergeant.
I was an Armor Captain in a cavalry unit. We had great
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stories about what the Army was doing, and we were
both suffering terribly in these advanced differential
equation courses and a few other courses that we had
to take from the math department for the summer.
Well, he went off to work at the General Motors (GM)
Tech Center, and I had another year to finish up. As we
did that, we would look more at those studies. And at
that time, the country was talking about the new rules
that were being passed to govern fuel economy—the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rules. At the
same time, as discussed earlier today, we were trying
to figure out how you could improve fuel economy and
control emissions—how you were going to regulate
the emissions coming out of the tailpipe.
Well, as a bunch of mechanical engineering students,
we said, “Man, that’s going in the opposite direction.
How are we going to do this? You can’t both regulate
emissions coming out of the tailpipe and improve on
fuel economy at the same time.” That was the thinking
that was going on back then. We further thought that
you certainly can’t do it and be competitive with Toyota.
At least that was how the automotive companies felt—
they were feeling the pressure from overseas sales. As
far as they were concerned, every penny that you spent
on a car to improve its capability was a penny less that
you put into the corporate revenue.
Well, my buddy who was the MP Sergeant went
off to work for an automotive company. A couple of
years later, after both of us had finished with work,
he said, “If the government had never passed that law
about fuel economy and emissions coming out of the
tailpipe, the automotive companies would never have
done anything.” And so it was a policy set of rules that
was not very popular politically, nor very popular on
Wall Street, that said that you had to do something.
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Now shortly after that, we all sat around and went
in odd and even days to the gas stations, and we sat
around and watched what really happened in terms
of fuel economy. I was a graduate student at the
time and started forming an opinion, and I wrote a
paper that was wrong though, fortunately for me, my
professor agreed with me. I looked at the energy and
the environment as a whole, and I said, “You can’t do
both. You’ve got to make some choices.” And, equally
fortunately, there were some smarter people around
who said, “No, you have to do both,” and sent us
down a path to accomplish controlling emissions and
improving fuel economy. Now that was almost 40
years ago, and we are at a position again today where
we are going to have to make some hard choices.
Changing Priorities.
A couple of years ago, Sir Michael Jackson, a good
friend of mine and of Bill Nash’s, was giving a lecture
in London on what the future challenges would be in
defense. I had to get up first. Now I had recently listened
to a lecture that had been given by a Rice University
professor, a Nobel Prize winner, Rick Smalley. He
has since passed away. Some of you may know him.
Carbon nanotubes were really his forte, and buckyball
was his real masterpiece. Anyway, I had heard him
give a lecture to a bunch of grade school kids. We had
started a contest to try to get some interest in math,
science, and engineering. And in that lecture, he said,
“The country has 10 problems to face in the future.
Number one is going to be energy.” He went on to list
the next problems, and the top four were energy, water,
the environment, and food. And I thought about that,
and about what I had said some years ago, and about
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the positions that we were all in. And I stood up in
front of this audience of Brits and said, “Our top three
problems are energy, the environment, and water,”
and depending upon where you live in the world,
you can change that order, but if you live around a
desert, and you have a lot of saltwater, it takes energy
for desalination to produce fresh water that you can
drink.
If you live in a desert region in the western part of
this country and you want to irrigate, you will need
energy. Some people think that California naturally has
lots of water running through it to produce all those
vegetables and fruits. Not true. It takes energy to pump
that water across those mountains and into the valleys
so you can irrigate. So again, you have this balance
between energy, and water, and your environment.
Now this military assessment board that we looked
at started putting these pieces together, and we said, “Is
there really something here? Is there a military security
relationship between energy and the environment?”
Now we didn’t add energy into it initially. We
looked at it from the environmental perspectives, and
you will hear a little bit more from Tom Morehouse
about the energy perspectives tomorrow. We started
by saying, “Well, we are not sure.” We listened to lots
of people. We listened to some of the most alarming
theories about falling off the cliff, very precipitous
changes, and considered some of the things that could
happen. We looked at things like what happens when
the permafrost melts in the tundra regions and asked,
“What do the models predict about that?” The answer
is that we don’t know, but we do know that inside that
permafrost is captured some frozen methane—if you
are a Brit, it is me-thane—and we do know that that is
going to add to the greenhouse gases without our doing
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anything. We do know that the earth is going through
fairly predictable cycles of climate change. Now the
good thing about those cycles is they are longer than
your and my lifetimes, so you and I will not have to
deal with it while we are living; but we do know that
the earth will have to deal with it.
The interesting thing when we went over to the
United Kingdom was that they put both of those models
together. They looked at human input, greenhouse
gases, as well as the history of the earth’s orbit, and
figured out that together the models predict that the
environment would get worse, though the models
were not accurate enough to predict exactly when. So
we started thinking through that, yes, there really are
going to be some issues here that we probably ought to
start thinking about so that we will be in a position to
do something if we have to react.
Business Enters the Picture.
Well, that was step one; but perhaps to me what
was the most intriguing and informative (and you
heard a little bit about it today, too) was when the
business world stepped in and said, “We want to play
in this issue.” The number one industry that caught my
attention was the insurance business. Now what does
the insurance business have to do with climatic change?
The answer is that they pay the bills. They have been
paying for these extreme weather events that we have
been seeing. We have watched insurance companies
go under, go bankrupt, as a result of not having the
resources to meet the cost of multiple calamities.
Take places that are in the coastal regions, and
especially the Gulf coast of the United States, whether
it is Florida, or Louisiana, or Mississippi. You cannot
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get insurance there now. So people are feeling the
economic impact of the storms in a way that had not
been predicted before. I ask you, is that global climate
change, or is that a local weather change? Is that part of
the historical trend or is that something that is a result of
greenhouse gases that we are adding? We debated that
for a while. We listened to a lot of different opinions,
not all in agreement. However, the answer you come
back with after listening to this kind of discussion for a
while, is that we are not really sure that we can pinpoint
exactly what is going on here, but still we ought to be
prepared, because something is changing.
Now as a young kid, I made a lot of money shoveling
snow and watched a lot of hurricanes bring the bay
and the ocean together in New Jersey. That stopped
for a while, and now we see it coming back again. So,
perhaps, the storms aren’t just due to all the things that
we are adding with greenhouse gases. Maybe there is
something in the cycle that causes the extreme weather.
But when it came down to a military assessment, we
kept going back and saying, “Something is happening.
We can be very certain that with all the scientific data
and with all the climatic data that has been put together,
there is something that we ought to be prepared to
do.”
So we started looking around at the different
combatant commands. We looked at the geographic
areas and looked at the pieces. And at that point, we
pretty much recognized that, as you all discussed
today, one of the things that we can do is to begin an
engagement process with people and help them deal
with whatever it is, whether it is a tsunami, a hurricane,
an earthquake, or some type of a natural disaster—and
no matter what was the cause of that natural disaster.
If you are caught up in one of these disasters, it doesn’t
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make any difference about the cause. Who you see
coming to help you does make a difference. We also
saw that there was pretty good evidence that both the
methane, which was mostly naturally occurring, and
the CO2 concentrations, which were man-made, were
contributing to this, and so we started down that path
in trying to look at it.
Planning and Resource Allocation.
At this point, we got the admirals and generals
together and said, “Okay, let’s come to some
agreement.” Well, we knew a fair amount about what
happens in military organizations, but we did not have
the scientific background to really be sure whether
climate change was man-made, a result of natural
events, or some combination. But the bottom line was,
if you are a military planner and if you are building
organizations and putting resources against them, you
ought to be prepared for the things that are out there.
If those things out there are going to make the situation
worse, then you ought to figure out how you are going
to deal with them. You have to apply resources to deal
with problems you see on the horizon. That is really
what we call troop to task business. You carry out a
military assessment, establish a mission, and allocate
resources to it. And it was fairly clear that if we did
not take climate change into consideration, there was
going to be some multiplying effect.
To give you an example, Bill Nash and I watched
the Sava River go from a little trickle to become a
major problem. It required all new bridging assets
to get into the Balkans. Well, I can tell you when we
started looking about going into Iraq in the 2003 time
frame, we noticed that there were a few rivers around
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Baghdad. We looked at all the bridging assets and at all
the flooding possibilities. Floods could be man-made or
they could be natural, but one way or another we were
going to have to deal with them from a military aspect.
Similarly, people who look at the Arctic ice sheets look
at them from a military perspective. We used to send
the submarines there all the time. We do not do much of
that anymore. We used to send the icebreakers up there.
We don’t have many icebreakers anymore. Making
these shifts takes resources, and those resources do not
materialize overnight. You have to think through how
to conduct your operations. Experience tells you, “You
have to plan for it. Don’t get surprised by it.” You may
not have the right plan, but when you are looking at a
national strategy that says that the environment and
global climate change are something we ought to be
prepared to do, you have to look at what are the second
and third order questions about the kinds of resources
that will be needed. It takes planning, and it takes prior
planning to get those into the flow. That was one clear
conclusion on which we could all agree.
We also agreed that, if you are going to deal with
this problem, you need to recognize that there are lots
of publics out there. There is a European public which
has come to much more of a cohesive agreement than
we have. There are lots of different American publics
out there. And if you really want people to pay attention
to something, you cannot afford to alienate any one
group. If you do that, the argument becomes focused
on a small microcosm of the problem. It is better to step
back and say, “Geez, we really need to think about
this seriously. It’s energy, it’s water, it’s global climate
change, it’s extreme weather conditions. It’s all of these
things that we are going to have to deal with. How do
we plan for it?” Don’t let the issue become focused on
a specific source of global climate change.
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If you are looking at it from a military perspective,
the important question is, “How are we going to deal
with the problem?” How are we going to find a response
mechanism, whether it is an engagement mechanism,
or whether it is setting the example, or whether it is
improving our use of energy and decreasing our
greenhouse gas emissions at all of our installations.
There are things that we can do to set an example, and
there are things that we can do to be prepared. If the
assessment is that there are severe climatic conditions
in the future which will impact military plans, then we
can let the scientific community argue the why and the
how we will get to these conditions. Our task, in the
military, is to step back and say, “What should we do
to prepare? These are some of the conclusions that we
have come to.”
Economic Incentives.
One thing that you brought up time and again in
the discussion today is the importance of economics.
This is a lesson that I have learned out of all of this, out
of watching how people solve problems in our world
today. Not everybody is in 100 percent agreement, and
so you are going to hear some continued debate here,
but I think it has been a very healthy set of arguments.
You are beginning to see that there are people who are
investing money in trying to solve problems, whether
it is Wal-Mart, General Electric, Virgin Airlines, or
the insurance companies. They are saying, “It is time
to step up and put some of our money into solving
these problems, because if we don’t, we might create
a problem that is worse than we expected. We have, if
nothing else, some years to learn how to become more
efficient and to learn how to adapt to the changes. We
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need to invest in results which will keep us competitive.”
And so economic incentives play a big part.
I attended an Air Force sponsored energy symposium a couple of weeks ago, and one of the things we
talked about was biofuels. Well, we have been talking
about biofuels for a long time. Is it 5 percent ethanol or
is it 85 percent ethanol? Do you go out and collect all
the grease from McDonald’s and pour it into your fuel
tank and burn it? You can do that, and some people
have done it fairly effectively. But questions remain.
What is the right economic solution, and how do you
provide the right economic incentives so that what
comes out of the tailpipe and what goes in the front
end to produce power are the most efficient and the
least harmful to the environment? And another set of
military assessments says, “Every dollar that we spend
on petrol that does not come from a well inside the
United States is a dollar that we give to a terrorist.”
And there is another set of economic incentives that
says, “Well, maybe there are good reasons to not be so
petroleum dependent.”
If you live in Africa, you worry about emmigration
caused by the expansion of the Sahara. The data that
we saw said the desert grows about one mile in radius
every year. What does that cause? Well, it causes
people to go in search of more arable land, and they
want to head north to Europe. This is yet another
problem that our European friends have to deal
with. So there are other issues involved in this whole
business of the environment and how it is changing
our world. But again, it is fairly clear to me that what
you really get a return on is incentives. To go back to
this Air Force conference; when they gave a real tax
incentive to biodiesel, guess what people did? They
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started producing a lot of biodiesel fuel. The quantities
increased almost proportionally to the tax writeoff.
A second thing happened, too. Whether you are
talking about a 20 percent, or a 30 percent, or a 40
percent, or 100 percent biodiesel engine, you have to
meet a number of other standards. Failing to meet the
fuel standards begins to adversely affect the capabilities
of our current engines. Now the blame game starts,
“Well, it’s because, of that biodiesel fuel.” The answer
is wrong. It’s really because, if you look at it from a
technical point of view, the fuel does not meet all the
standards that we require of either a pure gasoline
or a pure diesel fuel today. The fuel standards that
we have created make sense. You cannot just throw
them out the window, or you will be looking at the
negative impacts and the incentives from a biased set
of data. This will create positions for special interest
groups based on erroneous data sets. The scientific
and academic community must enlighten everyone on
the facts and conclusions from accurate assessments.
I encourage you to continue this debate and publicize
your results. We need the unbiased facts.
What makes people change today in this world,
particularly in this country, are economic incentives—
we are a democracy, but we are also capitalists. What
counts is how people see the return on their investment,
and this has an impact on how people behave. And so
the incentive process needs to do more than just appeal
to people’s view that we are improving the health of the
world and that we are doing something for a greater
global good. It also has to address the return on your
investment.
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The International Dimension.
Finally, there is the more international perspective.
When you look at two great countries in this world as
economic challenges to the United States, India and
China, we can make a threat out of them, or we can
make friends out of them. How we deal with that is
going to depend very much on how we deal with the
energy and the environmental issues.
They feel that they have every much of a right
to pollute this earth as we did when we started the
industrial age. One of the questions that we are going
to have to deal with, again from a total economic and
national security perspective, is if the Chinese are
building a new power plant every week to 10 days—
and it is a coal-fired power plant, and the winds blow
from the west—is it in our best interest to help them
clean up those power plants? We could charge them
for it. We could partner with them. We could do lots of
things. But there are two issues that come out of that.
One is national security, and the other is economic
security. And we ought to look at all these problems
as much more of a global set of issues because we are
all living together on this biosphere. There is only one
biosphere here, and we somehow or another have to
figure out how to share it whether we speak the same
language or burn the same coal or want to fight over
the same piece of rock. This is the earth we live on.
And so I think what I have learned over the last
few years is that we all look at this from a different
perspective, and we will doubtless argue about what is
causing climate change for some time before we decide
exactly what it is. Indeed, we may never know exactly
what it is. But the problem is real. The science may be
bigger than we can deal with, at least in our lifetimes,
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but we do know how to solve some of these problems.
We do know that there are some impacts that are going
to affect our military resources, and we need to plan for
that right now. Our report will be ready, we hope, in a
couple of weeks for publication, about the same time
as some of these other issues will be coming around.
We appreciate that you have all taken this on.
I have great affinity for the university systems and
the Army research offices in this part of the country.
Molly Broad and I had some long discussions when
she ran the North Carolina University systems about
how it was impacting the military and what we could
do to improve it, so I appreciate that the War College
and the universities here are getting together and
addressing this issue. I think it is a pertinent issue for
our generation. My kids like to look at me and say,
“Dad, you’ve really screwed this one up. We’ve got the
world at war, we’ve got the environment going to hell.
And you guys aren’t retiring. You are working longer,
so you are taking all the jobs!”
I think there is more than enough for all of us to do,
and I think there is a great challenge that you have in
front of you right now. So again, I congratulate all of
you for taking this on, and forming this partnership to
address this issue. It is not easy, and it is not one that
everybody is going to agree on the first time through.
There will be a lot of contention, but that is a necessary
part of making our lives better and making the world
a better place to live in during the 21st century. With
that, I will try to answer any questions you might have.
I know that you all just had 8 hours of lectures and 2
hours of happy hour, and it is late at night.
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Synopsis and Concluding Remarks
Richard Weitz
The Hudson Institute
Synopsis.
Areas of Agreement. In this weekend’s discussion
on the relationship between climate change and
national security, many participants seemed to share
a consensus on a number of points. For example, the
attendees at the colloquium shared the perception
that climate has been changing in the past and is
changing now. A general scientific consensus also
exists that managing the problem will require not just
a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to curb the
effects of climate change, but also an increase in the use
of alternative forms of energy.
In addition, it is now widely accepted that climate
change can seriously threaten U.S. national security.
Direct threats to the lives and property of Americans
could come from natural disasters on the scale of
Hurricane Katrina. (Although the precise connection
between climate change and hurricanes remains an
object of scientific debate, standard scientific models do
predict global warming will lead to rising sea levels.)
They could also arise from diseases and pandemics
induced by climate change or from mass migrations
within or into the United States of threatened
populations as coastal regions flood and agricultural
breadbaskets disappear. Climate change also threatens
U.S. allies and the Americans living with them. For
example, any climate-induced disasters in Japan or
Europe could easily impact the U.S. troops and their
dependents based in the region.
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Another consensus belief expressed at the conference
was that climate change could bring the need for many
more humanitarian interventions led by the United
States. The Cable News Network effect (highly visible
during humanitarian emergencies), pressure from
friendly governments and nongovernmental organizations, or other ethical or pragmatic considerations
could lead U.S. policymakers to feel compelled to
rescue people from climate–induced disasters.
In addition, the military can begin to take initiatives
on its own to prevent climate change from degrading
its operational readiness as well as to enhance the
capabilities of its forces to undertake humanitarian
missions. The military can also begin to adopt more
energy-efficient practices and technologies, some of
which may prove suitable for adoption by the civilian
sectors of the economy.
Conference participants also agreed that the
military alone could not manage the consequences
of such a wide-ranging and multidimensional threat
as climate change. Instead, they stressed the need for
an interagency approach that would involve deep
and sustained collaboration between the military and
a range of civilian agencies—from the intelligence
community to climate scientists.
Within the military, participants argued that the
Department of Defense (DoD) should incorporate
issues relvant to climate-related environmental changes
into DoD planning processes, including those relating
to unexpected contingencies as well as routine theaterengagement plans.
Areas of Disagreement. Despite the consensus
on these general principles, the participants differed
on many specific issues. Agreed definitions of what
constitutes a “climate change” issue as opposed to
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one concerning related environmental, economic, or
energy security issues are lacking. The boundaries
between these terms, and their interrelationships,
remain contested. One viewpoint present at the
conference, however, was that consensus over these
terms is irrelevant as long as we know the kinds of
concrete physical phenomena that will ensue—and
can reasonably anticipate their impact in the natural
world and especially on human behavior.
Disagreements remain over the immediacy of the
threat posed by climate change. Some scientists speak
as if they are thinking in terms of decades. Under this
timeline, the military will have the opportunity to be
proactive. For example, it can take steps to increase its
fuel efficiency and develop new technologies that may
pay dividends only decades from now. Others describe
the threat as more imminent. They therefore call for
urgent preparatory measures that would influence the
military’s short-term planning processes and perhaps
even current operations.
While the conference participants generally agreed
that the military will only be one of many agencies
to address the problem of climate change, this also
presents some hurdles. The U.S. defense community
could bring valuable resources and capabilities (e.g.,
intelligence and medical capabilities) to climate change
efforts, especially since it is better resourced than
many civilian agencies (which also encourages others
to turn to it in national crises). Nevertheless, military
involvement in this area will generate budgetary
requirements and result in more resources flowing
to the defense budget instead of to already underresourced civilian agencies. If the U.S. Government
turns to the military for every major security issue, the
military’s status as the only agency that can effectively
“get things done” will be self-reinforcing.
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Opinions also vary over the harmony between
the challenge of dealing with the national security
consequences of climate change and other goals. Some
people maintain that addressing climate change issues
from a national security perspective will help combat
terrorism and improve U.S. ability to project soft power.
In essence, they hope to experience a “virtuous cycle”
where our efforts to limit climate change’s negative
effects create positive, ancillary benefits in terms of
other U.S. national security objectives. Others worry
about budgetary tradeoffs, leading to underfunding
of other priorities, and other conflicts and negative
spillovers.
The 2004 Asian tsunami and subsequent U.S.
humanitarian relief operation does show the
potentially positive consequences that can ensue
from the application of limited U.S. military power
to natural disasters. The successful operation helped
improve U.S. public perceptions in a predominately
Muslim-inhabited area. Yet, it remains unclear how
easily the boon to U.S. soft power on that occasion
can be replicated in other instances. In some cases,
the affected population might prove less hospitable
to a U.S. military presence, especially if the United
States was seen as having contributed to global climate
change through its past policies. The local government
might fear that Washington would try to use the
occasion to coerce it to change its policies toward the
region or even, as might be the case in a near-term
intervention in Iran, pursue regime change under the
cloak of humanitarianism.
While the conference attendees generally agreed
that the U.S. military must incorporate climate change
into its assessment and planning processes, not all
elements of the military appear equally ready or willing
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to make such a commitment. Some of the presentations
showed that the regional combatant commanders are
beginning to consider how to incorporate climate
change into their own agendas. Nevertheless, climate
change is not their main focus, nor do they have force
personnel assigned solely to deal with climate change.
In addition, combatant commanders tend to focus on
the short term, in 2 to 4-year windows, as befits their
responsibility.
The institutional bureaucracy in the Pentagon appears more hesitant to make long-term plans. Fighting
climate change is not the reason why most people join
the military. The same cultural and intellectual barriers
to dealing with climate change within the armed
services arise as they do in the cases of post-conflict
reconstruction or state-building interventions. It is
not the role most people first attribute to the military.
The debate a decade ago over whether to set up a
force for humanitarian or post-conflict reconstruction
issues ended with the determination that separate
assets should not be allocated for such purposes, given
overall limitations on available manpower. Given
today’s increasing stress on the military with the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, finding the resources to devote
portions of the military to fighting climate change and
its associated problems will be exponentially more
difficult. It comes as no surprise, then, that there is
no intramilitary consensus on the future role the U.S.
armed forces must play in preparing for the national
security implications of climate change, and whether or
to what extent this should affect future force structure
decisions.
Given these resource limitations, some conference
participants underscored the value of collaborating
with U.S. friends and allies to pool defense resources
in the military’s response to climate change. Many
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opportunities continue to present themselves in
Europe, but the most interesting developments come
from Russia and China. Despite the very complex
military engagement process the United States has had
with these two countries, climate change is one area
that all parties may feel more comfortable dealing with
and discussing.
Elsewhere in Asia, there are a series of dialogues
taking place in which energy conservation and climate
change are being addressed. For example, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are
all participants in a five-party energy dialogue. In
addition, the recent Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate (AP6) with Australia,
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States
is looking at other means of energy conservation as a
supplement or a substitute for the Kyoto Process. As
another example of opportunities coming out of Asia,
in January 2007 the 2nd Annual East Asia Summit
produced a declaration on East Asian energy security
that made climate change and energy conservation an
important aspect of their definition of security. As well,
despite strained relations between Japan and Russia,
and Japan and China, they are discussing possible
energy cooperation, which could eventually spill over
into a discussion of climate change issues.
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Report.
A study currently taking place at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides
an interesting addendum to the climate changenational security discussion that took place at this
Strategic Studies Institute/TISS conference.1 The
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CSIS project, which will culminate in a book, brings
together perspectives from two traditionally separate
expert communities: scientists of climate change and
social science and policymakers/political scientists.
The paper by Jay Gulledge, a scientist at the Pew
Center for Climate Change, describes the physical
possibilities of each of three climate change scenarios.
His climate change scenarios provide the foundation
for three other papers, each of which explores one of
his scenarios and examines their potential national
security consequences.
The least severe scenario reasonably can be thought
of as the most likely outcome since it is based on a midrange projection of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). The two authors, John Podesta
and Peter Ogden, consider the possible political,
economic, and military consequences over the next 30
years, should major elements of the A1B greenhouse
gas emission scenario of the IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report occur.
The changes under this scenario are described as
“expected” because many of these forecasts may have
become inevitable as a result of past human economic
activities that have already dramatically increased
the quantity of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
In addition, there is little indication that either a
technological fix or a major international agreement will
reduce anthropogenic carbon emissions significantly
over the next 3 decades.
Balancing this pessimism, the scenario assumes that
climate change does not trigger any significant feedback
loops—physical tipping points that, once set in motion,
become hard to stop or predict due to their potentially
discontinuous or chaotic nature. Such catalysts—for
instance, a decline in surface snow cover due to global
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warming, which reduces the earth’s capacity to reflect
light and thereby results in more warming—could
magnify the effects of climate change substantially.
Finally, the authors underscore the importance of local
political, social, and economic factors in determining
the geopolitical effects of climate change.
Prudent security planners always consider worstcase scenarios in determining policies, and this volume
is no exception. The dangers of underestimating
the degree of climate change—and its effects on the
earth—lead the authors to posit scenarios that assume
the scientific literature may systematically minimize
the extent of global temperature rise and its effects on
the earth’s physical and natural properties. Like other
scientists, most climatologists tend to be conservative
in assessing phenomena they do not thoroughly
understand, especially on politically controversial
subjects such as the causes and consequences of climate
change. In addition, the IPCC report-writing process
requires that participating scientists reach a broad
consensus on causal statements, at least in terms of a
range of probabilities, in order for these statements to
be included in a report.
Partially for these reasons, some climate scientists
suspect that IPCC projections may systematically
underestimate future climate change. For instance,
they note that the models used to project future
warming either omit or do not fully account for certain
potentially important positive feedbacks that could
amplify warming (e.g., release of greenhouse gases
from thawing permafrost, reduced ocean and terrestrial
CO2 removal from the atmosphere, etc.). In addition,
there is some evidence (e.g., changes in global ice cover,
rates of sea level rise, tropical storm patterns) that such
feedbacks may already be developing in response to
the present warming trend.
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These considerations lead us to develop a second,
more severe 30-year scenario that assumes IPCC
projections underestimate the rate of change by twofold.
In this world, described by Leon Fuerth, average
global surface temperatures rise to 2.5-3°C above 1990
levels over the next 3 decades. During this 30-year
period, dynamic changes in polar ice sheets accelerate
rapidly, resulting in a 45-60cm rise of average global
sea levels. In addition, the availability of fresh water
decreases substantially in the most affected regions at
lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting
1-2 billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes
essentially nonviable in the dry subtropics, where
irrigation becomes exceptionally difficult because of
dwindling water supplies. Desertification significantly
expands the extent of arid regions in the low latitudes,
taking previously marginally productive crop lands
out of production. The North Atlantic overturning
circulation slows considerably, with consequences for
marine ecosystem productivity and fisheries. Crop
yields decline significantly in the fertile river deltas
because of rising sea levels and damage from increased
storm surges.
The CSIS study teams recognize that climate change
could lead to many unanticipated developments, but
it assumes that abrupt, large-scale climate events are
unlikely to occur during the next 3 decades. To explore
the foreign-policy consequences of such developments,
the third scenario projects the continued development
of the second scenario for the next 100 years. By
hypothesizing that rapid global warming will persist
throughout the 21st century, we can consider the effects
of a much more rapid loss of polar ice, a sea level rise of
more than one meter, a dramatic slowing or shutdown
of the North Atlantic overturning circulation, and
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massive die-offs of wet tropical forests in the Amazon
basin. Assessing the effects of abrupt climate change
is enlightening because, while communities often
find it harder to manage rapid change than gradual
transformations, this pattern is not universal. Sometime
abrupt shocks galvanize effective responses whereas
long-term trends can become lost in the background of
more pressing matters.
The 100-year worst case scenario described in the
chapter by Jim Woolsey is truly one of “cataclysmic
climate change.” It includes direct effects (e.g., rising
sea levels), secondary effects (e.g., mass migrations),
and tertiary effects (e.g., disruption of global oil
shipments) whose diverse interactions generate a
cascading wave of international security threats. The
author posits two positive feedback loops—“tipping
points”—the melting of tundra in Siberia and the
melting of the Western Antarctic ice cap. Trapped
within the Siberian tundra are roughly 500 billion tons
of carbon in the form of methane, which is 20 times
more potent as a greenhouse gas than CO2. The release
of this methane could provide a substantial catalyst to
the pace of climate change. Furthermore, the melting
of the Western Antarctic ice cap could cause sea levels
to rise many meters very rapidly.
In terms of physical impact, this sea-level rise could
transcend all others in the coming century. The sudden
and steady melting of ice sheets around the world
could lead to some 25 meters in sea-level rise and the
end of civilization as we know it. Even with only a 2m
rise, areas across the globe would be inundated, and
national governments would find it difficult to address
public policy issues beyond those promoting their own
salvation. For example, the U.S. Government would
face unprecedented levels of immigration. In addition,
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the U.S. military would find its reach severely reduced
by new logistical constraints and the need to respond to
many missions near U.S. borders. Many domestic and
overseas ports and harbors would become useless.
According to the author, climate change is a
“malignant” problem derived from nature, where
seemingly insignificant behavior can greatly increase
the chance of a “metastasis” in the system. Terrorism,
unlike climate change, is a “malevolent” problem,
driven by evil intentions. Yet, the world cannot ignore
either problem since climate change exacerbates
security concerns. The world’s energy infrastructure
remains highly vulnerable to the effects of climate
change and terrorist attack. For example, sea level
rise and chaotic weather patterns might interrupt oil
production. In addition, attacks by terrorist groups
might cause oil supply interruptions in exporting states
such as Saudi Arabia. Finally, terrorists might attack
the U.S. electricity infrastructure with a physical attack
or one involving electromagnetic pulse (EMP). An EMP
attack could cause unprecedented cascading failures of
the U.S. electric power infrastructure and cripple the
U.S. telecommunications, financial, agricultural, and
commercial infrastructures.
In addition to these three scenario chapters
and scientific background, two additional analytic
chapters help form the book. In one chapter,
Georgetown University historian John MacNeill
surveys past instances of major global environmental
transformations, and how communities and international politics were shaped by these events. This look
at historical lessons and their limits covers a wide
range of phenomena with persistent consequences,
including disease pandemics, natural disasters, and
resource shortages. These events may provide insight
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into how today’s and future societies may respond
to global climate change on a variety of levels. In the
last chapter, the policies and perceptions of the major
powers towards climate change will be analyzed,
including those of Europe, Russia, India, China, and
the United States.
With an abundance of new studies on the climate
change-national security nexus coming to fruition,
the areas of consensus and contention discussed at
this colloquium will continue to be topics ripe for
reexamination and further debate in the months and
years to come.
ENDNOTES - Weitz
1. Kurt M. Campbell, Jay Gulledge, J.R. McNeill, John Podesta,
Peter Ogden, Leon Fuerth, R. James Woolsey, Alexander T.J.
Lennon, Julianne Smith, Richard Weitz, and Derek Mix, The Age
of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications
of Global Climate Change, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, November 2007, available at www.cnas.org/
en/cms/?1278.
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General Wrap Up
(Comments from the Audience)
Comment Speaker 1: My name is Elizabeth
Leahy, and I work at Population Action International,
which is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in
Washington, DC. Based on our name, particularly
the first word, I think you can guess what our issue
is. We do research on global demographic trends,
and we advocate increased funding for international
family planning and reproductive health programs.
Amy Cohen, my colleague and boss, and I came to
this conference because we believe that population
and demographics are very important to all the issues
that we discussed over the past 2 days. Often when we
go to interdisciplinary conferences or meetings of this
nature, we have to spend a lot of time just convincing
our colleagues from other fields that population and
demographics are relevant and matter. I was gratified,
and maybe a little bit surprised, that we didn’t have to
do that so much this time. Many of the presenters have
discussed how countries’ national security, the impact
of climate change in specific countries and regions,
levels of effective governments, levels of development,
are all affected by demographics. I can see that the
presenters here are considering adapting more holistic
definitions of national security than I heard sometimes
in the past. Population is a dynamic issue, and many of
you seem to recognize that.
Maybe a bigger problem, unfortunately, is that
many decisionmakers do not realize that controlling
population can help solve many global problems. The
United States has consistently been the largest bilateral
funder of international family planning programs.
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For the fiscal year 2008 budget, it has been proposed
that those programs take a 25 percent cut. Part of the
rationale for that is that these programs have been
successful over decades in many developing countries;
and they have been. People are starting to talk more
about population aging these days, which is certainly a
genuine concern. However, we still have a world where
55 percent of the world’s population lives in countries
that are facing sustained population growth over time.
Our current population of 6.5 billion is projected to
hit 9 billion by 2050. I will not recite the whole litany
of statistics. Sometimes we are asked, “What can the
military do?” And in the past, we talked about the
military’s role in post-conflict situations including
humanitarian reconstruction, planning, and threat
assessment. I learned a lot over these past 2 days about
many of the noncombat roles of the military. Many
of the speakers have encouraged military integration
with other sectors, international organizations, other
agencies, and NGOs. I will just conclude by saying
that we are here to second that recommendation, and I
hope that we will continue to work together to develop
further opportunities for collaboration between our
sectors.
Comment Speaker 2: Richard Weitz’s idea of writing
a book doing some analysis of scenarios strikes me as
enormously useful. It is hard to do that in a conference,
but maybe at least a rough scenario might have kept
us a little bit better on-track. We did waffle around in
trying to figure out what national security was, and
that range expanded uncomfortably for me by the time
we were done. As a result, we spent a lot more time
talking about the U.S. military and what it could do
in what basically amounted to disaster relief than in
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dealing with global climate change in a more strategic
sense. As I said, disaster relief is a reactive thing that
we do now, but addressing the implications of national
security and global climate change is a strategic longrange process. Let’s face it, it is hard to get your hands
around something like that.
Comment Speaker 3: We hit-and-missed it
throughout the discussion, but consumption was a core
issue beyond just energy. We talked a little bit about
overfishing, we talked a little bit about the United States
being not only the largest producer of greenhouse
gases, but also the largest user of oil, and things like
that. However, when it comes to consumption across
the board—and that relates to the population issue
also—we did not stress enough the fact that, according
to some assessments, we are consuming about two
and a half planets more than what we’ve got. The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ascertained that
60 percent of our ecosystems are stressed and are
being overexploited right now. So all these different
environmental ecosystems are under intense pressure
right now, and then you throw in the additional stressor
of climate change, another one of those potential
tipping points. But at the core is consumption, being
led by the developed countries.
Comment Speaker 4: Let me second all of those
remarks, but especially those by Doug Johnson. We
can talk a lot about disaster relief, but there are several
problems. The first is that we might get stuck in places
longer than we like. But the larger thing is that, as
Doug says and as Tom Barnett and I worked out, we
are dealing with vertical scenarios versus horizontal
scenarios. This is a long-term process, with things
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happening along the way. Maybe there are incidents
the military gets into, but in that larger scope of things,
in the mitigation and the adaptation business, it is a
long incremental business.
Comment Speaker 5: Clearly, the evidence is out
there that, yes, global warming is happening, and, yes,
we need to address it—but how do you get the people
involved? It is easy in the Cold War to understand that
one nuclear bomb could ruin your day. But how do
you force this issue on the American people? Do we
bring back Burt the Turtle, the fellow who warned us
to duck and cover? I guess we don’t know, or no one
has put enough thought into finding out how best to
do this.
Comment Speaker 6: This ties in with the issue
of strategic communications raised by Hank Gaffney,
among others. The audience that we are primarily
talking about here has got to be the American people.
Governance also gets into it, leadership gets into it,
insight gets into it, and vision gets into it. We even
have to get to the point where we educate the American
people as opposed to alarming them. If we still have
skeptics, then there is something wrong with the
message that we have put out so far.
But I wanted to relate to the things said earlier about
the military. The impression that a lot of people still
have is that the military will only bow to pressure and
and will pay attention to the issue of climate change
only if you absolutely force it to. I would suggest to
you that the kind of mindset that leads young men or
women to join the U.S. military is the kind of mindset
that will be open to the idea that they must protect
their society by protecting their environment. What
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you have to do is convince the military that what you
are saying is correct. It is easier to do this when your
leadership also tells you that, to be sure. But once
you get the military on board, you will find no better
proponent of the cause. No one better follows the rules
or sets a better example on how to make sacrifices for
the greater good.
Comment Speaker 7: I just want to say that when
we talk about spending more time engaged in longterm deployments, it isn’t us who will be going. It is
our kids. Just remember that. I have a son in Baghdad
right now; I would just as soon he not be there.
Comment Speaker 8: You were talking about the
strategic communication problem, and I would like to
say that I come away from this conference really quite
impressed and amazed to find that this conversation is
taking place among the military establishment at all,
and especially at this level of sophistication. Yes, there
is a lot we still need to figure out. What exactly is the
potential mission here? Exactly what kind of forces
could we deploy? What kind of resources do we want
to put in? All this still needs to be worked out.
But this conversation is much more advanced than I
certainly came here expecting it was going be or hoped
it could be. This is good news for two reasons: First,
because you provide a message of national security
and climate change, which has not been a major part
of the broader public conversation at all. And second,
because you represent a set of messengers that carry
great weight and great credibility, with a lot of different
audiences that most of the rest of the public doesn’t ever
hear from. And I think that you have got to understand
how important the work that is being done here by all
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of you, and your colleagues that are not here, really
could be. You open entrees into communicating and
convincing people who would never listen to an
environmentalist, or an academic scientist, or even,
say, a religious person. I think this particular nexus is
really important at this point in the evolution of the
debate.
Comment Speaker 9: I would like to pick up on
something that Richard Weitz said. We still need to
figure out how all this fits in with the war on terror
and all the other challenges. The difficulty is that those
people who do not want to talk about climate change
are going to try to distract us by talking about the
war on terror, or China, or some other threat. If you
list the threats facing us, depending on the nature of
the conversation, climate change can come out fourth,
eighth, or even 26th. The fact of the matter is that all
these challenges are different from each other, and
they are different from what we thought they were
over the last 50-60 years. We cannot come up with a
simple message—like we are dealing with Godless
communism. And it is hard for us to articulate the
nature of the threat. We need climate change zealots,
I suppose, as we need zealots for all good issues.
However, those who deal in national security don’t
get to eliminate any of them just because they are not
of concern. They have to prioritize within the context
of all the threats to the country, and we need to make
sure we make that argument in such a way that it is
high enough up that list to be useful.
Comment Speaker 10: Richard, I thought you did
a good job of summarizing. However, I would like to
comment on two concerns raised over the last day and
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a half that you did not mention. One is what I would
call a minor concern, and the other one is more of a
major concern.
The minor concern is this: I heard a number of
people say, “We have the truth. We have the message.
We understand, but we need to convince the leadership.
How do we do that?” I would suggest to you that you
are the leadership. You run the risk of falling into the
pothole thinking you have to commit to somebody else
who is in a leadership position. If you are not careful,
if we are not careful, that can become a “that is not
my job” syndrome, and we really need to watch that.
Because I think there is more need for leadership here
in addressing this issue than you perhaps are prepared
to accept and recognize. That is the minor concern.
The second concern I also heard from a lot of
speakers—and I tend to agree with this—is that
the successful solutions here are going to require
cooperation and coordination with a whole lot of
different people from a whole lot of different cultures,
backgrounds, and experiences, who have different
agendas, goals, and purposes in life. And there was
a legitimate mystery as to “how do we do that?” I
think we all have experienced trying to work in those
environments and in those cultures, and we have come
away, most of the time, frustrated with our inability to
achieve any sort of reasonable goal or success. That, to
me, seems to be one of the underlying requirements of
success in this area that I think is going to be a major
hurdle. How do we get all these disparate folks moving
in the same general direction?
Comment Speaker 11: Just an observation. The
center that I direct works fairly closely with the
military, and has for some time. It also works with
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other groups, including a group of business leaders in
California, a couple of other parts of the government,
and a good part of the environmental community. One
of the things I noticed over the past decade is that the
military is developing a critical mass of knowledge and
expertise. This has given it clarity on these issues that
these other groups do not have. I am starting to see
the clearest discussions, the most informed discussions
about bird flu, or environmental change, or climate
change, often taking place in environments which have
a large military presence.
Now, as Bert Tussing made clear, the military
is there to support, not to lead, in a wide range of
activities. In some instances this was very clear to me.
I participated in the Mark IV PAC exercise to develop
a plan for bird flu. It was clear that there was a lot of
expertise at hand: these people were well-briefed on the
issue. They understood the issue, they were prepared
to discuss it, and they were very pragmatic about what
they needed to do. The State Department was clearly
confused about the issue, unsure about it, and very
hesitant. I wonder if maybe we are getting to a point
where the knowledge is shifting into this part of our
governance structure in a way that is not going be that
easy to transfer over.
So I think it is important that we do what we can to
communicate to these other groups, “We are taking this
seriously. We are no longer bogged down in debates
over whether this, or what that. We are moving to the
next generation of discussion.” So while I am very
impressed by the clarity that the military has brought
to these issues, I find it rather disconcerting that other
parts of our country have not achieved that level of
clarity at this point, including elected officials.
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Comment Speaker 12: This brings up a very
important point. If you all can go back and carry this
banner, then do so. You should be asking, “How do
we train our government officials, particularly our
strategic leadership?” And the answer is, outside of the
five-sided wind tunnel, not very well. This is, I think,
because a significant sector of the U.S. Government
thinks that time spent on education is time wasted. It
is very easy for the military to be coy from time to time
and talk about the effort that we put towards strategy.
After all, we have the people to do it and the people
who have been trained to do it. And we talk about how
other people ought to be taking up the educational issue
so that they can rise from the tactical to operational
to strategic mindset. However, we are living in a
world that is growing more and more complex. And
we cannot afford not to develop our leaders in every
branch of our government. Not just our military. We
must instill that notion.
Weitz: May I interrupt this just one second? Jim
Hanson testified before Congress, I think it was
Monday, and he listed a number of steps that we can
take to mitigate global warming, and he concluded,
“But the most important step you can take, gentlemen,
is campaign finance reform.”
Comment Speaker 13: Well, when we talk about
leadership right now, the primary concern of the
Prime Minister of Iraq is not climate change. We have a
bunch of four stars who have very, very full plates, and
tend to have very limited horizons as far as their crisis
management is concerned, so it is difficult to get them
to look 15, 20, 50, or 100 years down the road. That
said, Al Gore did put forward to the U.S. Government
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a proposal to create a future-focused planning and
evaluation body. I believe it exists in law, even though
I think there are zero bodies occupying the place, and
it is probably not funded.
Closing - Alex Roland.
On behalf of the Triangle Institute for Security
Studies, we would like to thank our host, the U.S. Army
War College, and our various sponsors—the Army
Environmental Policy Institute, Creative Associates, the
Center for Global Change Institute, Nicholas Institute
for Environmental Policy Solutions, the Environmental
Change and Securities Program, the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, and the Department
of Environmental Sciences at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. And thanks to our summarizer,
Richard Weitz. We are adjourned.

429

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
JOHN T. ACKERMAN is an Assistant Professor
of National Security Studies at the Air Command
and Staff College (ACSC), Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama. A retired lieutenant colonel of the U.S. Air
Force, He is also the Research Course Director for the
ACSC Department of Distance Learning. His research
efforts have included exploration into the relationships
between sustainability and security, the international
relations implications of global climate change, and
the national security ramifications of global warming.
Besides his published dissertation on Global Climate
Change: Catalyst for International Relations Disequilibria
(2004), Dr. Ackerman has written a number of papers
and reviews, most recently, “Climate Change, National
Security and the Quadrennial Defense Review:
Avoiding the Perfect Storm,” Strategic Studies Quarterly,
Spring 2008. Dr. Ackerman’s doctorate in Political
Science is from the University of Alabama.
JOSHUA BUSBY is an Assistant Professor at the Lyndon
B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University
of Texas, Austin. Prior to coming to UT, Dr. Busby
was a research fellow at the Center for Globalization
and Governance at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson
School (2005-06), the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard’s JFK School (200405), and the Foreign Policy Studies program at the
Brookings Institution (2003-04). He has a long-standing
research interest in climate change with articles on
the topic appearing in Current History, among other
publications. Dr. Busby is the author of a 2007 Council
on Foreign Relations special report on climate change
and national security. A scholarly piece, “Who Cares

431

about the Weather? Climate Change and U.S. National
Security,” will be published in Security Studies in 2008.
His doctorate is from Georgetown University.
KENT HUGHES BUTTS is Director of the National
Security Issues Branch, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College. Dr. Butts has served as
a strategic analyst in the Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, and taught at the U.S.
Military Academy. He has also been a John M. Olin
Postdoctoral Fellow in National Security at the Center
for International Affairs, Harvard University. He has
authored and edited a number of books. In a 1998 work,
Environmental Security: A DoD Partnership for Peace,
he looked at how international environmental issues
can lead to instability and conflict that threaten U.S.
security interests and may result in the commitment
of U.S. forces. More recently, he has written on how to
combat terrorism. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from
the University of Washington and is also a graduate
of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
and the U.S. Army War College.
ROBERT W. CORELL is the Global Change Director of
the Heinz Center. Before coming to The Heinz Center
in 2006, he served as a Senior Policy Fellow at the Policy
Program of the American Meteorological Society and an
Affiliate of the Washington Advisory Group. Dr. Corell
is engaged in research concerned with the sciences of
global change and the interface between science and
public policy. He co-chairs an international strategic
planning group that is developing a strategy designed
to harness science, technology, and innovation for
sustainable development, serves as the Chair of
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, counsels as

432

Senior Science Advisor to ManyOne.Net, and is Chair
of the Board of the Digital Universe Foundation. An
oceanographer and engineer by background and
training, he holds degrees (including a doctorate) from
Case Western Reserve University and MIT.
ROBERT H. DORFF is currently Research Professor of
National Security Studies, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College. Immediately prior to this, he
was Senior Advisor for Democracy, Governance, and
Civilian Military Relations for Creative Associates
International, Inc., a globally-engaged, international
consulting company. He worked extensively with
their “Security and Development Initiative,” focusing
on strategic approaches and policies that bridge the
civilian-military gap in addressing the challenges of
post-conflict and transitioning societies. Dr. Dorff is
the author or co-author of three books and numerous
journal articles, many of which focus on U.S. national
security strategy, democratization and failed states,
and peace support operations. Professor Dorff holds a
Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill.
GREGORY M. DOUQUET (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps)
holds a Fellowship at the Royal College of Defence
Studies in London where he is pursuing a dissertation
on national security implications of climate change in
the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. Professionally,
Colonel Douquet holds dual specializations in strategic
planning and in aviation operations. Prior to his
fellowship, he served as a planner for future operations
in Iraq for the Marine Corps. He has served two tours
of duty in Iraq and was involved in the evacuation
of noncombatants from Liberia in 1989; planning the

433

1999 United Nations Peacekeeping mission in East
Timor, Indonesia; and leading a detachment tasked
with recovering the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, in
2000. Colonel Douquet also served as a presidential
helicopter pilot and White House Liaison Officer
and completed a headquarters tour with U.S. Marine
Corps, Plans, Programs, and Operations.
HENRY H. GAFFNEY, JR. is a senior analyst at the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), which produced a
major study of climate change and national security
on April 18, 2007. He has been at CNA since 1990,
specializing in broad studies of the evolving world
security environment, to include the future of U.S.
defense and the national security implications of
energy and climate issues. Prior to joining the CNA
Corporation, Dr. Gaffney served for 28 years in the
Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense. He worked for
more than 12 years on NATO matters, for 2 years as
Director of the Near East and South Asia office, and
for most of the 1980s as the Director of Plans in the
Defense Security Assistance Agency. He served as an
officer in the U.S. Navy from 1956 to 1959. Dr. Gaffney
received his doctorate from Columbia University.
DAVID GILMARTIN is Professor of History at North
Carolina State University. He was a Fellow at the
National Humanities Center, 2001-02. He teaches
courses on Asian history, the modern history of India,
the history of European imperialism, the history of
Islam in the modern world, and 20th century world
history. He is the author of Empire and Islam: Punjab
and the Making of Pakistan, University of California
Press, 1988; and Beyond Turk and Hindu: Rethinking
Religious Identities in Islamic South Asia, edited with

434

Bruce B. Lawrence, University Press of Florida, 2000.
His most recent research focuses on the history of
water control in the Indus Basin region, the heartland
of the modern state of Pakistan, and on the historical
relationship between local community, the state, and
the environment. He holds a Ph.D. from the University
of California, Berkeley.
MICHAEL H. GLANTZ is Director of the new Center
for Capacity Building at the National Center for
Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado.
He is interested in how climate affects society and how
society affects climate, especially in Africa. Recently,
his research has focused on how to forecast possible
societal responses to the regional impacts of climate
change. He has taught at the University of Colorado,
University of Pennsylvania, Lafayette College, and
Swarthmore College. In 1983 he became the first (and
still the only) social scientist to become an NCAR Senior
Scientist. In March 1990 he received the prestigious
“Global 500” award from the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). He is the author of
many works, including Climate Affairs: A Primer, Island
Press, 2003. He has a B.S. in Metallurgical Engineering
and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of
Pennsylvania.
KAREN LESLEY HULME is Senior Lecturer in the
Law Department at the University of Essex, United
Kingdom. She currently teaches courses on public
international law, international law of armed conflict,
law of evidence, and tort law. Her research interests
are in public international law, the laws of armed
conflict, international environmental law, and the law
of evidence. Her dissertation examined the protection

435

of the environment in times of armed conflict. She
is the author of a number of articles and War Torn
Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, which was
the winner of the 2004 American Society of International
Law Lieber Prize. Her doctorate is from the University
of Essex, United Kingdom.
DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II has been with the Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, since 1985,
first as Strategic Research Analyst and then as Research
Professor of National Security Affairs. His 30 years of
service in the U.S. Army included two combat tours, a
variety of troop and staff assignments, and instructor
duty at the U.S. Military Academy and the School
of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. His areas of expertise include Army
transformation; futures; military history (especially
World War I and military doctrine); civil-military
relations; Just War theory and practice; and media.
He has edited, authored, and co-authored eight books
on these topics. In 2001 he co-authored a book with
Steven Metz on Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy:
Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts. He holds
a Ph.D. in History from Temple University.
PAUL J. KERN (General, U.S. Army-Ret.) was the
Commanding General, Army Materiel Command
(2001-04) and is now Senior Counselor at the Cohen
Group and advises the CNA Climate Change and Security Study. Prior to his command at AMC, he served
as the military deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and
was the senior military advisor to the Army Acquisition
Executive and the Army Chief of Staff on all research,
development, and acquisition programs and related

436

issues. General Kern also served in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and in several field units. He had
three combat tours, including two in Vietnam, and one
in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. He
holds Masters’ Degrees in both Civil and Mechanical
Engineering from the University of Michigan, and he
was a Senior Security Fellow at the John F. Kennedy
School at Harvard University.
RICHARD J. KILROY, JR., is Professor of International
Studies and Political Science at Virginia Military
Institute in Lexington, Virginia. At the time of the
conference, he was Assistant Director of Military
Programs at East Carolina University. He retired from
the U.S. Army in 2004, after 23 years of active duty
service as a military intelligence and Latin American
foreign area officer. He was also involved in standing
up the U.S. Northern Command as the military’s
response to 9/11 and supporting the homeland defense
mission. Dr. Kilroy is the editor of Threats to Homeland
Security: An All Hazards Perspective, J. Wiley and Sons,
2007. Dr. Kilroy holds a Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from
the University of Virginia.
ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ is Director of the Yale
Project on Climate Change and a Research Scientist at
the School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at
Yale University. He is also a principal investigator at
the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions
at Columbia University. He is a widely recognized
expert on American and international public opinion
on global warming, including public perception of
climate change risks, support and opposition for
climate policies, and willingness to make individual
behavioral change. His research investigates the

437

psychological, cultural, political, and geographic
factors that drive public environmental perception
and behavior. He has published over two dozen
articles, chapters, and reports, including, “American
risk perceptions: Is climate change dangerous?” Risk
Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2005, pp. 1433-1442. He earned
a Ph.D. in Environmental Science, Studies, and Policy
from the University of Oregon.
RICHARD A. MATTHEW is Director of the Center
for Unconventional Security Affairs and Associate
Professor of International and Environmental Politics
in the Schools of Social Ecology and Social Science at
the University of California, Irvine. He is also a member
of UNEP’s Expert Advisory Group on Environment,
Conflict and Peacebuilding; the Senior Fellow for
Security at the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD); a member of the World Conservation Union’s Commission on Environmental,
Economic, and Social Policy; and a member of the
Homeland Security Advisory Council (Region 1).
His research explores ways in which conservation
and sustainable development can be designed and
implemented to reduce violence and insecurity in
different settings. He is the author of many books, coedited books, and articles including Contested Grounds:
Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics,
SUNY Press, 1999. His doctorate is from Princeton
University.
TIMOTHY J. MCKEOWN is Professor of Political
Science at the University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill. He has also taught at Carnegie-Mellon and Duke.
Professor McKeown’s current research investigates
foreign aid programs and the practice of conditionality

438

and soft influence strategies; government research
and development subsidies as a trade-promoting
strategy; industrial structure and foreign economic
policy. Methodologically, he continues to work on
developing the theory and methods of qualitative
research, especially the systematic observation of
archival material. He is the co-author with Leonard
Lynn of Organizing Business-Trade Associations in the
U.S. and Japan, American Enterprise Institute, 1988;
and co-editor (with Dan Caldwell) of Diplomacy, Force
and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George,
Westview, 1993. He holds a doctorate from Stanford
University.
E. THOMAS MOREHOUSE, JR., is an adjunct at
the Institute for Defense Analyses (1994-present)
and consults a number of companies and research
institutions, such as the CNA Corporation. The
confluence of climate, security, and energy issues has
been a focus of his work for over 15 years. He was the
principal author of two Defense Science Board reports
that showed capability and cost improvements by
reducing battlefield fuel burden. He also assessed the
carbon benefits of Federal investments in a wide range
of technologies to mitigate global climate change. His
current work includes developing military responses
to address the national security implications of
predicted global climate changes caused by elevated
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. He is
the co-editor, with Philippe G. Le Prestre and John D.
Reid, of Protecting the Ozone Layer: Lessons, Models, and
Prospects, Kluwer, 1998. He holds an M.S. in Mechanical
Engineering from Boston University.

439

WILLIAM L. NASH (Major General, U.S. ArmyRet.) has been with the Council on Foreign Relations
since March 2001. A veteran of Vietnam, Operation
DESERT STORM, and 34 years of Army service, he
has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations
both as the commander of the 1st Armored Division in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and as a civil administrator for the
United Nations in Kosovo. In addition to his duties at
the Council on Foreign Relations, Major General Nash
is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, a
visiting lecturer at Princeton University, and a military
consultant to ABC News.
CAROLYN PUMPHREY has served as Program and
Outreach Coordinator for the Triangle Institute for
Security Studies since 2000 and also teaches history at
North Carolina State University. From 1997-2000, she
was a Post-Doctoral Fellow for the Triangle Institute
for Security Studies, and between 1986 and 1992 she
was an Assistant Professor of History at Spring Hill
College (Mobile, Alabama). She has taught a wide
range of classes dealing with war and peace in the
Middle Ages and has edited three books, Transnational
Threats: Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strategies,
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
November 2000; The Rise of China: Security Implications,
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
January 2002; and with Rye Schwartz-Barcott, Armed
Conflict in Africa, Scarecrow Press, August 2003. She
holds a doctorate from Duke University.
ANDREW PRICE-SMITH is Assistant Professor
Political Science at Colorado College and Director
the Project on Energy, Environment and Security
Colorado College. He held previous appointments

440

of
of
at
at

both the Earth Institute and School of International
and Public Affairs of Columbia University, and the
University of South Florida. Dr. Price-Smith’s published
works include The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease,
Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National
Security and Development, MIT, 2001; and Contagion
and Chaos, MIT, forthcoming 2008. He has served as a
consultant to the United States Institute of Peace, the
United Nations Development Program, the World
Bank, and the U.S. Department of Energy. He earned
his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of
Toronto.
SIMON RICH is the former Chairman and CEO of
Louis Dreyfus Natural Gas and President of Louis
Dreyfus Holding Corporation; the Louis Dreyfus
Group holds a global position in all areas of energy
and agriculture including production, processing,
and merchandising. He is also former chairman
and emeritus member of the board of visitors of the
Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences
at Duke University, and teaches courses in Energy and
Environment within the school. He is chairman of
Environmental Defense in North Carolina, chairman
of the Center for Environmental Farming Systems, the
largest sustainable agriculture program in the United
States, and a member of the Governor’s Energy Policy
Commission. Mr. Rich is on the board of Triangle
Capital Corporation, a business development company
operating throughout the southeast; Verenium, a
cellulosic ethanol developer and enzyme production
company; and he is a member of Cherokee Investment
Fund’s Sustainability Advisory Board. Mr. Rich is a
1967 graduate of Duke University.

441

JAMES A. ROTENBERG is Assistant Professor of
Tropical Ecology at the University of North Carolina,
Wilmington. His course on Global Environmental
Studies focuses on several major current issues,
including global warming. In 1998, he was awarded the
J. William Fulbright Scholar to Guatemala. His primary
research interest is tropical avian ecology, using birds
as environmental research projects in Mexico, Belize,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, California, and North Carolina.
He received his Ph.D. in Biology from the University of
California, Riverside.
WILLIAM SCHLESINGER is President of the Cary
Institute of Ecosystem Studies. Before assuming this
position in June 2007, he was James B. Duke Professor
of Biogeochemistry, and Dean of the Nicholas School
of the Environment and Earth Sciences at Duke
University. He is the author or co-author of over 160
scientific papers and the widely-adopted textbook,
Biogeochemistry: An Analysis of Global Change, Academic
Press, 1997. He was elected a member of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1995 and The National
Academy of Sciences in 2003. He was President of the
Ecological Society of America for 2003-04. Currently,
his research focuses on global change ecology. Dr.
Schlesinger has testified before U.S. House and Senate
Committees on a variety of environmental issues,
including preservation of desert habitats and global
climate change. His Ph.D. is from Cornell.

442

CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER is Charles S.
Murphy Professor of Law and Professor of Public
Policy Studies, and Director of the Program in Public
Law at Duke University. His areas of research and
scholarship include environmental and administrative
law, democratic theory, legislative institutions, and
separation of powers. He has written and taught about
the regulation of toxic substances, the performance of
American environmental policy and the philosophy
of environmental protection, and is the author with
Percival, Miller, and Leape of Environmental Regulation:
Law, Science and Policy, now into its fifth edition (Aspen
Publishers, 2006). He has served as Acting Assistant
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel at the
Department of Justice and holds a J.D. from University
of California, Berkeley.
DAVID A. SHEETS is a Senior Fellow with the Army
Environmental Policy Institute, assisting the Army
Secretariat in developing proactive policies and
strategies to address emerging environmental, safety,
and occupational health issues (ESOH) that may have
significant impact on Army operational readiness. Mr.
Sheets is responsible for sustainable energy initiatives
and identifying future contaminants and munitions
constituents of importance to the Army, to include
nanoparticles and heavy metals. He is also responsible
for several other initiatives, such as green chemistry
and for improving the management of environmental
cleanup. Mr. Sheets holds an MS in Environmental
Health Engineering from the University of Texas at
Austin and is a Licensed Professional Engineer in the
State of Minnesota.

443

MARVIN S. SOROOS is Professor Emeritus of Political
Science at North Carolina State University (Raleigh,
North Carolina), where he has taught courses on global
problems and policies and international law since 1970.
Dr. Soroos has also been a pioneer in the field of global
environmental politics, which has been his principal
teaching and research interest since the mid-1970s.
With David Orr, he co-edited an early book in the field
entitled The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives
on World Order, University of North Carolina Press,
1979. He is also the author of Beyond Sovereignty: The
Challenge of Global Policy, University of South Carolina
Press, 1986; and The Endangered Atmosphere: Preserving
a Global Commons, University of South Carolina Press,
1997. His doctorate is from Northwestern University.
DENNIS TÄNZLER is a research fellow at Adelphi
Research, an independent, non-profit institute that
develops and implements innovative sustainable
development strategies based in Berlin, Germany.
His research focuses on climate and energy policies
as well as on peace and conflict studies. In February
2007 he joined the Policy Planning Unit of the German
Foreign Office as an expert on climate and energy
policies. He has 10 years of experience in international
environmental policy, European environmental
policy and policy integration, and climate change
and institutional aspects of environment, conflict, and
cooperation. He has published widely on international
affairs and environmental policy. He is the program
director on the environment, conflict and cooperation
platform (www.ecc-platform.org). He holds degrees in
political science as well as in North American Studies,
Cultural Sciences.

444

BERT B. TUSSING is Director, Homeland Defense and
Security Issues, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S.
Army War College. He is a senior fellow with George
Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy
Institute, the University of California, Irvine’s Center
for Unconventional Security Affairs, and Long Island
University’s Homeland Security Management Institute,
and serves on the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols
task force examining the government’s response to
catastrophic events. While in the U.S. Marine Corps, he
participated in multiple humanitarian relief exercises,
served as Marine Corps Analyst to the Secretary of
the Navy and as Deputy Legislative Assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His publications
include (with Antulio J. Echevarria) From “Defending
Forward” to a “Global Defense in Depth”: Globalization
and Homeland Security, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.
Professor Tussing holds a Master’s Degree in National
Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War
College and in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army
War College.
SPENCER R. WEART is Director of the Center for
History of Physics of the American Institute of Physics
(AIP) in College Park, Maryland. Originally trained
as a physicist, he is now a noted historian specializing
in the history of modern physics and geophysics.
He has written numerous articles and authored or
co-edited seven books, most recently The Discovery
of Global Warming, Harvard University Press, 2003
(revised edition in press). He has completed a variety
of educational projects and has taught undergraduate
and graduate courses on history of science at The Johns
Hopkins University, the Eugene Lang College of the
New School in New York City, and Princeton University.

445

He earned a Ph.D. in Physics and Astrophysics at the
University of Colorado, Boulder, as well as a graduate
degree from the University of California, Berkeley, in
History.
ERIKA WEINTHAL is Associate Professor of Environmental Policy, Environmental Sciences and Policy
Division at the Nicholas School of Environment, Duke
University. She specializes in global environmental
politics and natural resource policies with a particular
emphasis on water and energy. The main focus of her
research is the origins and effects of environmental
institutions. She has written over a dozen articles in
scholarly journals including, with others, “The Water
Crisis in the Gaza Strip: Prospects for Remediation,”
Ground Water, Vol. 43, 2005, pp. 653-660; and is the
author of the prize winning book, State Making and
Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic and
International Politics in Central Asia, MIT, 2002. She holds
a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
RICHARD WEITZ is a Senior Fellow and Director,
Project Management at Hudson Institute. He is
currently collaborating with the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) on a study of climate
change and security. Dr. Weitz analyzes mid- and
long-term national and international political-military
issues, including employing scenario-based planning.
He is the author of Revitalising US–Russian Security
Cooperation: Practical Measures, International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers 377, 2005; and has
published widely in journals and internet publications.
He holds graduate degrees from the London School of
Economics (M.Sc. in International Relations), Oxford
University (M.Phil. in Politics), and Harvard University
(Ph.D. in Political Science).
446

